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This work is concerned with discovering what kind of assertions can be
meaningfully made about a literary work. That is, specifically, in what
ways and to what extent the tradition of literary theory is or is not
consistent with the aesthetic nature of literature, and where the limits
of such a 'consistent' interpretation are to be drawn. This has involved
both a consideration of certain traditional hermeneutical problems within
criticism, and also an outline of what I believe to be the nature of the
aesthetic per se. I have paid particular attention to metaphor, as a model
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A critic may with advantage seize an occasion for trying his
own conscience, and for asking himself of what real service, at
any given moment, the practice of criticism either is, or may be
made, to his own mind and spirit, and to the minds and spirits
of others.
Matthew Arnold
This work is concerned with certain problems in the description and
treatment of literature, principally within literary theory and criticism,
but also in a more general context, that is, wherever a definition of
literature is called, explicitly or implicitly, into play. All of the
problems which I shall deal with are perennial ones, the reader will no
doubt have read the contents with a feeling of familiarity, but what I
intend to show is that they are all interconnected, that they are, in
fact, all aspects of a single problem - the application of£consistent a.
notion of the aesthetic to the literary work. That a 'consistent notion of
the aesthetic' exists is one premiss of this thesis, that it is
continually on the point of realization within the tradition of writing on
literature, and continually, for a variety of reasons, left unrealized, by
that tradition, is another. To this extent my work has been simply a
matter of connecting previously remote areas of this tradition, of
discovering what it has left out, or what it leaves over, of drawing
implications. (Hence the apparently excessive use of quotation here,
producing what seems, at times, almost a parody of the thesis 'style'.) In
one sense, then, this work is concerned with the compatibility of beliefs.
I have begun with metaphor because, as will emerge, metaphor provides




But it is just this technical formulation, which reveals the truth to
our understanding, that conceals it once again from our feelings; for
unfortunately the understanding must first destroy the objects of
the inner sense before it can appropriate them. Like the chemist,
the philosopher finds combination only through dissolution, and the
work of spontaneous Uature only through the torture of Art. In order
to seize the fleeting appearance he must bind it in the fetters of
rule, dissect its fair body into abstract notions, and preserve its
living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder if
natural feeling does not recognize itself in such a likeness, and if
truth appears in the analyst's report as paradox.
Schiller
M e? t.«»p» l~io r»
'There is', writes Montaigne, 'more ado to interpret interpretations
than to interpret things; and more books upon books than upon any other
subject; we do nothing but comment upon one another.'.1 Three hundred
years later we find even in the field of literary studies not only works
of criticism, that is, books upon books, and works of literary theory, or
books about books about books, but also works on literary theory, or
books about books about books about books. It begins to sound like the
refrain from a nursery rhyme. I would defend the present essay, however,
by stating that it is, firstly, about a part of language - metaphor - and,
secondly, an act - interpretation. But why should I feel in need of a
defence? Disparaging though Montaigne's comment seems, a few sentences
later he is speaking of how our opinions 'are grafted upon one another;
the first serves as a stock to the second, the second to the third, and
so forth; thus step by step we climb the ladder', presumably to
comprehension.2 This may be so, nevertheless this essay is cast in a form
which I feel I need to defend, even if only to myself.
The source of my misgivings is this, that the present study is, to my
mind, full, one might say 'stuffed', with quotations and references. In the
essay quoted above, Montaigne goes on to discuss the use of 'foreign and
scholastic examples' and asks if they are so much used because 'we seek
more honour from the quotation, than from the truth of the matter in
hand?'.3 His own essay is replete with quotations from Plutarch, Tacitus,
Plato, Seneca, Quintilian, Aristotle, Propertius, Cicero, Virgil, Martial,
Horace, Juvenal, Ovid, and others, quotations that often simply repeat
what he has previously said in his own words. (The title of the essay is
'Of Experience'!) Yet there may be many reasons for using quotations. They
can lead the reader gently to a subject through something of subsidiary
and intrinsic interest, as, hopefully, my use of Montaigne has done here.
They may be summarizing, as many of Montaigne's are; a function to which
the brevity of Latin is well suited. They may be essential to the
integrity of the argument, as in scientific papers. It may be that they
express something which you yourself wish to say but cannot say as well,
or summarize a position more succinctly than a paraphrase could. But they
can also be used as mere ostentation, the seeking after 'honour V-* I have
used them for all these reasons, including the last; for as a piece of
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research it must appear as a piece of research. (Quotations can also be
used as an argumentum ad verecundiam, but this is an argument beneath
contempt.) This leads us, however, to another conundrum; if you are
familiar with the literature to which I refer then it is unnecessary for
me to refer to it, if you are not then you must trust me not to
misrepresent it, and if you will trust me thus far why not simply trust
me to talk sense on my own account? (Reason wants not Johnson to support
it.) But let us separate this into two questions, so that there will be no
confusion; firstly the necessity of research, secondly, its display.
Apropos the first question, one might ask how one can know, in advance of
doing research, whether anything one wants to say has not already been
said, that is, whether one's own work is not going to be redundant? One
discovers whether or not this is the case primarily from the tone of
contemporary discussions of the subject, but also from the advice of
those who are familiar with the subject; it is not so great an obstacle
as it appears. One can write a synthesis, but a synthesis which is not
underpinned with the writer's own convictions quickly becomes little more
than a colourless resume. I inadvertently overcame this problem by
writing the whole essay originally without benefit of research, so that
the subsequent research became organized around the undermining,
modifying, or expanding of conclusions which I had already come to. If I
could have found those conclusions, or the answers to the questions which
those conclusions raised, in any of the works on metaphor which I have
used, then I would not have bothered to write this essay. Bacon, in his
essay 'Of Studies', writes that one should read 'not to contradict and
confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and
discourse; but to weigh and consider.' and this, I believe, is very sound
advice, except I would add that if one's aim is to write on the same
subject then one should read also 'to improve upon'.s As to the display of
one's researches, here there are three considerations to be made; firstly,
it is good manners to acknowledge a debt, and justice to fairly represent
what one indicts, secondly, by comparing and contrasting my own views
with existing writings I place the reader in a position to judge to what
extent what I have to say is novel, and, thirdly, and perhaps most
importantly, since my own reading in the subject largely progressed by
way of the footnotes and bibliographies of existing works it would seem




Men do not know the natural disease of the mind; it does nothing
but ferret and inquire, and it is eternally wheeling, juggling,
and perplexing itself like silkworms, and then suffocates itself
in its work...It thinks it discovers at a great distance, I know
not what glimpse of light and imaginary truth; but whilst
running to it, so many difficulties, hindrances and new
inquisitions cross it, that it loses its way, and is made drunk
with the motion : not much unlike Aesop's dogs, that seeing
something like a dead body floating in the sea, and not being
able to approach it, set to work to drink the water and lay the
passage dry, and so choked themselves ,e
Mow that I have satisfied myself as to the form of this essay, why does
this passage from Montaigne make me pause? Could the research and its
inclusion be represented by the sea, a sea that will choke me before I
reach my quarry? Even apart from this resemblance the application of the
simile contains all sorts of unflattering comparisons; the goal of the
intellectual endeavour is represented by a corpse, the inquirer by a pack
of dogs. Even the word 'quarry', meaning an object of pursuit, is, after
all, etymologically derived from the Latin for 'skin', and its use might
therefore presume the destruction of the object of pursuit. Ve could
remember here how Schiller, in the epigraph to this essay, speaks of the
understanding destroying 'the objects of the inner sense before it can
appropriate them.'. Is the analogy, however, a fair one? For though I have
at times during the writing of this essay felt quite overwhelmed by the
literature on the subject, given that we are discussing language and the
description of language, the literature on metaphor is not something
separate from the metaphor in the way that our figurative body is
separate from our figurative sea; that is, the water is a route rather
than an obstacle. But still the image is troubling, for how we see a thing
depends very much on what we see it through. This is the subject of the
present essay.
- 7 -
M cb t. Si p-ihio r-
The Problem of Metaphor
Perhaps the oddest thing about the problem of metaphor is that
outside of its discussion in poetics, or philosophy, or linguistics, that
is, outside the discussion of it as a problem, it is not a problem at all.
Montaigne wrote that when one heard 'talk of metonomies, metaphors, and
allegories, and other grammar words' one was apt to think of 'some rare
and exotic form of speaking' though they in fact describe 'phrases that
are no better than the chatter of my chambermaid.'.7 Vhile researching
this essay I decided to turn my recreational reading to good use by
looking out for metaphors which I might use as examples or test cases in
this chapter. After a short time, however, I had to give up, for my
'recreational' reading had ceased to be that and had become a difficult
task, demanding more than usual concentration! The difficulty lay not in
trying to analyze such metaphors as I discovered, but rather in finding
them at all, for simply remembering to register metaphors turned the most
fluid and easy text into something quite different. This experience
impressed on me from the beginning of my study two related facts about
metaphor; firstly that metaphor is so far a part of 'ordinary' language
that it is not something we are generally used to contrasting with non-
metaphorical language, that is, it does not 'stand out', and secondly, as a
corollary to this, in the vast majority of examples our comprehension of
what the metaphor means is spontaneous, we are not aware of being
presented with a problem. There is no 'problem of metaphor', then, in this
sense; the problem of metaphor is the problem of its formal description -
nothing more. For to describe our comprehension of the meaning of
metaphor as 'spontaneous' is to describe the speed of that comprehension
not its nature, just as when scientists claimed that mice could be
'spontaneously generated' from heaps of corn or drawers full of old
shirts they demonstrated only their own ignorance. Yet description and,
indeed, interpretation is an unrewarding task unless undertaken for one's
own pleasure; the layman, who is aware of no problem to begin with, is
apt to respond to a solution to that problem with "Yes, Of course. So?".
But it is not always obvious why the obvious is such, and to make it so,
to express what was oft, but confusedly, thought, is the raison d'etre of
a study such as this. The purpose of this essay, then, is neither to
recount a discovery, except in so far as interpretation is discovery, nor
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to invent the gratuitous, but rather to make explicit in abstract terms
what is implicit in the very use of metaphor in concrete instances.
Metaphor ranges from the familiar and prosaic, 'Man is a wolf', which
produces little more than a mental shrug, to the outrageous, 'Light is but
the shadow of God', against which the rational processes disperse like
spray from a rock. For this reason those studies of metaphor which
proceed with the analysis of a single example often end with a
characterization of their subject which, while applying to the case in
hand, can seem inadequate to cover the whole range of metaphorical usage.
On the other hand comments on metaphor which are abstract and
aphoristic, while initially satisfying in their brevity and
suggestiveness, often reveal chronic ambiguities if one tries to use them
to distinguish metaphorical language from any other type of language.
Sometimes, to paraphrase J.L.Austin, it is easy to believe that over¬
simplification is the occupational disease of literary theorists, were it
not for the sneaking suspicion that this is their occupation. I have
chosen to take a more abstract pathway and to approach the goal not
through the rigorous analysis of a single example but through a series of
topics; firstly, how the actual meaning is generated/understood, secondly,
what is specifically metaphorical about metaphor, thirdly, what type or
types of meaning can metaphor generate, and, lastly, the role of metaphor
in pleasure and persuasion. As will soon become apparent, these divisions
are artificial if not entirely arbitrary; each topic is almost
inextricably bound up with all the others, and often it has been
necessary, since only part of the subject can be in focus at a time, to
use as premisses what will only later become conclusions. Indeed, already
here, in the introduction, I have found myself talking in the context of
assumptions some of which, we will later find, cannot be made. For this
reason I will be leaving many loose ends as I go along, as will be
nowhere so obvious as in the discussion of Aristotle, but they will all, I
hope, be picked up before the end - with one or two intractable
exceptions. This is primarily a problem of vocabulary; to begin at all it
will be necessary to use terms the precise sense of which it is yet our
task to determine. But let us begin at a beginning.
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Aristotle, in his Poetics defines metaphor as 'the application to one
thing of a name belonging to another thing', adding later that mastery of
its use is the most important thing for the aspiring poet.® This
definition is a masterpiece of concision but the examples which Aristotle
proceeds to give seem to confuse rather than clarify it. He divides
metaphor into transference from genus to species, as exemplified in 'Here
lies my ship', in which 'lying at anchor' is a species of 'lying'; from
species to genus, as in 'Odysseus has indeed performed ten thousand noble
deeds', in which 'ten thousand' is a species of the genus 'many'; from
species to species, as in 'Drawing off the life with the bronze' in which
'drawing off' is used for 'severing', both being species of 'taking away'.9
These may have been excellent metaphors in ancient Greek but, for
historical reasons that we shall discuss when describing dead metaphors,
they do not immediately strike the modern English-speaking reader as
particularly illuminating examples of transference.10 'Ten thousand' does
not appear to fall naturally into the genus of 'many', not for instance in
describing populations or astronomical data; even as a species of the
genus 'number of performable noble deeds' it would still seem to be
hyperbole rather than metaphor. There is, however, according to Aristotle,
a fourth category of metaphorical transference - by analogy.
I explain analogy as what may happen when of four things the
second stands in the same relationship to the first as the
fourth to the third; for then we may speak of the fourth instead
of the second, and the second instead of the fourth.11
He gives as an example 'old age is to life as evening is to day', from
which one can derive the metaphors 'the evening of life' or 'the sunset of
life' to stand for 'old age', and 'the old age of the day' to stand for
'evening'. In some cases, he continues, there can be no name for some of
the terms in the analogy but the metaphor can be used to supply them.
For example, to scatter corn is called sowing, but there is no
word for the sun's scattering of its flame; however, this stands
in the same relationship to sunlight as sowing does to corn, and
hence the expression, 'sowing his god-created flame'.12
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Metaphor by analogy, then, relies upon the correspondence between two
ratios; A:B as C:D, in which one of the terms may be something which does
not already have a name. In the Rhetoric Aristotle states that of the
four kinds of metaphor 'the most taking is the proportional [analogical]
kind', such as Pericles' decription of the vanishing from their country of
the young men who died in a war "'as if the spring were taken out of the
year.'" which relies on the ratio 'young men':'country' as 'spring':'year'.13
It has been suggested that Aristotle's fourth type of metaphor, that
by analogy, is not a separate type but rather the explanation of the
others.1,4 However, although he mainly concentrates on the proportional
metaphor in the Rhetoric he does not drop the classification there and we
would do well not to dismiss it either, for, as our discussion will later
show, there are great difficulties involved in drawing a dividing line
between metaphor and other figurative uses. Aristotle may indeed be
talking about the way metaphors are signalled, that is, if we can make
the distinction, the way they appear rather than the way they are
produced. In the Rhetoric he insists that proportional or analogical
metaphor 'must always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate
terms', that is, 'if a drinking-bowl is the shield of Dionysus, a shield
may be fittingly called the drinking-bowl of Ares.'.1s This may be the
distinction which Aristotle wished to draw between analogical and other
types of metaphor but a problem obviously arises when there is no name
for one of the terms of the analogy, if, for instance, the poet wanted to
liken a sower to the sun. The idea of metaphor as the transfer between
genus and species, and from one species to another, will become more
important in discussing dead metaphors and the vexed question of the
division between metaphorical and literal.
When, in the Poetics, Aristotle states that 'the ability to use
metaphor well implies a perception of resemblances' I take this to be an
acknowledgement that analogy is implicit in every metaphor.16. In the
Rhetoric he likewise says that 'in every metaphor to give names to
nameless things, we must draw them...from kindred and similar things'.1'7
All similarity depends upon analogy, the distinction we draw between our
use of the two words depends upon how readily we comprehend the
analogous relationships between parts or relations of parts in two
different objects or situations, or on how formally we wish to speak. We
do not, for instance, talk of faces being analogous to one another but of
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resembling one another even though we arrive at a perception of this
resemblance by comparing the ratios between the proportions of eyes,
nose, mouth, and so on, of face A and the ratio between the proportions
of eyes, nose, mouth, and so on, of face B. Thus we customarily speak of a
baby resembling one of its parents even though its features are of quite
a different size and complexion. What we call resemblance depends very
much on the readiness with which we discover analogous relationships.
'Analogy1 implies a certain distance; one 'compares', for instance,
Edinburgh University with some other university but one 'draws an
analogy' between a ship and the state. Where one decides to fix the line
between the use of these two terms, 'analogy' and 'resemblance', may be
either a personal or a cultural matter. On a personal level, for example,
I have never seen a baby which resembled one adult any more than it
resembled any other adult. At a cultural level, a Chinese was once
extraordinarily taken with my resemblance to Fred Astaire; but, though
within the rather gross paradigms which he probably used to distinguish
between occidentals, the likeness was highly striking, for an occidental
it would hardly exist. That is, if the whole world, but for Fred Astaire
and I, was Chinese we would pass for twins, though at the present moment
our features are only analogous in comparison to oriental ones. Because
of this element of relativity in the perception of resemblances, and
because in dealing with metaphor we will find ourselves dealing with
similarities between even abstract and concrete situations, in which our
normal use of 'resemblances' would be stretched beyond its natural limits,
we will use the term 'analogy' which, though in some instances it will
seem too formal, we can justify by demonstrating that ultimately analogy
is the cause of resemblances or similarities.1®
As we have said analogy relies upon the correspondence between two
ratios, A:B as C:D (for example, 1:3 as 2:6), but it should be understood
that this is simply the most formal expression we can give to the
relationship without actually reproducing the metaphor itself, that is, 'A
is C', and that providing the equation 'sunset:day' as 'old age:life' is
only the first, most elementary step in the explanation of how such a
metaphor works. In a detailed working out of the metaphor the
identification of 'day' and 'life' would also need to be established, but
again this would be by means of demonstrating the analogous relationship




which we are prepared to say that A is 'like' C is, therefore, a pragmatic
question, the metaphor itself supposes that 'the sunset of life' is
sufficient to represent the correspondence that is being established, but
this likeness depends on a series of more detailed correspondences since
sunset and old age are not so alike that we would confuse an example of
one with an example of the other.
Our 'sunset' metaphor hardly seems a controversial one, indeed it
appears obvious but, as I have said, I am here concerned with explaining
why the obvious is obvious. For, as I.A.Richards writes, while our skill
in using metaphor is prodigious 'our reflective awareness of that skill is
quite another thing - very incomplete, distorted, fallacious, over¬
simplifying.'.1 13 Let us look first of all at what we might call 'everyday'
metaphors, in particular those in which terms which appear to most
properly belong to the description of objects and processes in the
external, physical world, the world of the senses, are used to denote
affective qualities or abstract features. Such dual functions terms can be
adjectives, verbs or nouns; so people are 'warm', 'cold', 'hard', 'crooked',
'shallow', or 'deep', classes are 'high' or 'low', we 'hunger' for knowledge
and 'weigh' evidence, hopes are 'kindled' or 'shattered', wit comes in
'flashes', 'pressure' is exerted on governments, and opinion exists as a
'climate'. Rot only does it seem that there are very few terms that
describe the workings of our emotions and ideas, and our conception of
human personality and society that are sui generis, but even such terms
as have become so, for example 'jealous' and 'discreet', are often found to
be etymologically related to observable physical phenomena ('boiling' and
'sifting' respectively). The etymologies of words are indeed often
tributes to the progressive making abstract of the physical image. What
is important to note here is that such descriptions as 'deep sadness' and
'high hopes' are the most dead of dead metaphors, so long felt to be
appropriate that we are rarely aware of their figurative status, (Vhether
or not a dead metaphor is still a metaphor is a question we must
postpone.) Indeed, when we attempt to rescue the original force of a dead
figure of speech we try to conjure up the original image by prefixing the
phrase with 'actually' or 'literally'; 'I literally lost my head', 'Lily, the
caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet.',20
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Some research into whether this dual use of terms to describe
physical and psychological properties is to be found in historically
unrelated languages, and the degree of agreement in their usage between
such languages, has been carried out by the psychologist Solomon Asch.21
What he found was that dual terms are to be found in historically
unrelated languages and that their usages do correspond to a significant
degree. For example 'sweet'; in Hebrew pleasant words are said to be
"sweet to the soul" (J°rov. 16:24); in Greek it is used to describe the
voice and is etymologically linked with the verb 'to please'; in Hausa the
phrase 'I don't feel sweetness' means to feel unwell; in Burmese it is
synonymous with 'pleasant' when used in connection with the face, voice,
or speech; and in Chinese 'sweet' or 'honeyed' are synonymous with
'specious' when used in connection with words. The same uniformity is
found in the use of 'bitter'; "bitterness of the soul" in Hebrew (Job
7:11); 'bitter' pain or tears in Greek; 'bitter fate' meaning 'a hard lot in
life' in Chinese; 'bitterness of character' meaning an unpleasant
disposition in Hausa; and to 'speak bitterly' meaning to speak in an
unfriendly manner, in Burmese. Likewise the use of 'sour'; applied to the
heart in Hebrew (Psalms 73:21); a 'sour man' meaning a misanthrope in
Chinese; and 'I am very sour toward that person' meaning 'I detest that
person' in Burmese.22 In all of these examples 'sweet' does not stand
merely for any positive psychological quality, for example courage or
honesty, nor 'bitter' or 'sour' for just any negative quality, for example
fear. In certain languages words may denote only a physical quality (what
we might call an 'immediate' sensory quality), possibly because the
language does not possess an extended psychological vocabulary and does
not differentiate between different qualities of basic psychological
attributes. Furthermore a given term may develop a somewhat different
range of connotations in what we will, provisionally, call its non-literal
attribution, such as the Chinese use of 'sweet' to mean 'specious' - though
the idea of pleasing is still retained. Such usage, if all other variables
could be accounted for, might serve as a good index of a culture's
attitude towards some particular quality; when, for instance, a writer
talks of 'the cold cash of literal fact' his choice of metaphor is
expressing a particular attitude towards 'literal fact'.
One explanation of this duality in the use of certain terms could be
an associative connection on the basis of immediate sensory stimulus
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properties common to both instances of use. However, despite the
obviously metonymic aspect of some instances of substitution, as
'reddened' for 'embarassed', this will not account for most uses of dual
function terms, as, for example 'colourful' to describe character. A more
promising explanation is that what the usages have in common is the
description of a mode of interaction. When we call an object 'hard' we
mean that it resists change when pushed or pressed and supports other
things placed upon it without changing its own form. Hardness is,
therefore, resistance to change imposed by external forces. When 'hard' is
used to refer to a person, what it describes is a formally similar
interaction. The way in which we experience the interaction between a
'hard' person and another, or ourselves, or his environment, follows the
same schema of interaction as we might find in an abstract definition of
'hard'. The terms contained within this definition may themselves seem
metaphorical when applied to our person, but as we move progressively
deeper in working out the correspondences our terms, for example
'resistance' and 'change', become increasingly abstract and less obviously
attached to any particular domain, physical or psychological. The content
and complexity of the hardness of a table and the hardness of a person
may be radically different but they share the same dynamic of the
application of a force and unyielding opposition to that force. The same
schema of interaction makes intelligible the attribution of 'hardness' to
questions, facts, times, bargains, and winters. Asch does not use the word
but the relationship between sets of terms that can be joined by such
correspondences is one of analogy, as previously described. The difficulty
of describing, in less abstract words, the hardness of a 'hard' person is
demonstrated by the synonyms with which we might replace it, as for
example 'harsh' or 'unfeeling', both of which also have their roots in
sensory vocabulary, and neither of which has precisely the same
connotations as 'hard'. The common properties of a colourful person and a
colourful abject could likewise be characterised in this way, as sensory
stimulation arising from variety. All terms such as 'hard', 'soft', 'bitter',
'sweet', 'large', 'small', 'warm', 'cold', refer to properties of things as
perceived by a human being, and it is only from this viewpoint that the
metaphorical attribution of such terms can be meaningful. Vhen we say
'small mercy' we mean 'insufficient to what was required', as we would
more literally refer to a small amount of food (though even this latter
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is to same extent relative), that is, what is normally syncategorematic,
without independant meaning, becomes categorematic, able to stand on its
own, within the context of the metaphor; the metaphor presumes it. This
is perhaps what Aristotle has in mind when he states that 'many' is a
genus of which particular numbers - between x and y - can be a species.
To call a person 'warm' or hopes 'high' is to invoke a norm that is not
one established by use of these terms in their immediate sensory
contexts.23
The terms, that can be used both literally and metaphorically, so far
discussed, cannot be said to properly refer to the raw material of
sensory experience alone. Rather they describe modes of interaction
between terms that may vary from belonging to either the exclusively
concrete domain or the exclusively psychological. (One might think here
of the various uses of 'see'.) When we employ the description of forces or
relations as observed in the external, physical world to events,
processes, and relations in the psychological, human world we are
referring to functional properties that they share. Thus in his Critique
of Aesthetic Judgement Kant says that in analogy the sensory properties
of the analogon do not resemble or, as we might say, 'immediately
resemble' the original but share a similar formal principle of
functioning; the enlightened state can therefore be represented by an
organic body, the parts of which relate to one another in a harmonious
way, while tyranny can be represented by a machine such as a treadmill.2,4
The emphasis is, therefore, on the mode of functioning, the
correspondences that can be drawn between the dynamic interaction of
parts in one instance, the enlightened monarchy, and another, the body.
Although in discussing those terms that can be either literal in the
physical domain or metaphorical in the psychological domain, we have
referred to them as 'dual function' terms this may be misleading, since
they can stand in a wide variety of different sentences in which they
signal that the ratio between the parts or the interplay of forces in one
situation is analogous to the ratio between the parts or the interplay of
forces in another; for instance 'dead' in the following conjunctions -
person, to the world, language, letter, matter, gold (unburnished), colour
(in painting), nettle (non-stinging variety), sound, Sea, centre, weight,
freight (sum paid for cargo space not occupied), arch (not functional),
hand, hours, stock (unsaleable goods or unemployed capital), ball (out of
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play), of winter, stop, loss, 'lock, 'light (shutter), reckoning, asleep,
level, against, men (empty bottles), metaphor, and so on. But we must now
move on to less conventionalized metaphors.
It was I.A.Richards who started perhaps the most fruitful modern line
of enquiry concerning metaphor with his definition of it as 'two thoughts
of different things active together and supported by a single word, or
phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.'.25 Starting
from the idea that all definitions are 'essentially ad hoc', that is,
relevant only to some purpose or situation, some restricted "'universe of
discourse'" he goes on to state that an essential feature of metaphor is
the use of a term outside the universe of discourse for which it has been
defined, in a context in which it requires a new definition.25 It is,
therefore, according to Richards 'fundamentally...a borrowing between and
intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.'.27 Moreover he
was prepared, on the basis of this definition, to include as metaphorical
all 'those processes in which we perceive or think or feel about one
thing in terms of another'.2® This is a very broad definition and, though
elsewhere Richards insists that metaphor is not a 'verbal matter', at this
stage of our enquiry we will continue to concern ourselves with verbal
expression.2®
One of the immediate advantages of Richards' definition of metaphor,
over Aristotle's one of 'improper naming', is that it does not appear to
require the difficult task of deciding what is 'proper' tcr a word, but, as
we shall see later, this advantage exists only in appearance. However the
'interaction' view of metaphor does provide a useful emphasis and is
taken up by the philosopher Max Black who talks of the principal and
subsidiary subjects of the metaphor (Richards' 'tenor' and 'vehicle') being
'active together', or interacting, to produce a meaning that is a resultant
of that interaction.30 The given context, what Black terms the 'frame' of
the metaphor, imposes an extension of meaning on the focal word by which
it obtains a new meaning which is 'not quite its meaning in literal uses,
nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute would have.'.31 He
rejects the idea that this happens through a selection of the
connotations of the focal word used, in favour of the idea that the
reader is 'forced to "connect" the two ideas' suggested by the two
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respective words or phrases.3:2 This is an overstatement; certainly the
principal subject ('Man' in 'Man is a wolf') controls the relevant
connotations of the subsidiary subject ('wolf'), and vice versa, but
'farced to "connect'" appears to be a phrase designed to circumnavigate
the use of 'resemblance' as being a word too prosaic for what he wishes
to convey. However, as we have earlier noted, resemblance or analogy
cover a vast range of relationships and situations, arguably all those in
which, as Richards says, 'we perceive or think or feel about one thing in
terms of another'.33 In The Meaning of Meaning Richards explicitly states
that he considers metaphor to be 'the use of one reference to a group of
things between which a given relation holds, for the purpose of
facilitating the discrimination of an analogous relation in another
group.'.3,4 We will now consider the nature of these 'groups' and how the
exchange takes place between them.
One of the major points which this essay will try to communicate is
that the examination and elucidation of the analogous properties or
qualities a literal usage may share with its metaphorical employment
keeps us within the limits of the ordinary use of language and, as dead
metaphors demonstrate, our common way of perceiving the world. This
saves us from having to make recourse to dubiously extra-linguistic or
quasi-psychological explanations of the significance of poetic images. For
John Press images such as the Sea, the City, and the Desert are
'primordial' and their significance is 'discovered by poets rather than
invented by their idiosyncratic use of language'.33 He then goes on to
quote a number of erotically orientated poems which all employ images of
cherries, apples, or spices, commenting that 'the theories of both Freud
and Jung about the nature and origin of images enables us to detect a
logic in the poetic employment of imagery which might otherwise have
escaped us'.33 However, the Freudian analytical procedure, insofar as it
is almost exclusively sexually orientated, cannot be said to be a subtle
herraeneutical tool outside the field of psychopathology for which it was
developed.37 Ve need neither Freud nor Jung to help us discover why
images of cherries , apples, or spices are apt images for an erotic
context. The size, shape and colour of cherries, the trajectory of the
curves of an apple, the aromatic and pungent properties of spices and
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their exotic origin, the sensuous pleasure derived from these products,
the status of fruits as emblematic of nature and, figuratively, its
'generosity', as well as a variety of other properties and qualities of
fruit and its place in the life of man make these images particularity
apt metaphors, both on the immediate basis of resemblance and the more
'postponed' basis of analogy, for the female body and, therefore, for
erotic poetry. (It may seem strange to appeal to some properties that are
themselves primarily figurative, that is, the emblematic status of a
domain, but this status can itself be justified by the drawing of
analogies which do not rely on such conventions.) The basic dynamic or
function which connects the two domains is 'sensuous pleasure derived
from the organic' but it is the number of possible attributions which
they both share, the degree of correspondence between terms in the two
domains, whether metaphorical or literal in either case, that is directly
proportional to the appropriateness of the image.
The literal, denotational, and connotational associations of 'desert'
will make sense of Marvell's 'And yonder all before us lie/ Deserts of
vast eternity' without recourse to talk of primordial images.3® The
denotational sense, that is, that found in the dictionary definition, of
'desolate' and 'barren', provides us with two terms that are not only
appropriate to the sense of the whole poem but which are also commonly
attributed, literally or metaphorically, to human physical or
psychological states. Given the problem of conceiving of eternity, or time
without end, the image of the desert, a vast and uniformly empty expanse,
invoked by the literal sense of the word, is as close as one can get to
comprehending or conveying the concept. We can say, therefore, that the
sensory and associated emotional properties of 'desert' are to man as the
emotional import of the idea of eternity. Eternity is a rather
metaphysical notion and therefore a special case when it comes to the
making of metaphor, but even this brief elucidation of the literal, or
linguistically non-controversial, terms used to describe the attributes of
deserts should demonstrate its aptness to describe certain psychological
states. Some metaphorical images are taken direct from the human domain,
for example those of birth, love, and death, and therefore need no such
gloss to explain their affective connotations. Other common themes in
poetry, such as the changing seasons, are so familiar as to be taken as
affectively charged of their nature. To take this last example, we might
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elucidate several layers of correspondence between the seasons as
perceived and affective aspects of human life; firstly, they are naturally
emblematic of the passage of time which brings things, good and bad, to
us and takes things, good and bad, away; secondly, the changes are
manifested on a landscape which demonstrates a high degree of continuity
in its form, just as for all changes in personality and fortune there is
sufficient continuity in the basic aspects of the individual, felt self
for us to be able to speak of another person or ourselves as 'the same
person' at widely separated points in time; thirdly, in connection with
these correspondences, there is a contrast in that the landscape on which
the change of seasons is manifest is, despite its changes, more permanent
than any individual life. The simple process of decay is not so apt an
emblem of time as affectively perceived because it cannot sustain this
range of corresponding attributes, though it could be used metaphorically
for more short term affects, such as 'the decay of affection'. The seasons
can also serve as a memento mori, for while their course is circular ours
is linear.33
The same basic term or image, for example 'sea', 'city', or 'desert',
may serve to construct a different image in different contexts; it is the
systematic employment of a certain body of terms in a coherent body of
imagery that marks off one poetic 'school' or epoch from another.
Nineteenth-century Romantic writers used connotations of 'sea' and 'city'
that eighteenth-century writers did not, the medieval European and the
ancient Hebrew writer would have used different connotations again.
However the literal attributes of these things and their relation to man,
the role they play or could potentially play in his life, allows us to
grasp the way in which they could function in a variety of different
metaphors. We could represent this as follows:
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In this diagram each circle represents the domain of a concept and the
shaded area the metaphorical attribution. The range of what can be
included in this domain is very great, ranging from the strictly
denotational (logic), that is, all the particular existing examples of x\
the connotational, that is, the overtones or associations customarily
evoked by x\ to the realm of contrast, which Hume classes as one of the
forms of association between ideas.AO This is, however, a subject we will
return to later. It is important to note here that it is not the entire
domain of either concept that is operant in the metaphor; though the
degree of correspondence may be high the concepts must remain to some
extent discrete. Absurdities in interpretation are usually caused by
mistaking the nature or extent of the correspondance between the two
domains. To present the further, more direct, connections between p, q, r,
s, themselves would require a more complicated three-dimensional model,
for it seems likely that almost any two things can be 'combined' to form
a metaphor. Even when an abject or relation has a conventional or
traditional symbolic meaning, for example within a religious context,
those properties or qualities of it which were originally felt to make it
an apt metaphor for a concept or feeling will often allow us to
reconstruct those concepts or feelings even when it is encountered in a
form comparatively isolated from its supporting body of doctrine.
Systematically organized religious belief is, necessarily, an expression
of universal tendencies in human thought rather than vice versa. Even in
the case of the use of theory-laden terms from abstruse 'sciences', as in
the Metaphysical poets, the technical term will often retain an
etymological connection, or stand in a metaphorical relation, to more
familiar concepts.
It could however be argued that Donne's line '0 my America, my new
found land,' loses its significance unless we apprehend what 'America'
stood for in the late sixteenth century.d1 This is a highly contentious
proposition for, insofar as none of us will ever have the opportunity of
being born in the sixteenth century we must content ourselves with what
historical research and imagination will provide. Furthermore, it is going
to be the latter of these two resources which will prove most fruitful
once we have gone past the simple fact that the continent of America had
recently been discovered at this time. The sense of mystery and
possibility suggested by 'my new found land' does not need a specific
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historical dimension in order to make it applicable to the experience,
physical and psychological, that is the context of the poem. What it does
require is a sympathy towards, an ability to entertain or imagine what it
would be like to entertain, the idea of the erotic (in the widest sense)
that is conveyed by the metaphor. D.H.Lawrence uses the same metaphor in
a more extended form when he talks of a man's desire 'for the embrace,
for the advancing into the unknown, for the landing on the shore of the
undiscovered half of the world, where the wealth of the female lies
before us.'.'*12 Referring back to our diagram we may note that some of the
attributes or connotations which fall under the domain of 'new land', for
example 'hostile', are partly excluded in Donne by the modifier 'found'
suggesting 'sought', but mainly by the overall sense of the poem. We may
decide that the metaphor also connotes an 'exploitative' attitude on the
part of the speaker, but whether we consider this a negative or a
positive quality depends more upon our knowledge of, or attitude towards,
the erotic than upon our knowledge of the discovery of America. While
many things could be derived from the metaphorical connection, some will
be irrelevant because too prosaic for the context, or will be contradicted
by the sense of other parts of the text, that is, those metaphorical
attributions so far derived, as they form a consonant series, or will
involve anachronistic denotations or connotations of words or concepts
that can be proven to have a sense at variance with modern ones.
Just on what basis the two domains, or words, interact is a question
which Black addresses in his discussion of the metaphor 'Man is a wolf'.
In order to arrive at a meaning what is needed, according to Black, is
'not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning
of "wolf" - or be able to use that word in literal senses - as that we
shall know...the system of associated commonplaces.', and, furthermore, the
metaphor's effectiveness relies not so much on the truth of these
commonplaces as their ready availability to the reader.*3 Literal use of a
word commits the speaker to 'acceptance of a set of standard beliefs
about wolves (current platitudes) that are a common possession of the
members of some speech community' and it is this 'wolf-system of related
commonplaces' which is evoked when the metaphor is used.'1'1 It is from
these 'associated commonplaces' that the properties are found which apply
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to 'Man', that is, which make sense of the metaphor, or make what would
otherwise appear to be a piece of nonsense into a metaphor. The reader
uses the 'system of implications' belonging to the subsidiary subject
('wolf') 'as a means for selecting, emphasizing, and organizing relations
in a different field.', that is, the principal subject CMan').'ts Although
Black has earlier rejected the idea of metaphor involving 'comparison' his
account of the way in which metaphor leads the reader 'by way of the
wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of
implications about the principal subject.' obviously involves some sort of
comparison.The ideas associated with 'wolf are, in Black's words, 'not
sharply delineated, and yet sufficiently definite to admit of detailed
enumeration.The same position is taken by Goodman in his Languages
of Art in which he writes of metaphor occurring when a term 'with an
extension established by habit is applied elsewhere under the influence
of that habit' so that in its metaphorical use there is both 'a departure
from and a deference to precedent.'.*® Certainly the 'associated
commonplaces' pass over, there is, as Goodman says, 'a migration of
concepts', but without the use of such terms as 'resemblance' or
'similarity' or 'analogy' to say that metaphor involves transference is
only to produce, in Greek at least, a tautology.*®
What I called 'the problem of metaphor' appears here also, in
Goodman's description of it, as both 'a departure from and deference to
precedent', for the problem is principally one of vocabulary. Metaphor is
language used unconventionally, yet metaphor is a convention; it is
'improper naming' yet it is not simply misnaming, since it can be apt or
inapt.so As in manners and in morals so in language, what is improper
today is the convention tomorrow and what was the convention yesterday
is, due to our forgetfulness, the novel of today. What is 'proper' to a
ward depends on the general state of the language, but we shall discuss
this in greater detail later on. This historical shift in the denotations
and connotations of words has its counterpart in the overlapping, but
rarely coextensive, areas of meaning represented by similar words in
contemporary languages. As I have said, though the metaphor's immediate
appearance must be one of impropriety, it is possible to follow the
metaphor down, through the terms of its implicit analogies, to a level at
which it is no longer clear to which domain the terms of correspondence
'properly' belong. I take this to be what Richards means when he says
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that in metaphorical language 'one reference borrows part of the context
of another in an abstract form.'s'1 Certain properties, or supposed
properties, of wolves are made to serve as a model for certain properties
of men. The success of this procedure depends on the possibility of
translating some predicates applying to wolves into some predicates
applicable to men, those predicates which can, as Eberle writes, be
'expressed in partial vocabularies of the two subject-matters.®2
In his Semiology and the Philosophy of Languages Umberto Eco talks
of 'the only possible representation of the content of a given lexical
item' being provided 'in terms of an encyclopedia.' and it this concept
which we will now examine in order to see how, apart from associated
commonplaces, the domain of a term or concept might be filled in, just
what it might contain.®3 Eco writes that the sememe (the unit of meaning)
is 'a virtual or potential text', 'the source of energy of chains of
connotation', and suggests that a case-like representation of the
encyclopedic content, along metonymic lines, will account for metaphorical
usage.®* Thus a representation of noun x implies the aspect of perception,
the form of x (F), an agent of production (A), a material from which x is
made (M), and a purpose which x is supposed to fulfil (F).®® For example;
/house/ ^ F A M P
With roof Culture Bricks Shelter
Considered from the point of view of being a shelter, a house can
therefore be referred to as a shelter, or a shelter as a house - in some
instances of which the use will be metaphoric. The organization of these
cases is described as metonymic because, for example, to call a house a
'roof' is an instance of metonymy.®7 (One might also think here of Hume's
three 'principles of connexion among ideas ...Resemblance, Contiguity in
time or place, and Cause or Effect' by which one idea introduces another
'with a certain degree of method and regularity.'.®3) Such an encyclopedic
representation is 'potentially infinite' since each of the cases - F, A, M,
P - has an almost indefinite range, even for one culture.®3 For this
reason Eco conceives of the 'universe of semiosis' as a 'labyrinth' in the
form of a net, since 'every point can be connected with every other point,
and, where the connections are not yet designed, they are, however,
conceivable and designable.',®° Earlier I spoke of the dictionary entries
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of the terms involved in any metaphor as being sufficient for its
explanation; my discussion here of Eco is meant to extend rather than
supplant that model; he himself speaks of the dictionary as a 'disguised
encyclopedia' but we might also call it a summary of, or, in certain
circumstances, an abstraction from, the use that characterizes the
meaning of a word, a use which ultimately involves the whole of the
labrynth of language.6' This encyclopedic content of the term corresponds
to what Black called the 'associated commonplaces' but the advantage in
Eco's model is that it illustrates one aspect of metaphor obscured by
Black's account; the fact that though metaphor requires that we know
enough of the encyclopedia to understand it, it also 'permits us to
understand the encyclopedia better.' in that metaphorical usage brings
into focus parts of the labyrinth - connections - that have not
previously been considered; 'the terms in question are enriched with
properties that the encyclopedia did not yet grant them.'.62
Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, observes that 'metaphors imply riddles'
and that riddles, therefore, provide good examples of metaphor.63 In
illustrating his general model of metaphor and in drawing a distinction
between 'closed' or trivial, and 'open' metaphors Eco uses two Kenningar,
Icelandic riddles; 'The tree for sitting' and 'The house of the birds'. In
unravelling the first of these he begins by constructing the following
table for 'tree':
/Tree/ s> F AM P
Trunk Nature Natural wood Fruits
Branches
Vertical
As a potential reserve of information about trees, their purposes and
uses, the encyclopedia would allow the almost infinite extension of such a
table. Our context however has indicated 'sitting', so that a 'series of
hypotheses leads us to single out in the tree trunk the element
"verticality", so as to look for something that is also wooden but




/Bench/ s> F AM P
Horizontal Culture Worked timber To seat oneself
Although 'bench' is obviously the best answer, the metaphor is not very
striking; 'Cognitively speaking,' as Eco writes, 'not much is learned,
except far the fact that benches are made of crafted timber.'. This then
is a trivial metaphor because the correspondences, though inescapable, are
few. Eco's second example 'The house of the birds' is what he considers to
be 'good', 'open', or 'poetic' metaphor. He constructs the following tables
for its interpretation:
/House/ 3 F AM P
Rectangular Culture Earth Shelter
Closed (Inorganic) Resting on ground
Covered
/Birds/ => F AM P
Winged etc. Mature Earth Flying in the sky
(Organic)
This metaphor is more difficult than the 'Tree for sitting' example
because 'it requires more daring abductions.\es We might try 'sky':
/Sky/ ^ F A MP
Formless Mature Air NonshelterSG
Open
In this example the 'process of semiosis' can be continued much longer
than in our first example, it 'permits inspections that are diverse,
complementary, and contradictory.' and it is this property which Eco
defines as 'poetic'.e7 Although most commentators eschew definitions of
what makes a 'good' metaphor most agree that the metaphor's effectiveness
depends on the number and complexity of correspondences involved, its
resistance to simple interpretation. For example Eberle, who is discussing
metaphor in scientific theory, talks of one metaphor being 'cognitively
better' than another if from it one can construct a better model, a better
representation of the facts involved in the principal subject;
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'Models...are extended metaphors if by "extending the metaphor" we mean
"constructing the model whose existence is suggested by the metaphor".'.ss
However the relationship between metaphor and scientific theory is
something we will discuss elsewhere.
Eco's account of the interpretative rules for metaphor demonstrates
an aspect of the discussion which is common to most accounts, that is,
they are almost invariably biased in the direction of the sort of
metaphor which is used as illustration. Eco thus emphasizes 'contrast' and
a certain closure in interpretation, for suggestive as 'The house of
birds' is it does have a specific goal - 'sky' - and this spe^icity is not ci
something we can expect from other metaphors. Indeed, along with other
kennlngs such as 'the gannet's bath' or 'the whale road' for 'sea', or 'the
snake's sorrow' for 'winter', such riddles do focus on one aspect of the
principal subject, in each case absent, and do employ terms in a non-
literal or extended fashion - 'house', 'bath', 'road', ('tree' is more
controversial) - but from this account we might be left with the idea
that the disguising of the principal subject was the distinguishing
feature of metaphor, which plainly, in the majority of cases, it is not.es*
There is, however, a more important point to make here and it is that
the 'associated commonplaces' or 'encyclopedic content' of any term can be
manipulated by the context in which the metaphor occurs so as to
emphasize those properties, or that portion, which we finally select to
serve as the basis for correspondences.70 Indeed, it may be the context
itself which establishes the associations, or content, of any term which
we meet within it and which thereby allows the metaphor to convey what
it never could outside of that context. This is an aspect of metaphor
which Mowottny discusses at some length in her Language Poets Use, where
she writes that 'the real peculiarity of poetic structure is that in it
one constituent is used to develop the potential of another...one
constituent acts upon another almost like an x-ray.'.71 The same could be
said, of course, of the mutual dependency of terms in everday, of
'ordinary', language but in even the isolated metaphor this exploration of
the 'contents', the potential meanings, of a term is, as we have seen, far
more important to the particular meaning that the term is intended to
convey. Vords are used in such contexts in a heuristic fashion; most
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obviously in the case of catachresis, when an old word is used in a new
sense in order to name the previously u^jamed, but also in a more general -n
way. This same idea is evident in Paul Valdry's description of the writer
as a 'maker of deviations';
This does not mean that all deviations are permitted to him; but
it is precisely his business and his ambition to find the
deviations that enrich, that give the illusion of the power or
the purity or the depth of language. In order to work through
language he works on language.72
This exploratory, refining process is what Nowottny considers the
characteristic of poetry, in which 'the structure of a passage is...a means
of making it possible for farms of language used in it to have more
meaning than they would otherwise have; the structure is a solution of
the problems involved in getting a particular thing said.'.73 Through
retrospective redefinition, by metaphor, of abstractions produced by some
initial metaphor the poem, as a 'network of figures', consists of 'multiple
relationships undergoing multiple transformations', and thereby conveys
by each subsequent metaphor what that metaphor could not convey in
isolation.7,4
This account, however, raises the question for me : Where does the
metaphorical, in any context, begin? Langer suggests that;
Since the context of an expression tells us what is its sense -
whether we shall take it literally or figuratively, and how, in
the latter case, it is to be interpreted - it follows that the
context itself must always be expressed literally, because it has
not, in turn, a context to supplement and define its sense.75
As we have seen from Nowottny's acount, the literal context which we
might evoke for the interpretation of metaphor will depend upon the
context in which we find that metaphor - if it occurs at the end of a
series we may well consider its principal subject, the ostensibly 'literal'
part, to be itself metaphorical in intention. Poetry, and literature in
general, is distinguished by containing metaphors of metaphors and the
point at which we decide that we are now concerned with the literal is of
the utmost importance to interpretation. Indeed, different forms of
criticism are characterized by the degree to which they postpone
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discussion of the 'literal', but this is a point we shall return to in
later chapters. Augustine, talking of biblical interpretation, comments
that 'we must not suppose that all the events in the narrative are
symbolic; but those which have no symbolism are interwoven in the story
for the sake of those which have this further significance.' just as it is
'only the share of the plough that cuts through the earth' and 'the
strings of the lyre...that are designed to produce the music' though the
whole of the plough and the lyre are necessary to achieve the respective
effectsAugustine's similes are interesting, if slightly confused, but
more important to us here is that he is discussing biblical
interpretation; for, as an historical fact, just what part of the text
constitutes the share of the plough, or even if the share is to be
distinguished from the plough, is a question which has received
innumerable different answers.
The immediate context of any element may thus be itself a figurative
element in a previously established context and so we may pursue literal
reference from figurative description to the act described, and from this
act to the character's possible figurative status, and from here to the
action as a whole, and from here to the status of the representation as a
'fiction', and so on until we reach the larger context of shared cultural
knowledge and belief which will still be, however remotely, operant on our
criteria for choosing what similarities are to be transferred, what
correspondences drawn, between principal and subsidiary subjects, even in
our most explicit metaphor, the first in the series. This is the
importance of context; that if any element or elements, in this chain were
disengaged from the rest, so that we had to draw our criteria for its
interpretataion more or less directly from the cultural context, we would
interpret it in a different way to the way we would were we taking it as
part of something else.7"7 The various approaches that criticism may take
will also lead to a focus on different correspondences, as for example
were one to read The Tempest 'in the context of', as the saying goes,
Shakespeare's comedies, or his tragedies, or his later plays, or romantic
tragicomedy in general, or the Nature-Art debate of the period, or any of
a host of other contexts, though ultimately, whether we make it explicit
or not, we criticize in the context of the relationship between ourselves
and the world, of which the work is a fragment. If we discuss any of
these contexts, aside from the last, as self-contained then we are
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probably drawing correspondences between a figurative representation and
what is itself metaphorical rather than literal, that is, we are working
within the context of an unexamined metaphor.7®
The most obvious way in which metaphor is signalled, or announces
its presence, is through an absurdity in its literal sense - a man is
plainly not a wolf - but there are other properties which guide us into
reading metaphorically. The juxtaposition between two domains of meaning
can, as Tourangeau writes, render a literal reading 'impossible, silly,
irrelevant or simply incomplete.'.79 But a literal reading could also be
ruled out, even in the absence of any overt semantic anomaly, simply
because it would describe a 'bizarre state of affairs'.®0 Tautology, for
example, by its apparent banality, and contradiction, by its patent
rejection of literalness, also encourages us to read it metaphorically.
The text which uses metaphors, as Eco writes, 'apparently lies, speaks
obscurely, above all speaks of something other, all the while furnishing
only vague information.'.®1 By these means, by violating all of the most
general rules of good sense in communication, metaphor attracts the
attention of the reader, providing that they have not previously decided
upon the ineptness of the author, to the fact that something other than
the literal meaning is meant. (According to Aristotle the 'liveliness of
epigramatic remarks' and the attractiveness of riddles is due to 'the
meaning not being just what the words say',82) Yet I would not want to
give the impression that it is merely unconventionality, or the breaking
of rules that guides our perception of metaphor; metaphor is a rule in
itself and one which is so familiar, so integral a part of our use of
language, that more often than not we are unaware of that process of
rejecting the literal meaning of terms which is described above. 'Diction,'
wrote Samuel Johnson, 'being the vehicle of thoughts, first presents
itself to the intellectual eye; and if the first appearance offends, a
further knowledge is not often sought.' for
Whatever professes to benefit by pleasing must please at once.
The pleasures of the mind imply something sudden and unexpected;
that which elevates must always surprise. Whatever is perceived
by slow degrees may gratify us with the consciousness of
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pleasure.®3
Thus, as Ricoeur writes, the metaphor must be 'semantic impertinence', a
'violating of the code of pertinence or relevance which rules the
ascription of predicates in ordinary use.' but also a 'semantic innovation,
thanks to which a new pertinence, a new congruence, is established in
such a way that the utterance "makes sense" as a whole.'; the metaphor,
according to Ricoeur, is 'not the enigma but the solution of the
enigma. '.eA
At this stage there is a general point I wish to make about fiction,
which is closely related to our foregoing description of the signalling
of the metaphor. Hymes describes metaphorical sentences as challenges to
the reader 'to try and figure out some context in which he can use them.',
and I would suggest that this challenge, or offer, is what is extended by
fiction in general.®5 For fiction too is irrelevant, often impossible or
incomplete, it appears to say the thing that is not; as apparently
incongruous to our daily commerce with the real world as the individual
metaphor, considered from a strictly 'literal' point of view, is
incongruous to its surrounding text. Literal falsity is both the
touchstone of metaphor and one of the defining characteristics of
literature, for even if we can discover a story to be true that
truthfulness is irrelevant to the uses to which we put it as a story.
Later, particularly in dealing with pleasure and persuasion, I shall
return to and expand upon this correspondence.
Before going on to discuss how the division may be drawn between the
metaphorical and the literal, I will just pause to take a brief look at a
type of what we might call 'metaphorical representation' that is an
intermediate stage between the individual, isolated metaphor we have been
so far looking at and those forms of fiction which we will later be
concerned with. In the Rhetoric Aristotle characterizes proverbs as
metaphors;
Suppose, for one instance, a man to start some undertaking in
hope of gain and then lose by it later on, "Here we have once
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more the man of Capathus and his hare" says he. For both alike
went through the same experience.®6
Is this actually the 'same' experience? Aristotle feels that the
correspondence between the man of Capathus and his hare and the unnamed
man and his unspecified situation, is close enough for the identification
to be complete. Though the two situations are only analogous to one
another, the proverb, like the metaphor converts 'is like' to 'is'. Both
'parable' and 'proverb' in the Old Testament are translated from the
Hebrew mashal meaning 'to be like'.®7 In the New Testament both the
Hebrew and the Greek words rendered as 'parable' imply resemblance or,
more particularly, the placing of two things side by side, the bringing
together of two different things in order for one to explain or emphasize
the other.®® Aside from proverbs and parables much of the language of the
Bible is, as both its Oriental origin and its abstract subject matter
would lead us to expect, figurative. Scripture, Aquinas writes, 'expresses
truth in two ways, first, through its literal sense, when things are
signalled by words : secondly through the spiritual sense, when things
are signalled by other things.'. This 'spiritual sense', he continues, is
found by 'looking past the thing signified by the literal sense to other
realities behind them'.®3
The metaphorical sense is contained in the literal sense, for
words bear imaginative suggestion as well as their plain and
proximate sense. The literal sense of a figurative phrase is not
the figure of speech itself, but what it symbolizes; for instance,
when speaking of God's arm the Bible literally means that he
wields power, not that he has a bodily member.30
Even what was considered as true historical narrative could be given a
spiritual interpretation; Augustine, for example, declares that it is
'arbitrary to suppose that there could not have been a material paradise,
just because it can be understood also in a spiritual significance...or
that there was no rock from which water flowed when Moses struck it,
just because it can be interpreted in a symbolic sense, as prefiguring
Christ'.31 There is here, strange as it would seem in Augustine, a
refreshing permissiveness about the variety of interpretations a text can
yield, though he adds that we must also believe in the truth of the story
'as a faithful record of historical fact,'.32 For, though for him the
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scriptures were 'always to be interpreted with reference to Christ and
his Church1, there was at this time no set formula for how this was to be
done, nor any prohibition on mutiple interpretations.33 If we look at one
of Augustine's own interpretations we find it at once ingenious and, to
modern eyes, highly contentious. For example, though he considers the
Flood and the building of Noah's ark as historical facts, he also
considers the ark as a symbol of the Church 'on pilgrimage in this world'
saved by the wood of the ship which prefigures the wood of the Cross,
furthermore he finds a correspondence between the proportions of the ark
and those of the human body, prefiguring the incarnation of Christ,
between the door and the wound made in Christ's side, since the latter is
'the way of entrance for those who come to him, because from that wound
flawed the sacraments with which believers are intitiated', and between
the 'squared beams' used in the ark's construction and the 'life of the
saints which is stable on every side; for in whatever direction you turn
a squared object, it will remain stable.'. Augustine concludes, therefore,
that all the other details mentioned in the account of the ark are also
'symbols of realities found in the Church.'.3"1 His account appears
fanciful though its analogical basis is clear; 'Church : world' as 'ark :
Flood', 'door : rescue' as 'crucifixion : salvation' and so on. But it is
important to note that within each of these analogies there are further
ones. Thus, for instance, the straightforward proportional analogy between
the dimensions of the ark and those of the human body yields not only
the Incarnation but could also, in conjunction with the first analogy
between the Church and the ark, yield the familiar image of the Church as
the Body of Christ, an image which itself contains further analogies. This
sort of typology, in contrast to straightforward allegory, views previous
events as literally true though also an anticipation of what it holds to \
be the decisive event, thus the Exodus is a 'type' of the more decisive
deliverance accomplished by Christ. (The parallels with the
psychoanalyst's 'reading' of the patient's early experience are striking.)
Such a procedure was not an invention of the Church fathers, Philo of
Alexandria had used allegorical interpretation to establish a congruency
between Platonic philosophy amd Jewish theology, and the Gnostics also
interpreted the Old Testament in this way (though, in keeping with their
tenets, they treated the God of the Old Testament as an evil demiurge and
the serpent as a type of Christ.3S) Nevertheless the exegetical findings,
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or inventions of the Church fathers, and their subsequent history of
biblical exegesis, forms a whole which, in its detail and the unity of
that detail, demonstrates an investigation of the metaphorical potential
of narrative that has probabaly never been surpassed in its
thoroughness.3e Much of this early writing on interpretation, as for
instance that of the Gnostics in their blatant and self-conscious
disregard for authorial intention, is still interesting and suggestive
today, but we must move on to less exotic pastures.
Such examples as the scriptural tradition provide are further
illustrations of the conviction that Aristotle seems to hold in the
Rhetoric, that the proverb/parable has what Bacon, talking of Aesop's
fables and other 'parabolic poetry', called an 'inwardness' of meaning,
which allows it to apply metaphorically in a variety of different
contexts.37 This 'inwardness' of the meaning of the anecdote or story
corresponds, then, to what Aquinas calls the 'imaginative suggestion' of
the ward, bath being, properly speaking, species of metaphor. In his
Aethetics Hegel talks of the relation between the fable and its general
application relying on the 'more general characteristics' of the two
situations, those elements which, as I have already argued, do not appear
to exclusively belong, in their 'proper sense', to either the principal or
subsidiary subject alone.3S For example, beginning some undertaking in
the hope of gain and then losing by it later on is not a pattern, or
dynamic, which properly belongs only to the man of Capathus and his hare,
though he may be a striking example of it. But we must now take a closer
look at this question of what is 'proper' to a word or concept.
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Dead metaphors seem most obviously to derive from Aristotle's
metaphor by proportion or analogy, in which a name is provided for the
previously unnamed on the basis of the position it holds in the analogy;
A:B as ,x:D.9,9 Examples of such dead metaphors would be 'leg of the table',
'mouth of the river', 'neck of the bottle', and so on. The deadness of our
examples consists in the fact that they do not immediately strike us as
figurative (though placing them in a list as I have done here may
slightly revive them); we only call them metaphors at all because they
appear, though the case is not always so obvious, to have derived from
what were originally examples of improper naming - an old word has been
used in a new sense, without losing its old use. Shelley when he wrote
his famous passage about every author of language being, in the 'infancy
of society', necessarily a poet, 'because language itself is poetry',
probably did not have such prosaic examples as 'the leg of the table' in
mind but the idea is clearly applicable to our discussion. The language of
poets', he continues, 'is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the
before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their
apprehension, until words, which represent them, become, through time,
signs for portions or classes of thought...and then, if no new poets
should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus
disorganized, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human
intercourse.'.100 Against this view I would argue that the creation of
such metaphors is invariably a collective rather than an individual act,
for though they must start with some individual it is only general
understanding which makes them metaphors, and, furthermore, many
metaphors created by poets will never become current, that is, will never
die, because they depend upon a very specific context for their existence
and so cannot, as metaphors, become commonplace. However, Shelley's
association of the creation of language with the poetic act (if not
strictly with 'poets') is illuminating and has since been echoed by other
writers on culture. Cassirer, for example, writes of "'radical metaphor'"
as 'a condition of the very foundation of...verbal conception'.101 Likewise
Langer speaks of metaphor as 'the law of growth of every semantic.', 'the
power whereby a language, even with a small vocabulary, manages to
embrace a multimillion things; whereby new words are barn and merely
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analogical meanings become stereotyped into literal definitions...the force
that makes language essentially relational, intellectual, forever showing
up new, abstractable forms in reality, forever laying down a deposit of
old, abstracted concepts in an increasing treasure of general words.'.102
The psychologist Vygotsky envisages this growth of language through
analogy, as expressed in metaphor, in a way that, as we shall see,
accounts for both the continuity and discontinuity we find between the
present senses of a word and its etymology. The historical development of
language, like the formation of concepts by the child, often relies,
according to Vygotsky, on a chain complex of associations in which links
established at, historically, short-range will demonstrate an obvious
resemblance in meaning, though it may not be possible to show a common
concept that unites all the multiple meanings with the original one from
which they have developed.103 In illustration of this idea he cites the
semantic evolution of the Russian word sutki from its original meaning of
'seam' (the junction of two pieces of cloth), to its use as denoting any
sort of junction, such as the corner of a room, to its metaphorical use
for 'twilight' (the junction of day and night), to its use to denote the
twenty-four hour day (the time between one twilight and another)-1 OA
While we can find a common attribute in 'seam', 'corner', 'twilight', the
concept of 'twenty-four hour day' does not share in this attribute and we
might be surprised to discover what its etymology was.10S Though 'day'
still contains the idea of division, implicit in the idea of junction, that
is, non-continuity, in that the other concepts denoted by sutki could not,
in English, serve as metaphors for the period between one twilight and
another, nor it for any of them, we could not claim that the etymology of
this particular use was especially pertinent to its sense. We might note
a similar divergence in meaning from the etymological root between the
words 'ignore' and 'ignorance' since, while bath are derived from in
meaning 'not' and gno meaning 'know*, to be able to ignore a thing one
must have knowledge of it.
When is it, then, that a metaphor dies? Demetrius says that when a
metaphor is applied with 'good taste' it can seem 'literally true', and I
would argue that it is this appearance of literal truth which marks the
end of a figure's figurative status.1 os A similar point is made by Langer
who writes that 'if a metaphor is used very often, we learn to accept the
word in its metaphorical context as thought it had a literal meaning
- 36 -
M eft t.. ai p:«ho r>
there.'107' and Goodman who writes that 'with repetition, a transferred
application of a schema becomes routine, and no longer requires or makes
any allusion to its base application...its past is forgotten and metaphor
fades into mere truth,'.109 That is, if the improper, metaphorical use of a
word proves useful then the new sense given to the old word will become
part of the literal sense of that word when it appears in a new context.
(We will come to the division between 'literal' and 'metaphorical', which I
have rather arbitrarily introduced here, in a moment.) Wimsatt and Brooks
define the dead metaphor as a 'collapsed metaphor, one in which A
[principal subject! and B [subsidiary subject! have come together so
completely that only one is left holding the field', though while this may
hold when A is a concept without a name it will not do for every example
of what we may wish to call a dead metaphor.109 While some words which
we can trace back to a metaphorical beginning, such as 'arrive' from ad
ripare meaning 'to come to shore', are so completely literal that the
original, literal meaning is truly buried others tend to rise zombie-like
under the influence of a context which recalls their origin - 'I put my
foot down with a firm hand', 'A virgin land, pregnant with possibilities'.
In these cases the subsidiary subject attracts more attention than the
principal subject. Likewise transposing a metaphor from one medium to
another can resuscitate its literal status; Eco, for example, cites
Modigliani's female portraits which 'visually reinvent (but also oblige us
to rethink even conceptually and, through various mediations, verbally) an
expression such as neck of a swan.' and even 'worn-out expressions such
as flexible (used to indicate openness of mind, lack of prejudice in
decision making, sticking-to-the-facts) can reclaim a certain freshness
when...translated visually through the representation of a flexible
object.'.110 Interestingly, when we try to rescue the original force of a
dead figure of speech we attempt to conjure up the original physical
image by prefixing the phrase with 'actually' or 'literally'; 'I literally
lost my head', 'Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her
feet.' in which the prefix to the figure is used in the same sense as the
archaic 'very'.111 Paradoxically such expressions will probably occur when
the speaker is most aware of the aptness of the metaphor, though they
seem to be least aware of its metaphorical nature,
The deadness, or liveliness, of metaphor is historically and
culturally conditioned, thus Aristotle's example of 'the arrow flew' does
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not strike me as live enough to be an obvious example of metaphor, while
Turbayne's example of dead metaphor, 'smelling of indolence', does not
strike me as dead enough to be almost literal.112 In contrast 'The cat
insinuated himself into the kitchen' does sound to me like a metaphor
because of the conventional use of the words 'insinuate', 'insinuation',
and so on, in the human domain, but, in that 'insinuate' is derived from
the Latin sinus meaning 'curve', the word might be said to apply more
literally to the movements of a cat than in its normal senses. However,
if we accept that the sense of a word is its standardized usage then our
example is a metaphor, transferring the usual sense of 'insinuate' to the
cat, anthropomorphizing it. Even if one is aware of the root the
expression is mare 'metaphorical' than, for instance, 'the leg of the
table' (if this is metaphorical at all) because those usages which
immediately recall its root, while possible, are uncommon.
Whether a term is literal or metaphorical, then, depends not on its
etymology but on those contexts in which it is habitually used; the
distinction between literal and metaphorical is, at this stage, an
historical question. This is even more pronounced in the case of
homonyms, such as 'bank'. While what the lexicographer classifies as
multiple meanings will be given under one dictionary entry - as in mine
'bankS is split into two parts, the first defined as 'raised shelf of
ground, or slope' or 'flat-topped mass of clouds, snow, etc.', and the
second as 'sloping margin of river, ground near river' or 'edge of hollow
place' - words that are classified as homonyms are given separate
entries. In the case of 'bank' this means there are five entries; 'bank's
meaning 'to confine with banks' or '(of car or aeroplane) to travel with
one side higher'; 'bank'3 meaning 'establishment for custody of money';
'bank'* meaning 'to trade in money', 'to keep money at bank', or, in 'bank
on', meaning 'to base one's hopes on'; 'bank's meaning 'galley-rowers
bench', 'tier of oars', 'row of organ keys', or 'working table'. 'BankS and
'bank's are obviously related,and likewise 'bank'3 and 'bank'*, while
'bank's seems to have a metaphorical connection to 'bank'i. However these
three all share a common root in the Old Teutonic bankon meaning 'bank'i
from which came, by analogy, the later Teutonic bank meaning 'bench'
giving, directly, 'bank's and more indirectly, through Italian and French,
and along metonymic lines concerning the physical setting of early
banking practices, 'bank'3. It is clear, however, in this case, that we
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would never be able, without the aid of the respective words' etymologies,
to make a direct connection between 'bankS and 'bank'3, their meanings
are so divergent that homonymity might just as well be accidental for all
that the use of one will tell us about the use of the other. While
knowledge of the root of 'insinuate' does liven our perception of its
normal uses, the connection between the various uses of 'bank' is little
more than an historical curiosity. However as we can see in the
distinction made by the dictionary between 'bank'i and 'bank'3 the
distinction between homonymy and multiple meaning is, as Lyons writes,
'indeterminate and arbitrary.' resting ultimately 'upon either the
lexicographer's judgement about the plausibility of the assumed
"extensions" of meaning or upon some historical evidence that the
particular "extension" has in fact taken place.'.11'1 The distinction Lyons
speaks of is artificial rather than "arbitrary", since the lexicographer
will be guided by distinctions drawn in actual use, but such distinctions
can change, though not perhaps so easily between the homonyms of 'bank1,
from one generation to the next.
There may, however, be instances when the effect of etymology on
present sense will appear more important. There are instances when, as
some writers have claimed, we use words believing that we are referring
literally to something when in fact we are only referring to it by way of
a metaphor. In such cases as 'the leg of the table' this is obviously an
irrelevance, since we are unlikely to confuse the attributes of table legs
with those of other sorts of legs, and our knowledge of table legs is
direct, not dependent on our knowledge of other sorts of legs, even
though the dictionary defines the two uses as close enough to merit a
single entry, that is, as instances of multiple meaning rather than
homonymy. However there are instances when we cannot point directly at
any object in order to determine the meaning of the words we use, the
most obvious example, and one which we will discuss in more detail later,
being theological language, and, specifically, terms predicated of God,
Hick writes that 'in all those cases in which a word occurs both in
secular and in theological contexts, its secular meaning is primary in
the sense that it is developed first and has accordingly determined the
definition of the word.'.115 The meaning of a term when it is applied to
God is, then, an adaption or extension of its secular use; for example,
the ancient Egyptian symbol for God (neter) was an axe-head, from which
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we might deduce that the term started out as an abstract conception of
'strength' or 'power', developing by an extension of the idea of the
ordinary role which such a weapon would fulfil. Vhether neter, then,
properly refers to something other than this abstraction is really the
same question as whether neter is a literal term or a dead metaphor, the
metaphorical nature of which has been forgotten.116 What effect the
answer to this might have on the sense we can properly claim to convey
by theological language is a question we shall leave to later.
We shall now turn to more mundane examples, first of all to show how
consideration of the etymologies of words can make them seem more like
dead metaphors than is at first apparent, and secondly to see how
significant this may be for their sense. As I noted earlier Aristotle's
metaphor 'the arrow flew' appears to me as a literal use of the word
'fly'.117. If we understand flying as moving through the air with wings
then it will appear metaphorical, but there are so many other objects
which 'fly' and which are not birds, and which, indeed, have no other
single term to describe their movement through the air, that 'fly' seems
to properly belong to all of them. Given that an arrow does not have
wings we might try to discover what were the correspondences between an
arrow and a bird which led Aristotle to call he application of 'fly' to an
arrow metaphorical. First of all we can distinguish* the movement of an
arrow or of something thrown, from the the movement of other objects
through the air in that it is horizontal; something simply falling does
not appear to be flying. The fact that, as a bird, the arrow appears to be
defying gravity, which inanimate objects ordinarily do not, gives it a
certain appearance of animation, that is, of intention, purpose or design,
and it is this quality, real in the bird but only apparent in the arrow,
which makes 'the arrow flew' metaphorical. So we might distinguish
between the literal and metaphorical uses 'fly' by saying that in one
instance there is intention and in the other there is not. However the
etymological root of 'intention' tells us that it came from 'stretching' or
'putting under strain' which would make 'intention' a literal reference to
the origin of the arrow's motion and a metaphorical reference to the
origin of the bird's. 'Purpose' and 'design' likewise discover etymological
roots in physical actions. However, like 'insinuate' the word 'intention'
is now used in contexts in which it would not be confused with its
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etymological origin, we know what is intended when we hear the word, it
has its intendment fixed by the laws governing its use.
The extension of the meanings of one term in order to name a new
concept is not exclusively an historical phenomenon. As Addison writes;
Polite masters of morality, criticism, and other speculations
abstracted from matter, who, though they do not directly treat of
the visible parts of nature, often draw from them their
similitudes, metaphors and allegories. By these allusions a truth
in the understanding is as it were reflected by the imagination;
we are able to see something like colour and shape in a notion
and to discover a scheme of thoughts traced out upon the
matter....Allegories, when well chosen are like so many tracks of
light in a discourse, that make everything about them clear and
beautiful.11S
The transfer from the concrete, 'the visible parts of nature', to the
abstract can be seen both in 'insinuate' and 'intention', and in Addison's
image of understanding being 'reflected' by the imagination, and notions
having 'colour and shape'. There can also be a transfer from the abstract
to the concrete, as in Eliot's 'Streets that follow like a tedious
argument/ Of insidious intent', though we might imagine that, as an
historical shift, this would account for fewer extensions of meaning.119
Such metaphors as Addison's, that is, those used illustratively, differ
from historical extensions of meaning, whether into polysemy of homonyms,
in that the sense of their new use is not divorced from the sense of
their old one to the same extent.
This divorce of the sense of the etymological root from the sense of
the contemporary term is the subject of C.S.Lewis' discussion in his essay
'Bluspels and Flalansferes', aptly subtitled 'A Sematic Nightmare', in
which he distinguishes between two types of metaphor, 'Master's' and
'Pupil's', on the basis of their respective original uses. The question
really hinges on whether we think independently of buried (though not
necessarily 'dead') metaphor or not. The 'Master's' metaphor is, according
to Lewis, one invented to help another grasp a concept we already fully
understand ourselves, that is 'clear in our own minds'. In this case the
way in which we understand the concept is relatively independent of the
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metaphor we have invented; we are not dominated by our new 'tool' because
we have 'other tools in our box.',120 Such a metaphor becomes dead if I
continue to use the terms of the metaphor but forget that they were
originally metaphorical; I may even concatenate them into a single
neologism, the original elements of which I can no longer identify.121
However this forgetting does not necessarily alter my thinking on the
subject, provided that it was originally a magistral metaphor and my
conception of the subject it described was not limited by it;
To anyone who attempts to refute my later views on the subject
by telling me that I don't know the meaning of my metaphor I may
confidently retort "Derivations aren't meanings"....What is
important for us is to grasp that just in so far as any metaphor
began by being magistral, so far can I continue to use it long
after I have forgotten its metaphorical nature, and my thinking
will be neither helped nor hindered by the fact that it was
originally a metaphor, nor yet by my forgetfulness of that fact.
It is a mere accident.122
Such 'dead' metaphors as 'arrival', 'insinuate', and 'intention' seem
adequately covered by this account (though 'intention' is not as precise a
concept as, for instance, 'arrival'). Lewis' second type of metaphor, the
'Pupil's' is that type which, in contrast to the magistral, we encounter
when it is we ourselves who are being instructed. Such a metaphor,
according to Lewis, makes what has previously been meaningless acquire
'at least a faint hint of meaning.'. In this instance we are 'entirely at
the mercy of the metaphor.' and if it has been badly chosen or if we are
not aware that it is a metaphor, 'we shall be thinking nonsense,'.123 This
type of metaphor is 'the unique expression of a meaning that we cannot
have on any other terms; it dominates completely the thought of the
recipient; his truth cannot rise above the truth of the original
metaphor.', his thought is 'entirely conditioned' by the imagery which the
metaphor contains.12'4 Such a metaphor can die, or, as Lewis terms it,
'fossilize', in two ways; we may either grasp the subject more directly by
study of the subject itself, or we may continue to use the metaphorical
term and forget the analogy it reperesented though without gaining any
more direct apprehension of the subject. In the first instance it makes
no difference to our understanding to forget that the term has ever been
metaphorical but in the second instance, if I continue to use the term,
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then it is now meaningless and my conception of the subject 'which could
never get beyond the imagery, at once its boundary and its support, has
now lost that support....I am only talking, not thinking, when I use the
word.'.1
Our thought is independent of the metaphors we employ, in so far
as these metaphors are optional; that is, in so far as we are
able to have the same idea without them....The relationship of
meaning to derivation will thus vary from word to word, and from
speaker to speaker.1
Lewis' account is a lucid one but I have reservations about the
example he gives of a pupillary metaphor and, therefore, about his account
of this type of metaphor. The example that he gives is of his own
conception of what a fourth dimension would be like. He has arrived at
this by analogy, that is, by being told to imagine how a third dimension
would appear to the inhabitants of a two-dimensional world. The problem
that arises for me is that I cannot imagine a two-dimensional world, for
though I can imagine a very flat one I realize that even being 'very flat'
involves the notion of a third dimension. For this reason it does not at
all help me to imagine a fourth spatial dimension and I frankly admit
that I cannot. Furthermore I am not sure that Lewis does not simply
imagine that he imagines it, that is, that there is not some gap, some
empty space in the image which he has when he thinks of a fourth
dimension. Ve could consider an alternative example of what may have been
a magistral metaphor - the word 'hedgehog' ('hedge' due to the animal's
habitat, and 'hog' due to its snout). If we look at the dictionary
definition - spiny insectivorous quadruped, rolling itself into a ball for
defence - then its name does not seem particularly pertinent to its
nature. Direct acquaintance with the animal is important to the
metaphorical deadness of the term 'hedgehog' and, indeed, I had heard it
for years before realizing that it was made up of two words with self-
contained meanings. Were one's conception of the animal limited to the
metaphor, that is, a hog that lives in a hedge, then one would have a
very poor idea of the animal, and it is difficult to imagine this as a
very effective pupillary metaphor. However it is equally difficult to
imagine a situation in which the passing on of the name, even assuming
that the 'pupil' has never seen anything as common as a hedgehog, would
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not be accompanied by some further explanantion of the way it differed
from a hog both in size and appearance. The name could then, despite its
descriptive properties, equally well be something else, a group of
syllables with no previous sense, and the metaphorical nature of the name
would be, as it has been for me until recently, accidental. This account
relies on the ability of the person who is instructing us on hedgehogs
being able to represent the animal in other ways aside from its name and,
at this level of language, not only is this probable but it is even more
likely that our acquaintance with the representation will precede our
learning of the name. But we may now turn to a more esoteric concept -
'elephant'. In the choir stalls of Chester cathedral there is a wooden
carving of an elephant which has, among other unelephantine qualities,
hooves. It is, I would argue, an example of an unintentional visual
metaphor. One can see how the carver might have arrived at the hooves by
analogy with animals with which he was familiar; the larger a European
quadruped becomes, along the scale of quadrupeds, the less likely it is to
have paws and the mare likely it is to have hooves, similarly, though a
bear is large and has paws it is also shaggy, therefore a large smooth-
skinned animal will have hooves. The carving is a representation in a
much stronger sense than we can use in calling the word 'hog' in
'hedgehog' a representation, though we might be justified in so doing.
Again the metaphor might be unimportant on acquaintance - one can now
recognize the carving as an elephant because it is more like that animal
than any other - but it is quite plausible that a contemporary of the
carving on seeing a real elephant might believe that they had discovered
a previously unrecorded animal that was 'something like an elephant'.127
It is the conversion from 'it is something like' to 'it is' which is
the fundamental process in the demise of metaphor. But there are two
types of 'it is', the first is when we point to the object itself or a
faithful representation of it and say 'it is that', the second is when we
remain in ignorance of the true nature of the object but still say 'it is
that', as for instance when, pointing to our carving, we implicitly
declare that an elephant is a 'long-nosed, large-eared horse'.123 The
first relies on a more direct acquaintance with the object, or a more
detailed knowledge of it than is contained in the metaphor and dies
because it is so easily accompanied by a representation, the second
relies on a knowledge of the metaphor alone, but, since it is not so
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easily painted to directly, it dies because it is no longer taken to be a
metaphor. Naming a hedgehog a 'hedgehog' is likely to be a gradual,
communal act which will leave nobody confused as to what it refers to,
but the carved elephant is an esoteric piece of vocabulary analogous to
an abstract term or a specialized use, perhaps the invention of an
individual. Vith most academic disciplines concerned with the humanities i
there are a host of terms analogous to 'long-nosed, large-eared horse'
which point to something either quite unlike their apparent meaning, the
way in which they are used, or else to nothing at all in existence; the
centaurs, griffons, and chimeras of the intellectually orientated mind.
The popularity of the multiplication of entities, of classes, and classes
of classes, can be seen, for example, in contemporary literary theory; one
system of classification after another is thrown out, replete with
evocative terms that will not, however, resolve into separate senses, that
is, one can define the terms but the definition remains chronically
ambiguous in the practical situations to which they supposedly refer.
There are certain words, such as 'subjective' and 'objective', which, when
any writer uses them as absolutes, become mere husks of sense. This is
the power of the Greek, the polysyllabic, or even simply the technical
word over the imagination; there is, after all, an etymological link, via
the concept of magic, between 'grammar' and 'glamour'. Classifiers are
always in the ascendant over analysts in papular intellectual life, since
it is easier to learn a jargon than to equal an insight. (The 'fundamental
dichotomy', an animal practically unknown in the wild, is best of all.)
As a second example of an alternative pupillary metaphor to that of
Lewis I would suggest the likening of words and their meanings to tools
and their functions. I would argue that once one has grapsed the aptness
of this metaphor, even if one has never considered the concept of meaning
before, then one has grasped all that is contained in the likeness, that
is, one has as complete a knowledge of what the master means by it as
they have themself .123 In certain cases the metaphor contains the whole
of the idea, and thus understanding it at all presupposes that one could
construct another different metaphor to express the same idea. It would
still be possible, of course, /tol merely 1 learn the words contained in the
simile and repeat them, parrot-fashion, in response to the stimulus
'meaning' without reflecting on them and, therefore, without being able to
offer an alternative metaphor, or even perhaps to be able to do so at
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first but subsequently forget and still carry on using the expression. In
both these instances we might say that, even though the likeness is
obviously being drawn in the expression, as a metaphor it would be dead
to the user.
As we saw with 'bank' (the establishment) the original name given to
something may be to a large degree accidental to its defining
characteristics. With an example such as 'insinuate', despite its original
metaphorical status, its image of curving, we are not dominated by that
original meaning, that is, we can use the word correctly and meaningfully
without even being aware of its origin.130 Ve think, therefore,
independently of buried metaphor in so far as we could, in Lewis' words,
supply in its place a 'new and independent apprehension' of our own, for
'to have a choice of metaphors (as we have in most cases) is to know
more than we know when we are the slaves of a unique metaphor.'.131 This
holds for individual sensible objects, continues Lewis, but 'when we begin
to think of causes, relations, of mental states or acts, we become
incurably metaphorical.'.133 This is something we have already touched
upon when talking of expressions such as 'deep sadness'. In this sphere
Lewis considers that 'freedom' from a given metaphor is, in some cases,
'only a freedom to choose between that metaphor and others.'.133 Whether
we can legitimately call something which has a definite sense 'incurably
metaphorical' is a question we will return to, for it concerns not only
the division between metaphorical and literal, but also the type, or types
of meaning a metaphor can have, and the possibilities of paraphrase.
Lewis holds that in certain instances a thing has never been apprehended
literally and we must therefore have metaphor understood to be such, or
nonsense, and that, therefore, 'we are never less the slaves of metaphor
than when we are making metaphor, or hearing it new made.'.13'4
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How are we divide the metaphorical from the literal? We began with
Aristotle's definition of metaphor as the application to one thing of the
name belonging to another, an alien name, or the use of a word
transferred from its proper sense.13S Is metaphor, then, simply improper
use of language, that is, catachresis? The two terms 'metaphor' and
'catachresis' are obviously not synonyms in so far as catachresis could
be, by this definition, mere nonsense as well as metaphor. But the
introduction of our new term, even if we decide it is the genus of which
metaphor is a species, does not actually advance us very far in the
direction of the distinction we are looking for. In hitting on the idea of
metaphor as deviance from 'proper' or 'ordinary' language we have, so to
speak, got the snake by the tail; but where does the tail end and the
body begin?
Ve have seen some of the ways in which a metaphorical (or metonymic,
in the case of 'bank') term can became literal in the preceding analysis
of dead metaphor and we could summarize these as follows : A word is the
proper word far a thing when it becomes the one that a speaker of the
language would expect to hear applied to that thing, that is, when any
ambiguity that might arise in understanding its use is due to homonymity
and not to the novelty of the application. It may be best, then, to
contrast metaphorical language not with ordinary or literal language, but
with established language. This is certainly not the last word on the
distinction and neither is it very informative about the particular
qualities of the metaphorical and the literal/established, but this
historical aspect is, neverthless, a good place to begin.
In the Poetics Aristotle defines a 'poetic coinage' as a 'word which
has not been in use among people' and we might adapt this to say that a
poetic metaphor is, in contrast to those metaphors in their declining
years, the use of a word that has not been in use among people,13e In
contrast to nonsense there is, in the new application, a discoverable
appropriateness, by way of analogy, as has been discussed in the first
part of this essay.137 As long as the impropriety of the application or
use, the resistance between the old and new senses of the word, remains
for so long is the application metaphorical.13S Demetrius holds that
'custom...is especially a teacher of metaphors.' and applies them almost
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universally, though most escape notice because they are 'safe'.139
Demetrius conception of the growth of language appears to be an odd one,
for he speaks of 'custom' describing some ideas 'so well by metaphor,
that we no longer need literal words; the metaphor remains, usurping he
place of the original word - as, for example, "the eye of the vine"', but
we would obviously not want to presume that there was always a literal
term for a thing, that came into being, as it were, with the thing
itself.1,40 However, the idea of custom establishing the proper, apparently
literal name for a thing is, I believe, correct, for what is apparently
literal is literal. The metaphor points out an analogy, between situations
or things, which has not been previously accepted or 'seen'. As Eco
writes, 'the latent proportion...does not exist before the metaphor; it
must be found, whether by the person who invents the catachresis or by
the person interpreting it...after which discovery language absorbs the
trope, lexicalizes it, and registers it as an avercoded expression.'.1"11 A
term which has thus 'settled', the sense of which is sufficiently common
for it to be amenable to a reasonably adequate definition, can then be
decribed as literal or, excluding homonyms, univocal. Indeed without this
settled aspect metaphor could not exist, for it only exists in
contrast.1,42 However, I believe that the idea of all contemporary language
having its roots in metaphor is mistaken; though the number of things
that can be named, the referential power of language, evidently increases
by metaphor, we must allow that there is, at however remote a stage, a
time when a word is simply a collection of sounds either arbitrarily of
metonymically (as in onomatapeia) associated with some object in the
world, for we cannot have a metaphorical application without a literal
meaning.
Something of this process can be seen in our acquisition of language
as children, or, more rarely, in learning a foreign language. Our first
steps in learning to understand or reproduce language consist in
associating a ward or phrase with some specific situation. We reproduce
it on what appears to be a similar occasion and are rewarded either by
approval or, more directly, by our efforts being the cause of the
repetition of some pleasure. We repeat our word or phrase in subsequent
similar stations and gradually discover, from the reactions of others, X
whether we have mistaken the analogy between one situation and another
which defines them as the same situation. As a personal example, the
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first time I saw a concrete-mixer I pointed it out as a 'coffee machine',
naming it by analogy with a coffee grinding machine I had recently seen
working in a shop. A new word or phrase invites the child, or adult, to
find a governing semantic rule from its context; we abstract the
recurring attribute from particular instances and generalize to new
instances. The concept that we thus form is also a semantic rule, a rule
of reference for the new word.1'1'1 Not only nouns but also verbs,
propositions, and subject-object constructions are learnt in this way.
Vhen they are taught systematically it is by the comparison of sentences
that are alike in every element except that to be learnt, matched with
situations that are identical but for the relevant linguistic feature.1 "ie
This can also be a procedure for the definition of concepts even at an
esoteric level, as, for instance, in such questions as 'Is Ulysses a
novel?' or 'Can you separate "modern" and "medieval" elements in Luther's
weltanschaung?', and so on. Quine writes that it is, therefore, 'a
mistake...to think of linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body
and metaphorical in its trimmings.' and Richards describes metaphor as
'the omnipresent principle of language'.1"-6' But before taking what may
seem to be naturally the next step, and declaring that all language is
governed by metaphor, we might ask what is to be gained or lost by
saying so. Even if we allow that situations which are the same are rarely
identical situations, this does not make our use of a term or phrase to
cover all of them, metaphorical. This is, however, related to an idea of
language which is bound to occur to one if one thinks about the subject
of language in these terms, an idea for which I will let Nietzsche be the
spokesman;
Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it
is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and
entirely individual original experience to which it owes its
origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it
simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases -
which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and
thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation
of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never
totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept
"leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual
differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects.1'17
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In this passage we slip along, almost insensibly, from similarity to
difference, to inequality, to arbitrary association, as if unaware that,
apart from the names of individuals and places, there are few words
which are not intended to refer to classes of things and that language
can usually be made as specific as the instances which we want to refer
to require it to be. Metaphorical use is distinguished from simply general
use by the fact that, as we have observed, it is the use of a word which
is somehow contra-indicated by the context in which it occurs. Thus one
can refer to 'leaf!, 2, 3, a...' as 'leaves' without transporting into one
context any term belonging more properly to another, while in referring
to a leaf as a 'tongue of fire' one does. Likewise 'leaves of a book' is
not metaphorical because one does not have to think of leaves (botanical)
in understanding or using it (though my placing it here, among other
'leaves', has probably made you da so). More strictly analogical uses of
'leaf' occur when a botanist refers to specialized leaves, such as those
of a carnivorous plant or climber; in these cases the analogy is drawn on
the basis of a specialized definition of leaves as organs, a definition
that may not coincide with the more obvious characteristics by which the
non-botanist identifies them.
If all language is metaphorical then no language is metaphorical, for
to transfer a word or phrase from its proper context implies a proper
context, a literal use far that word or phrase. Nevertheless metaphor is
no respecter of settled categorical habits and, as such, is often
instrumental in forming new ones; even a dictionary only half a century
old can surprise one with how many uses which now seem literal are cited
as figurative extensions. While there is a dividing line between
metaphorical and literal use it is one which, due to the freedom with
which ordinary language exploits the possibilities of allusion or
similitude, is constantly moving. Jakobson writes of an 'ascending scale
of freedom' in the possible combination of linguistic units which a
language user can make, going from phonemes to the combination of
phonemes into words, to the formation of sentences, to the combination of
sentences.'(This varies from language to language; the possibilities of
combining parts of words into new yet immediately meaningful ones are,
for example, much greater in modern Greek than in modern English.) We
could look upon the formulation of sentences and the combination of
sentences as the creation of contexts within which a word can take on a
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new meaning, in which a use that would perhaps elsewhere be simply
nonsense can become metaphorical. Indeed it is uncommon to find a single
paragraph of any sort of discourse which does not contain a metaphor, or
at least a construction that once would have been one. Even in speech,
the context of which is more often a practical one, this freedom to
invest, by analogy, an old expression with new meaning is possible,
though we might expect it to be rarer. For in discourse there are always
two elements; the familiar, that is, known words and the syntactical rules
for their combination, and the particular, that is, what on any particular
occasion the speaker or writer is trying to refer to, which will often be
something quite novel.1 A31 I have refrained from saying that it will
always be novel because though two situations, say two separate occasions
of addressing a letter to the same place, are not identical, just because
we are only doing 'the same thing' does not justify our saying that we
are doing something 'different'. When a discourse is made up almost
exclusively of metaphors then we have a riddle, though its very status as
a riddle, its form, tells us that it points towards a literal abject or
situation.150 Metaphor, then, is a way of increasing the possibilities of
conveying new information, comparable to the combination of old senses
that make up a new sentence but, at the same time, involving a deviance
from an established use, so that its metaphorical use is not simply new
but also unorthodox.151
It is because of metaphor's ability to express the novel that it is
often found at what Quine calls 'the growing edge of science'.1 But we
must justify our use of the word 'metaphor' here, for it would seem that
'analogy' would better describe the theoretical models of science. However
metaphor and analogy are two types of representation that are intimately
connected. Vhen we consider metaphor as involving only a single point of
comparison or likeness we can then contrast it with analogy which, by
definition, sets out numerous comparisons point by point. But metaphor, as
our earlier discussion has shown, involves not just a single point of
comparison , though it often appears to, for an analogy is always
implicit. Likewise in simile the 'like' hides a multitude of 'likes'. If we
wish to divide these three terms from one another then we would do so
along a continuum of increasing explicitness as to just what features of
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the principal and subsidiary subjects are being compared, with metaphor
at the least explicit end of the spectrum and analogy at the most
explicit. It is, finally, a matter of appearance.
Turbayne, who, in The Myth of Metaphor, is mainly concerned with
metaphors in science, writes that 'to present items belonging to one sort
in the idiom appropriate to another.' is not necessarily to create
confusion but, on the contrary, often has 'great illustrative and
explanatory value.'.1S3 This definition of metaphor is almost identical
with Ryle's description of the 'category-mistake' and this parallel is of
great significance for the use and abuse of scientific description.1 For
it is in science, and, as we shall shortly see, in philosophy too, that
the division between metaphorical and literal can become most
problematic. Turbayne cites Freud's Interpretation of Dreams and
Berkeley's Essay Towards a Mew Theory of Vision, among other works, as
examples of 'the deliberate and sustained application of an extended
metaphor - that is, a model - to a concrete problem.'.1 At a more
prosaic level I might offer the example of those models consisting of
balls and springs that are used in teaching chemistry to demonstrate
molecular structure, for, while the atoms themsleves are represented in a
similar idiom, that is, as matter (the balls), the forces which bind them
together are represented by a different idiom, again matter (the springs).
In this instance we could say that the spring is an instance of visual
metaphor. Used with awareness metaphors can illuminate obscure or
previously hidden facts, however, when they are used without awareness
the result is confusion; as if, for example, we were to expect the
breakdown of some molecule into its constituents to give us certain
elements and whatever type of matter the springs represent. However, the
model, whether a visual or a verbal matter, is a form of explanantion, it
makes intelligible to us what otherwise might not be. If an analogy or
metaphor is a good one then it can be used as the basis for
experimentation and to make the results of experimentation
intelligible.1 se There may come a point at which the established metaphor
becomes more misleading than helpful, and it is then dropped in favour of
one which is, as we might say, mare apt.
However, with certain very effective metaphors our instinct is to
'deny the metaphor and affirm the literal truth', as Turbayne writes;
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The history of science may be treated from the point of view
that it records attempts to place metaphysical disguises upon
the faces of process and procedure. After the disguise or mask
has been worn for a considerable time it tends to blend with the
face and it becomes extremely difficult to "see through" it.157
(In such instances the metaphor does not die by becoming literal, it dies
by becoming hidden, by taking on the appearance of literalness.) In the
mind of the observer it moves along a continuum from simile to metaphor
to literal truth, but unlike our earlier examples of the metaphorical
becoming literal, in the scientific context, in which the metaphor is a
form of explanation, this process involves a loss of sense. Turbayne
describes haw a special set of implications is taken from one idiom, -for
example that belonging to machinery, and used to explain facts about
something not so directly observable, for example the human body. What
are conclusions in the first idiom are thus used as premisses in the
second.1 Be However, no metaphor, he continues, can 'validly claim to
provide the correct allocation of the facts.', though it may serve as a
more useful guide than its predecessors, and if it does cease to be
understood as metaphor, or if it is not understood as such to begin with,
then the result is confusion.1 I do not, however, agree with Turbayne's
conclusion that 'we cannot say what really is, only what it seems like to
us' since while all theories about processes or forces are provisional
there are certain basic objects in scientific inquiry, the flesh and blood
of things, which science does refer to without involving itself in
metaphor at all.ieo Similarly, while we may not be able to point to an
observable literal half of the analogy we have drawn, individual
observations and experimental results are things which we can actually
point to; it is in the synthesizing, theoretical aspect of science that
metaphor holds sway. Somebody, possibly Bertrand Russell, wrote that
reality was the current state of scientific knowledge, and, in that
reality is, once we have allowed for the provisional nature of theory,




In Demonstration, in Councell, and in all vigorous search of
Truth,, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding
have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is
so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case
utterly excluded. For seeing they openly profess deceipt; to
admit them in Councell or Reasoning, were manifest folly.161
Hobbes appears here to completely reject the use of metaphor in
philosophy. Yet this may be a question of style rather than of subject
matter, for he is ready to allow simile, or undisguised metaphor, and in
praising it he himself employs what seeems to be metaphor
'understanding...opened by some apt similitude'. Having, in the last
section, identified metaphor and simile as figures with the same
cognitive potential, differring only in appearance and immediacy, we
might read this passage as a warning against the confusion that can
arise from using metaphors when it is possible they will not be
understood as such. In an earlier chapter Hobbes writes that metaphors
and tropes are 'less dangerous' than such words "as are the names of
Vertues and Vices' - 'wisdom', 'fear', 'cruelty', 'justice' - because, while
these ethical terms hide the fact that they signify 'the nature,
disposition, and interest of the speaker', figurative words at least
'profess their inconstancy'.162 Is there a sense, then, in which ethical
and evaluative terms are dead, or, rather, hidden metaphors like those
hidden scientific metaphors discussed above, that is, involving a loss of
sense? I do not wish to get into a full-scale discussion of the
evaluative use of language here but will say, in passing, that, since
evaluative statements are obviously statements about the disposition of
the speaker, unless the speaker is actually lying they cannot be said to
be deceitful, and to insist that the speaker make the subjective nature of
his statement explicit is purely gratuitous, for what they "really" mean
is to be understood by what they say. We will now turn to Demonstration
and Councell in general.
Nietzsche, in the essay earlier referred to, begins by attacking the
supposed objectivity of evaluative, moral language, but soon extends his
argument to all language. He writes of how a 'uniformly valid and binding
designation is invented for things', and how, with this 'invention', the
'legislation of language', the difference between truth and lies first
comes into existence.163 Aside from the use of 'invent' this proposition
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seems uncontroversial, since without such a 'legislation', an established
body of correct usage, there can be neither representation nor
misrepresentation. However, Nietzsche then goes on to question the basis
of these linguistic conventions;
Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate
expression of all realities? It is only by means of forgetfulness
that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess
a "truth" of the grade first indicated. If he will not be
satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if
he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always
exchange truths for illusions.1 e"t
The arbitrary designation of things, according to Nietzsche, arises
through processes involving metaphor - a nerve stimulus is 'transferred'
into an image, the image 'imitated' in a sound - 'each time there is a
complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely
new and different one.'.1&E The result is, he concludes, that though we
believe we know something about such things as 'trees, clouds, snow, and
flowers', in fact 'we possess nothing but metaphors for things -
metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.'; we
'dissolve' our sudden impressions, images, and intuitions into concepts
and abstractions.1 ee
What then is truth. A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies and
anthropomorphisms : in short, a sum of human relationships which
have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred,
and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to people to
be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we
have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become
worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which
have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no
longer as coins....to be truthful means to employ the usual
metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is to lie according
to fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding
upon everyone.1
Nietzsche claims that it is only by forgetting that the original
perceptual metaphors are only metaphors and not 'the things themselves',
that one can live 'with any repose, security, and consistency', for our
concepts are piled up on a foundation of, as it were, 'running water.'.1&s
If all this is 'true' what then of Nietzsche's own discourse? Is it made
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up lies? A paradox is an attractive thing, but it can be profound or
meaningless, and a discourse that undermines itself can only leave irony
- but at whose expense?
Nietzsche defines the liar as 'a person who uses the valid
designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal
appear to be real.' but this is not, of course, possible unless there is a
valid designation; there must be truth for there to be illusion and truth
is a property which only language can possess.1 e3 To illustrate how we
may differentiate between what is true and what is not, or at least
between degrees of truthfulness, we might look at the opening of the
essay under discussion. Here Nietzsche invents a fable in order to convey
'how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary the
human intellect looks within nature.'.170 I am no more than a human being
with a human intellect so I cannot verify Nietzsche's picture, but when he
speaks of this intellect 'detaining' us for 'a minute within existence',
then it becomes clear that words are being used to make the unreal
appear real, for a lifetime may not be an appreciable span in the history
of the universe, but to a human being, as Nietzsche was and as any of his
potential readers are, it is a lifetime. This assertion of Nietzsche's,
then, appears to have been a metaphor - 'a man's lifetime : universe' as
'a minute : a man's lifetime' - but as we see, when its terms are formally
set out, it is neither true nor a metaphor.171 Philosophically, then, same
metaphors are better than others.
In another essay, written during the same period, Nietzsche suggests
that the 'spiritual activity of millenia is deposited in language.', and it
is to this idea, which is especially relevant to the examination of the
role of metaphor in philosophy, that we shall now turn,172 Jonathan
Culler states that, since a literal expression is 'a metaphor whose
figurality has been forgotten.', then philosophy 'is condemned to be
literary in its dependence on figures'.173 As we have seen, however, in
our discussion of Lewis' essay, there are many ways in which a figure can
lose its figurative status and each of these ways will have a different
effect on its subsequent meaningfulness. In his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding Locke condemns 'atomists' for defining 'motion' as 'passage
from one place to another' on the grounds that this is merely to replace
one synonymous ward with another.17d Paul de Man comments on this
passage;
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Locke's own "passage" is bound to continue this perpetual motion
that never moves beyond tautology : motion is a passage and
passage is a translation : translation, once again, means motion,
piles motion upon motion. It is no mere play on words that
"translate" is translated in German as "ubersetzen" which itself
translates the Greek "meta phorein" or metaphor. Metaphor gives
itself the totality which it then claims to define, but it is in
fact the tautology of its own position. The discourse of simple
ideas is figural discourse or translation and, as such, creates
the fallacious illusion of a definition.176
I have already described many of the objections that can be made to the
idea of the ubiquity of metaphor, here I will just reiterate that choice
of metaphor entails a freedom from metaphor, and the fact that if a
contemporary term were truly synonymous with its metaphorical origin
then they would be interchangeable, which, patently, in the majority of
cases, they are not. De Man goes on to discuss how the metaphors which
Locke himself employs to describe language shape his cognition of the
subject, so that he must be read 'to same extent, against or regardless of
his own explicit statements....he has to be read in terms of the
rhetorical motion of his own text, which cannot be simply reduced
to...identifiable facts.'.1'76 The idea that metaphors play a crucial role in
theoretical description is no more than has already been discussed, but
it does not fallow from this that meaning or verification must be
indefinitely postponed. Indeed, were this the case then meaningful
discussion of the figurative status of Locke's passage would be
impossible. De Man holds that, at times, 'it seems as if Locke would have
liked nothing better than to be allowed to forget about language
altogether', but this is a comment that only a fellow-writer could
seriously make.17"7 All writing, philosophy included, demonstrates an
extraordinary concern with language - this is the paradox of Nietzsche
and all writers on the inadequacy or distorting influence of language.
Those who take language for granted only write out of necessity.
Philosophy is a concern with the referential power of language par
excellence, and, in this respect, we could characterize the project of
philosophy, from Socrates onwards, as an attempt to liberate thought from
the disruptive power of metaphor and the unreflective use of language.176
When de Man states that philosophy 'is condemned, to the extent that it
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is dependent upon figuration, to be literary' and that, consequently, it
cannot claim a separate 'identity or specificity' from literary discourse,
he says no more than that metaphor can be found in both.173 Though we
must make this distinction, that the metaphors in philosophy are made to
be questioned.130
This is a view that Derrida seems to hold when he asks 'Has not
philosophy always recalled the arbitrariness of the sign in order to
point the contingent and superficial exteriority of language to thought,
the secondariness of the sign in relation to the idea, etc.?', but it soon
transpires that the question is more than rhetorical.131 In 'White
Mythology' Derrida states that 'metaphor seems to involve the usage of
philosophic language in its entirety, nothing less than the usage of so-
called natural language in philosophical discourse, that is the usage of
natural language as philosophical language.'.132 The argument by which he
arrives at this conclusion is already familiar to us; the abstract concept
comes into being through the 'wearing away' usure of what was originally
physical metaphor. The difference is that Derrida takes this idea to its
final conclusion, short of resigned silence. He quotes a dialogue from
Anatole France in which one character, to demonstrate how 'metaphysical
metaphor' has 'erased piles of physical discourses', reactivates 'the
primitive inscription' in "The spirit possesses God in proportion as it
participates in the absolute".133 By tracing the geneaology of each term
this is finally rendered as "He whose breath is a sign of life, man, that
is, will find a place.,,in the divine fire, source and home of life, and
this place will be meted out to him according to the virtue that has been
given him...of sending abroad this warm breath, this little invisible soul,
across the free expansd'.1 This is the meaning, or one of them, of the
title 'White Mythology', for metaphysics has 'erased within itself the
fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains
active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered
over in the palimpset.'.185 Though Derrida states that 'the issue is not
to take the function of the concept back to the etymology of the noun
along a straight line', he nevertheless sees the historical tie between
origin and use as 'not a reducible contingency.'.iee We have already noted
that theological language can only be analogical, and this is a fact not
hidden from most theologians, but Derrida appears to extend the rule of
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metaphor to cover all abstract language and this presents a special
problem for its philosophical description;
Metaphor cannot dominate itself, cannot be dominated by what it
itself has engendered, has made to grow on its own soil,
supported on its own base. Therefore it gets "carried away" each
time that one of its products - here the concept of metaphor -
attempts in vain to include under its own law the totality of the
field to which the product belongs. If one wished to conceive and
to class all the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, one
metaphor, at least, always would remain excluded, outside the
system : the metaphor, at the very least, without which the
concept of metaphor could not be constructed...1®7
Vithout a non-metaphorical vocabulary or standpoint one cannot stand
outside of the subject of metaphor, or even define it - for some defining
term will be itself metaphorical. Drawing an analogy with the concept of
scientific theory as metaphor, he asks 'Is rectification henceforth the
rectification of a metaphor by a concept? Are not all metaphors, strictly
speaking, concepts, and is there any sense in setting metaphor against
concept?'.1 se That 'proper meaning' is not synonymous with 'original
meaning' is something we have already established, but Derrida is
suggesting something more radical - an absence of 'proper meaning' in the
philosophical use of language.1433 There are two questions to be answered
here : Is Derrida right? Does it make any difference if he is?130 With
Nietzsche's paradoxical argument these two questions amounted to a single
question, but Derrida's position is more sophisticated.131
To ask whether a term in philosophy can be separated from its
physical roots is to ask whether it can be made to meaningfully refer to
something other than those roots. ("The spirit possesses God in
proportion as it participates in the absolute" is not, of course,
philosophically meaningful to begin with!) In Derrida's account the
philosophical term, despite his emphasis on geneaology, appears suddenly,
devoid of defining properties that will separate it from its metaphorical
origins by allowing it to refer to a state-of-affairs separate from those
origins.132 However, as Austin reminds us, 'it is advisable to bear in
mind...that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part,
relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always
very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary'.133 Just as it is the
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context of the use of a word which makes it either metaphorical or
literal, so it is the context of any word which qualifies its precise
sense. We can look upon a word such as 'intention' as an attempt to hide
an image of stretching, or as an attempt, or the result, of a
differentiation between concepts. Those sentences which 'stretch' can
meaningfully belong to are not the same sentences as those which
'intention' can meaningfully belong to, though there may be some overlap
and, as with 'insinuate' we can imagine 'intention' being used
metaphorically in this overlapping.13/1 Even if the rest of the components
of those sentences are themselves rooted in metaphor - though, given
their new independence, 'originated in metaphor' is more apt - then at
least we know that they all belong to the same area of language, that is,
when they appear together we are not immediately aware of metaphor.133
If we mix the domains of 'stretch' and 'intention' then we no longer have
the contemporarily literal, for the domains can be differentiated; the two
words refer to different states-of-affairs, and to substitute one in the
normal context of another is to create metaphor, to say something novel
by the use of analogy.133 'Intention' and 'stretch' are more closely
related to their respective areas of language than to one another, indeed
the very fact that one began in another but began on the basis of an
analogical relationship denies the possibility of identity. Let us look
for a moment at the individual metaphor : Without some state-of-affairs
to provide a resting point, or points, in the interpretative process begun
by metaphor, that is, without some resemblances that exist and therefore
can be pointed to even if their description has not previously existed in
language, then metaphor is not possible. To argue, then, that some
abstract or philosophical term is metaphor is to point to resemblances
between its normal use and its genealogy, that is, to understand how they
are separate.137 If we, provisionally , adopt as a criterion of
significance the possibility of providing a definition that is ultimately
ostensive for each term in any sentence, then we must allow that, despite
any metaphorical relationship between a term and its ancestors, the
states-of-affairs that would be finally pointed to by such definitions
would be different from one another.133
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The problem, if problem it is, of the relation between literal
meanings and any other sorts of meanings confronts us nowhere more
strikingly than in the central topic of this essay - literature, It was
Dryden's opinion that 'the boldest strokes of poetry, when they are
managed artfully, are those which most delight the reader.' and he cites
Virgil and Horace, in their 'frequent use of the hardest metaphors, and of
the strongest hyperboles', as both the best authority and the best
argument for this opinion.13,9 Aristotle, who in the Poetics writes that
'there are not the same standards of correctness in poetry as in
political theory or any other art.', gives examples, in the Rhetoric, of
metaphors which are 'bad taste' in certain forms of discourse because
they are 'too much like poetry.'.200 There may indeed be reason for
identifying the poetical with metaphor per se, for though, as we have
seen, almost all discourse uses metaphors, there may be a point at which
the difference in degree to which one form uses them becomes the
difference between that kind and others. With respect to the use of words
Bacon defined poetry as 'but a character of style' which 'belongeth to the
arts of speech' and held that its 'license' derived from its being a
product of the imagination 'which, being not tied to the laws of matter,
may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which
nature hath joined: and so make unlawful matches and divorces of
things',201 It seems unlikely that any single feature can be defined the
presence of which will justify our calling one form of discourse literary
or poetical, for the way in which we use such terms differs not only with
time but also between individuals, that is, it seems fruitless to try and
lay down a priori rules about where difference in degree turns into
difference in kind (it is for this reason perhaps that the perennial
problems in aesthetics are not ones of detail but rather of general
principle).202 Jakobson writes that 'poeticalness is not a supplementation
of discourse with rhetorical adornment but a total re-evaluation of the
discourse and of all its components whatsoever'.203 But this seems to me
misleading, for not only can poetry be a very localized effect, perhaps
only a single sentence in a whole book, but also it suggests, as many
bold statements do, more than it can deliver - the existence of a type of
discourse which owes nothing to the rules governing all other types.20"4
Metaphor is not, in itself, the criterion for dividing literature from
other types of discourse, but the division, wherever we decide to draw it,
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is made on the basis of metaphor or metaphorical effects. Some
contemporary linguisticians have approached literature in this way; Leech,
for example, distinguishes literature from other 'varieties of linguistic 6
activity above all by the number and the importance of the deviant
features it contains.'.205 The deviations that occur in literature, in
contrast to simply uncommon words or usages, can belong, due to the
context-specificity of certain metaphors, to only a single text.
Mukarovsky's concept of the aesthetic as being the product of
foregrounding is of some relevance here;
The function of poetical language consists in the maximum of
foregrounding of the utterance. Foregrounding is the opposite of
automatization, that is, the deautomatization of an act; the more
an act is automatized, the less it is consciously executed; the
more it is foregrounded the more completely conscious does it
become.205
An expression that is automatized is that expresssion which we would
expect in a situation, foregrounding is the presentation of what is not
expected and what is, therefore, capable of 'provoking special
attention.'.202 I am not here concerned with defining 'the poetic', but
much of what is said by Mukarovsky, whether it is right or wrong with
regard to this larger question, is illuminating about poetic license and
suggestive about the relation between poetic license and metaphor. He
holds, for example, that the 'poetic utilization of language' is made
possible by a background of 'standard language', 'the norm' which is
distorted or violated by poetry .20s Indeed Mukarovsky identifies the
metaphorical and the aesthetic use of language to the extent of stating
that when 'a metaphoric designation loses its esthetic effect completely,
it becomes a literal designation.'.205 However, in discussing metaphor as
linguistic deviation it is easy to forget that metaphor is itself a norm,
that is, it is a meaningful use of language, not something extra-
linguistic; it is a type of language called 'metaphoric'. We are, I believe,
now in a position to resolve the paradox of metaphor as a meaningful
deviation from the use that characterizes meaning, as conventional
unconventionality.
We have already seen how the use of a word is metaphorical if the
context in which it appears somehow contra-indicates that use, and how,
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from an historical perspective, metaphor exists in contrast with
established language. On the basis of these conclusions we can now
characterize the metaphorical, in contrast to the literal, in this way :
The metaphorical is langauge using language, the use of usage.210 If we
cannot split 'ordinary language' and metaphor into a straightforward
dichotomy then we can at least distinguish between different degrees of
figurativeness. All language is heuristic in the sense that it points
beyond itself to states-of-affairs but, within language itself, we can
distinguish between heuristic and non-heuristic expressions on the basis
of whether what is pointed to already has an established connection with
the expression that is used to point, the immediacy with which we grasp
what is pointed to, and the novelty of the expression, that is, how
familiar we are with that state-of-affairs embodied in that verbal
formula, or, indeed, in any. Within the body of existing words or
expressions, exlcuding neologisms in so far as their form is arbitrary,
metaphor is the use of language at its most heuristic. Metaphor refers us
not directly to a state-of-affairs but to another area of language and it
is through what that area refers to that we view the state-of-affairs to
which the metaphor finally points.211 It is this indirection, the
filtering or magnifying function of the usage used out of its ordinary
context, which allows the metaphor to be more specific than established
language. Hence the role of metaphor in naming the previously unnamed.
From this heuristic pole language fades through the figurative and the
dead metaphor towards the literal use of language, which is non-heuri|tic S
in the sense that here usages are established; expressions can be related
immediately to their corresponding objects or states-of-affairs without
an intermediary use of language, If, for a moment, we consider language as
a means of dividing up the world (like a yardstick laid against reality,
as Wittgenstein has it) then metaphor uses these existing divisions to
create previously unexisting ones,212
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Metaphor, then, is new language built upon literal, established usage
but saying something more than can be said by that established usage as
it is usually combined.213 Hegel places the source of metaphor in 'the
need and power of spirit and heart which are not content with the simple,
customary and plain, but place themselves above it in order to move on to
something else, to linger over various things, and to join two things
together into one.'.21 "■ But at this point we should note that writers on
metaphor, while broadly agreeing on the innovative nature of metaphor,
differ widely in the semantic status, or degree of meaningfulness, they
accord these innovations. Coleridge, most famously, talks of the poet
diffusing a tone and spirit of' unity into his subject 'that blends and (as
it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical
power... Imagination.
This power...reveals itself in the balance or reconcilement of
opposite or discordant qualities : of sameness with difference;
of the general with the concrete; the idea with the image; the
individual with the representative; the sense of novelty and
freshness with old and familiar objects...215
Poetry and prose, according to Coleridge, consist of the same elements,
but it is the combination of these elements by the imagination which
distinguishes the poetic.215 The same idea can be found in Hobbes, who
had earlier written that a poem required both 'Judgement' (the power of
discerning between things) and 'Fancy' (the power of finding similitudes),
but that 'Fancy must be more eminent' because it is extravagance of
invention which produces the pleasure which is the end of poetry.212
Similarly Alexander Gerard, an earlier and, to my mind, greater literary
theorist than Coleridge, had suggested that the imagination 'draws out
from the whole compass of nature such ideas as we have occasion for,
without attending to any others; and yet presents them with great
propriety, as if all possible conceptions had been explicitly exposed to
view, and subjected to our choice.'.213 Thus, for Gerard, the imagination
is the spirit that gives shape to the 'confused heap of materials,
collected by fancy'.213 Shelley too, for whom poetry is "'the expression
of the imagination'", writes of imagination as 'mind acting upon...thoughts
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so as to colour them with its own light, and composing from them, as
from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle
of its own integrity.'.220 But simply the recurring insistence of writers
on the connection between imagination and what are obviously metaphorical
combinations, will not take us very far. Gerard, Coleridge, and Shelley
are all approaching this connection from the point of view of the
production of metaphors but here I am concerned with the understanding
of metaphors, and their effect on the imaginaton, for, however we finally
define imagination, I believe we will find that it is a concept intimately
bound up with the passible meanings metaphor can convey.
The writer of a contemporary 'handbook of rhetoric' describes the
virtues of metaphor as 'economy of meaning', that is, the compression of a
wide spectrum of ideas and feelings into a few words, the power to 'put
us more deeply in touch with the world in a more complex way.', and the
power to 'enlarge and harmonize experience.'.221 This emphasis on the
emotive potential of metaphor is common; Brooks, for example, holds that
all 'the subtler states of emotion...necessarily demand metaphor for their
expression.', and this is the standpoint of most rhetorical writings,
whose emphasis is on the potential for pleasure and persuasion to be
found in figurative language.222 Longinus, in On the Sublime, writes that
the 'timely expresssion of violent emotions together with true sublimity
is the apppropriate antidote for the number and boldness of
metaphors... the onward rush of passion has the property of sweeping
everything before it, or rather of requiring bold imagery as something
altogether indispensable; it does not allow the hearer leisure to consider
the number of metaphors, since he is carried away by the enthusiasm of
the speaker.'.223 To adapt the subject matter so as to accomodate the
figure seems a strange suggestion, but the whole of Longinus' attitude to
metaphor is ambiguous. While he describes how sublimity, or literary
excellence, and 'the expression of strong feelings' can guard against 'the
suspicion that attends the use of figures.' and even conceal the fact that
they are figurative, he also counsels the use of figurative language 'in
the handling of commonplaces and of descriptions' for, here, 'nothing so
much confers distinction as a continuous series of metaphors.'.22'1 Indeed,
as it transpires, the excess which Longinus fears, though his argument is
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slightly confused, is not in the number of metaphors employed but in the
emotion conveyed by them. For, though 'emotional and descriptive
passages...most gladly find room for them', metaphors can be too
emotionally patent far more sober passages.22® As we have seen, there is
no particular reason for equating emotional expressiveness with metaphor
per se, but as we go on it is this aspect of metaphor, what we might call
its rhetorical role, which will become increasingly important to us.
As we have seen in the preceding sections one of the most important
distinguishing characteristics of metaphor is novelty. Aristotle writes
that, while strange words simply puzzle us and ordinary words 'convey
only what we already know', metaphor is the means by which we 'can best
get hold of something fresh.', of new ideas.22® When he says a new idea
he does not necjessarily mean only an intellectual construct, the example
he gives is of the poet calling old age "a withered stalk" and thus
conveying 'a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion
of "lost bloom", which is common to both things.'.227- Eco likewise writes
of how 'infinite pieces of encyclopedic information can be inserted' into
the 'schema' provided by the analogy - A:B as C:D - to produce new
predicates, making metaphor 'above all, a tool of cognition.'.22® We have
already seen how metaphor expresses the previously unexpressed, indeed
may be, at any given time, the only passible way of pointing to the
unnnamed. According to Langer it is when 'new, unexploited possibilities
of thought crowd in upon the human mind' and 'the poverty of everyday
language becomes acute' that conditions are 'favourable to the development
of metaphorical speech.'.229 Likewise Lewis' account of how 'a new
metaphor starts forth, under the pressure of composition or argument',
and how our 'new understanding is bound up with the new metaphor.', would
seem to apply as much to poetic conception and the understanding of
poetry as to any of the more theoretical discourses with which he is
concerned.230 But how new is this 'new understanding', particularly from
the reader's point of view?
True wit is Nature to advantage dress'd;
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd;
Something, whose truth convinced at sight we find,
That gives us back the image of our mind.231
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That this passage from Pope is so well known is perhaps the best
argument in favour of its sense. But it also exemplifies all the
ambiguities involved in the study of metaphor. For is 'what oft was
thought' the subject of poetry, and metaphor only the way of verbalizing
it? How can we be convinced of the 'truth' of a poetic statement? Is this
the result of its giving back only the image of our own mind? The
quotation itself could provide a focus for all these questions, yet it
seems to bring them prematurely to a close, for even in applying them to
it we find that its immediacy, the conviction that it produces 'at sight'
seems to undermine them, to introduce an artificial note into any
analysis we might perform. Pope's account of wit, as Johnson says,
'depresses it below its natural dignity, and reduces it from strength of
thought to happiness of language.'.232 But in the case of metaphor
happiness of language may be strength of thought, for the figure may be
the only way of expressing or making manifest some thought or some
state-of-affairs. Literature, and poetry most obviously, is a form of
discourse in which form and content are inseparable and it would seem
unwise to look for its essence either in the novelty or the philosophical
perspicacity of what is conveyed. I would side with Pope insofar as I
believe that the aesthetic lies less in what is said as in the fact that
it is said. Dryden's definition of wit, as 'propriety of thoughts and
words', is perfectly gratuitous from the reader's point of view since, as
I shall argue in a later chapter, tone of voice cannot be separated from
the subject matter, but when Dryden states that it is 'in other terms,
thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject.', then this is, from
the writer's point of view, no more than finding a means of expression,
and applies particularly well to the conception of metaphor.233 This is
not to describe metaphor as an ornament, as Demetrius appears to do, but
to make it part of the matter that is conveyed; Dryden, indeed, describes
how catachresis and hyperbole should be 'used judiciously, and placed in
poetry as heightenings and shadows are in painting, to make the figure
bolder, and cause it to stand off to sight, h23-*
There is no final way of characterizing the potential sense of every
instance of metaphor. In my first section, on meaning, I examined how
metaphor generated meaning but such an account as was given cannot
finally decide on what semantic status is to be accorded the metapohor
per se. Were it the case that established language and metaphorical
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language were fixed and separate entities then this might be possible,
but, given the creative role which metaphor often, perhaps always, plays
within language, it is not. Thomas Browne, in the preface to his Feligio
Hedici, cautions that such of his expressions as are 'meerly Tropical' are
to be taken 'in a soft and flexible sense, and not to be called unto the
rigid test of Reason.'.333 We can look upon metaphor as a way of
rendering a concrete subsidiary subject into an abstract one; thus the
connotations of 'wolf' in 'Man is a wolf' do not refer primarily to the
physical properties of a wolf, but rather to the lupine, though the image
of the wolf is integral to the figure, as a form of hyperbole, in evoking
and giving force to the attribution of those lupine qualities to man. The
final semantic potential of abstract language is a question of pragmatics,
that is, of how much, if anything, they communicate in any particular
instance. The degree of raeaningfulness a metaphor can have is decided by
its efficiency as an instrument, by the ratio of the results achieved in
sense, to the complexity of expression.a3S As Dryden writes, 'A city's
being buried [in sleep and wine] is just as proper on occasion as an
angel's being dissolved in ease and songs of triumph.' for poetic license
is 'the liberty, which poets have assumed to themselves in all ages, of
speaking things in verse which are beyond the severity of prose.
Bacon characterizes 'allusive' poetry, in contrast to 'narrative' or
'representative', as follows;
Allusive or parabolic is a narration applied only to express some
special purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of parabolic wisdom
was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of
Aesop...And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to
express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtile than
the vulgar in that manner, because men in those times wanted
both variety of examples and subtility of conceit. And as
hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before
arguments: and nevertheless now and at all times they do retain
much life and vigour, because reason cannot be so sensible, nor
examples so fit.33S
This is an interesting passage, both for the parallel it draws between
allusion and primitive argument, and also for the idea of the
metaphorical being necessary 'to express any point of reason...more sharp
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or subtile than the vulgar', a role which we might presume, from the close
of the passage, Bacon would suggest that it can still play. At the end of
the last section I stated that metaphor is, potentially, a way of creating
new divisions in language, that is, of combining elements to create a
reference that is more specific than that normally contained in any of
the individual elements or their non-metaphorical combinations. It is this
filtering, or magnifying function of usage used out of its normal context,
the specificity of metaphor, to which we shall now turn.
What is closest to us is more differentiated than what is at a
distance; most famously there are the Eskimo's multiple distinctions
between different sorts of snow, and the Philippino Hanunoo's names for
ninety-two varieties of rice. This is not exclusively a cultural matter,
each of us will have a specialized vocabulary for what is close to our
central concerns, and will be able to draw and name distinctions which
are unknown, because unnecessary, to another English speaker. The
metaphor aims towards this discriminating function, towards establishing
an increased intimacy with the facts that lie in the conjunction of the
principal and subsidiary subjects of the metaphor, the reference that is
brought into being, as we might say, between them. Demetrius writes that
some ideas 'are described in metaphors with greater clearness and
exactness than if exact language had been used - as the phrase "the
battle shivered",' so that no paraphrase 'could give a truer or clearer
impression.'.233 By 'exact language' I presume Demetrius means literal
language, for, as he says, the description could not be more exact. But it
is in the emotional sphere that metaphor seems to come into its own, just
as it is in this area that we find perhaps the greatest and least obvious
differences between modern languages.
Cleanth Brooks identifies metaphor with paradox for 'all metaphor,.,
involves some element of paradox, for metaphor by its very nature cannot
give a strictly point by point analogy with no element of discrepancy and
contradiction between items compared.'.2AO It is these 'overlappings,
discrepancies, contradictions' which, in Brooks' opinion, allow the
paradoxical aspect of metaphor to convey subtle or complex emotional
states and processes.2-ai
I submit that the only way by which the poet could say what "The
Canonization" says is by paradox. More direct methods may be
tempting, but all of them enfeeble what is to be said. This
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statement may seem less surprising when we reflect on how many
of the important things which the poet has to say have to be
said by means of paradox : - most of the language of lovers is
such.. c2"12
This is an opinion which I broa^dly agree with, though it seems
unnecessary, and possibly confusing, to introduce the concept of paradox,
since it is not so much the overlapping of concepts which generates the
meaning in paradox, as it is in metaphor, but rather what is excluded
from whatever is synonymous in^terms involved. Brooks argues that it is tUe.
the 'precision' of Donne's statement in "The Canonization" which
distinguishes it from a paraphrase of its contents, such as "Love in a
cottage is enough". Such a clichd is not, of course, a paraphrase of
Donne's poem, it is only a related sentiment; the precision lies in the
conciseness with which the paradoxical or metaphorical form of the poem
draws in whole complexes of emotions which, though recognizable, are not
reducible to familiar proverbs. In Principles of Literary Criticism
Richards describes metaphor as 'a semi-surreptitious method by which a
greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the
experience.' for 'what is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not
always naturally present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what
is needed may be smuggled in.'.2'"3 (How, and to what ends, we shall
examine both in the final section of this chapter and elsewhere in this
thesis.) This is expressed rather from the creator's point of view, but
the basic idea of metaphor as an addition to language, an addition that
narrows down the referential function to something unusually specific, is
clear. Bacon makes a similar point when he declares that poesy, in
contrast to reason which 'doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of
things', submits 'the shows of things to the desires of the mind'.2"'"4
There is, in this statement, a suggestion of the ambivalence with which
rhetoric and rhetorical figures (once exposed as such) has been
considered historically. Today 'rhetorical' most readily connotes, or, in
some cases, denotes, 'over-elaborate' or 'insincere', The allusiveness of
metaphor, the inevitable introduction of matter strictly foreign to the
subject which it entails, can be either clarifying or confusing,
revelatory or deceptive, Herbert Read, like Brooks, considers that the
poet 'seeks absolute precision of language and thought, and the exigencies
of this precision demand that he should exceed the limits of customary
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expression, and therefore invent - invent sometimes words, more
frequently new uses of words, most frequently phrases and figures of
speech which reanimate words, and among these, above all, metaphor.',2'ts
Read goes on to say that our normal, non-poetic language, is 'clear and
logical' only 'at the cost of being superficial or inexact' and that the
things the poet 'approaches' are 'eternal thingsV2-"5 Row, while metaphor
does more closely define the sense in which the principal subject is to
be taken, that is, modifies that sense, this modification can be "mere
rhetoric" and is just as capable, if not more capable, than non-
metaphorical language of being 'superficial and inexact'.
I must now distinguish between the idea, to which I subscribe, of the
potentially heuristic function of metaphor, and another popular idea -
that metaphor in some way transcends language. In the First Surrealist
Manifesto Andre Breton announces that surrealism is in revolt against the
'reign of logic', under which 'boundaries have been assigned even to
experience', and is based on 'the belief in the superior reality of certain
forms of association heretofore neglected, in the omnipotence of the
dream, and in the disinterested play of thought.'.247 I do not believe
that there is such a thing as 'disinterested thought' in any absolute
sense, but the surrealists' use of accidental association, especially in
the Exquisite corpse, was aimed at achieving the expression of, if not
disinterested thinking, then at least oblique or unconscious thinking,
freed from the 'restrictions of logic' and the everyday.2'<te These 'written
games' were 'contrived so that the elements of language attacked each
other in the most paradoxical manner possible, and so that human
communication, misled from the start, was thrown into the mood most
amenable to adventure.'.2/13 In the unplanned associations produced by the
Exquisite corpse, continues Breton, 'we had at our command an infallible
way of holding the critical intellect in abeyance, and of fully liberating
the mind's metaphorical activity.'.2®0 Metaphorical because not only was
the interaction between principal and subsidiary subject (whichever was
which) not everyday, but it was not even intentional; only that it should
be metaphorical was intended. This use illustrates the twofold nature of
metaphor, for as a method of synthesizing scientific results it is
critical intellect at, potentially, its most critical, but it can also be
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just the opposite for in it the copula 'is1 appears, from a logical point
of view, to indicate contradiction, nonsense, or paradox, an aspect that
became more obvious as surrealism became more visual and eventually
degenerated, in some instances, into the simply "odd". (A visual
representation less readily suggests the domain that belongs to it than
the word by which it is usually referred to does; it becomes a puzzle
more readily than a metaphor,251) Breton writes that with the advent of
surrealism 'imagination is on the verge of recovering its rights', and
certainly such methods as outlined above depend heavily on the products
of what Hobbes, Gerard, and Coleridge would have called 'Fancy' though
whether this term can be made synonymous with 'imagination' is another
question.Here we might bring to mind a distinction made by Joseph
Addison between two types of 'wit'; true wit which is 'a Resemblance and
Congruity of Ideas....that gives Delight and Surprize' such as to be found
in 'Metaphors, Similitudes, Allegories, Aenigmas, Mottos, Parables, Fables,
Dreams, dramatick Writings, Burlesque and all the Methods of Allusion';
false wit which is the 'Resemblance and Congruity' of letters, syllables,
words, or visual elements, such as to be found in 'Anagrams, Chronograms,
Lipograms, and Acrostics...Ecchos and Doggerel Rhymes...Puns and Quibbles...
Mimickry'.353 Both classes are, strictly speaking, methods of allusion,
the difference lying in whether it is the sense or the ingenuity of the
result which is the more strikinhg. Metaphor can demonstrate either true
or false wit, which belong to imagination and fancy respectively, and it
is as well to keep this in mind in the fallowing discussion, for there we
shall meet several writers who, like Breton, consider metaphor per se as
the salvation of the human spirit. Before moving on, however, we might
consider Addison's third type of wit - mixt wit. This is 'a Composition
of Punn and true Wit...Reason puts in her Claim for one Half of it, and
Extravagance for the other.'.2eA One might cite Donne and, preeminently,
James Joyce, as exmplifying this combination though, with Donne
especially, the false wit, as 'tone of voice', often contributes to the true
wit of the whole.
But we shall now return to the idea of metaphor as transcendental.
J.Middleton Murray, for example, describes the 'highest function' of
metaphor as being 'to define indefinable spiritual qualities.', while
Ricoeur describes it as 'that strategy of discourse by which language
divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the
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mythic level where its function of discovery is set free.'.2SS Myth is one
of the great myths, in the popular sense, of much writing in aesthetics
and literary theory; as a word it is surrounded by an aura of profundity,
but what, if anything aside from an 'I know not what' accompanied by
intimations of profundity, exists in the midst of this aura when the word
is used in a context such as that above, is a mystery. Such a vagueness
is recurrent and perhaps inevitable in discussing the effect of poetry,
but we must see if it is inevitable in describing metaphor.
What lies beyond the strictly observable, measurable and
verifiable aspects of things?...What are things, natural and human
alike, in their inner, inpalpable, unseen beings?...Brought thus
sharply to the boundaries of the demonstrable, ie. scientific,
knowledge of the world, we are confronted by the illimitable,
unplumbed world lying beyond the narrow scope of the discourse
of science and the understanding, and in the face of this
metasensual world, the world as it is in itself, the unknown
being of things, we are left to wonder and surmise...it is at this
point that metaphor and symbol come into operation.2^
This passage, from an essay by D.G.James, is typical of the approach we
are looking at, in moving from a description of the inadequacy of
language when called upon to deal with things-in-themselves, that is, the
fundamental anaemia of language, to a declaration that the poetic
metaphor is the remedy to this. In that metaphor is involved in naming,
this is obviously true, but something more than this is meant here.
Nowottny similarly begins by stating that 'the relation we assume to
exist between our own consciousness and what is "out there", is only
illusorily clear; the conventions of language foster the illusion that
objects "out there" can be reliably identified and referred to by the
proper use of their accurate names.', and goes on to declare that metaphor
'breaks the hold of convention and enables us to become aware of the
subjectivity of objects and the objectivity of subjective processes.'.2B7
Likewise Harries, who writes that there are moments when 'the inadequacy
of our language seizes us, when language seems to fall apart and falling
apart opens us to what transcends it.', moments when 'contact with being
is reestablished.\2SS Such words as could be found, she continues, to
'close the gap between language and reality' would have to be 'the
creative words of God.', but the poetic metaphor, by rendering language
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'questionable', 'succeeds in gesturing towards a language that shall never
be ours in which...things speak to us.'.253 There are echoes of the
Nietzschian approach to language here, and, though one has an inkling of
what state of language is being described, the vocabulary of the
descriptions themselves founders on the fact that the limits of language
are the limits of language. (Nowottny, for example, according to her own
account cannot be talking about that metaphor which she refers to by the
'proper use of its accurate name', that is 'metaphor'.) Metaphor is,
therefore, the triumph of language over such obstacles to reference as
may occur rather than a bypassing of them, a tribute to the potency of
language rather than its inadequacy.
Literature is often talked of as 'showing' or 'teaching' us something
and the parallel, made by Harries, with the Divine is a recurring feature
of literary discussion from Plato onwards. Booth writes that it is the
'inherent aspiration of all literature to metaphoric truth that accounts
for our tendency in modern times, as the old religious metaphors have
weakened their hold on us, to turn literature to overt religious uses.'.250
How overt these uses are is questionable, but certainly much of the
vocabulary that would once have most naturally belonged to practical
theology is now the possession of literary criticism. The theologian Paul
Tillich, discussing the symbol's religious function of opening up 'levels
of reality which otherwise are dead to us', cites the arts as a type of
discourse which creates 'symbols for a level of reality which cannot be
reached in any other way.'.251 Precisely in what sense we are to
understand theological terms, especially those terms predicated of God, is
a question which Aquinas addresses, and his conclusions are of interest
here. Certain terms which are used of God, as when he is called 'a rock'
or described as having an 'arm' are used metaphorically, since nothing
which is not finite and material can be a rock or have an arm. However,
certain other terms, such as 'wise' or 'good' or 'just' are predicated of
God neither univocally, that is, with precisely the same sense in which
we use them of a person (which would introduce anthropomorphism), nor
equivocally, that is, with an entirely different meaning from that which
they have in the human context, for in that case they would have no
significance for us; rather they are predicated in an analogical sense. We
can see how such an analogical predication works 'downwards' when, for
example, a dog is described as 'faithful' to indicate that 'at a level of a
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dog's consciousness there is a quality that corresponds to what at a
human level we call faithfulness.'.262 It could be argued, however, that
this is anthropomorphism. Aquinas, neverthless, held that "'pure
perfections", like goodness, which are not inextricably bound up...with a
particular level of being, can be predicated of God; and it is these terms
which are predicated in an analogical sense.'.263 We have already
discussed such terms, mainly abstract or relational, which cannot be said
to properly belong to a single domain, but the case of God is a more
particular and problematic sort, though it applies to all speculation on
the realm of what D.G.James above called the 'inner, inpalpable, unseen'
being of things. Although the human possession of goodness, wisdom,
justice, and so on, is supposed to stand in the same relationshoip to
these qualities in God as, for example, the faithfulness of a dog stands
to the faithfulness of a human being, from a linguistic point of view our
terms primarily refer to the world and their use when predicated of God
is only an approximation; we do not know what perfect goodness or wisdom
would be like. This is, indeed, Aquinas' conclusion also - that 'the
meaning which the term has for me in my own mind' is not 'adeqaute to
the abjective reality connoted by the term when predicated of God.',26* As
Copleston concludes, there is, therefore, in Aquinas' account of 'our
natural knowledge of the divine nature...a certain agnosticism.'.266
Aquinas is not concerned with showing that theological language is as
meaningful as any any other sort of language, but rather with explaining
how the believer is to understand theological language. The degree of
meaningfulness we ascribe to the vocabulary used to describe the
ultimately unknowable is finally a matter of faith, we cannot derive any
knowledge from that vocabulary itself, for it neither shows nor teaches
us anything unless we are prepared to make a non-rational act of faith in
the reality to which it points. For our purposes we can consider such
terms as 'wise' and 'just' as metaphorical once taken out of the human
sphere ('good' is more problematic), for Aquinas does not provide an
argument for showing how such terms can be made to properly belong to
any other sphere. To give metaphor a transcending function, then, entails
far-reaching consequences that have little to do with the technical
questions raised by figural language, and which are, ultimately, amenable
to neither ratiocination nor discussion, but only to statements of belief.
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There is a form, or, one might say, use of metaphor which seems
especially to signal an attempt to describe the undescribable
systrophe. It is defined by Henry Peacham, in his Garden of Eloquence, as
'when the Orator bringeth in many definitions of one thing, yet not such
definitions as do declare the substance of a thing by the general kind,
and the difference, which the art of reason doth prescribe, but others of
another kind all heaped together '.26e Hegnauer, a modern rhetorician,
defines it as 'an elliptical periphrasis of one tenor by three or more
asyndetic and isocolical analogies.', so perhaps some examples would be
more helpful than trying to further define it.262
Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleave of care,
The death of each day's life, sore labourls bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
Chief nourisher in life's feast, -2SS
'0 comfort-killing Wight, image of hell!
Dim register and notary of shame!
Black stage for tragedies and murders fell!
Vast sin-concealing chaos! nurse of blame!
Blind muffled bawd! dark harbour for defame!
Grim cave of death! whispering conspirator
With close-tongu'd treason and the ravisher!126,3
Stella, the only planet of my light,
Light of my life, and life of my desire,
Chief good whereto my hope doth only aspire,
World of my wealth, and heaven of my delight...220
'Systrophe' comes from the Greek systrephein meaning 'to turn back to, to
revolve around' and this aptly describes the figure, for the metaphors
involved revolve around the principal subject in a series of
approximations. As can be seen from the examples above, it is a figure
that belongs most naturally to the expression of powerful feelings, and
to demonstrative oratory, that is, persuasion, eulogy, and invective. In
his essay on systrophe, Hegnauer discusses George Herbert's use of its
'argumentive force' in the 'cognitive process of interpretation and
definition'.221 The example he uses is Herbert's sonnet 'Prayer':
Prayer the Churches banquet, Angels age,
Gods breath in man returning to his birth,
The soul in paraphrase, heart in pilgrimage,
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The Christian plummet sounding heav'n and earth;
Engine against th'Almightie, sinners towre,
Reversed thunder, Christ-side-piercing spear,
The six-daies world-transposing in an houre,
A kinde of tune, which all things heare and fear;
Softnesse, and peace, and joy, and love, and blisse,
Exalted Manna, gladnesse of the best,
Heaven in ordinarie, man well drest,
The milkie way, the bird of Paradise,
Chqfch-bells beyond the starres heard, the souls bloud, t
The land of spices; something understood
Of such deliberative use of systrophe Hegnauer writes that the single
metaphor is admitted to be inadequate and instead becomes 'just one of
many attempts at fencing in the absolute' so that the figure moves on
from one to another, each 'subsequent translation makes the preceding one
appear relative, and at the same time adds a new angle to the total
picture.'.27,4 When the figure comes to an end 'it is not because it has
attained to the truth, but because it despairs of the possibiblity of ever
attaining it.'.274 Thus, though Hegnauer places systrophe outside of what
we may call emotive discourse, he does so by giving it what appears to
be a semi-transcendental role, as a way of using analogy to point out
'the inadequacy of the analogical method in pursuit of the unnameable.',
the 'something understood' of Herbert's poem,275 (This arguably places the
figure once again within emotive discourse.) He likens the 'continuous
translation' of systrophe to 'the approximation of the circle by way of
superimposed polygons,' in that, by using the technique, 'one can go on
forever, one can get infinitely close to the infinite without ever
reaching it.'.275 The analogy is an interesting one, for a figure is either
a circle or a collection of polygons, it is not both simultaneously, that
is, one can imagine one sees a circle in series of imposed polygons, but
no circle is there. However there are two important ways in which
systrophe can be differentiated from the sort of 'transcendental' use of
metaphor already discussed. Firstly, from the reader's point of view, what
is conveyed by the figures may be quite precise enough to form a clear
picture, indeed precision seems to be one of the main strengths of
systrophe. Secondly, and more importantly from a cognitive point of view,
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it is an error to liken a concept to a circle or anything so definite; the
image of imposed polygons with their interconnections and relationships
is more appropriate to something which may be either too specific for
non-metaphorical description or, as in the case of prayer, a mutli-faceted
complex of elements. It is, of course, the desire to describe such things
as these that gives rise to the individual metaphor as well.
Against all this emphasis on meaning one could abject, with Archibald
Macleish, that 'A poem should not mean / but be.' but in quoting these
lines I have, in a way, contradicted them - for I have appealed to their
meaning. Yet such an attitude is a common one even, paradoxically, in
literary criticism itself; Herbert Read, for example, writes that the
'emotional unity which is the raison d 'etre of every poem cannot be
measured by the instruments of reason.'.277 Likwise D.G.James, whose
account of metaphor was discussed above, distinguishes poetic statement
from theological statement on the grounds that the former 'does not
advance to statements about the nature of the world'.27®
[Metaphor] is the imagination of one thing in the form of
another; it is the mode in which the nature, the being, the
imagined extra-sensual essence of a thing, is represented by the
identification with the apparently different; and it is a
procedure for which science can give no warrant; the scientific
use of language must abhor metaphor....metaphor is the only way
in which the imagination works; it never adds up to a statement
and doctrine.273
The piece of fiction is, according to James, the world as 'dissolved and
recreated' in the imagination of the author, it contains 'no
generalizations, no philosophy,...Something is held up for us to behold;
but nothing is said.'.2®0 A more modern and technical formulation of this
venerable doctrine comes from Mukarovsky who writes of poetic language
achieving 'maximum intensity to the extent of pushing communication into
the background as the objective expression' so that language 'is not used
in the services of communication, but in order to place in the foreground
the act of expression', that is, it is expression 'for its own sake'.2®1
Describing a human product as existing 'for its own sake' is rather like
calling a process 'spontaneous' - it is a signal that an explanation
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cannot be produced. To return to the quotation from Archibald Macleish -
'A poem should not mean / but be.' - one of the ways in which I could
have demonstrated its meaningfulness, or its intention to possess
meaning, is by asking what it meant and thus eliciting a paraphrase. It
is to the issue of paraphrase that we shall now turn, for this is perhaps
the last word on metaphor's potential meaningfulness.
The most obvious paraphrase of metaphor is another, separate figure,
- simile. Henle goes so far as to say that the difference between
metaphor and simile lies in simile containing 'no terms with figurative
senses.'.2®2 This is true insofar as, while the copula 'is' identifies the
principal and subsidiary subjects, the use of 'like' presumes that the two
things are not the same, however, when the principal and subsidiary
subjects are very unalike, as, for instance, when one is concrete and the
other abstract, then 'like' is being used in a sense so loose as to be
figural. In certain instances the 'like' of simile may be drawing things
only analogous together with no less licence than the 'is' of metaphor
draws together things only 'alike'. (Without there existing a distance
between the two things, over which they must be drawn, there would be
simply an instance of comparison rather than simile.) The simile, then, as
Aristotle says, 'is metaphor, differing from it only in the way it is
put'.2®3 Addison, as we have already seen, defines 'allusions', such as
simile, metaphor, and allegory, as 'but so many different manners of
similitude'.2®A But we should not emphasize the similarities at the
expense of the differences between the two figures. Aristotle holds that
simile is less attractive because it is longer, and this idea of the
metaphor as a more daring and forceful figure than simile has been
common throughout the history of writings on the two.2ss Demetrius, for
example, writes;
A simile is an extended metaphor. For example, you may take the
metaphor, "The poet Python, pouring down on you in a flood", and
amplify it by saying "pouring down on you like a flood". So the
figure has been converted into a simile, and it is safer. The
former version is a metaphor and more dangerous.2®®
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The greater 'liveliness, attractiveness, and verve' of the metaphor, when
compared to the simile, has perhaps been overplayed. Certainly, at a
formal level, the semantic perturbation involved in the identification
made by metaphor is greater than that in the comparison made by simile,
but it would be unwise to decide, on this basis, which is the more
'dangerous' per se. The extravagance of the figure depends more upon the
distance between the two subjects involved; the simile claims that the
distance is shorter than it is, and the metaphor that it does not exist
at all, but in reality we remain aware of the separateness and the degree
of that separateness, involved in the relationship between principal and
subsidiary subjects.
But if simile still involves the figurative use of language then it
cannot be said to be the sort of paraphrase which takes us very far
towards establishing paraphrasability as a test of the meaning of
figurative language. Let us first hear the case against paraphrase. This
takes several forms, the most common being the simple statement that
metaphor cannot be paraphrased! Owen Barfield, for example, writes that
the kind of usage one finds in 'good poetry is always the kind that could
not be paraphraesd.' but goes on to add that the 'poetic element in any
statement...is essentially something which can be expressed in no other
way.'.287 This last clause is, I believe, correct but I am not sure that to
say this is to deny the possibility of paraphrase. In his essay 'What
Metaphor Means', Donald Davidson confuses the situation even further by
insisting that metaphors 'mean what the words, in their most literal
interpretation, mean, and nothing more.', so that metaphor 'says only what
it shows on its face - usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth',28®
This whole esssay of his is a dire warning against interfering with the
basic vocabulary surrounding a subject, for his position leads him to
declare firstly that 'metaphors cannot be paraphrased...because there is
nothing there to paraphrase.' but secondly that this is not 'to deny that
a metaphor has a point, nor that the point can be brought out by using
further words.' .2e8 In some instances to paraphrase may be to replace an
utterance with its equivalent - as, say, a definition for each word, or, if
passible, synonyms for same of the terms involved - but it can also be,
and this is usually its end, to provide the sense of the original.
Providing the sense of the original is a very different matter in
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literary discourse and in other types of discourse. For in literary
discourse the 'form' is never contingent; it is essential.
Aristotle claims, perhaps rather gratuitously, that metaphors must be
drawn 'from things that are related to the original thing - just as in
philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things
far apart.'.290 What is interesting here is likening the process of
creating metaphor with the process of philosophical enquiry, for
metaphor, particularly when discussed in a literary context, often appears
to be the very antithesis of the rational. Harries, for example, writes
that measured by 'established and accepted language, the collisions of
poetic metaphor have no proper sense.' and 'cannot be drawn from what has
already been established.'.291 The sense of metaphor cannot, of course, be
drawn from anywhere other than established language - the material from
which it is created. Looked at from the point of view of Eco's
'encyclopedic content' the potential of established language is much
greater than it appears when looked at only under the categories of
denotation and connotation (in its more restricted sense). Metaphor may
very often convey a very great emotional charge but this does not, in
itself, place it beyond questions of truth or falsity, or sense. When
someone is described as a 'wolf they either have the characteristics
metaphorically imputed to them by this description or they do not. As
Goodman writes, 'The question why predicates apply as they do
metaphorically is much the same as the question why they apply as they
do literally.', though, particularly with the novel metaphor, the meaning
may be somewhat vaguer, 'less sharp and stable', than an established
predication.292 This in itself could serve as a proof of the
meaningfulness of metaphor, but I do not yet want to abandon the
possibility of paraphrase.
What might we wish to call a 'paraphrase'? If everything literal in
Ti (the individual metaphor, line, poem, and so on) is stated in Tz and
everything referred to metaphorically by words in Ti is literally
designated by wards in Tz then we might call Tz a paraphrase of Ti. But
the ties between the principal and subsidiary subjects, despite the fact
that they create the metaphor for us, are not always easily identified. In
dealing with the isolated metaphor, the sort of metaphor one deals with
when "dealing with metaphor", the case is simpler; one could, for
instance, paraphrase 'Man is a wolf as 'Man is fierce, cruel, and so on',
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•Man has wolfish ferocity, wolfish cruelty, and so on', or 'Man is cruel
and fierce and the cruelty and ferocity of man is like the cruelty and
ferocity of a wolf'. On the basis of these examples , particularly the
last, in which 'wolf is apparently used literally, Beardsley considers
literal paraphrase is indeed possible.233 There is enough in such
paraphrases to give the metaphor a meaning, but not necessarily enough to
give the meaning of the metaphor in question - the paraphrase trails off
into 'and so on'. That metaphor is open to rational explanantion is
something that was established at the beginning of this essay, but here
we must admit that to paraphrase the metaphor is not to replace it with
something that has an equal sense. To say, for instance, that the cruelty
and ferocity of a man is as the cruelty and ferocity of a wolf, could
seem almost an apology for these traits in man, since a wolf is not to be
judged morally, but in the original this sense was not present. The
original, as we saw with some of Eco's examples, may have an ambiguity or
a specificity which is difficult to reproduce in the paraphrase simply on
logistic grounds. This is not to say that paraphrase is impossible but
only to explain why even the most thoughtful examples given of it can
seem jejune; for what is dismissed with 'and so on' or 'etc.' is almost
inevitably, like the countryman's "Mile and a bit", several times more
than what has been given.
When the metaphor is considered in situ the difficulties of
paraphrase are even more pronounced. It has been suggested that a poem
is a long idiom, that is, a sequence of words the meaning of which cannot
be predicted from the meaning of the individual parts, but, since a poem
does not recur in various contexts that would give its meaning, as an
idiom does, such a viewpoint would place poetry forever beyond
comprehension. However, there is, I believe, a strong case for considering
local instances of usage in literature as idiomatic, insofar as their full
meaning can only be brought out by the context of the whole to which
they belong. A piece of literature, preeminently poetry, consists of
numerous interrelated elements, 'multiple relationships undergoing
multiple transformations' as lowottny writes, and this infuses into any
particular instance of metaphor a meaning which not even a full
paraphrase of that metaphor in isolation would adequately cover ,23,a
Mowottny's account of the kind of meaning generated by a poem,
impressionistic though that account is, is persuasive;
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Both in the means of organization and in the particulars
organized there is much unverbalized, not tied down in a
sign....The particulars, however definite in themselves and
however definite in the analogy they build up, bring into play an
aura of their suggestions, the 'feeling-tone' of their adhesions
in the world of non-linguistic reality; this feeling-tone, though
it may be as individual as a taste or a scent, is also, like
these, too idiosyncratic and rich to pin down in
verbalization.295
Perhaps, then, the best way to bring out the meaning of metaphor,
particularly extended and complex metaphor is not paraphrase at all.
Something of the relationship between metaphor and paraphrase exists
between the epigraphs to the chapters in this work and the chapters
themselves - the epigraphs as metaphors. If the content of the chapters
could be thus summarized, is there any need for the chapters themselves?
The epigraphs are helpful, but they have only the appearance of summaries
or explanantions; they suggest truths open to more literal expression but
also things that are impossible, or simply nonsensical. The chapters, I
might say, 'refine' the epigraph, for though the epigraphs are shorter
they are not distillations but rather more general and more vague than
the chapters. That is, they act better as epigraphs than they would were
they placed, as such quotations often are, at the end of the chapter as
summaries, where they would suggest that those confusions which they
contain are somehow a 'conclusion'.
Black writes that 'the set of literal statements' produced by
paraphrasing a metaphor 'will not have the same power to enlighten and
inform as the original.', for 'implications previously left for a suitable
reader to educe for himself, with a nice feeling for their relative
priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented explicitly as
though having equal weight....literal paraphrase inevitably says too much
- and with the wrong emphasis, This seems to be an appeal to
intuitionism; for why should literal paraphrase inevitably misrepresent
the original metaphor? This depends on what we consider to be the ends
of paraphrase; to reproduce the effect of the original, or to make its
meaning more explicit, that is, perhaps to describe the effect. To
reproduce the effect is impossible, since it depends, even in mundane
examples, not only on the brevity but also on the semantic aspects of
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using figurative language, that is, the sense is contained not only within
the figure but also in the use of the figure per se. Metaphors extend an
invitation to the hearer or reader to fallow the creator through those
novel connections in the 'encyclopedia' which it involves.297 However,
this does not preclude description, or the making of the implicit explicit
- which may itself have an explanatory role, particularly in the case of
a figure the sense of which can be definite even when the source of that
sense may be obscure. Nowottny, again, holds that it is doubtful whether
critical language 'can deal fully with the complexities of the various
poetic modes of meaning at that level where..."one string, sweeet husband
to another, Strikes each in each by mutual ordering'".299 Even if this
difficulty could be overcome, she continues, 'it would be advisable to
calculate, beforehand, what we might hope to achieve by pushing
theoretical criticism to this level, since the poem (incalculably more
complex than any one sentence in it, and each sentence probably more
complex than comparable sentences in ordinary discourse) would seem, by
definition, to preclude the making of useful generalizations about the
ordering of the whole.'.299 It is true that exhaustive description can
produce a text which seems more in need of interpretation than what it
describes. However, the relationship between text and critique is the main
subject of this thesis as a whole, and so we shall not go into it here.
Obviously something has gone wrong in a paraphrase or description that
is intended to bring out the sense of a metaphor if what it says is no
more than what the metaphor says better by itself, but, in practice,
interpretations that illuminate do exist. Our next section may indicate
some of the reasons why this is so.
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'Had we but an Act of Parliament to abridge Preachers the use of
fulsom and luscious Metaphors,' wrote Samuel Parker in 1670, 'it
might perhaps be an effectual Cure of all our present
D istempers,1300
The great temptation in writing on metaphor is to describe its
effects as all of one sort or all of another, to describe it either as the
ultimate confuser of sense, or as per se the vehicle of a higher wisdom.
Metaphor is a kind of allusion, it introduces, in the subsidiary subject,
something which is, strictly speaking, foreign to the immediate subject of
discourse. Without this foreigness there is no metaphor. (Paradoxically,
the more obviously metaphorical the figure is the less obvious is it that
the subsidiary subject acts as an allusion, for one simply registers the
whole figure, subsidiary and principal subjects together, as metaphor.)
Metaphor, then, involves not only speaking of a thing as what it is not
but also speaking of it as something else, that is, we see the principal
subject 'in the light of' the subsidiary one. This is the rhetorical aspect
of metaphor - the way that it influences how we see the principal
subject. In, for example, 'Man is a wolf it is those human traits which
can be most easily rendered into the vocabulary associated with wolves
that will be most emphasized, brought most forcibly to our attention.301
It is important, however, to emphasize here that the subsidiary subject is
also modified by its relationship with the principal subject; we might
compare 'The ship's prow ploughed the waves' with Bolivar's description of
trying to govern Latin America as 'like trying to plough the sea'. In some
instances it may indeed be that the intention is to attract our attention
to the subsidiary subject, as in Shelley's lines;
Hell is a city much like London -
A populous and a smoky city;
There are all sorts of people undone,
And there is little or no fun done;
Small justice and still less pity.303
Likewise Langland's Lady Mede seems as much an attack on lasciviousness
as on bribery and corruption.303
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The subsidiary subject, then, both changes its significance under the
influence of the principal subject and 'filters and transforms' the usual
associations of that principal subject, selecting and emphasizing what
might be ignored or even suppressed by a different metaphor. Even if we
wish to deny the validity, the aptness of the metaphor, in order to
understand it we must at least momentarily concur in the viewpoint that
it offers. Black gives as an example of this influence, the description of
a battle in the vocabulary of chess - a vocabulary that would suppress
the emotive, human aspect of the principal subject - but we might also
think of Pope's 'Rape of the Lock', Swift's Battle of the Books, or any of
the great set pieces of description in Dickens. As I argued in the
opening section of this chapter, the type of allusions made by the
subsidiary subject is often a distinguishing characteristic of the
individual writer, the school or movement, the period, or even
nationality.30A The type of allusions made by the metaphors Lawrence uses
in his description of sexuality are perhaps the most distinctive aspect
of his style; censorship, if censorship it was, created rather than
stifled what we know as Lawrentian. But the rhetorical aspect of the
relationship between subsidiary and principal subject is not confined
simply to such obvious examples as these, it exists wherever metaphor
exists, indeed, as we have seen, it is its presence or absence which
distinguishes metaphor from established language.
There is in the very use of metaphor the implication, whether
justified or not, that established language is inadequate to the reality
involved, that something must be 'brought in' to the account. (What we
might call the 'opposite' of metaphor, that is, tautology, significantly
appears to assert just the apposite - the total adequacy of language.)
When this is not justified then the use of metaphor appears only as a
poor style, for recourse to the figural, when redundant, gives out the
promise of a certain type of inquiry, and a certain novelty or comlexity
in the object sought, which cannot be fulfilled. I am thinking now not
primarily of that 'poetic diction' exemplified by Dryden's 'woolly care',
and rejected by Wordsworth, but rather of less literary contexts. In
scientific, and perhaps philosophical, metaphors the allusion is made
purely for cognitive purposes and thus, while they may have a rhetorical
aspect, with all that implies, the obscurity of the principal subject
militates against the sort of effects we are here concerned with.
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In his Poetics Aristotle states that he will not discuss thought in
tragedy because he has already dealt with the subject in his treatise on
rhetoric, to which discipline it 'more properly belongs1 - 'Thought
includes all the effects that have to be produced by means of language;
among these are proof and refutation, the awakening of emotions such as
pity, fear, anger, and the like, and also exaggeration and
depreciation.'.3°s George Campbell in 1776 described poetry as 'no other
than a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory.', an
opinion which is presumed not only in Aristotle but also in Longinus and
many Renaissance works on poetry.303 Aristotle illustrates the rhetorical
aspect of metaphor by comparing its effects with the use of epithets;
just as to call Orestes either 'mother-slayer' or 'father's avenger' is to
bring forward either the ugly or the 'good' aspects of his action, so a
metaphor to be complimentary must draw its subsidiary subject 'from
something better in the same line' as the thing to be complimented, and
to disparage 'from something worse'.307 This is the result of the
filtering action of the subsidiary subject and it is this selection of a
certain group of properties out of all those which characterize the
principal subject which puts that principal subject into a certain
perspective. This selective description implies a judgement, that is, it
is, in a broad sense, the expression of an ideology.
The rhetoric involved in metaphorical description is brought out by
nothing so much as the nan-reciprocity of the analogy upon which it
relies. Demetrius paints out that not all metaphors are as interchangeable
as 'the city's pilot' and 'the ship's ruler', though so many false
analogies have been urged on the basis of this particular metaphor that
not even it would seem exempt from our argument, He states that the poet
is 'justified in calling the mountain slope "Ida's foot", but would not be
allowed to describe a man's foot as his "mountain slope".'.303 Vhy? To
refer to a mountain's 'foot' is to emphasize its grandeur - how massive it
must be if this is only its foot! imagine a person so great that their
foot would be comparable to a mountain slope! - but a mountain is massive
and awe-inspiring and so the metaphor passes as justified, the diction
involved in describing it must be elevated in order to reach the real
effect the mountain has. But it is for these same reasons that the terms
of the analogy cannot be reversed - a foot is not grand and awe-
inspiring, we do not have to strain the imagination to realize its size or
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to imagine giants in order to feel that we have done it justice. Longinus
cautions against using 'grand diction' at all times, 'for to apply great
and stately terms to trifling matters would be like putting a big tragic
mask an a tiny child.'.309 But if a foot is simply a foot, no less is a
mountain slope simply a mountain slope. There is obviously something
unsatisfactory about this last clause, yet many have seen figural language
as an obstacle to truth, as a mist that obscures the plain, unadorned
fact. Thus, for example, Hobbes;
The sixth [cause of Absurd conclusions, I ascribe] to the use of
Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of
words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in
common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The
Proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor
Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such
speeches are not to be admitted.310
The seeking after objective truth and the refinement of the standards of
that objectivity are certainly the objects of the sciences and of
philosophy; a metre is a metre and 'Mot both p and not-p>' are true, no
matter what our emotional attitude towax-ds them. There are, however,
times when a metre may seem considerably longer or when we are strongly
inclined to deny that a contradiction is a contradiction; but the first
can be empirically verified and that the second is a contradiction is
what, of its nature, it must be. In this sense the measurements of
science, though created by human beings are independent of human beings;
despite the undeniable role of relativism it is the existence of
verifiable physical constants as the basis of science which makes it
possible even to recognize that relativism. Philosophy likewise deals with
the application of givens to human thought, that is, what must a priori
be the case in any specific instance. If we look once again at metaphor
we find that we are discussing what might also be loosely called
constants, that is, a uniformity across culture and, as a brief look at
the literature syllabus of any school or university would quickly tell us,
across time, in the way we perceive and describe, through metaphor, the
affective aspects of our existence. The role of time and culture is by no
means negligible, they may, through changes in the habitual associations
of the subsidiary subject, render the metaphor impenetrable or, more
importantly, deceptively clear. But is a mountain simply a mountain?
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Obviously yes but, equally obviously, no, A tautology of this kind is as
rhetorical as the most highflown metaphor, for if the speaker thought a
mountain was simply a mountain they would hardly need to say so; the
only context in which such a tautology would be made is one in which
this fact had already been admitted. 'A mountain is simply a mountain*
like 'Man is simply an animal', presupposes something more, the statement
would be redundant otherwise. The context of every metaphor or simile,
the unspoken and naturally transparent premise upon which it rests is 'as
perceived by myself' or, more often, and invariably in poetic metaphor,
'as affectively perceived'. In this sense we may say that in the
humanities, in contrast to the sciences, the measure is never independent
of humanity. This general point is, however, one which will run throughout
this work and it is enough merely to register it here.
It is very difficult to imagine some metaphors as reversed; for
example 'Man is a wolf as 'The wolf is the man of the animal kigdom'.
When one thinks of comparing an animal to man the effect is quite
different from comparing man to an animal. In, let us say, a documentary
about wolves one would probably find some degree of anthropomorphism,
and its evolution would invariably be talked of, presumably for the sake
of convenience, in terms of conscious design, that is, metaphorically.
When this is done, as when one calls a dog 'almost human', the light in
which the animal appears is very different from that which falls on
mankind when it is described as wolfish or dog-like. There is, then, at
least an element of exaggeration in such metaphors as 'Man is a wolf'.
However novel the metaphor, it implies a human standard; to describe a
man as a wolf is to distinguish him, morally, from the wolf, at least in
his aspirations or professions, since when the metaphor is reversed the
animal appears in a more sympathetic light that it otherwise might, 'She
eats like a bird' is a particularly obvious example of this since, while
it could possibly mean that she eats the same sort of diet, or that she
eats half her own bodyweight in food every twenty-four hours, or even
that she picks up her food with her mouth and flies off with it; what it
is taken to mean is that she eats little, yet a bird does not usually eat
little, for a bird. Such animal metaphors, then, rely on those traits
which actually distinguish the two things that are being compared. The
same is true of many metaphors.
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The import of certain metaphors can be far from inevitable, yet that
import becomes fixed by being habitually used in a context in which only
certain of the metaphors potential meanings can be generated. Eco cites
the metaphor 'She was a rose' as one the interpretation of which can
never be completely ingenuous; for of the possible correspondences which
can be drawn from it there are some which are already familiar, some
which come 'ready-made'.311 He lays out the content of 'rose' and 'woman'
as follows;
/Eose/» F A M P
Colour Nature Vegetal Gratia sui
Freshness
/Woman/ 3> F A M P
Colour Nature Animal Gratia sui312
Freshness
The meaning that we arrive at for this metaphor is conditioned, according
to Eco, by the knowledge that 'when a woman is compared to a flower, it
is in terms of woman-object, which, like the flowers, lives for its own
sake, purely as an ornament to the world.', and this conditioning, he
concludes, renders the metaphor 'scarcely cognitive'.313 This fixity is
not, however, an intrinsic property of the metaphor 'She was a rose'; in
the absence of overt physical resemblances, aside from the abstract
'beauty', between the principal and subsidiary subjects, the element of
common, purpose, or lack of it, seems the most dominant likeness, but it
is by no means this which gives the metaphor its peculiar quality - one
need only think of a subsidiary subject which was beautiful and existed
for its own sake, but which was inorganic. If the 'she' was a young woman
then it would connote a beauty that was short-lived, if an older then it
would connote a fullness, a stateliness, a beauty completed (the element
of time is controlled by the principal subject acting on the subsidiary
subject), but in both cases the comparison made between the type of
beauty of the rose and of the woman is perhaps more important. By
viewing the human through something which, though living, lives in a very
different way, the type of beauty is posited as something alien,
something 'uncanny', that is, not the familiar, domesticated beauty of an
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art object or a landscape. From a masculine point of view, though not
necessarily exclusively so, the tendency to contrast the human with the
natural is collapsed by the metaphor; an identification often made in
metaphors describing women.31 A To a man a woman can be a manifestation
of nature in a way that his fellow man almost never is (a wolf is at
least an animal, it is even a mammal). Thus it is not simply a likeness
in the element of purpose that is operative in the final effect of the
metaphor, indeed, depending on the context, it need not even be the mast
dominant cognitive feature. As with the animal metaphors, it is the
element of difference - between the human and the natural - which creates
the force, if we can rescue that force from familiarity, of the metaphor.
Aristotle's metaphor 'The sunset of life' is one that I have already
discussed; it suggests not an approaching end of the sort that death is,
but rather something cyclical, it also suggests that the change is
external, that it is happening around the object rather than in it. 'The
old age of the day', on the other hand, suggests almost the reverse of
this - this day in particular is going to be over forever, the day itself
has grown old. Yet there is more to the metaphor than this parallel,
there are also the associations of sunset - mellowness, withdrawal,
tranquility - and for this reason the metaphor 'sunset of life' could not
be used, for example, in retrospect to apply to the last years of someone
who died young. The metaphor, then, involves more than an analogy relying
on cessation, it describes a particular type of old age, and when it is
used as a generalization it casts old age in a light which it may or may
not deserve in the particular. In this connection we might consider the
often hidden metaphors in advertizing, a great contemporary repository of
rhetoric. For example, one motoring organization has the slogan 'It's
great to know you belong'. While it is true that one does 'belong' to an
organization the whole sentence is one that is usually associated with a
very different context, that of 'belonging' to a family or comparable
close-knit group, in which the ties are personal, it suggests
unconditional acceptance, a natural right to regard, or an affinity -
everything except the type of commercial transaction to which the slogan
is used to refer. In a similar vein is the bank which advertizes itself
as 'A friend for life'. We may 'bank on' a friend but the analogy posited
by the advertizment, once reversed, presents a very derogatory view of
friendship. These are rather trivial examples but we might also consider
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the abuse of analogy in the following saying of the Institut fur
Geopolitik in defence of the idea of lebensraum, dating from just before
the Second World War; 'A nation can no mare manage to get along without
the mouths of its rivers than the owner of a house can get along without
the key to his door!',31 s It is to effects such as these that 'rhetorical',
in its now popular sense, refers. Montaigne writes that it is the business
of the rhetorician 'to deceive not our sight only but our judgements, and
to adulterate and corrupt the very esssence of things.'.31 s In the same
passage he compares rhetoric unfavourably to a woman's use of cosmetics,
but he has either no great understanding of this subject or sixteenth
century cosmetics were a much cruder affair than they are today, for the
main point of his comparison is that both are a sort of 'plastering over'
of the truth. However make-up is, at its most subtle, an art which
conceals art, an art of emphasis, of drawing the observer's attention to
certain features and distracting it from others - in this sense the
comparison with rhetoric is just. However, not all artifice is considered
to be deception.
The eighteenth century critic Joseph Trapp, in his lecture 'Of the
Beauty of Thought in Poetry or of Elegance and Sublimity', insists that
the poet must abide by the rules of reason and truth, from which rules he
does not exempt even such rhetorical devices as equivocation;
Neither metaphors, hyperboles, ironies, nor even equivocal
expressions, when properly used, nor fiction or fable, are any
deviation from this rule of right thinking, for there is a wide
difference between falseness and fiction, between that which is
truly false (if I may so speak), and that which is only so in
appearance. Tropes and fictions are raised, as it were, upon the
foundation of right reason. Truth is the basis of them and
receives new luster from such airy disguises.317
We have now seen how metaphor can be improperly used and examined
briefly how it can be truthful in the affective sphere; it is a matter of
right use rather than the intrinsic properties of metaphor itself. Ricoeur
writes that the fiction of metaphor has 'the power of suspending what we
call "reality" in ordinary language', of addressing itself 'to deeply
rooted potentialities of reality to the extent that they are absent from
the actualities with which we deal in everyday life under the mode of
empirical control and manipulation.'.31 s This may be the case, but
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metaphor can also conceal and manipulate; all argument from analogy is
prone to this. There is no reason why the imagination should not be just
as much an extension of the 'empirical' manipulative mode, as a revelation
of its opposite. Hegel, in contrast, says of similes and their authors; 'In
general a melancholy and weak feeling readily overflows into comparisons.
Vhat such a soul desires, what constitutes its interest is far off and
past, and so, in general, instead of regaining courage it is induced to
immerse itself in something else.'.313 These lines, perhaps
unintentionally, suggest the 'escapist' view of literature which might be
contrasted with Ricoeur's 'revelatory' one.
As an example of the rhetoric of a literary metaphor we might look
at the opening of L.P.Hartley's The Get-Between - 'The past is a foreign
country. They do things differently there.'. The metaphor, as it is first
stated, is a striking and highly emotive one, but the present tense in the
second sentence, while enforcing the original metaphor, also suggests that
the past is not what is over. (In this sense it is like an analysis of
the metaphor; by focussing on certain correspondences it reveals what it
was that was striking about the metaphor.) It is true that the book will
'inhabit' the past, and in this the use of the present tense is apt, but
there is also an equivocation, a suggestion of the impossible, that is, it
makes the past as 'real', as important as the present. There is a deadness
in the metaphor; time is arrested, and the final impression is too
cerebral, too introverted, too pessimistic. But what of '0 my America, my
new found land,'? Here, I would argue, the metaphor is simply trying to
catch up with the experience; 'something else' is appealed to not as an
escape from the import of the facts but rather to convey that impart, to
establish an intimacy with the facts. It may be the case that certain
areas of experience, like having 'deep sadness' or 'high hopes', cannot be
communicated without the help of some degree of figurativeness. There are
times, too, when to speak as 'objectively' as possible about affectively-
charged areas of experience, especially to those who have no direct
experience of them, is to misinform. No doubt a psychologist could offer
a paraphrase to Lawrence's decription of the effect upon Tom Brangwen of
his meeting with the foreigners - 'they had set fire to the homestead of
his nature, and he would be burned out of cover' - but it would be
unlikely to be itself free of metaphor, or to be as appropriate to the
specific case.330 To object that such metaphors go beyond the facts is to
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presume that the facts of any particular situation are only what an
observer could verify. Metaphor receives some justification from our
normal uses of' the word 'like'; "Situation x is like..,", "No, it is just
like situation x", "Yes, but what is situation x like?". Demetrius, writing
on rhetoric, states that 'Everything normal is unimpressive, and therefore
fails to attract admiration.', but though rhetoric can obscure or simply
adorn, it also serves to render language capable of referring to those
states-of-affairs which are not everyday, which are out of the run of
things, which are imbued with special significance.321
'Haw we see a thing depends on what we see it through.' Ve have come
some way since then, but the idea remains intact; metaphor is a way of
seeing things. But this 'seeing' is perhaps itself metaphorical, for
metaphor is rather a way of thinking or believing about things, a way of
feeling about things. This is the usefulness of beginning our study of
literature through an examination of metaphor; for the paradox of
literature is that it is an effective "untruth", it both is (by effect) and
is not (by definition) about reality. Let us look at Hughes' definition of
allegory:
An Allegory is a Fable or Story, in which under imaginary
Persons or Things, is shadow'd some real Action or instructive
Moral; or, as I think it is somewhere very shortly defin'd by
Plutarch, it is that In which one thing is related, and another
thing is understood. It is a kind of Poetic Picture, or
Hieroglyphick, which by its apt Resemblance conveys Instruction
to the Mind by an Analogy to the Senses; and so amuses the
Fancy, whilst it informs the Understanding. Every Allegory has
therefore two Senses, the Literal and the Mystical; the literal
sense is like a Dream or Vision, of which the mystical Sense is
the true Meaning or Interpretation.322
What is interesting about John Hughes' Essay on Allegorical Poetry, from
which this passage is taken, is the range of forms which its author is
prepared to allow under the title 'allegorical'. Writing of the Circe
episode in the Odyssey, he states that when characters are fictitious and
events 'without the Bounds of Probability of Nature', then it is
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'impossible for the Reader to rest in the literal sense, but he is of
necessity driven to seek for another Meaning under these wild Types and
Shadows.323 Allegory, even allegory as involuted as Langland's, appears
as a crude form of representation in comparison with most others, that
is, it is a form which rarely allows us to forget the author's controlling
hand and one which easily lends itself to didacticism. But the very
vagueness of Hughes' description of it reveals its kinship with those
other forms; the definition he takes from Plutarch, for example, also
covers the most essential point of irony, and the comparison with the
hieroglyphic reminds us of Bacon's description of the fable. However, this
speaking of a thing as it is not in order to show it as it is, finds its
most compact expression, one might say its 'model', in metaphor.32,4 One
might hestitate to agree with Hughes that it is 'Instruction' that is
conveyed by the analogy, at least within literature, but the idea of two
senses is presumed by metaphor - we take the subsidiary subject in a
'metaphorical sense' because it cannot be taken literally, that is, because
it is a fiction. In allegory the principal subject is likely to be
signalled by the names of the characters, places, or events, and in the
fable by either the anthropomorphic element or the usual character
associated with the animal, that is, the role it would play in a metaphor
describing a person, and by the sheer triviality of the action. But all
literature is about what is not; its fiction is as incongruous with our
daily commerce with the real world as the individual metaphor, if we
considered it literally, would be to its surrounding text. Yet the idea of
a work having 'two senses', as presumed by literary criticism, seems to
many an affectation, an unnecessary complication of the simple truth that
everyone enjoys a good story.
I would suggest that just as the involved process we go through in
order to apprehend the import of a metaphor is swallowed up in our
apprehension of that metaphor, so the process of inference by analogy,
from the work to the world, that takes place when we read is likewise
normally obscured by the fact that we are so used to doing it, by the
very naturalness of the process. Fiction, by being non-literal, extends,
like its compressed counterpart the metaphor, an invitation for us to
discover a non-literal way of understanding it. Allegory and fable do
this most obviously but I am not suggesting that every piece of
literature should be understood as allegory, though criticism, especially
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when it concentrates on character, has often done so in a variety of more
or less sophisticated ways. Neither am I suggesting the generalizing from
one fictional instance to a rule in the world, though again this is a
common strategy. Rather I am here introducing an idea which I shall later
expand upon, that is, that, for the purposes of criticism, literature can
be considered as the subsidiary subject of a metaphor, the principal
subject of which supplied by the reader. To make plain this principal
subject and to examine the import of the rhetoric involved are, therefore,
the two 'aims' of any criticism that can be said to be consistent with
the nature of literature - from the most naive to the most esoteric. What
I do not intend, in calling literature 'metaphorical', is to champion that
use of the word 'metaphor' in such constructions as 'The Crucible is a
metaphor for the McCarthyist era': this simply tells me that the speaker
wishes to regard the play as an historical document, that is, that their
primary interest in the work is not a literary one, (We might also note
that it implies the substitution theory of metaphor!) Poetry, and
literature in general, is distinguished by containing metaphors of
metaphors and the point at which we decide that we are now concerned
with the literal, that is, at what level of abstraction we choose to
locate the principal subject, is of the utmost importance to the style of
critical interpretation. We might, indeed, characterize different forms of
interpretation by the degree to which they postpone discussion of the
principal subject.
I am not suggesting, in beginning this study that metaphor can be
used as a metaphor for literature, but rather that literature is
essentially metaphorical. I do not wish to impose metaphor on literature,
to create an aesthetic gimmick, though the necessity of clearly defining
what I meant by metaphor to begin with may make it seem this way, since
it reverses the actual process that led to this study; that is, the
gradual emergence of the metaphorical as a unifying model in the topics
that follow. Literature, as we shall see, is metaphorical after the model
of rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor, that is, that type the
significance of which is destroyed by paraphrase because its significance
lies in what it can effect only in its original integrity. Hence the idea
of form and content in literature being inseparable and the idea of
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literature as a style of description (as 'wolf is a style of vocabulary
for the description of 'Man'). Hence also the notion that the discussion
of literature is inevitably a discussion of values. The fallowing chapters
are, however, written almost as if self-contained for the very reason that
I did not want to give the (false) impression that in approaching each
subject my primary interest was in working them around towards the
metaphorical. The proof, and, perhaps, usefulness, of the hypothesis that
literature is essentially metaphorical lies not so much in the fact that
beginning with certain conclusions about metaphor one can use them as
premisses in discussing literature, but rather in that we will find the
same problems which have come up in connection with metaphor will
reappear in almost exactly the same terms in the chapters that fallow,
and that, starting with what are traditional questions in literary theory
or poetics, we are constantly brought around to propositions about the
use of language already met with in the discussion of metaphor, Thus, for
example, you might consider the chapter that follows either as a self-
contained discussion of the relationship between literature and reality or
an examination of the proposition that the literary work, like the
individual metaphor, is, a description of what is (the world) in terms of
what is not (the fiction).
But let us finish this chapter with a problem, a problem which may
demonstrate why there should be a question of the relationship between
literature and reality at all. In this chapter I have broadly
distinguished two types of metaphor - the 'scientific' or empirical, which
is contingent and hypothetical, and the 'metaphysical' or rhetorical,
which is essential and final. Only the scientific metaphor, I have said,
can actually 'die' - either by being replaced, or by being so amenable to
ostensive definition that it becomes part of established language ('leg of
the table'). The fundamental process in the death of metaphor, then, is
the conversion from 'it is something like' - the metaphor's 'is' - to 'it
is' - the immediate referentiality of established language. A dead
metaphor is no metaphor. The scientific metaphor is simply a prelude to
its own extinction. But what can be said of mortal metaphors, that is
empirical ones, cannot be said of rhetorical ones. A rhetorical metaphor
takes upon itself the function of a scientific metaphor, it asserts
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something about the world either by a false analogy, in the sense that it
asserts what cannot be asserted, or by an analogy made within the realm
of the affective. A rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor cannot, therefore,
die in the same way as a scientific one, it can only become hidden.
Moreover I have said that the rhetoric of metaphor lies in the fact that
it speaks of something in terms of what it is not. As an argument from
analogy the only guarantee of sense that it can give is its contingency
in the role of describing. If it is empirical then it is always aimed at
its own extinction, either through ostensive definition, or through its
replacability. (An argument from analogy is never proof.) But there is a
problem here, for what does it mean to say that we can distinguish
betwen two types of metaphor on the grounds that one is contingent and
hypothetical while the other is essential and final, one empirical and one
rhetorical? The problem is this : To say that there are two types of
metaphor is to say that they are two uses of language analogous to one
another, that is, metaphorically related. But what sort of metaphor is
involved, what sort of metaphor is it that we use in calling both
'metaphorical', - a 'scientific' or a 'metaphysical' one? If it is a
scientific one then we must allow that to be truly such either
'metaphysical' metaphor is not metaphor, for an empirical metaphor must
be capable of being replaced with something else, or, if this is not the
case, then 'metaphysical' metaphor is identical with 'scientific', and no
analogy is involved. But if this is so then we cannot distinguish between
them. If, on the other hand, the analogy between the two types of
metaphor is a 'metaphysical' one, then we must say that one or the other
is not tru^ly metaphor, which again involves us in contradiction.32:6 The
paradox exists, however, only for so long as we ignore what the word
'rhetorical' implies. We can identify 'rhetorical' metaphor and 'empirical'
metaphor because each is, in fact, a moment in the other's history, a
potential of the other. We can if we like ignore the hypothetical status
of a scientific analogy and thus believe what is impossible, as a child
might inadvertently do in understanding an analogy as literal truth,
likewise we may choose that rhetorical metaphor should appear scientific,
as when we believe that metaphor can show us 'the inner, inpalpable,
unseen being of things'. Metaphysical metaphors "exist", are not
contingent because we choose that they should be so. They contain, or
import, in what they emphasize and suppress, in their ethos, something
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which we wish to believe. When we choose that they should not, they
unravel into false analogies or nonsense (or became paraphrasable!). In
order to understand the metaphor as such, and not as absurdity, we must
momentarily concur with the viewpoint it offers; our feelings are implied.
The rhetorical metaphor, then, is simply a compressed analogy the form of
which is necessary because our principle interest in it depends not, as
in empirical metaphors, on the orderings of verifiable fact to which it
can point, but upon what it can convey only in its original integrity.
This last point - the indivisibility of form and content - though it
will inevitably arise again in the following chapter, is something I shall
deal with more fully in Chapter 3. For the moment let us see how this
relationship between rhetorical and scientific metaphor is reflected in




We all know that art is not the truth. Art is a deception made
in order to approach the truth, at least such truth as can be
expressed. The artist has to find a way to convince others of
the truth through his deception. Too many painters believe
instead that the result of their work, that is their canvasses,
is the "truth" in itself. "Truth" is found beyond the canvas,
never in it. It is realized in the relationship of the canvas
with reality.
Picasso
But since it will frequently happen that some delusion must be
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Introduction
In this and succeeding chapters I wish to consider how the principal
subject is to be expressed or described in interpretation, that is, to
consider the kind of vocabulary that can be meaningfully used, and the
kind of assertions that can be meaningfully made, within literary
criticism. Thus the following chapters will be concerned with the
relationship between literature and reality, the distinction between form
and content, the 'thesis' or 'metaphysic' of the work, and evaluation. It
is important to emphasize here that I am not primarily concerned with
the question of interpretation versus misinterpretation but rather with
the relevance or irrelevance of interpretations to the work as literature,
that is, one might say, with the 'So what?" of interpretation.
Strange as it would seem there is a whole debate on the truth-value
of fictional statements.1 For though fictional characters and situations
do not, by definition, exist, they can be the subjects of sentences. What,
then, is the ontological status of Pegasus or Julien Sorel? The answer
seems and, indeed, is obvious - they are fictional characters,
hypothetical instantiations. Is is and isn't isn't. Inquiry into what
particular non-empirical mode of 'real being' fictional characters
possess, in lieu of the mode of being of things such as the page you are
reading, is futile; for once we have called them 'fictional' we have the
answer. (Though this is an answer that those who send baby clothes to
pregnant characters in The Archers, or abuse television villains in the
street, choose, for whatever reason, to forget.) Every fictional narrative
or poem arrives with the prefix 'Imagine...', and there is no difficulty,
from a pragmatic viewpoint, about what status is to be accorded such a
designation. The domain of the imagination is that area between belief
and disbelief we inhabit whenever we think in terms of 'it is as if,..',
and thereby employ our existing knowledge to infer something that is not,
or not yet, the case, whether for amusement, as in children's games or
literature, or as guide to future action, as in expectation. Nevertheless,
there is still a good deal more to say about the relationship between
fiction and reality.
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A statement may be used for the sake of the reference, true or
false, which it causes. This is the scientific use of language.
But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion
and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the
emotive use of language,...But usually references are involved as
conditions for, or stages in, the ensuing development attitudes,
yet it is still the attitudes not the references which are
important. It matters not at all in such cases whether the
references are true or false. Their sole function is to bring
about and support the attitudes which are the further
response....The emotions and attitudes resulting from a statement
used emotively need not be directed towards anything to which
the statement refers.2
This passage, from I.A.Richards, demonstrates the difficulties of the
subject of the referential aspect of literary language. For is Richards'
statement the equivalent of saying that in metaphor it does not matter
what is chosen for the subsidiary subject? Yet, as was demonstrated in
Chapter 1, it is the light cast by the subsidiary subject on the principal
subject that is the assertion made by the metaphor.
Language in literature, then, both does and does not refer, in the
same way that the subsidiary subject of metaphor both does and does not
refer to its dictionary definition. But this paradox exists only as long
as we fail to separate established language from metaphorical language.
Wellek, for example, draws attention to the rhetorical nature of literary
language but then withdraws from such a direct emphasis on referentiality
by saying that 'Art imposes some kind of framework which takes the
statement of the work out of the world of reality.'.3 Frye, too, is led to
talk of literature as 'autonomous language', but it is the representatives
of more formalistic approaches to literature who most emphasize this side
of the equation, as, for example, Linda Vaugh who writes that 'poetry is
not made with ideas but with signs...[it] is not about the real world of
life, but about itself.\A Insistence on the non-referentiality of the
language of literature must, however, lead to contradiction, as in the
following passage from Tzvetan Todorov, in an essay on Henry James;
Art therefore is not the reproduction of a given 'reality', nor is
it created through the imitation of such a reality. It demands
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quite different qualities; to be 'real' can even, as in the present
case, be harmful. In the realm of art there is nothing
preliminary to the work, nothing which constitutes its origin. It
is the work of art itself that is original; the secondary becomes
primary, hence the frequent comparisons in James's work that
explain 'nature' through 'art', for instance:
'That was the way many things struck me at that time, in England
- as reproductions of something that existed primarily in art or
literature. It was not the picture, the poem, the fictive page,
that seemed to me a copy; these things were the originals and
the life of happy and distinguished people was fashioned in their
image.'5
Here Todorov appeals to some common conceptual ground between his thesis
and the work he quotes, that is, if he is claiming that his thesis has
some basis in fact then he is making the story refer to some basis in
fact, he is claiming that the work can be made to refer to the same given
reality which his thesis expresses. This side of the paradox, then, - that
literary language does not refer - produces as great a self-contradiction,
when taken too literally, as the other side - that literary language does
refer - which ends with us talking of fiction as fact.
The examples of insistence on the non-referentiality of literary
language given above are, with the possible exceptions of Richards and
Todorov, in the nature of asides, throwaway generalizations that suffer
from the urge to define too soon, but before leaving the subject I will
consider an essay by Michael Riffaterre in which he actually sets out to
define what he calls the 'referential fallacy'. His intention is to show
that the 'referentiality of literary meaning...is a fallacy, and that the
representation of reality is a verbal construction in which meaning is
achieved by reference from words to words, not to things,'.5 As we might
guess from his use of the word 'representation', the reading of
Wordsworth's 'Yew-Trees', which is his test case, does not abandon the
connection between words and things. What he is really arguing for is the
recognition that the most important factor in the meaning of the poem is
the way that its words act upon and modify one another, rather than the
existence of any actual yew-trees.
First we have a wood code, or living-matter code, represented by
'intertwisted fibres'. 'Intertwisted' not so much adds to 'fibre'
as it activates and singles out the most important feature in the
semantic complex of 'fibre'. That is to say 'fibre' as a part of
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an organic, living fabric, 'fibre' as a component incapable of
independent existence,..tied to other fibres by something that is
not mere contiguity or mere mechanical function, for that would
be mineral or metallic or artificial. 'Fibre' as bound to other
fibres by links complex enough, and labrynthine enough, to become
a kind of image within an image of the complexity of life, Hence
'intertwisted'....Now, all these details are but a grammatical
expansion of the meaning of the word 'growth', which is in itself
only a generalisation of 'trunk'....So that lines 16-18 mean not in
relation to the particular experience of a yew-tree and do not
depend upon our verifying them against such an actual tree. They
mean as a formal variation on one semantic feature,7
It is a happy accident for my purposes that the sort of interpretation of
language he employs has close affinities with that practised by Eco, and
discussed in Chapter 1. In basing his interpretation on semantic
relations between words and the associations of concepts (the 'code'), he
cannot also be arguing that language is non-referential in the sense of
unconnected with a reality which is the basis of such connections. As
soon as we move from one word to an associated one, say 'fibre' to
'organic', then, unless their relationship is one of homonymity, we have
moved through a portion of the real world. What Riffaterre is really
objecting to, in coining 'referential fallacy', is the critical practice of
making proper names, when they occur in a literary context, refer to the
historical reality of those proper names. He uses two examples from
Wordsworth's poem - 'Azincour' and 'Yew-tree'.
Names are such a marker not because they are famous per se, but
because a name sounds more specific than a noun....Suggestiveness
is circular : the descriptive sentence finds its reference in a
name whose referent need only be the preceding part of the
sentence leading up to it.®
'Azincour', then, for Riffaterre, signals only the distant past, and this
is given by its context, not its reference; its historical details are not
important. However, he is led astray by his own lack of ignorance here,
for, according to the letter of the poem, the tense could refer to the day
before the poem was written, indeed, it is only his knowing that Azincaur
happened in 1415 that makes him read the first eight lines of the poem
in the way that he does, and thereby conclude that 'Azincour' adds to the
evocation of the tree's antiquity. His point is better made with 'Yew-
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tree', for here he shows that critics can tend to explain away difficult
aspects of the poem by referring the reader to the physical appearance of
yew-trees, and thereby introduce a rather bogus evaluative standard of
'minimal factual recording'.® The problem is that if we are to accept, as
seems reasonable, that there is a 'wood code' or a 'living-matter code',
then why not an 'Azincour' or 'Yew' code, indeed, the idea of an
encyclopaedia more readily suggests such items than those Riffaterre and
Eco advance; 'Azincour' - battle, fifteenth-century, age of chivalry,
English victory over France, victory against odds, won by disregarding
humanitarian conventions (war-crime), wan by technical innovation, and so
on. Riffaterre seems correct in deciding that little of this content of
'Azincour' is germane to the poem, though, as I have said, he himself uses
the time reference contained in it. What part of the connotations that
belong to 'Azincour' are relevant to the poem is, then, decided by the
rest of the poem; this is most probably what Riffaterre means when he
says that literary meaning 'is achieved by reference from words to
words'.
The connotation of war-crime, potential in 'Azincour', is not picked
up, not made active in the interpretation, because it would make too much
of the rest of the poem redundant. This is what I mean by the critic
making the 'best' reading.10 To make 'Yew-Trees' an ironical comment on
British patriotism would take a great deal of ingenuity. (Ingenuity is
usually a virtue, hence the current state of criticism.) But, and this is
something the non-critic instinctively feels and resents; such criticism
is an almost autonomous enterprise; it starts with what it wants to say
and rationalizes the work into an unnatural shape in order to have
occasion to say it. Nevertheless, how can I say that the overall meaning
of the work is the arbiter of what connotations are relevant in each of
its elements, when it is only the connotations selected for its elements
that give us the overall meaning? This argument has only the appearance
of circularity, for what the reader is looking for, as I have said before,
is a consonance in the meaning of the elements, they are looking for the
best, that is, most interesting possible reading.
Hough writes that 'When Stendhal sets Lucien Leuwen first in fancy,
then in Paris during the July monarchy, he is committing himself to
representing a verifiable external reality - the provincial nobility, then
the political and official class of the capital, at a particular moment in
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their destiny.', that by choosing this background he is 'committing
himself to history.'.11 Does this mean that only an expert in this period
of French history would be qualified to judge Lucien Leuweh? that
historical inaccuracies are necessarily aesthetic faults? that we should
defer aesthetic judgements on works which treat of historical events of
which we had no historical knowledge? The actual existence of anything
that might correspond to the 'setting' of Lucien Leuwen is not an
aesthetic consideration. The setting exists as a contribution to motive
and an opportunity for choice, as scenery, as atmosphere, as action
itself, but as such its 'historical accuracy' is irrelevant; to assert
otherwise is to assert that the work is a poor relation of an empirical
study, a very poor relation indeed. However, we might imagine that in
certain instances - for example if on the last page the hero is on his
way to a battle which, as an historical fact, was a massacre - our
knowledge of historical fact will influence the imaginative suggestion of
the work, This is not a question, it seems, which can be answered in any
absolute sense in a purely theoretical context, though I feel that the
critical abuses arising from making literary references literally refer
are both more common and more misleading than those that can arise from
a more restricted reading.
In what sense, then, can we say that fiction does refer or assert?
Sidney answers the charge that the poet is a liar by saying that of all
writers the poet is the 'least liar' since 'he never affirms and therefore
never lieth.'.
For as I take it, to lie is to affirm that to be true which is
false. So as the other artists, and especially the historian,
affirming many things, can in the cloudy knowledge of mankind
hardly escape from many lies. But the poet, as I said before,
never affirmeth.12
The poet's 'persons and doings are but pictures what should be and not
stories what have been' and are to be taken 'not affirmatively but
allegorically and figuratively written.'.13 A crude critical approach will
treat literature as though bound to truth in this way, but in this case it^
is, as Sidney says, not 'that poetry abuseth man's wit, but that man's wit
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abuseth poetry.'.1 A Yet what are we to make of what is 'allegorically and
figuratively written'?
In dedicating the Paradisa to his patron, Con Grande del la Scala,
Dante insists that the meaning of his work is not simple but polysemous;
The first meaning is the one obtained through the letter; the
second is the one obtained through the things signified by the
letter. The first is called literal, the second allegorical or
moral or anagogical. In order that this manner of treatment may
appear more clearly, it may be applied to the following verses:
"When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a people
of strange language, Judah was his sanctuary and Isreal his
dominion." For if we look at the letter alone, the departure of
the children of Isreal from Egypt in the time of Moses is
indicated; if to the allegory, our redemption accomplished by
Christ is indicated to us; if to the moral sense, the conversion
of the soul from the woe and misery of sin to a state of grace
is indicated to us; if to the anagogical sense, the departure of
the consecrated soul from the slavery of this corruption to the
liberty of eternal glory is indicated.15
The Renaissance philosopher Jacopo Mazzoni also appeals to the tradition
of biblical interpretation, in his Defence of the Comedy of Dante, and
cites the 'Song of Solomon' as a poem which is not 'purely phantastic' but
rather 'one of those which under the husk of the literal sense conceals
pure and complete truth.', so that 'it can be called, phantastic with
respect to the literal sense, but icastic with respect to the allegorical
sense.'.15 But the influence of the biblical model was, perhaps,
pernicious, for what was to be found affirmed in the analogical sense was
held to be always conformable with a truth, or rather, the truth. Unless
poets are also to be taken as writing under the direction of the Holy
Spirit, this claim to truth is not one that can be made for their work;
yet it is one which, in other forms, is often made. As, for example,
Nietzsche;
Thus art treats illusion as illusion : therefore it does not wish
to deceive; it is true....Artistic pleasure is the greatest kind of
pleasure, because it speaks the truth quite generally in the form
of lies.17
This idea of the poet as, necessarily, a truth-teller inherits also the
classical tradition of the furor poeticus that goes back at least as far
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as the Homeric 'Hymn to Dionysus', in which Dionysus is invoiced as the
god without whose help the poet will write nothing of value. Plato, too,
insists, in several places, that it is not art but divine inspiration
which enables the poet to write beautiful poems.1® A similar sentiment
can be found in many writers; in a pure form in Emerson's 'The Poet'
(1844), Whitman's 'Preface' to Leaves of Grass (1882), and Lowell's 'The
Function of the Poet' (1894), and implicit in any treatment of the artist
as somehow necessarily oracular. Many critics do not seem able to stop
with the bald fact that the poet is a person who writes what some
section of humanity calls 'poetry'. Richards, for example, declares that,
in comparison with the poet, 'the ordinary man suppresses nine-tenths of
his impulses, because he is incapable of managing them without confusion.
He goes about in blinkers because what he would otherwise see would upset
him. But the poet through his superior power of ordering experience is
freed from this necessity.'.13 The opposite thesis is equally supportable,
and my own experience makes me lean more towards it, but this is not a
question to be decided by aesthetics or literary theory. In that this,
essentially Romantic, conception of the poet can lead us to a prejudging
of everything that comes to us as 'literature', it is, at the very least, a
fundamentally un-critical notion.20
If literature does make assertions through what it means
'allegorically' or analogically, then it must be capable of being false if
it is to be capable of being true, thus Edward Phillips makes the
distinction that it is 'whatever is pertinently said by the way of
allegory [that] is morally though not historically true'.21 I have already
touched on how an assertion is made by a fiction in considering the
rhetorical effect of the subsidiary subject on the principal subject in
metaphor. The descriptions or representations of fiction stand, as I have
said, in an analogical relationship to reality, and it is their
metaphorical appropriateness rather than the truth of their letter that
we are invited to believe in, that constitutes their 'truth to life'. For
once a fiction takes on the function of describing, is created, outside
the empirical, solely to bring reality to mind (as opposed to lying), we
are involved in rhetoric. Literature asserts things about the world, or
can assert (for us) things about the world, only within this rhetorical
realm, the realm of 'moral truth'. Whether such assertions are assertions
is a question I shall postpone to Chapter 4.
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Literature as Information
The nineteenth-century critic and historian Hippolyte Taine, holding
that a literary work 'is not a mere individual play of the imagination,
the isolated caprice of an excited brain, but a transcript of
contemporary manners, a manifestation of a certain kind of mind.'
concluded that from literature 'we might recover...a knowledge of the
manner in which men thought and felt centuries ago.'.22 He begins by
considering the work as a 'fossil shell', which is studied to bring before
us the animal which inhabited it; the work or, as he calls it, 'document'
is a 'lifeless wreck...valuable only as a clue to the entire and living
existence.'.23
If [the historian's] education suffice, he can lay bare, under
every detail of architecture, every stroke in a picture, every
phrase in a writing, the special sensation whence detail, stroke,
or phrase had issue; he is present at the drama which was
enacted in the soul of artist or writer; the choice of a word,
the brevity or length of a sentence, the nature of a metaphor,
the accent of a verse, the development of an argument -
everything is a symbol to him; while his eyes read the text, his
soul and mind pursue the continuous development and everchanging
succession of the emotions and conceptions out of which the text
has sprung: in short, he unveils a psychology.2"4
By this means the historian/critic discovers the 'system in human
sentiments and ideas' which characterizes the 'elementary moral state' of
the race, surroundings and epoch (la race, le milieu et le moment) from
which the work arose.25 He realizes, however, that such a construction
will always be incomplete and produce only an incomplete judgement.25
Indeed Taine is a strange historian - he would exchange 'fifty volumes of
charters and a hundred volumes of state-papers for the memoirs of
Cellini, the episles of Saint Paul, the Table-talk of Luther, or the
comedies of Aristophanes.'.27 His 'historical' project being dubious, he is
perhaps best considered as advancing a form of psychological criticism;
it is, as he says, a 'moral history' he aims at, one that will discover
the 'psychological laws, from which events spring'.23 The description of
his method, if we were to replace writer with reader, might describe the
discovery of the imaginative suggestion of the work as I shall describe
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it. Whether or not such a project could be undertaken on an historical
scale, and what purpose such provisional results would serve, is doubtful.
Even leaving aside Taine's systematic approach, the idea of literature
as information is a pervasive one; there is a suggestion of it in
Johnson's claim that the reader of Thomson's Seasons 'wonders that he
never saw before what Thomson shows him, and that he never yet has felt
what Thomson impresses.', and more than a suggestion of it in the
contemporary insistence that contemporary novels are information about
the political facts of the countries in which they are set or from which
they come.23 But Johnson is vague as the sort of knowledge poetry
provides, Zola, on the other hand, is quite explicit about le roman
experimental; 'We are looking for the causes of social evil; we study the
anatomy of classes and individuals to explain the derangements which are
produced in society and in man...We [obtain] the necessary data so that by
knowing them we may be able to master the good and the evil....No work
can be more moralizing than ours, then, because it is upon it that the
law should be based.'.30 Zola's model is a scientific one - Claude
Bernard's Introduction a 1'etude de la medicine experimental - and it is
the spirit of scientific research he feels the novel should emulate;
The novelist starts out in search of a truth....The problem is to
know what such a passion, acting in such surroundings and under
such circumstances, would produce from the point of view of an
individual and of society; and an experimental novel, Cousine
Bette, for example, is simply the report of an experiment that
the novelist conducts before the eyes of the public. In fact, the
whole operation consists in taking facts in nature, then in
studying then the mechanism of these facts, acting upon them by
the modification of circumstances and surroundings without
deviating from the laws of nature. Finally you possess knowledge
of the man, scientific knowledge of him, in both his individual
and social relations.31
Except, of course, that no experiment has taken place and all one has
done is to imagine what might be! The praise of Balzac is interesting,
for Sainte-Beuve, too, talks of him as a 'physiologist and anatomist' but
declares that he 'imagined as much as he observed.'.32 While Zola's
manifestoes may seem dated, much contemporary discussion of the arts, as
I noted above, demonstrates a similar demand; whenever, for example,
'social comment' is taken as an evaluative term. The sort of information
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Zola means is information about type, but a similar concern for the
strictly factual can be found in James' report that he was left 'gasping'
by Zola's admission that his next book was to be set in Rome - a city
Zola had not visited.33 This concern with the factual seems to be
directed mainly towards the novel : thus John Stuart Mill;
Poetry, when it is really such, is truth; and fiction also, if it
is good for anything, is truth: but they are different truths. The
truth of poetry is to paint the human soul truly: the truth of
fiction is to give a true picture of life.34
As one might imagine, it is the opinion of Henry James that the 'only
reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent
life.', and it must speak 'with the tone of the historian', it must, indeed,
be 'history'.3S Criticism, then, only just beginning to recover from the
rhapsodic absolutism of the nineteenth-century, in James begins to take
on a new, and now familiar, prosaic absolutism - literal truth to the
literal fact;
The air of reality (solidity of specification) seems to me the
supreme virtue of a novel - the merit on which all of its other
merits (including...conscious moral purpose...) helplessly and
submissively depend. If it be not there they are all as nothing,
and if these be there, they owe their effect to the success with
which the author has produced the illusion of life.3S
'The Illusion of Life'
In what terms, historically, has the question of literature as a
representation been discussed? This is the question I will address here.
But why such a concern with terms? In a discipline, like criticism, that
comprises almost entirely of words, terms are practice.
Aristotle writes, in the Poetics, that characters in tragedy should be
'good', 'appropriate' (that is, female characters should not be manly or
clever), 'lifelike', and 'consistent'.37 For the moment I will concern
myself only with the criterion of 'lifelike', or 'resemblance' as it is
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sometimes translated, though appropriateness and consistency of
characterization are obviously related to this. This concern with
'resemblance' is one that has hardly ever been out of favour, and today
'convincing', 'unconvincing', 'realistic' and 'unrealistic' are perhaps the
most common evaluative terms used of art, particularly outside its
academic study. Because the word 'realistic' is popularly used and
popularly understood as meaning "lifelike", I will use it here in
preference to 'naturalistic', though I will have something to say about
its more technical use - as denoting subject matter - towards the end of
this chapter.
Mazzoni, deferring to the authority of Plato, holds that since 'the
truth of imitation...consists in representing things exactly as they are,
it therefore follows that it is an essential mistake in poetry to
represent them differently and with dissimilitude.', and his contemporary,
Castelvetro, insists that the matter of poetry should be like the matter
of history and not 'less like the truth than is the history produced by
the course of mundane events'.3® Indeed, Castelvetro seems to say that the
only reason it should be 'like' history rather than history itself is that
if it were merely history then the poet would get no credit for his
imaginative powers! ("Based on a true story."!) Though Aristotle was
speaking of tragedy when he laid down the principles quoted above, Lope
de Vega holds that it is also the true goal of comedy to 'imitate the
actions of men and to paint the customs of their age.', a view that looks
forward to the Naturalist's concern with the contemporary.33 This concern
that the imagination should not be stretched too far is also evinced in
the Renaissance's concern with the 'unities' of time and place; thus
Sidney finds fault with the English drama for making the stage now Asia,
now Africa, now a garden, the scene of a shipwreck, or a battlefield,
while in the space of two hours a character is conceived, born, grows up,
and is married.40 Corneille, too, insisting that dramatic poems, as
imitations or portraits of human actions, are, like all portraits, 'more
excellent as they better resemble the original', believed that if the play
lasted two hours 'it would be a perfect resemblance if the action which
it represented did not require more time in reality.'.41 Already, though
Corneille considered such perfect resemblance too difficult to try, we are
moving towards credibility or realism as the absolute aesthetic
standard. Thus Tasso;
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Poetry is nothing else than imitation; this cannot be called in
question; imitation cannot be separated from versimilitude, for
imitation is nothing else than giving a resemblance; no part,then,
of poetry can be other than true to fact. In short, truth is not
one of the conditions demanded from poetry for its greater
beauty and ornament, but is intrinsic to its very essence and in
every part is necessary above anything else.*2
Addison, for example, writes that it is only 'nature' which can 'please
those Tastes which are the most unprejudiced or the most refined.', a
sentiment more famously expressed in Johnson's 'Preface' to The Plays of
William Shakespeare , where he writes that 'Nothing can please many, and
please long, but just representations of general nature.'.*3 The idea that
'Good art is nothing but a representation of life' is one that is
especially applied to the novel, a form that is taken to have emerged
when narrative turned from the romance to the 'history of, that is, to
realism.** But even two hundred years before James declared that 'the air
of reality' was the 'supreme virtue' of fiction, Georges de Scuddry had
written that he could not be touched by the misfortunes of the Queen of
Guindaye and the King of Astrobacia since he knew that their realms were
not to be found on any map.*8
It is with the end of the nineteenth-century, however, that we find
Horace's judgement, Incredulus odi ('unable to believe it, I dislike it'),
is a reigning principle of critical judgement.*6 Henry James, for example,
in an attack on Our Mutual Friend, asks, apropos two of Dickens'
characters, 'was anyone ever mischievous in that singular fashion? Did a
couple of elegant swindles ever take such pains to be aggressively
inhuman - for we can find no other word for the gratuitous distortions
to which they are subjected.'.*7" Though he accepts that half of Dickens'
characters can be 'intentionally grotesque' he demands that in the story
there must also be 'exemplars of sound humanity who should afford us the
proper measure of their companions' variations'.*8 Zola, in a more
sweeping gesture, objects to the Romantic movement in the theatre, with
its 'persistent and monstrous exaggeration of reality' and its 'characters
in doublets who perform great feats and flit about like insects drunk
with the sun', on the grounds that such people as it portrays 'have never
existed.'.*3
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The old formulas, classical and romantic, were based on the
rearrangement and systematic amputation of the truth....Up to the
present the different literary schools disputed only over the
question of the best way to disguise the truth so that it might
not look too brazen to the public. The classicists adopted the
toga; the romantics fought a revolution to impose the coat of
mail and the doublet. Essentially the change of dress made little
difference; the counterfeiting of nature went on, But today the
naturalistic thinkers are telling us that the truth does not need
clothing; it can walk naked.50
Zola can claim the unusual honour of being a prophet in the realm of
poetics, for, when he declared that naturalism would survive and become
the 'durable formula' for art, he was actually right.51
('Truth', it seems, has always been proposed as a characteristic of
fiction, perhaps most commonly through the idea that literature presents
'types', that is, that while literature may be false when it speaks of
particularities it is true when making generalizations. Aristotle, for
example, writes that 'it is not the poet's function to describe what has
actually happened,but the kinds of thing that might happen, that is, that
could happen because they are, in the circumstances, either probable or
necessary.'.5:2 Sidney dscribes poetry as moderating between moral
philosophy, which 'giveth the precept', and history, which describes the
example.53 This poetry can do because, while the historian is tied to 'the
particular truth of things and not to the general reason of things', and
the philosopher to 'a wordish description, which doth neither strike,
pierce, nor possess the sight of the soul', the poet can give 'a perfect
picture of it in one by whom he presupposeth it was done; so as he
coupleth the general notion with the particular example,'.54 Victor Hugo,
in similar vein, wrote that, in creating a dramatic work, the poet shoud
choose 'not the beautiful, but the characteristic.',55 Schopenhauer, too,
writes that, in art 'one single case stands for thousands in that what
art has in view with that careful and particular delineation of the
individual is the revelation of the Idea of the genus to which it belongs;
so that, e.g., an occurrence, a scene from human life depicted correctly
and completely, that is to say with an exact delineation of the
individuals involved in it, leads to a clear and profound knowledge of
the Idea of humanity itself perceived from this or that aspect.'.55 But
perhaps the most famous expression of this attiude, in English literature,
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is to be found in Fielding's 'true history' of Joseph Andrews, in which he
declares that he describes 'not men, but manners; not an individual but a
species.'.57 Historians, according to Fielding, may agree as to the place
in which an event took place but hardly anything else;
Now with us biographers the case is different; the facts we
deliver may be relied on, though we often mistake the age and
country wherein they happened: for, though it may be worth the
examination of critics, whether the shepherd Chrysostom, who, as
Cervantes informs us, died for love of the fair Marcella, who
hated him, was ever in Spain, will anyone doubt that such a silly
fellow hath really existed?....is not such a book as that which
records the achievements of the renowned Don Quixote more worthy
the name of a history than even Mariana's: for, whereas the
latter is confined to a particular period in time, and to a
particular nation, the former is the history of the world in
general...ss
From this Fielding concludes that the lawyer he describes 'is not only
alive, but has been so these four thousand years : and I hope G— will
indulge his life as many yet to come.'.59)
Let us look at this claim that literature, to be good, must be
'realistic', and that, in fixing 'its attention on reality and contemporary
existence', in showing us 'the world as it is', realism can claim the
monopoly on Truth.50 To say that a great deal of what has been
traditionally taken as 'great' literature would became 'bad' literature by
these lights is to prejudge the issue, for, if the principle is valid then
both tradition and instinct must defer to it. Johnson's work has
something of a struggle with the question of realism despite, or perhaps
because of, the definite air of his pronouncements on it. He praises
Shakespeare for having no heroes but only 'men, who act and speak as the
reader thinks he should himself have spoken or acted on the same
occasion.'
This therefore is the praise of Shakespeare, that his drama is
the mirror of life; that he who has mazed his imagination, in
following the phantoms which other writers raise up before him,
may here be cured of his delirious ecstasies, by reading human
sentiments in human language; by scenes from which a hermit may
estimate the transactions of the world, and a confessor predict
the progress of the passions.51
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This is praise indeed - or would be for a book of social psychology, or
anthropology, or sociology. (Aristotle held that we enjoy accurate
representaions of what we know because we feel pleasure in discovering
what is depicted, but when it is an unknown object it must be the
execution of the likeness which pleases, since we cannot judge the
accuracy of the representation.*52) Johnson himself provided a criticism
of this view, fifteen years earlier, in an essay on the novel; 'If the
world be promiscuously described, I cannot see of what use it can be to
read the account or why it may not be as safe to turn the eye
immediately upon mankind, as upon a mirror which shows all that presents
itself without discrimination.'.G3 Not only as 'safe', but as much to the
purpose. However it is not promiscuous description but selection, system
and experimentation that Zola claims as the principle virtue of
naturalism. The naturalist writer, insists Zola, is not simply a
photographer, his method is to experiment;
With the application of the experimental method to the novel that
quarrel dies out. The idea of experiment carried with it the idea
of modification. We start, indeed, from the true facts, which are
our indestructible basis; but to show the mechanism of these
facts it is necessary for us to produce and direct the phenomena;
this is our share of invention, here is the genius of the
book....The writer's office, far from being lessened, grows
singularly from this point of view. An experiment, even the most
simple, is always based on an idea, itself born of an
observtion....He sets out from doubt to reach positive knowledge;
and he will not cease to doubt until the mechanism of the
passion, taken to pieces and set up again by him, acts according
to the fixed laws of nature.
Realism is, then, as William Dean Howells wrote, 'nothing more and nothing
less than the truthful treatment of material', and nothing must interfere
with 'the illusion in which alone the truth of art resides.'.es Yet there
are many different forms which can lay claim to being 'realistic'; Eliot,
for example, explains the complexity of James' sentence structure as
arising from 'a determination not to simplify, and in that simplification
lose any of the real intricacies and by-paths of mental movement'.GG Yet,
and here begin the doubts as to whether language is represenatative at
all in this sense, why is it that while even our mast complex thoughts
can be sure-footed, we stumble through James' sentences? The 'modernist'
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approach was also seen as a breakthrough in realism. Virginia Voalf, far
example, dscussing the 'conventional' plot structure and characterization
of novels by such writers as Wells, Bennett, or Galsworthy, reports a
'doubt, a spasm of rebellion, as the pages fill themselves up in the
customary way.', and expresses this doubt in the question 'Is life like
this?'.G7 When one looks 'within', she continues, life is not like this; the
mind 'recieves a myriad impressions - trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or
engraved with the sharpness of steel...so that, if the writer were a free
man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must,
if he could base his work upon his own feeling and not upon convention,
there would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or
catastrophe in the accepted style.'.ee She insists that any method is
right 'that expresses what we wish to express', but of Joyce she writes
that, 'If we want life itself, here surely we have it.'.e3 Ortega y Gasset,
on the other hand, condemns what he calls the 'infrarealism' of Joyce and
Proust on the gounds that, in making what normally exists only on the
periphery of attention occupy its centre, their method is unrealistic.70
One last form of 'realism' I wish to mention, most often found in strictly
aesthetic theories and in accounts of the imagination though also in the
conclusions to specific critical essays, is the identification of the
experience of the characters or narrator of the fiction and the
experience of the reader. Richards, for example, defines the 'essence of
Tragedy' as an experience in which the mind of the reader is farced far a
moment to live without 'any of the innumerable subterfuges by which it
ordinarily dodges the full development of experience.'
It is essential to recognize that in the full tragic experience
there is no suppression. The mind does not shy away from
anything, it does not protct itself with any illusion, it stands
uncamforted, unintimidated, alone and self-reliant.71
The experience of tragedy is, then, according to Richards, like a tragic
experience in its immediacy and the demands it makes on us.72 Leaving
aside the fact that it is fictions, of all types, by which we dodge the
'full dvelopment of experience', it has to be said that Richards must have
been a very fortunate man, for I take it from this that he never
discovered what a tragic experience was.73 But I shall have more to say
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about this view of literature as a sort of correspondence course at the
'University of Life', elsewhere.
Let us return to Johnson and his comment on the unities of time and
place; 'The objection arising from the impossibility of passing the first
hour at Alexandria, and the next at Rome, supposes that when the play
opens the spectator really imagines himself at Alexandria, and believes
that his walk to the theatre has been a voyage to Egypt, and that he
lives in the days of Antony and Cleopatra. Surely he that imagines this
may imagine more.'.7'* He further observes that it is rare for 'minds not
possessed by mechanical criticism' to 'feel any offence from the
extension of the intervals between the acts, nor can I conceive it
impossible or absurd that he who can multiply three hours into twelve or
twenty-four might imagine with equal ease a greater number.'.75 This
obviously applies to drama, but does not, at first sight, appear to touch
on 'realism' in other forms of literature, but the premiss upon which he
bases these views does - 'It is false that any representation is mistaken
for reality; that any dramatic fable in its materiality was ever credible,
or, for a single moment, was ever credited.'.75 Exceptions, such as
statues which could be mistaken for people or the trompe effect in
painting, at least at the moment before they are taken for
representations, have no analogue in literature.77 'Imitations', writes
Johnson, 'produce pain or pleasure, not because they are mistaken for
realities,but because they bring realities to mind.'.75 But in how many
different ways can reality be brought to mind? The language of literature,
writes Hazlitt, 'is not the less true to nature, because it is false in
point of fact; but so much more true and natural, if it conveys the
impression which the object under the influence of passion makes on the
mind,'.73 And once we have admitted this degree of licence in bringing
reality to mind, we have admitted every degree. What, then, of Zola and
his experimental method? His contemporary, Guy de Maupassant, paints out
that the process of selection which Zola advocates is itself 'the first
blow to the theory of the whole truth.' and that the aim of creating 'a
total illusion of truth', which naturalists espoused, should better earn
them the title of 'Illusionists'.50
The illusion of reality does, indeed, appear to be one of James' aims,
for he states that he is shocked at the novelist conceding 'in a
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digression, a paranthesis or an aside' that his fiction is 'only make
belief';
Such a betrayal of sacred office seems to me, I confess, a
terrible crime; it is what I mean by the attitude of apology, and
it shocks me every whit as much in Trollope as it would have
shocked me in Gibbon or Macauly, It implies that the novelist is
less occupied in looking for the truth (the truth, of course I
mean, that he assumes, the premises that we must grant him,
whatever they may be) than the historian, and in doing so it
deprives him at a stroke of all his standing room.®1
What is the novelist's 'standing-room'? If it is to maintain the reader's
historical faith, then truthfulness is certainly not one of the qualities
of the novel. Sartre goes further than this, calling for (manifestoes are
le vice francais) an 'absolute subjective realism', that will leave the
characters 'genuinely' free of their creator.®2 If there is one thing that
is categorically unreal, however, it is illusion. If we must make the
verisimilitude of a narrative a moral question on such grounds, then we
might characterize the 'fourth-wall' concept of art as a sort of
philosophical error, for if we cease to be able to measure the
representative against the represented, the real, then we cease to be able
to measure its truth at all.33
But if the arrangement of details is imposed, cannot the details
themselves be 'as they are'? But at what level is this to be, since we
have seen Dryden insist that hippocentaurs and chimeras are 'founded on
the conjunction of two natures which have a real separate being.'?e,a- Once
we grant the novelist 'discriminative choice', as Hardy writes, 'we grant
all.'.8S Reality is what really happened, and to be like reality is to be
different from it. Thus if a station master tells me that a train for
Leeds leaves platform twelve at six o'clock, and there is no train for
Leeds from that station and no platform twelve either, then the fact that
Leeds, trains, platforms, and six o'clacks exist does not make what the
station master said any less a fiction than had he told me I could catch
a gryphon to Narnia every blue moon. (One is, however, a better illusion
of information than the other, that is, more convincing misinformation.)
It might be objected that while trains can be met with in everyday life,
gryphons cannot. Yet this is a strange basis for an evaluative standard;
that the representation of what we meet with in everyday life is 'good',
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and the representation of anything else is not. Has anybody ever judged
from this position without first making the, false, assumption that the
former type of representation is more 'true' than the latter? If we did
demand the 'true representation' of everyday facts then narrative and
poetry would be the lowest of art forms, since words do not represent
half so well as speech, objects, lines, and colours. If we want history
then there are history books which do the job better, if we want social
anthropology then there are works of social anthropology, if we want
things 'as they are' then there is the world as it is, Thus Alexander
Gerard, addressing the question of 'whether poetry be properly an
imitative art?';
Poetry makes use of language, or artificial signs. These bear no
resemblance to the things signified by them; and therefore the
poem can have no proper resemblance to the subject described in
it. It cannot be called an imitation of that subject, with any
more propriety than an historical narration can be called an
imitation of the transaction of which it gives an account.se
With the exception of drama there is no form of literature which cannot
be more properly called descriptive, and hence heir to all that
descriptions are heir to. While imitation, as Tasso said, cannot be
separated from verisimilitude, description bears a different relationship
to reality, and particularly so if it is by definition untrue - fictional.
If the description brings to mind realities then it is in its proper
relationship with reality, but any piece of language that makes sense -
and some that do not - will do this. 'This question of realism,' writes
Robert Louis Stevenson apropos Zola, 'regards not in the least degree the
fundamental truth, but only the technical method, of a work of art.'.s,F
Yet this is the last thing Zola, as the champion of an 'ism', will see;
'Our condemnation of the romantic formula is summed up in one severe
remark : To destroy one rhetoric it was not necessary to invent
another.'.ss Rhetoric begins with the selection of materials, its
structuring, with description itself - from the choice of subject to the
choice of word order. Once a fiction is created to bring reality to mind
('Man is a wolf') we are involved in rhetoric.
Nothing is more a matter of convention than the 'realistic'. Classical
and Renaissance theorists were concerned that the representation of
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action in drama should not exceed the time-limit such an action would
occupy in life, and yet did not baulk at masks, speaking in verse, or
musical accompaniment. Johnson, as we saw, claimed that Shakespeare
presented characters speaking as anyone would on a similar occasion, and
in another essay he describes the works of Fielding and Richardson as
exhibiting 'life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that
daily happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities which
are to be found in conversing with mankind.' - two propositions that
would be particularly difficult to sell to a contemporary fifth-former,
(Even each individual work tends to generate its own conventions, so
that, for example, the reader, under the impression that they have been
reading an almost day by day account, is startled when, in Flaubert's
Sentimental Education, sixteen years are made to pass in four
sentences,90)
To praise a work for its realism, as to carp at its lack of realism,
is, necessarily, a non sequitur in that such a bald judgement cannot be
made to fallow from any consistent principle. Indeed, the same person who
might make such a statement will, an another occasion, enjoy any amount
of fantasy. It is not that we dislike a thing because it is unrealistic,
rather we say that it is unrealistic because we dislike it. I have
suggested above that each work generates its own convention of
description : Does this mean that it is perceived as a fault when the
work suddenly breaks its own convention? But if the work establishes the
convention then any deviations from what has so far been established are
also part of its convention, because its full relationship to reality is
not finally established until the last ward of the work. Yet there seems
ta be some truth in this idea of self-consistency, since too great a
deviation, for example some deus ex machina in a story of everday London
folk, can be said to work the imagination too hard. Yet we do not mind
having our imagination worked hard so long as we consider the work was
worth the trouble.
Literal credibility is probably so often appealed to as a virtue
because it is so easy to appeal to, we are all experts at what things are
like at an everyday level, and, though it may not really be the
verisimilitude or otherwise which effects our enjoyment of a work,
'realism' has at least the appearance of an objective criterion for
judgement,31 To say that somebody means something other than what they
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say is, of course, only marginally more polite than saying that they do
not know what they are talking about, but as with many other formulas
that are used in criticism, formal or informal, there is here simply a
gap between response and expression that has been filled in a makeshift
way. For the principles implied in judgements based on verisimilitude,
would, if seriously held, place all fiction beneath the consideration of
the person who makes them.
At the beginning of this section I promised to say something about
the distinction between 'realism' and 'naturalism', for, though I have used
'realism' in a loose popular sense here, it has a more technical use.
'Naturalism', then, is used to refer to a method of representation but a
method which has limited subject matter - the unexceptional - while
'realism' refers to subject matter and attitude to subject matter -
impartial, 'objective' presentation of low-life - though in this attitude
we might say there is a limitation put on method. This is one way of
drawing the distinction, but in a field in which terms are manipulated
primarily with an eye to impact and fashion rather than theoretical
clarity, the distinction is often drawn in different ways. Let us look,
however, at the sense of 'realistic' I have outlined here, for it is often
used evaluatively, as in the "gritty realism" claimed as the principle
virtue of such books as John Hubert Selby's Last Exit to Brooklyn. Such
unremitting focus on the revolting, often prescribed as edification for
the 'bourgeois mind', is more properly a form of decadence; the
constricting of the compass of experience to the narrow, and, therefore,
distorting area of the extreme. There is something in the temperament of
this century to which this view appeals, but Schopenhauer could readily
explain the reason for this more restricted meaning of 'realism';
For whence did Dante take the materials for his hell but from
this our actual world? And yet he made a very proper hell of it.
And when, on the other hand, he came to the task of describing
heaven and its delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty
before him, for our world affords no materials at all for
this...92
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Yet, as Saintsbury observes, 'killing is not in the least more real than
kissing, nor are descriptions of outrage and torture more so than
descriptions of dances and Watteau-like picnics.'.93 If you want to 'face
reality', or even some specific sort of reality, that you desire knowledge
of for the good of your soul, then to go in search of it in a book is to
travel in the wrong direction.
More Real Than Reality
'Art is more real then reality' : this is a perhaps crude, though
revelatory, formula which I use to express an attitude which can be found
in several writers on aesthetics. It takes a variety of forms, but in each
case is found to rest, not surprisingly, on a general theory as to the
nature of reality and can only be understood in the light of that theory.
I will quote at length, therefore, from one example - Hegel's
'Introduction' to his Aesthetics;
If...the pure appearance in which art brings its conceptions into
existence is to be described as 'deception', this reproof first
acquires its meaning in comparison with the phenomena of the
external world and its immediate materiality, as well as in
relation to our own world of feeling, i.e. the inner world of
sense....But it is precisely this whole sphere of the empirical
inner and outer world which is not the world of genuine
actuality; on the contrary, we must call it, in a stricter sense
than we call art, a pure appearance and a harsher deception. Only
beyond the immediacy of feeling and external objects is genuine
actuality to be found. For the truly actual is only that which
has being in and for itself, the substance of nature and spirit,
which indeed gives itself presence and existence, but in this
existence remains in and for itself and only so is truly actual.
It is precisely the dominion of these universal powers which art
emphasizes and reveals. In the ordinary external and internal
worlds essentially does indeed appear too, but in the form of a
chaos of accidents, afflicted by the immediacy of the sensuous
and by the capriciousness of situations, events, characters, etc.
Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure
appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world, and gives
them a higher actuality, born of the spirit, Thus, far from being
mere pure appearance, a higher reality and truer existence is to
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be ascribed to the phenomena of art in comparison with [those
of] ordinary reality.9't
Hegel further adds that history, 'burdened with the entire contingency of
ordinary life and its events, complications, and individualities', is more
deceptive than the work of art which 'brings before us the external
powers that govern history without this appendage of the immediate
sensuous present and its unstable appearance.'.99 Art, then, 'has the
advantage that it points through and beyond itself, and itself hints at
something spiritual of which it is to give us an idea, whereas immediate
appearance does not present itself as deceptive but rather as real and
true, although the truth is in fact contaminated and concealed by the
immediacy of sense.'.99 Schopenhauer, too, plays a variation on this
theme, though his formulation is more strictly tied to an implicit theory
of the imagination. Vhat Schopenhauer is concerned with are what he calls
'Ideas', 'the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself', which
though expressed 'in innumerable indiviuals and particulars are related to
these as archetypes to their copies'.'97 Such Ideas can only become
'objects of knowledge' when the subject 'relinquishes the common way of
looking at things, gives up tracing...their relations to each other, the
final goal of which is always a relation to his own will; if he thus
ceases to consider the where, the when, the why and the whither of
things, and looks simply at the what; if, further he does not allow
abstract thoughts, the concepts of reason, to take possession of his
consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind
to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his consciousness
be filled with the quiet contemplation of the...object actually present'
and 'forgets even his individuality, his will, and continues to exist as
pure subject' then the object passes 'out of all relation to something
outside it, and the subject out of all relation to the will, then that
which is known is no longer the particular thing as such; but it is the
Idea'.99 It is art, according to Schopenhauer, which best exemplifies this
kind of 'knowledge' because in it the object is isolated, taken out of
time, and perceived without its relations.99
If the whole world as idea is only the visibility of the will,
the work of art is able to render this visibility more distinct.
It is the camera ohscura which shows the objects more purely,
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and enables us to survey them and comprehend them better. It is
the play within the play, the stage upon the stage in 'Hamlet'.100
A position very similar is (apparently) advanced in Heidegger's 'Origin of
the Work of Art'. He discusses Van Go^gh's painting of a pair of peasant's
shoes, and asserts that, in 'discovering' the 'equipmental quality of
equipment', the work lets us 'know what the shoes are in truth', since 'the
equipmentality of equipment first genuinely arrives at its appearance
through the work and only in the work.'.101 It is not, then, according to
Heidegger, that Van Go^gh depicts, or draws a likeness of a pair of
actually existing shoes, for to see the painting in this way is to treat
the painting itself as 'equipment', rather it has 'set up a world' in which
material, instead of disappearing into usefulness', as it does in the
manafacture of equipment, is caused 'to come forth for the very first
time and to come into the Open of the work's world.'.102
Truth happens in Van Gough's painting. This does not mean that
something is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the
revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes, that which is
as a whole - world and earth in their counterplay - attains to
unconcealedness.103
What can we make of this idea of 'genuine actuality', 'being in and
far itself', 'the unconcealedness of Being'? It is interesting to note that
Plato, starting from a similar point of view about the relationship
between things and their Ideas, arrives at an apposite conclusion about
art - that it is a copy of a copy. Rather than asking if art can do what
these philosophers say, if such a question can be asked, it would seem
both quicker and more decisive to ask if anything is more real than what
we call reality, that is, what can be meant by the phrase 'thing-in-
itself'. But we cannot talk about the thing-in-itself; the phrase only has
meaning when it is placed in contrast to the individual's perception of
the thing, their version. Each writer - Hegel, Schopenhauer, Heidegger -
is an individual, so that in talking of the thing-in-itself he admits that
he is not talking of the thing-in-itself. He can mention it, as I am
doing, but the application of the phase to anything immediately
undermines that phrase, cancels out its own use. It is much more honest,
then, simply to talk about things and distinguish other people's
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misconceptions by characterizing them as 'misconceptions', as distortions
introduced by the action of the will. Everyone will know that one is not
deliberately lying. Likewise, when somebody obligingly adds the suffix "In
your opinion!" to anything I say, I feel the addition as quite redundant,
for my saying it has made it my opinion. (The suffix is really the
equivalent of a contradiction or an appeal to my lack of direct knowledge
of the subject.) 'Real', in 'Art is more real than reality', is, then, being
used as an evaluative word, as a term of praise, and 'reality' as a term
of derogation. To speak of the 'thing-in-itself', like talking of a 'real'
book, party, man, and so on, is to say that these things correspond to
one's idea of what they should be at their 'best', and it is perhaps the
most deceptive way of thinking just because it is so absolute, because it
denies any possibility that one's conception is contingent. The truth of
any concept, far from being 'contaminated and concealed by the immediacy
of sense', must be rooted in that immediacy to be verifiable. What these
philosophers have actually claimed about art appears, then, to be that, as
rhetoric, the work can be so persuasive as to seem to embody the very
essence of a thing.
A related approach, which I will touch upon before leaving the
subject, is to be found in the Marxist Georg Lukacs, who defines the 'goal
of all great art' as the provision of 'a picture of reality in which the
contradictions between appearance and reality, the particular and the
general, the immediate and the conceptual, etc., is so resolved that the
two converge in to a spontaneous integrity' in which 'reality becomes
manifest and can be experienced within appearance' and 'the general
principle is exposed as the specific impelling cause for the individual
case being specially depicted.'.10'1 According to Lukacs the representation
of life which the work contains, because it is 'structured and ordered
more richly and strictly than ordinary life experience' is 'in intimate
relation to the active social function, the propaganda effect of the
genuine work of art' and, therefore, 'cannot possibly exhibit the lifeless
and false objectivity of an "impartial" imitation which takes no stand or
provides no call to action.'.105 The 'genuine' work, then, according to
Lukacs contains not a false 'impartial' objectivity, but a true 'partisan
objectivity' which sees the thing not as it is, but as it r-eally is.
From Lenin, however, we know that this partisanship is not
introduced into the external world arbitrarily by the individual
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but is a motive force inherent in reality which is made
conscious through the correct dialectical reflected of reality
and introduced into practice.1 oe
If objectivity, as it is ordinarily defined, is seeing a thing as it really
exists, external to the mind and without distortions introduced by the
perceiving subject, how can there be two forms of it? and how can
impartiality, which is, to all present concerns, synonymous, be a false
form of it? The key lies in the oxymoron 'partisan objectivity', for what
Lukacs relies on is the view that though the objects of our desires,
beliefs, or hopes, do not actually exist, the fact that they can be thus
objects gives them an objectivity. But how can we say that what is
imaginary, and, therefore, by one definition of 'real', unreal, is more real
than reality? What Lukacs is probably aiming at is that what is usually
called 'reality' is not reality as that word is defined but a bourgeois
construction; if so then some of the difficulties of his argument could be
overcome by placing 'reality' within quotation marks when it is meant in
this sense. Once more language has run away with itself and we are back
at the idea of a reality more real than reality, and the admission of
prejudice raised to absolute principle which it entails.
I have given so much space to these four thinkers here because the
claim that art reveals a superior reality is one which often steals upon
both literary theory and criticism without us being aware. By rejoining
the formula to its underlying assumptions I have, hopefully, shown how
far reaching are the intellectual consequences we commit ourselves to by
its use.
Before leaving the subject of literature and reality there is one last
'reality' which I must turn to - the reality of the author as an
historical person. Though 'intention' is now widely considered to be a
closed subject, I wish to show the ways in which intentionalism may
persist as a buried premiss in specific critical arguments or
descriptions, and the consequences or implications of its presence.
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Intention
To give an accurate description of what has never occurred is
not merely the proper occupation of the historian, but the
inalienable privilege of any man of parts and culture.
Wilde107
'Intentionalism' I will here loosely define as the tendency to seek
the key to the impart or value of a work in the intentions of its author
that is, to criticize by reference to the author's thought processes and
motives. Pope expresses it thus 'In every work regard the writer's end, /
Since none can compass more than they intend'.108 Indeed good intentions
have become, with varying degrees of explicitnes, a common normative
standaiml in evaluation and thus, through the persuasive defintions of
Romanticism, - 'poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful
feelings...emotion recollected in tranquility' - part of the definition of
literature itself.103 But, such is the 'naturalness' of this approach that
it is not a tendency restricted to the overtly Romantic; Hulme, for
example writes that 'excellence in verse' is rooted not in the emotion it
produces but that 'Wherever you get...sincerity, you get the fundamental
quality of good art'.110 Richards too appeals to authorial intention when
he writes that 'the deliberate conscious attempt directed to
communication' is never so successful as 'the unconscious indirect
method.'.111 One example of intentionalism that seems to me particularly
representative of the style, as I inherited it, is Coombes' comparison of
a stanza from Gray's 'Elegy' with part of Hopkins' 'The Leaden Echo and
the Golden Echo'; the latter, Coombes writes, is better because instead of
Gray's 'neat or solemnly impressive versified propositions' Hopkins
conveys his thought in an almost physically felt effort'; Coambes
concludes from the comparison that 'Poetic thought occurs when the idea
is felt, not merely utilized, by the poet, who makes his words unfold the
thought as it develops; usually, the thought is felt through concrete
words and images, the abstract being too vague and general.'.112 This
could be understood as a description of the sort of poetry he prefers and
as a description of that poetry's effects, but if so it is, for the reader,
a very tortuous way of doing so; its advantage for the critic is, that the
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hypothetical genesis is easier to describe than the actual properties that
lead to its inference.
Evaluation : It is such an approach as this which produces those
evaluative judgements which are apparently based on exclusively
historical criteria such as 'radical', 'experimental', 'important in the
history of', 'original', 'derivative', 'conventional', and so on. These, as we
shall discover in later chapters, are not aesthetic judgements and so do
not belong to criticism. 'A writer who produces a pastiche skillful enough
to contain pages Stendhal might have signed at the time', writes Robbe-
Grillet, 'would in no way have the value he would still possess today had
he written those same pages under Charles X....[No one] would dream of
praising a musician for having composed some Beethoven, a painter for
having made a Delacroix, or an architect for having conceived a Gothic
cathedral.'113 But what if a previously unknown Stendhal or Beethoven
manusript or painting by Delacroix was to be discovered, would they than
have no aesthetic value? A forger who produces 'a new masterpiece by
Cezanne' is, from a critical point of view, as great an artist as Cezanne,
for a great artist is a person who produces great art, that anybody
should think otherwise is the grossest superstition.11"- (This does not
mean, of course, that a work cannot be the best of its period, but this is
an aesthetic judgement only in a sense relative to the aesthetic value of
that period as a whole, not in any absolute sense. Consider the fate of
Ossian.)
It could, however, be said that, with regard to evaluation, the work
itself is evidence of what the author intended, Thus Hough;
In judging a poem we can say 'These lines were presumably
intended to produce an effect of grandeur; but they are
platitudinous and inflated, and fail to do so.' Or 'this poem aims
at elegance but achieves only triviality.'...Part of the process of
judging an unsuccessful or incompletely successful poem is a
matter of summarising the intention and seeing that it is
unfulfilled. With a completely successful poem all is achievement,
and the question of a separately concievable intention need not
arise.11 s
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But if the intention that we summarise is inferred from the poem then the
only intention for which we have evidence is the intention to write the
poem as it exists. Even if the poem is bad, to infer an intention that is
excess to the facts is only to say 'I can see how this could be improved
or changed to something I would like better' or 'If I were a poet I would
be disappointed with this poem', that is, to rewrite the poem to exclude
its faults and then measure the poem against this rewriting. Ve do not
know that these lines were intended to produce an effect of grandeur,
only that they are platitudinous and inflated. If we suppose that they
were then we imagine every work to have been written by a failed great
poet. Thus Collingwood;
What the artist is trying to do is to express a given emotion.
To express it, and to express it well, are the same thing. To
express it badly is not one way of expressing it...it is failing
to express it. A bad work of art is an activity in wjfech the V\
agent tries to express a given emotion but fails.116.
There may indeed be something in this, but it is a type of shorthand that
tortuously expresses what is really at issue, that is, the expectations we
have of art, and which can be misleading, for the emotion is not 'given'
at all except as it is given in the work. Once the inquiry moves outside
such 'intention' as the work provides, that is, once this discussion of
intention becomes more than pleonastic, it becomes no more than
extravagant speculation on 'what has never occurred'. The poem expresses
not failed grandeur but absurdity. But if we can characterize a bad poem
by saying that it has certain negative characteristics, that is, qualities
which we could define as the failure of certain positive qualities, does
this not require us to invoke intention? But then if a poem were
perfectly absurd, we would have to praise it for perfectly expressing
absurdity, for every work perfectly expresses exactly what it expresses.
The difficulty only arises, however, if we have already decide to judge by
intentions. Every work does perfectly express exactly what it expresses,
but this is itself one of the arguments against judging from intention,
for this only makes every poem a good poem if we are already committed
to judging by intention. The only meaningful criterion is, as we shall
see, whether or not what the poem expresses was worth expressing.
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The question of intention can, nevertheless, be more problematic than
this. Consider Hurd's defence of the Faerie Queene;
When an architect examines a Gothic structure by Grecian rules,
he finds nothing but deformity. But the Gothic architecture has
its own rules, by which when it comes to be examined, it is seen
to have its merit, as well as the Grecian. The question is not,
which of the two is conducted in the simplest or truest taste:
but whether there be not sense and design in both, when
scrutinized by the laws on which each is projected. The same
observation holds of the two sorts of poetry. Judge of the Faerie
Queene by the classic models, you are shacked withn its disorder:
consider it with an eye to its Gothic original, and you find it
regular. The unity and simplicity of the former are more
complete: but the latter has that sort of unity and simplicity
which results from its nature.117
What Hurd is doing here is very useful from a critical point of view; he
is seeking to remove from the reader's mind a false and inapplicable
standard of value, to make the reader appreciate the Faerie Queene for
what it is. But is this what he does? For the question for evaluation is
whether or not the poem is 'conducted in the...truest taste'. What he has
done is to set up another standard that is, arguably, just as irrelevant,
for whether or not a work conforms to some model - other than the
critic's model of a 'good work' - is not an aesthete judgement of that
work. Each new work is a variation on a genre (x) but that variation is
itself a species (xy), a new genre to be conformed to or deviated from.
Thus if we are only to judge each work according to its type then
judgement must always be favourable; alternately we can decide on a fixed
number of genres - but this is the very thing that Hurd is arguing
against, for, as he rightly observes, to judge only according to accepted
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beside the white
chickens
This is, or rather, would be a poor haiku. I have heard it described as a
haiku so let us for a moment pretend that is what it is. It is a poor
haiku, then, because it does not conform to the form of haikus. This is
not, however an aesthetic judgement, for the Prelude is also a poor haiku,
as are all of Shakespeare's sonnets, but this fact does not usually effect
our sense of their value. If it were intended as a judgement then it could
only be a judgement of Villiam Carlos Williams' grasp of Japanese
poetical forms and only then if he had declared that he set out to write
a haiku; it cannot, in any sense, be an aesthetic, critical judgement. If
the judgement was not intended as one of Williams then it is irrelevant,
for if a sonnet can be a good poem and a poor example of a haiku then
being a poor example of some form cannot be part of an aesthetic
judgement. To say it is a bad poem is an aesthetic judgement but to
introduce 'haiku' into the critical account is to introduce an irrelevance
that serves only to demonstrate the critic's knowledge. Why, then, did I
ever hear it described as a such? Perhaps because this poem, as several
others by Williams, reminds the reader of a haiku. (It may be that
Williams has himself said such was his intention - I do not know.) This
demonstrates the distortion, or abnegation, of the evaluative process
which intentionalism can introduce, for if we make conformity to the
nearest related type or genre of which the poem seems an example, or the
fulfilment of the author's expressed intention, the standard by which we
evaluate the work then we are not judging that work as a work, that is,
not making an aesthetic judgement.
Hough writes that 'All literature is read within a context - a
historical context in the first place. The author's intention, where he
has made it known, is part of this historical context.' so that 'Samson
Agonist.es could not be judged rightly if we did not know that Milton
intended to write a tragedy modelled on classical Greek tragedy.' and
'Lycidas ...would be almost unintelligible to a reader who did not
know...that it was intended to be a poem in the long and elaborate
tradition of the pastoral elegy.'.11® Such things are interesting to know,
and can certainly help prevent our preconceptions getting in the way of
judgement, for it would be foolish to pretend that a reader can appreciate
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all the forms of poetry without some sort of introduction to the
possibilities of poetry. But this does not ultimately bear on aesthetic
evaluation or criticism, that is, it is a process for overcoming
preconceptions, if it becomes simply a means for arguing away strengths
or weaknesses on the grounds of 'convention', then it is a positive
hindrance to criticism. The knowledge of genre, and its use as a
normative standard, cannot be defended on the grounds that it helps
prevent us from mistaking the intention of the work, for this, as we saw
with Hurd, supposes that intention is already being used as a standard
and itself points out the dangers of so doing.
Significance : I will now turn to intention as a criteria for the
elucidation of the import of the work; 'A perfect judge', writes Pope, 'will
read each work of wit / With the same spirit that its author writ'.119 As
we shall see in the next chapter, our 'natural' tendency is to see and
talk about the work as a medium of communication, and this includes the
idea of an author with something to say and the work as the way it is
said, that is, to look for a personality behind the letter. This is
unproblematic so long as we restrict our search to what the work itself
will yield, but this approach can also lead, as I will show, both to the
rationalizing of the work to a pattern it does not have and to the actual
ignoring of what the work, in itself, expresses.
Treating a work as the communication of someone separate from that
work is, then, a common practice, but we can draw a distinction between
seeking to reconstruct the author's intentions from the work and seeking
to restore them from other sources or on the basis of certain
presuppositions about the nature of the work. The former need be no more
than one way of talking about what is really on the page, for, as I wrote
above, to talk about the author's intentions in this way is to talk of
what was done in terms of what the 'author' did.120 It is the latter that
can lead to distortions in the perception of the work itself. John
Harrington in his 'Briefe Apologie of Poetrie', for example, cautions the
reader of Ariosto's Orlando Furioso to read the bawdy passages 'as my
author meant them, to breed detestation and not delectation.\1S1 This, as
I have written elsewhere, was one of the drawbacks of New Criticism; it
appeared to assume that a work of a certain complexity must always "mean t
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well", and it encouraged the reader to adjust the meaning of the work
until it did demonstrate this type of meaning. What is bawdy is bawdy.122
The phenomena of historical intentionalism, discussed above with
regard to value, can also be said to encompass certain approaches that
rely on historical criteria for deciding on meaning. Knights, for example,
though he assserts that we need only read Shakespeare's plays 'with
attention' to discover 'how they should be read.', also writes that a
'consideration of Shakespeare's use of language demands a consideration
of the reading and listening habits of his audience.',123 Thus he
considers that 'the contemporary factors that conditioned the making of
an Elizabethan play...the construction of the playhouse and the
conventions depending, in part, upon that construction, and the tastes and
expectations of the audience.' are all 'evidence' as to how Shakespeare
should be read.12/t Why not, indeed, make full use of the evidence? The
answer is contained in the very word 'evidence' - for a work is not a
murder mystery, it is not so much a collection of clues as the 'deed'
itself. Historical background can be very useful in enhancing the
enjoyment of a work, and certainly some knowledge, or even fanciful
speculation, about a work's milieu is a useful way of maintaining the
attention when dealing with a long work of an unfamiliar style. This is,
however, a more complicated subject, for historical criteria are
demonstrably essential in deciding on meaning at a local level - a
dictionary is itself, in one sense, an historical document.
Nevertheless certain historical, as biographical, approaches can be
both irrelevant and positively detrimental to aesthetic judgement, and
therefore to criticism. Before demonstrating why this should be so I must
make it clear that I am not in any way denigrating either the methods of
historical scholarship as they pertain to literature, nor the role such
scholarship must play in the 'teaching' of literature. Indeed, with regard
to this 'teaching of literature', history is all. The principles of
literary criticism, we may presume, can also be taught but, though history
and criticism can scarcely avoid one another if the former is to have a
general appeal, criticism, despite that it requires a wide acquaintance
with literature, cannot be properly described as part of an historical
activity, and certainly cannot be taught in a similar manner. That
Spenser's diction in Tie Faerie Queene and elsewhere and Sidney's in
Arcadia were archaic for their times is of great interest to the literary
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historian but irrelevant to the critic. Knowing what a word means to a
people, whether that people is separated by nationality or by time, is
knowing what that word means in a context that derives from thence. This
is part of literary history and also part of literary criticism, in so far
as we need to know what all the words in a work mean, at an everyday
level, before we can begin to consider the significance that the context
of that work gives them.125 Vhat I mean by 'significance' is the role
those words play in the imaginative suggestion, the metaphysic of the
work. Much of the obfurscation that exists within criticism and much of
the hostility that exists towards it is the result of confusing
'significance', as it is here defined, with meaning; meaning is what can
be preserved in paraphrase, significance is what cannot. Ve are as
capable of finding the meaning of Spenser's archaisms as his
contemporary audience would have been, and if we are not then only time
and philology will tell, but it does not fallow that we can say the same
of their significance, or that it is at all relevant to criticism that we
should be able to do so. Sidney, for example, wrote that he 'dare not
allow' Spenser's 'old rustic language...since neither Theocritus in Greek,
Virgil in Latin, nor Sannozaro in Italian did affect it.', Ben Jonson wrote
that Spenser 'in affecting the Ancients, writ no Language', and D'Avenant
attributes Spenser's use of 'exploded words' to the necessity of finding
rhymes, while, in contrast, Digby praises him for 'renewing some obsolete
words and using some ancient forms of speech' on the grounds that as
well as expressing 'more lively and more concisely what he would say'
they also 'retain the majesty of antiquity'.125 Indeed D'Avenant records
that the archaic nature of Spenser's language 'be grown the most vulgar
accusation that is laid to his charge.'.122 Today all of Spenser's
language has 'the majesty of antiquity', and it is only a specialist
reader who can identify as 'more archaic' or even mock-archaic those
parts which caused such consternation to his contemporaries, that was
part of their 'significance' for them. Should the reader, as critic, then,
look for the significance of using archaisms? No, because although as a
critic I must 'read as an Elizabethan' with regard to meaning, I can only
read as a critic with regard to significance. The significance which
these aspects of Spenser's work had for his contemporaries or the
significance of Spenser's intention are an issue for literary history, for
literary history is concerned with Spenser's work in the context of a
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certain period. The significance of the work as an object of criticism,
that is, the significance of the work per se, is, in this sense, timeless
because as a critic this is always the significance it has for me. The
question of my limitations as a late twentieth-century man is of no
interest to me, I have never been anybody else and I never will be anbody
else, such limitations as I know I have I can strive to overcome, such
limitations as I cannot know I have I cannot take into consideration. As
a critic I wish to know the effect of the work and that is something I
can only verify with reference to myself.
But where are we to draw the line between meaning and significance?
According to Preston when Pope wishes to denigrate William III in Windsor
Forest he associates him with William I who in turn is referred to as
'limrod', a figure generally understood in eighteenth-century biblical
commentaries as the type of the tyrant.12® Could this not be said to be
an historically determined significance that is germane to the criticism
of the poem? The passage in which 'Nimrod' occurs is, in fact, self-
explanatory with regard to the traits that are being attributed, so that
it is only the meaning of the word 'Nimrod' itself that is now
problematic. If the work bears out the meaning that the typology lends
it, that is, for example, if tyranny is obviously predicated of a 'Nimrod',
then the significance of 'Nimrod' as it occurs in the work needs no more
support than the eighteenth-century meaning of the word will supply. If
the work does not bear out this meaning then, unless we wish to
understand the use as an instance of irony, the eighteenth-century
significance of 'Nimrod' is irrelevant to criticism of the work, and only
an appeal to authorial intention can make it otherwise. But as we have
seen with Donne's '0 my America' and Wordsworth's 'Azincour' there are
occasions, particuarly with regard to proper names, when the case is more
difficult to decide. Meaning, in the sense of word use, and significance
shade imperceptibly into one another and it would be futile to try to
decide, before the fact, where a proper respect towards the one turns into
an uncritical deference towards the other.
A great deal of specialized knowledge is only of 'use' to criticism
from an intentionalistic point of view, (It may be that it is not the
natural tendency to appeal to intention that is responsible for the
emphasis on specialized knowledge within criticism, but conversely that a
desire to have specialized knowledge, "hard evidence", within criticism is
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responsible for the persistence of the more indirect forms of
intentionalism.) The nature of Roger Ascham's prose style can be
explained by his mentally translating from the sixteenth-century idea of
good Latin, but such an explanation does not account for that nature in
the sense that a critic must account for an effect, in the sense of
showing why it strikes one as it does. As we shall see, looking to an
author or their times for 'proof' of impart can cause us to distort the
work by rationalizing into or out of existence what does or does not
accord with what we know of these things, but it can also be used as an
excuse to avoid the actual import of the work. There is a difference
between explaining and explaining away. With the aid of such phrases as
'inherited from' and 'reacted against', and the psychoanalytical concept of
sublimation it becomes possible to derive the system of values which a
work expresses from any background which its author might have had; a
futile, if harmless procedure, since in giving a 'how' rather than the
'what' of the work's values it passes over analysis in favour of a
fancifully "scientific" appearance of it.
There are of course examples of critical pronouncements that run
counter to intentionalism; Dryden asserts that the author is certainly
competent to judge the 'fabric and contrivance' of their own work but,
with regard to the 'ornament of writing' and its effects, since it is 'the
child of fancy', it can no more be judged by the 'fancy' of the author
'than two crooked lines can be the adequate measure of each other.'.123
Johnson, in the same vein, writes that though 'equivocations' which 'at
least approach to impiety' are to be found in Wilton's Lycidas he does
not believe that Milton was conscious of them.130 Goethe likewise writes,
apropos some works that were attributed both to him and to Schiller, that
only a 'thorough Philistine' would be at all interested in deciding on
their authorship, 'as if the existence of such things were not enough.'.131
In modern times the desirability of separating author from work has been
stated more systematically. (Though whether this separation has been as
systematically made is another question, and one that I will come to
shortly.) Schleiermacher, for example, wrote in 1818 that the critical
task 'is to be formulated as follows
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"To understand the text at first as well as and then even better
than its author." Since we have no direct knowledge of what was
in the author's mind, we must try to become aware of many things
of which he himself may have been unconscious, except insofar as
he reflects on his own work and becomes his own reader.
Moreover, with respect to the abjective aspects, the author had
no data other than we have.132
Dilthey writes that criticism is concerned not 'with the processes of the
poet's mind but with a structure created by these processes yet separable
from them.'; Wimsatt and Beardsley, in 'The Intentional Fallacy', that 'the
design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a
standard for judging the success of a work of literary art', and Wellek
that 'The meaning of a work of art is not exhausted by, nor even
equivalent to, its intention. As a system of values it leads an
independent life. The total meaning of a work of art cannot be defined
merely in terms of its meaning for the author and his
contemporaries.'.133 Nor, it must be said is the critical practice of
critics either exhausted by, or, indeed, equivalent to, their stated
principles.
Poe, for example, writes that we should 'forebear praising the epic on
the effort's account' and looks forward to a day when the value of a work
is decided 'by the impression it makes, by the effect it produces' rather
than 'by the time it took to impress the effect or by the amount of
"sustained effort" which had been found necessary in effecting the
impression.'.13"- A few pages later, however, he is praising a poem for
'[breathing] an earnestness - an evident sincerity of sentiment'.13S Eliot
does something rather similar in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent',
where he writes that 'Honest criticism and sensitive appreciation are
directed not upon the poet but upon poetry.', but then discusses Canto XV
of the Inferno almost exclusively in terms of Dante's mental processes,
concluding the discussion with a definition of poetry which is decidedly
Romantic in taking the poet as the starting point; 'Poetry is not a
turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the
expression of personality, but an escape from personality.'.13e It could
be, of course, that all that Eliot says of Dante could be translated into
statements about the effect of the Canto, indeed if the criticism is about
this Canto then it must be capable of such translation. The problem is
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that even if the invention is at this stage harmless, it appeals to
criteria that cannot be sustained unless we are prepared to start judging
the author rather than the work; a principle that only works when it does
not matter whether it does or not is not very useful principle. More
revealing about the hold that intentionalism has on criticism is, however,
Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'Intentional Fallacy' itself. Aside from making an
obvious appeal to intentional criteria when they write that the
'characteristic fault' of contemporary poets lies in 'planning too much.',
they also write that 'Poetry succeeds because all or most of what is said
or implied is relevant'.137 Relevant to what? This concept of relevance
supposes something other, more or less, than the work as it exists, that
is it presumes a model, an intention, that can be differentiated from the
result, the work. Everything is relevant to the work as it exists, as it
is given. Similarly Crane, in an essay on Gulliver's Travels, sets out to
show that attempts to interpret the 'Voyage to the Country of the
Houyhnhnms' by appeal to the 'climate of opinion', 'dominant tendency' or
'ruling opposition of attitude or belief of the historical period in which
Swift wrote betray a 'fundamental confusion in method.'.13® This sounds
promising, for I was never happy with the way that the disturbing nature
of' this part of the work was avoided by the simple assertion that Swift
was a Christian minister.
Indeed Crane attacks critics' attempts to defend Swift against the
charge of all-out misanthropy by appeal to the intellectual and religious
concerns of Swift's age, on the grounds that general postulates about an
historical period cannot be made to encompass every instance of thought
or expression in that period. Crane does himself believe that the voyage
is misanthropic but is still concerned with the question as to whether or
not Swift can be distinguished from Gulliver in this chapter, that is,
whether or not Gulliver is himself an object of satire at the end of the
work. This, according to Crane, cannot simply be the result of an
exegesis of the voyage itself. Despite that Crane gives much space to
attacking the idea that the degree of misanthropy can be judged from the
'spirit of the age' he himself appeals to Swift's acquaintance with
certain contemporary textbooks of logic, and the definitions of humanity
which they contained, and to the evidence of certain of Swift's letters.
The evidence that he produces is interesting enough in itself and perhaps
indicative of Swift's state of mind when he wrote the letters under
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consideration, but, in so far as Crane considers the voyage to be
misanthropic to a greater degree than Swift can be said to be
misanthropic, his essay is not primarily concerned with Gulliver's
Travels, that is, it is not an essay in criticism. (It may be that the
work is intrinsically ambiguous, that is, there may be no answer to the
question as it is posed. It is such works that most encourage us to go
outside of them to answer what are essentially questions for
criticism.139) Crane's is an essay about Swift's mental state as it is
manifested in his letters. The mental state of Gulliver's Travels is not
touched on, except where he writes that he considers the last voyage to
be misanthropic.
But how can a book be said to have a mental state? This question
introduces the question of just what the word 'Swift' means when it is
used in connection with Gulliver's Travels or A Tale of a Tub or The
Battle of the Books, and so on. It should be understood that if we are to
avoid intentionalism yet also do justice to the many critical works which
appear intentionalistic but, in fact, are not, then we must appreciate
that an author's name when it is used to refer to works can mean quite
different things on different occasions. The author, in connection with a
particular work is an hypothesis, that is, if we wish to use the author's
name - and it is often convenient to do so - it should be understood
that this author is a part of the fiction under consideration, a part
which exists only by virtue of the work, or, to speak paradoxically, a
part which comes into being after the work and is inferred from it.14-0
Gardner writes that 'each work has an historical relation to its
author's other works.' and this is certainly true, but it has no more
aesthetic relation to those works than to any others that were ever
written.1,41 If I say that work A is darkly pessimistic and work B,
written by the same person, is tentatively optimistic I can say that A
and B, that is, this writer's ouevre, is darkly pessimistic but tinged
with optimism. This does not mean, however that A's effect is tinged with
that of B, the cumulative import is a property of the ouevre and not of
either A or B as unique literary works. The import of any particular work
can only be decided upon by an examination of the meaning of that work.
Thus a criticism of work A can be part of a criticism of a writer's
oeuvre, but the criticism of a writer's ouevre cannot be part of the
criticism of' work A. I have no objection to the discussion of what import
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arises from the diaries, correspondence, essays, sermons, philosophical
works, and so on, of any writer, that is, I can see no reason why these
individually, or as an ouevre, or even in connection with the same writers
fictional works, cannot be in themselves objects of criticism.1 The
question that must arise is, however; When we refer to the 'author' are we
refering to the hypothesis that we have inferred from work A, or works A
and B, or works A, B amd C, and so on? This is something we must be
clear about for the author is not, for critical purposes, some person who
ever lived and went by the name we find on the cover of the work, rather
the author is an inference from a work or body of works; the author of
Gulliver's Travels may be quite a different entity from the author of
Gulliver's Travels and A Tale of a Tub who may be quite a different
entity again from the author of The Correpondence of Jonathan Swift.
I have involved myself in this admittedly tortuous argument as to the
nature of the 'author' in relation to the work because there are
circumstances in which what appears to be intentionalist criticism is not
necessarily so.143 Take, for example, Longinus' description of the
Odyssey,
As though the ocean were withdrawing into itself and remaining
quietly within its own bounds, from now on we see the ebbing of
Homer's greatness as he wanders in the realms of the fabulous
and the incredible....I am speaking indeed of old age, but after
all it is the old age of a Homer.1
This passage describes the Iliad and the Odyssey, 'Homer' is the way in
which Longinus refers to the import of these. Similarly when Eliot writes
that Donne felt thought 'as immediately as the odour of a rose.', that it
was for him 'an experience' that 'modified his sensibility', he is patently
not writing about any historical person but about the effect of certain
writings.1 dS Likewise Lawrence who declared that one should 'lever trust
the artist.' but rather 'Trust the tale.' and that 'The proper function of
a critic is to save the tale from the artist who created it.',
nevertheless almost invariably talks about works in terras of their
'authors'.1 However, by talking about the unconscious motivation of the
author, that author is, for Lawrence, rarely more or less than an
hypothesis inferred from the work.
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There is a sense in which criticism is always trying to 'reconstruct
the author', that is, in the sense that to grasp with immediacy the unity
of the imaginative suggestion of the work, to feel the work as an all-
encompassing world, one requires first and foremost the ability to
empathize. 'We are all poets when we read a poem well,', writes Carlyle,
'The "imagination that shudders at the Hell of Dante," is not that the
same faculty, weaker in degree, as Dante's own?".''17 But this is only one
way of talking about how the work makes an impression on oneself, it
describes the faithful reconstruction of the imaginative suggestion of the
work as it exists, not of Dante as an historical figure independent of
the work. Emilia Betti makes a fsimilar) point] to Carlyle's when he writes
that because, with literature, we are dealing with 'objectivations of
mind', interpretation must take the form of 'an inversion of the creative
process' so that 'the interpreter retraces the steps from the opposite
direction by re-thinking them in his inner self.'.1AS The danger however
of seeing the process of reading as Betti does, that is, as 'the re¬
cognition' of meaning by 'the cognizing subject', is that it almost
inevitably leads us to think of the work as the expression of, if not the
historical character that went by the author's name, at least the
expression of some historical character.149 Thus elsewhere he states that
'One proceeds...to the pre-supposition that the totality of speech, just as
that of any manifestation of thought, issues from a unitary mind and
gravitates towards a unitary mind and meaning.'; but the 'mind' of a work,
its imaginative suggestion, may turn out to be a quite different type of
entity from the 'mind' of a person.150 Hence, though, as we have seen, to
talk in terms of 'the author' may be just one way of talking about the
import of the work, to identify the import of the work with the
expression of even some hypothetical inferred mind, like our own, cannot
be justified before the fact, and to presume it is to delimit, before the
fact, the kind of import which a work may have. This is a subject I shall
return to in the next chapter.
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Conclusion
To attempt to...define art as nothing more than a recollection or
reproduction of the highest beauties of nature, strikes at the
very root of its free and independent existence. Had not art a
power distinct from that of nature, were it not governed by its
own peculiar laws, we should be compelled to regard it as a
feeble device of the ancients, a subtle contrivance by which to
protract in faint reflection the declining vigour of its own
natural life. Those who were not all-absorbed in the
consciousness of youth and vigour would hasten eagerly in
pursuit of truth, and leave the grey-headed to seek warmth from
the mummy of life, and the feeble-minded to revel in
insubstantial shadows.
Schlegel1 S1
To praise literature far the presentation of facts is, then, to commit
it to a standard of evaluation in which it must compete with historical,
sociological, anthropological, or psychological texts - on their own
ground. Moreover, a concern for realism is a demand that literature be a
scientific metaphor, that is, amenable to paraphrase without loss,
contingent to explanation. To treat the text as the expression of some
historical reality (including that of the author) is to treat it as
compound, as the expression of something that could be expressed
otherwise, that is, something other than what, as a whole, it expresses.
(This notion, as we shall see, cannot be commensurate with any
description of literature as a discrete form of discourse, for it deprives
literature of its identity.) Literature, I would argue, is, on the contrary,
metaphorical after the model of rhetorical or metaphysical metaphor, that
is, its significance is of that type which is destroyed by paraphrase
because it lies in the pleasure and persuasion it can effect only in its
original integrity. This leads us on to the subject of the next chapter -
'Form and Content'. For if the work, to remain a work, cannot be
considered as primarily denotational, that is, if the terms within the
work cannot be replaced salva veritate with others (there being no verity
to save), but are absolutely necessary to its identity, then we cannot
separate expression from what is expressed within literature : What then





We act as though we had tried to find the real artichoke by
stripping off its leaves.
Wittgenstein
Whatever you want to say, there is only one word to express it,
one verb to set it in motion and only one adjective to describe
it.
Maupassant
Whatever we want to convey, there is only one word to express
it, one verb to animate it, one adjective to qualify it.
Maupassant
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These two terms - 'form' and 'content' - do not have a universally
agreed usage in literary criticism, though the distinction they represent
pervades that subject. At a simple level we might use 'form' to designate
such categories as the sonnet, short story, or novel, and 'content' to
designate whatever is written within any of these forms. On this basis it
is possible to say that two different pieces can have the same form, but
they cannot, even if they have similar 'themes' or 'plots', have the same
content. However, there is another definition of 'form' used within
literary studies which appears synonymous with 'style' (a term I will
deal with later), and this is the 'mode of expression' of a work. In this
sense 'form' is commonly distinguished from 'content' on the basis that
while the latter is 'what is said', the former is 'the manner in which it
is said'. In the discussion of a literary work this 'form' often appears
only as a transparent medium, the means by which we know about the work
- "War and Peace is a novel about Russian family life during and after
the Napoleonic war/a group of characters called Bezuhov, Count Rostov,
Sonya, Bolkonsky, and so on.". Charles Lamb's 'Shakespeare' or Roger
Lancelyn Green's 'Homer' obviously do not reproduce the effect of the
original, do not convey the same import, yet they appear to bear some
sort of relationship to their originals, a relationship that is almost
universally sanctioned by our customary way of talking about works. What
that way of talking seems to suggest is that there is a kernel of
information, the reported action, the 'thought', or simply a 'ripping good
yarn', that lies within the work, behind the expression.
This distinction between 'content' and 'form' appears, for example, in
Aristotle, in his definition of tragedy as 'a representation of an action
that is worth serious attention, complete in itself, and of some
amplitude'.1 The mode of representation is not, however, transparent to
him for in his introduction he promises to talk about 'the types of plot-
structure that are required if the poem is to succeed'; nevertheless the
overall impression one gains from both the Poetics and the Rhetoric is
that drama is a matter of pieces fitted together, an impression that is
even stronger with Demetrius and Longinus.2 (The classical emphasis on
rhetoric, touched upon in Chapter 1, would tend to suggest that the
affective aspect of 'form' was assumed in the writings of these authors,
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for it is a greater consciousness of the rhetoric of literary language,
coupled with a realization that the only semantic a work has is contained
in its affect, which might serve to collapse the distinction under
discussion.) The idea that poetry can be defined by its subject matter
reappears in the Renaissance; Cinthio, for example, insists that the poet
is so called because he is a 'maker' and 'not because of his verses but
chiefly through his subjects he is called a poet, in so far as these
subjects are made and feigned by him in such a way that they are
suitable for poetry.' - a rather circular definition!3 Castelvetro, too,
implies the distinction while further restricting what is 'poetical', when
he declares that it is the action which is 'poetical' in poetry, while the
moral habits of the characters are only accessory, for, since these are
dealt with in Aristotle's Ethics and Theophrastus' Characters, they are
principally philosophical and not poetical material!'4 Castelvetro's is an
unusual distinction but the defining of 'poetry' in terms of subject
matter is a tenacious habit; Arnold, for example, writes that the first
thing a poet must do is 'select an excellent action', that is, an action
that will 'most powerfully appeal to tho groat primary human affections :
to those elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race, and
which are independent of time.'.s However, in the same essay, Arnold also
writes that feeble conception and loose construction can render the
effect of even an excellent action 'absolutely null', and invites the
reader to compare the 'same story' in Keats' Isabella and Boccaccio's
Decameron,G More explicitly on the side of treatment as the definition of
'poetry' are Newman, who writes that 'Opinions, feelings, manners, and
customs, are made poetical by the delicay or splendour with which they
are expressed.', Hulme who, in his 'Romanticism and Classicism', simply
asserts that 'subject doesn't matter', and Ortega y Gasset, who writes
that 'A work of art lives on its form, not on its material; the essential
grace it emanates springs from its structure, from its organism. The
structure forms the properly artistic part of the work, and on it
aesthetic and literary criticism should concentrate.'.7-
In the first part of this essay I will be primarily concerned with
the concept of subject versus form that has emerged from the preceding
brief survey. The more complex, and perhaps more contentious, question of
style as expression I will leave to the second part of this chapter.
There is, of course, hardly any definition of 'style' which cannot be
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interpreted to include what will here be referred to as 'structure', but to
identify the two from the start would be, to a certain extent, to beg the
question.
The most straightforward concept of 'form', then, is 'form' as the
structure - 'logical', 'narrative', or 'dramatic' - of the work, what is
more informally called the 'story' or 'plot'.® 'Narrative structure' is a
common term, but there seems no firm agreement as to what this is. If we
use it to designate the order in which events are related, as distinct
from their "chronological" order, then 'form', in this sense, consists of
sequences of action which are distinguished and described in a number of
ways; formally by such terms as 'linear', 'conical', and so on, or
informally, in terms of 'trials', 'successes', 'failures', 'resolutions'. Such
terms may be useful in characterizing a genre, but it is hard to see how
analysis of this type, if it could be distinguished from analysis of
meaning, can contribute to the elucidation of the individual work. The
discovery of the form common to a genre seems only useful in telling us,
as critics, how the sense conveyed by that genre is achieved, Moreover,
and the point is most obvious with the second set of terms, though it
applies no less to the first, whatever divisions are drawn between one
sequence and another they are made on the basis of meaning, that is,
formal analysis is only a disguised from of semantic analysis. Likewise
the terms in which we might describe 'dramatic structure' are hard to
distinguish, in practice, from the 'informal' description of narrative
structure and, as the building and relaxation of tension, such structure
is inseparable from any consistent concept of 'content'. To treat the
'drama' as distinct from characters and events, as they are presented, is
to make the erroneous supposition that it exists in the same manner as
that presentation, but indepenedently of it.
Ve might, for a moment, adopt a division between 'form' and 'content'
in which 'content' refers to the chronological sequence of events and the
characters involved, in some separate existence as they might be
hypothetically inferred from the work, and in which 'form' refers to the
manner in which this existence is reported, the narrative sequence and
verbal design, in short, the work. 'Form' in this sense could be defined
as recurring features of rhetoric, In interpreting a work we could
certainly discuss 'content' independently of 'form', according to this
definition, but we could hardly discuss 'form' without bringing in
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'content', unless we were to reduce the work to a kind of algebraic
formula. I cannot discuss how a book is about what it is about without
bringing in what it is about. For the critic, as I said before, structure
only bears on the individual work in the way it contributes to sense.
Even given a system of classifying rhetorical devices, their deployment
in analysis would depend upon knowing what the import of any arrangement
of words signified in rhetorical terms. 'Form' as structure, that is, the
relationship between elements of 'content', is also 'content', for such
relations may generate parallels or antitheses, or a third meaning not
explicit in either part alone, from crude moralistic irony to the subtle
relations of main action to subsidiary action - the arrangement of words
is the sense of a sentence. Any element is, then, token-reflexive; its
complete meaning in the work can be found only in its relations to other
parts of the work. To put the matter bluntly : Lamb's tales from
Shakespeare are not the essence of Shakespeare.
A rather interesting collapse of 'form' and 'content' occurs almost
inadvertently in Friedrich von Schlegel's Lectures on the History of
Literature, though Schlegel himself allows the moment to pass without
becoming conscious of what it implies :
In the works of Shakespeare a whole world is unfolded, Whosoever
has comprehended this, and been penetrated with the spirit of
his poetry will hardly allow the seeming want of form, or, rather
the form peculiar to his mighty genius, nor even the criticism of
those who have misconceived the poet's meaning, to disturb his
admiration; as he progresses he will, rather, approve the form as
both sufficient and excellent in itself, and in harmonious
conformity with the spirit and essence of his art.®
What Schlegel does not seem to realize is that to change the form would
be to change the 'essence' of Shakespeare's art. The fallacy of
considering form and content as separable, of believing affect to reside
in one independently of the other, remains in this passage; it is, indeed,
compounded, for Schlegel has made their unity into an evaluative
standard,10 The rule, often repeated through the history of criticism,
that form must be wedded to content, is a guideline for the writer (for
whom it is tantamount to saying 'say what you intended') not for the
reader; for the reader the form always is wedded to the content. (This,
however, is something I shall return to in discussing style.) Schlegel's
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reappraisal of Shakespeare brings to mind the distinction that is often
made between 'imposed' or 'conventional' form, and 'organic' form, the
farmer being exemplified by poets of the 'Augustan' period and the latter
by the poets of the 'Romantic' era. In 'imposed' form, it is said, the
ideas are fitted into a pre-existing structure, while in 'organic' form
the structure follows the idea. But such a distinction only signals a
reluctance to read a certain type of poetry as poetry, for, the precise
tenor of the idea being a function of how it is written, all literature,
to be read as literature, must be considered as having 'organic' form; the
definition of 'organic' is a definition of literary language per se.
Likewise, it is often said that the student must be aware of literary
conventions in order to know when a writer departs from them - as if the
conventions themselves were, with regard to the imaginative suggestion of
the individual work, sema^tically neutral, transparent.
This interdependence between elements of a work which I have
outlined here is also insisted upon by James;
A novel is a living thing, all one and continuous, like any other
organism, and in proportion as it lives will it be found, that in
each of the parts there is something of each of the other parts.
The critic who over the close texture of a finished work shall
pretend to trace a geography of items will mark some frontiers
as artificial, I fear, as any that have been known to
history....What is character but the determination of incident?
What is incident but the illustration of character?....When a
young man makes up his mind that he has not faith enough after
all to enter the church as he intended, that is an incident...11
A similar identification of what might be separated into 'form' and
'content', is made for poetry by Empson, who writes that 'A metrical
scheme imposes a sort of intensity of interpretation upon grammar'.12
Empson's observation might, of course, serve as the basis of a definition
of 'poetry', and this fact serves to illustrate, as does James' 'in
proportion', the curious nature of the present subject : It appears almost
impossible to talk about 'form' and 'content' as one thing, yet what seems
to be the easiest, most natural way of talking constantly appears to
treat as accidental what is, in fact, essential. Even when I assert that
form and content are inseparable I appear to assert the existence of two
separate entities - 'form' and 'content'. What elements in the work these
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two words refer to is not an issue here, for writers use them in various
ways, and I might say in my defence (a strange defence!) that I do not
have any strict notion of what I have been using them to refer to myself.
It is not, however, the principle of separation itself which I am
objecting to, it is, rather, the independent consideration within criticism
of the elements which are separated, that is, the making accidental of
what is essential. The separation of 'form' from 'content', as, indeed, the
point where we might distinguish between the two, depends upon the type
of context in which we are using the text.13 For literary criticism it is
the imaginative suggestion of the text, that is, the text as work, which
is the abject of enquiry, and this imaginative suggestion is not simply
an aggregation of certain elements, it is the sum of everything that is
in the work. To treat the text as compound, as the expression of
something other than what, as a whole, it expresses, is, then, to ignore
its literariness, to use it as some other form of discourse.
Yet the formula remains problematically unproblematic; "Discuss the
imagery/diction/structure/plot/form of x", "How does the imagery/diction/
plot/form of x contribute to..."; all of which serves to make us think
that these are things a work has, ancillary to its essence, rather than
aspects of what it is. The alternative question, the one implied by what
this thesis has so far argued, would be simply "Vhat is said?", but there
seems, as yet, something strange and bare about such a question. To say
that 'form' and 'content' are inseparable seems to imply that to
paraphrase any element or collection of elements chosen for some
similarity of function, independently of the rest of the work is to talk
of something other than the text as a work, as literature. Consider even
the following paraphrase which Hunt makes of a speech from Shadwell's
Psyche;
With kindness I your prayers receive,
And to your hopes success will give.
I have, with anger, seen mankind adore
Your sister's beauty and her scorn deplore;
Which they shall do no more.
For their idolatory I'll so resent,
And shall your wishes to the full content!!
I receive your prayers with kindness, and will give success to
your hopes. I have seen, with anger, mankind adore your sister's
beauty and deplore her scorn : which they shall do no more. For
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I'll so resent their idolatry, as shall content your wishes to the
full.1*
Hunt's prose rendering has merely inverted Shadwell's inversions, but the
effect of the two excerpts is not the same; Shadwell's syntax is
'interpretative', in the sense that it is inseparable from the effect of
the lines. Would it, then, be reasonable to answer "What is said?" with a
repetition of the work in question? The identification of 'form' and
'content' appears to undermine the very concept of literary criticism
until we realize that even my amended question contains a subterfuge,
that is, assumes what literary criticism does not want to say. For
criticism can be distinguished from reading for pleasure on the grounds
that while in reading it is the imaginative suggestion which is the
object, in criticism it is my response to this suggestion which is the
object. (I avoid the conventional 'our' in this last clause because its use
is part of the very subterfuge I am discussing.) In criticism, then, one
is talking about, not reproducing, one's response, and it is primarily the
misrepresentation of this response which is the issue in this discussion
of 'form' and 'content'.
The question of structure is, however, the least interesting aspect of
this subject, for, perhaps because of its very lack of universal
definition, it is a notion, in contrast to that of 'style', which has to be
taught. This is not, of course, true of the idea of literary forms such as
the sonnet, play, novel, short story, and so on, but, despite those
contemporary movements which have taken 'structure' as their object, the
average educated reader is still not likely to feel a sense of recognition
or of propriety when a work is described either geometrically or even in
such abstract terms as 'trials', 'successes', and 'failures'. What the
average educated reader feels is arguably irrelevant to the discipline of
literary criticism, but the fact is an indication that this concept of the
division between 'form' and 'content' is not so ingrained as that one to
which I now wish to turn.
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Style
Others for language all their care express,
And value books, as women men, for dress :
Their praise is still - the style is excellent;
The sense they humbly take upon content....
In the bright Muse, though thousand charms conspire,
Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire;
Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear,
lot mend their minds; as some to church repair,
Not for the doctrine, but the music there.1 A
Here is 'something, whose truth convinced at sight we find,' or is it,
perhaps, merely at first sight convincing? Far Pope's analogy between the
man and his attire, and sense and style, is a false one : What is left of
an expression once its expression is taken away? This point makes the
concept of rhetoric problematic, for these quotable lines were at first
sight convincing, and that conviction was created by means of false
analogies and the persuasive force of the closed heroic couplet. 'The
poet', writes Nietzsche, 'presents his thoughts festively, on the carriage
of rhythm; usually because they could not walk.'.16, But Pope's "thought"
has not ridden either, though it appeared to for a time. I have asked,
rhetorically, what is left of an expression when its expression is taken
away : Does, then, my distinction between Pope's "thought" on the matter
of 'style' and 'content' or 'matter', and the carriage or the dress of that
thought, that is, the nine lines from 'Essay on Criticism' quoted above,
indicate that my question should not have been rhetorical, that Pope's
distinction is valid? For we must note that with this quotation it is not
that, while the content of the argument is valid, the style is invalid -
such designations hardly make sense - but rather that the whole is a
superficially convincing expression of a false distinction. More
importantly, for my present concerns, however, is the way in which I have
used the quotation; for I have used it as the statement of an argument
and not as poetry, not, indeed, as literature in the sense in which I have
used and will use 'literature' throughout this thesis. When this quotation
is considered as an argument the definite air of the lines is an
irrelevance to remove. As nine lines of poetry, however, the air is an
inseparable part of the expression we refer to when referring to those
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nine lines in a critical context. It is for this reason that I have to
cast my question in an almost paradoxical way - 'What is left of an
expression once its expression is taken away?' - for an expression does
not have an expression, it is what it is.
Of all critical fallacies the distinction between 'style' and 'content'
or 'matter' is the most persistent, the most widely practiced, the most
alien to the concept of literature, and the most difficult to discuss
without committing. "What is the author writing about, and how does his
way of writing relate to what he is saying?", runs the usual question for
the student, and immediately, in seeking to collapse the distinction the
question reinforces it. It may be the presence of the author which lies at
the heart of this problem - "What do you think the poet is trying to say
here?" - for the idea of an author suggests somebody with something to
tell or say, and the work then becomes the way that thing is told or
said.17 A style, like its rural homonym, is difficult to think of except
as a means - a means of getting from the word to the content, to the
meaning, to the author's intentions. Part of the confusion arises from
approaching the subject from the writer's point of view, for what Pope
says may be true for the poet as they correct the manuscript, and
certainly seems to be readily confirmed every time we take up a pen. A
style is, for the writer, a means of expression, but for the critic it is
the expression; for the work does not so much express a personality lying
behind the letter, as manifest one in the letter.
Let us consider the term 'style' as used to denote the manner of
writing as opposed to the matter to be written about, and approach the
distinction between 'form' and 'content' at this more familiar level. Style
is often spoken of, and perhaps thought of, as detachable from meaning,
but the analysis and evaluation of style seems to lead inevitably back to
meaning. When there is no difference in meaning, for instance between 'She
sells cakes and pies' and 'She sells pies and cakes', or else a great
difference, as between 'Guns not butter' and 'Buns not gutter', then this
does not constitute a difference in style. When there is a difference in
meaning at a connotational level between two sentences, but also some
apparent similarity at another level, as between 'Canst thou not minister
unto a mind diseased?' and 'Can't you help a lunatic?', the difference is
called one of 'style'.
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Philip Sydney speaks for a tradition that sprang from classical
treatises on rhetoric when he declares that the 'manner' of the poet
surpasses table-talk by its 'peizing each syllable of each word by just
proportion according to the dignity of the subject.', but it is an attitude
towards the relationship between 'style' and 'content' which receives its
most fa'mous expression in Dryden's definition of 'wit' as 'a propriety of
thoughts and words; or, in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly
adapted to the subject.'.1® As Addison very properly pointed out, however,
if this is the true definition of 'wit' then 'Euclid was the greatest Wit
that ever set Pen to Paper'.13 Though Addison's reply was made little
more than thirty years after Dryden's original remark, it is now a
critical assumption that such rigorous separation of 'form' and 'content'
is a pre-Romantic aberration; a proposition for which, since such a
separation, even if only implicitly made, is still the common sense today,
there seems little proof. Here we come once again upon the problem that
while it is easy to say that 'form' and 'content' are inseparable, it is
difficult to retain that inseparability in one's saying. Matthew Arnold,
though on other occasions more circumspect, describes a 'great artist' as
one 'who subordinates expression to that which it is designed to
express.', and Ezra Pound, decidedly post-Romantic, lists among the
principles of 'Imagism' the resolve to 'use absolutely no word that does
not contribute to the presentation....no superfluous word, no adjective
which does not reveal something.'.20 If there was ever a cautionary tale
against confining a certain temperament or opinion to a certain period
then it is the eternal return of such dogmatic statements long after
"their time" has passed. Take, for example, Mark Schorer's 'Technique as
Discovery', in which he addresses the idea that we cannot talk of the
content, that is, the experience that has gone to make the work, but only
of 'achieved content', that is, the form, the work as work.21 When we
speak of 'technique', he continues, 'we speak of nearly everything.' - but
in this 'nearly' lies his link with the traditional distinction discussed
above, for by 'technique' he means 'any selection, structure, or distortion,
any form or rhythm imposed upon the world of action'.22 The writer, then,
he concludes, cannot eschew technique; yet he can still talk of the
'content' of a work almost exclusively in terms of characters, and
describe one novel as a 'technical failure' because it contains 'a
psychological tension which disrupts the form of the novel and obscures
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its meaning, because neither the contradiction in style nor the confusion
of point of view is made to right itself.'.23 One recalls Arnold's
definition of the 'great artist' as the one 'who subordinates expression
to that which it is designed to express.'. Having said that 'technique' or
style is something a work cannot fail to have, by virtue of being a work,
it is a contradiction to talk of a work as a 'technical failure'. Moreover
if, as Schorer says, 'style is subject' then there cannot be a
'contradiction in style', for the meaning of the work far from being
obscured by the relationship between elements in the style is composed of
them. There is, indeed, no excess, no irrelevance, in the work as work -
these two notions only appear with regard to particular interpretations
(or even, perhaps, understandings) of the text. It is an habitual fault in
predatory critics to accuse the work of inconsistency because it will not
bear out the meaning they wish it to have, or which they expect it to
have by virtue of the author's pronouncements or their experience of
other works. But if the style contains the meaning, then the meaning must
be contained in the style; from the critic's point of view there is no
such thing as a technical failure.
In most forms of discourse we are primarily concerned with the
denotational value of words; for instance, in two different contemporary
descriptions of the same chemical reaction differences in connotational
meaning, while they may effect how interesting we find the description,
are negligible in contributing to the meaning conveyed, to the sense we
take away from them. There are other areas of discourse, such as
philosophy, in which the case is more problematic:
A...for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in
their reasons considers them in their images more than he who
views them in their effects. (Plato Phaedo, 100.)
B...because I do not at all admit than an enquiry by means of
theory employs "images" any more than one which confines itself
to facts. (Plata Phaedo, 100)
C...a theoretical enquiry no more employs images than does a
factual investigation. (Plato Phaedo, 100)
With writers such as Heidegger or Derrida, that is, those writers,
introductions to, or translations of, whose work is usually prefaced with
an assertion that the task in hand is almost hopeless, the question of
denotational sense is even more confused, and in this confusion often
F'or-ivi s«n c.1 Content
lies the problem of whether they are philosophy or literature. Literature
per se, as we saw in the last chapter, does not denote; we do not
paraphrase as we read, as we might when taking notes from a lecture on
chemistry or the philosophy of Plato.2,4 Words identical and co-extensive
in sense and usage are extremely rare, such synonyms as 'donation' and
'gift', 'leap' and 'jump', 'slay' and 'kill', or even more so 'German' and
'Kraut', will have different connotations and, therefore, potential
meanings in a literary context. Mentally running down a list of synonyms
for a word in a literary context is, indeed, a good exercise for
discovering why any line or passage has the precise effect it does,
especially when "all it appears to say is...".
Every way of saying has a different connotational import. The passive
voice, for example, can emphasize a character in a situation or weaken
the responsibility of another, especially in a first-person narrative.
Some element we might expect, or the implications of an action, may be
'deleted' and thus emphasized by its absence. In connection with this, the
reticence or ambiguity of a work will also have a semantic component,
perhaps serving ironical or dramatic purposes. Processes or emotions that
are nominalized may be emphasized at the expense of the action or actor.
The omission of a specific reference may effect a generalization, or the
making metaphorical of an action or thought. Archaisms or foreign words,
that would not alter a paraphrase, may summon up historical contrast and
comparison, or reflect on the narrator. Many such effects only appear as
part of a history of literature, that is, as a result of contrary
expectation. One can easily became enmeshed in intentionalism, however, if
this historical dimension is not to a certain extent deliberately
overlooked —that Spenser's diction in the Faerie Queene or Sidney's in
Arcadia were archaic for their times is of great interest to the literary
historian but, as we have seen, irrelevant to the critic. There is an
overwhelming reason for not extending this little catalogue of literary
effects, or rhetoric, and it is this - to include every different effect
would mean including the whole of literature, for even those effects that
can be subsumed under the same rhetorical title are on each occasion
different. There is no standard, apart from grammatical sense and
arbitrary historical expectation, that can serve a measure of such effects
in the way that that natural colour or perspective does for painting,
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This non-synonymity is, indeed, the definition of the text as a
literary object, and it is those philosophical or even historical works,
the main interest of which we feel is lost by paraphrase, which become a
part of 'literature' in its broad sense, a part of what was once
revealingly called belles lettres. This is not, of course, to say that the
literary work is a text that cannot be paraphrased - any text may be
paraphrased - but rather that when considered as a literary work it is
the original integrity of the text which is the main abject of our
interest. Any text may be used for any purpose, as, far example, my use
of Pope at the beginning of this section - a use that was primarily
philosophical rather than literary-critical. These are not, however, the
terms in which this question of paraphrase or synonymity has usually
been discussed. One side claims that literature is unparaphrasable, while
the other claims that if a thing makes sense then it must be amenable to
paraphrase. Furthermore, because the question has a distinctly
philosophical flavour to it, it is often discussed on what might be called
philosophy's "ground", where certain important distinctions can easily
became forgotten in the excitement of generalities. Hirsch, for example,
in an essay concerned with 'style' argues that while, for example,
'bachelors' and 'unmarried men' taken in isolation appear non-synonymous
because we intuit different semantic probabilities for them from our past
linguistic experience (informal, and impersonal and legalistic
respectively); in any context only certain of their 'semantic
potentialities' are utilized, and there may be, therefore, occasions when
they are interchangeable without this substitution effecting a change in
sense.25 He demonstrates this with a hypothetical charter for a
bachelors' club, by which it emerges that the two terms, 'bachelors' and
'unmarried men', can replace one another with no change in the sense
conveyed. The fact appears too obvious to be worth demonstrating, but it
is also irrelevant to the question he is addressing, that is, the value of
a stylistic approach to literature, With regard to the text as literature
no difference is negligible, even the slight differences which separate
'bachelors' (positive, active, way of life, slightly farcical) from
'unmarried men' (negative, in potentla, collective), for to treat the terms
as interchangeable or the form of the expression itself as redundant, is
to treat the text as primarily denotational, as something other than a
literary work. (Since the truth value of any sentence containing
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'Aristotle' is not effected by its being replaced with 'The Stagirite' they
are, from a philosophical point of view, identical; the roles I am placed
in by reading either one or the other, that is, the respective effects of
the two are, nevertheless, entirely different.) It is the decision not to
consider any nuance as negligible, any connotation as surplus, which
constitutes the making literary of a text. It is a question of choice,
then, a choice that must to a certain extent, succeed some form of
evaluation, that must take into account whether the integrity of the work
is worth preserving. This solution to the question of synonymity in
literature is sufficiently inimical to the objectifying trends in both
literary theory and aesthetics that constitute these disciplines' very
attempt to define themselves, to account for the fact that the problem is
considered a perennial one. However, to say that "Literature is what we
choose not to paraphrase, that is, literature is what we call 'literature'",
no more addresses the question of what criteria we employ in this choice
than does the definition "Literature is what cannot be paraphrased",
though it does have an advantage over this second definition in that it
allows the question to be asked. The question, then, of the definition of
literature is really one about the basis upon which this choice is made,
and it is to this that I shall turn in the next chapter.
Yet the inseparability of style and content is a difficult concept to
express, as blunt and challenging as a metaphysical proposition; it is
perhaps fitting, then, to begin a short catalogue of attempts to express
the concept with a writer who has a high tolerance for blunt metaphysical
propositions, and who thus appears almost everywhere else in this thesis
as the villain. 'Style', writes Schopenhauer, 'is the physiognomy of the
mind.'
To arrive at a provisional assessment of a writer's worth it is
not necessary to know what or upon what he has thought, because
that would mean having to read everything he has written; it is
sufficient in the first instance to know how he has thought. How
an exact impression of this how of his thinking, of its essential
nature and prevailing quality, is provided by his style.2e
Puttenham too, who defines 'style' as 'a certain contrived form and
quality...of words, speeches, and sentences', holds that it reflects the
quality of the author's mind;
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And because this continual course and manner of writing or
speech sheweth the matter and disposition of the writer's mind
more than one or few words or sentences can shew, therefore
there be that have called style the image of man Imentis
character). For man is but his mind, and as his mind is tempered
and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large; and his
inward conceits be the metal of his mind, and his manner of
utterance the very warp and woof of his conceits, more plain or
busy and intricate or otherwise affected after the rate.2"7
Either of these two short passages could serve as a statement of the
basic premiss behind the essays in Auerbach's Mimesis or, inded, any
stylistic approach to literature, including those forms of formalism
which have a sociological or historical goal. One need only think of
those authors, often a source of confusion in attempts to define
'literature', that endure by virtue of their 'style', such as Thomas Browne,
Edmund Burke, or Gibbon, to see that the how is often taken as a source
of value. 'Stylish' is, especially today, a common term of praise, though,
since no work can lack a style, such a judgement is also a non-sequitur.
I will shortly come to definitions of 'good style', but for the moment I
wish to examine whether even the distinction between the how and the
what of thought is justified, that is, whether what Browne, Burke, or
Gibbon say really is irrelevant to the value we place on them, for there
is a great difference between thinking of style as the dress of thought
and as its physiognomy. This difference is well brought out in De
Quincey's praise of Burke as the writer of the 'largest and finest
understanding' of his time. De Quincey lays stress upon the word
'understanding' for he is defending Burke against those critics who had
both praised and damned the author of Reflections on the Revolution in
France for his 'fancy', that is, for the figurativeness of his 'style'.
His great and peculiar distinction was that he viewed all objects
of the understanding under more relations than other men and
under more complex relations....Now, to apprehend and detect more
relations, or to pursue them steadily, is a process absolutely
impossible without the intervention of physical analogies. To
say, therefore, that a man is a great thinker, or a fine thinker,
is but another expression for saying that he has a schematizing
(or, to use a plainer but less accurate expression, a figurative)
understanding. In that sense, and for that purpose, Burke is
figurative : but, understood, as he has been understood by the
long-eared race of his critics, not as thinking in and by his
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figures, but as deliberately laying them on by way of enamel or
after-ornament, - not as incarnating, but simply as dressing his
thoughts in imagery, - so understood, he is not the Burke of
reality, but a poor fictitious Burke, modelled after the poverty
of conception which belongs to his critics.2®
Likewise, on reflection, we discover that, unless we wish to resort to a
synopsis that will bring them down to some common ground with other
attitudes, it is not that Pater often has a precious style or Nietzsche
often an aggressive one, but that the two writers often demonstrate,
respectively, precious and aggressive attitudes to life. To speak, however,
of style as the 'incarnation' of thought, or even to use any of the
relatively few synonyms, such as 'manifestation', 'materiality',
'realization', 'disclosure', 'unconcealedness', which might replace the term
is, aside from evoking inappropriate metaphysical associations, to
suggest some separate mode of existence of the thought, which, even if
such an existence is possible, is of no interest to the critic.
'Art', writes Victor Hugo, 'has a terrestrial, material side.' so that
'do what it will, it is shut in between grammar and prosody' : It is just
this negative, almost grudging way that the identity of style and sense
is made.23 Arnold, for example, talks of 'style' as 'the expression of the
nobility of the poet's character', and Lawrence, firmly attributing
significance to style, talks of how a novel can have sympathies which are
not those assumed by the author.30 An ethical sympathy is, as Wilde says,
a mannerism of style, and vice versa, but it is a work's mannerisms of
language which constitute its style, we cannot have a work without
them.31 As Robbe-Grillet observes, it is only necessary to change the
tense of the verbs or replace the first person perfect by the third
person past in L'Etranger, or to rearrange the words in Madame Bovary for
there to be nothing left of Camus or Flaubert, for their respective
'universes' to. 'disappear'.32 Those writers, then, who, like Maupassant,
have been aware that there is only one way to say a thing or, rather,
that each saying says only one thing, are apt to equate a concern with
style with a concern for truthfulness : Arnold, for example, writes that
'truth and seriousness' are inseparable from 'superiority of diction',
Stendhal describes pandering a quarter of an hour over whether to place
an adjective before or after its noun in his pursuit of 'clarity' and
'truthfulness', and Conrad writes that 'the whole of the truth lies in the
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presentation'.33 It is Flaubert, however, who is most famously aware of
style, which he calls 'the life-blood of thought', as the defining property
of the individual work, even to the extent of holding that aesthetic
criticism lagged behind history and science because of a neglect of its
analysis.
You say that I pay too much attention to farm. Alas! it is like
body and soul : form and content to me are one; I don't know
what either is without the other. The finer the idea, be sure, the
finer-sounding the sentence. The exactness of the thought makes
far (and is itself) that of the word,3*
Although this conscious concern with style is an un-British one (Conrad
tends to prove rather than disprove the rule), Coleridge, in his lecture
'On Style', writes that he 'cannot conclude...without insisting on the
importance of accuracy of style as being near akin to veracity and
truthful habits of mind; he who thinks loosely will write loosely', a
sentiment that is picked up again in Orwell's 'Politics and the English
Language', where he asserts that our language 'becomes ugly and
innaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our
language makes it easier far us to have foolish thoughts.'.35 But these
are only tentative formulations of the plain truth that the word, once
written, is the thought.
What might it mean, then, to say that a work has a 'style'? Perhaps
it is this : that the significance of every element, in relation to the
total meaning, is immediately apparent.35 This would also account for the
idea of a "style" as something recognizable, predictable, and amenable to
parody. Conversely a style can also appear as an historical phenomenon,
that is, as a deviation from a norm that has become stylistically neutral
(that is, appears not to be a "style") through familiarity. Sidney
complains that certain writers 'cast sugar and spice upon every dish that
is served to the table, like those Indians not content to wear earrings
at the fit and natural place of the ears, but they will thrust jewels
through their nose and lips'; an interesting comment, in the light of the
vagaries of fashion in men's jewllery, on how style becomes conspicuous
through changes in taste with regard to import.37 'All the recognized
flowers, the removable ornaments of literature', as Pater writes, 'are part
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of the actual value of what one says.',3® To take Sidney's analogy; the
'flavour' of a literary work is part of its meaning.
The goodness or badness of style is not something that can be judged
indepedently of the import of the work, neither, as a corollary of this,
can the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the "subject" be judged
independently of the style. Can we lay down a priori rules, then, by which
to recognize poor style, as Orwell does? This is not possible with
literature except in terms of effect; those often repeated rules of
clarity and economy which Orwell lays down are rules only for producing
a certain type of effect. Interestingly enough, Pater, in his essay 'Style',
also champions the plain, unadorned style, free of 'surplusage'!33
(Moreover, one might ask how seriously such rules as Orwell's are to be
taken, when the final one advizes the reader to 'Break any of these rules
sooner than say anything outright barbarous.'?AO> We might still try to
say that an appropriate style is one in which diction and syntax do not
produce incoherence between a hypothetical denotational meaning and its
connotational level...except, as with irony, where appropriate. This is,
obviously, something that cannot be said. We might also, believing we
have grasped the general import of the work, feel able to judge to what
extent diction and syntax are appropriate in local effects, but this
presupposes a final import that the work may not have.*1 This was the
case with Schorer describing a work as a technical failure; what it
signifies is the wish for a different, hypothetical work made to one's
own specifications. This last, unkind thought brings us to the three
standards by which we can be said to measure 'style'; whether or not we
think what is said is worth saying, whether or not we agree with the
import of the marriage between between hypothetical fact and connotation,
and whether or not, in the case of obscurity, the effort expended in
unravelling the sense seems worthwhile. An offender against the first and
last of these could be the following, 'Lessons with me, indeed, that
charming summer, we all had a theory he was to have'; an admirer of Henry
James might be prepared to defend this sentence, but in doing so they
could only appeal to the overall meaning that is conveyed by 'The Turn of
the Screw'. The three standards I have outlined here are, of course, only
three ways of trying to get at the same idea; all of them can be reduced
to the first. The last is not merely to repeat the modern dogma that
clarity and economy are best; we may find that the most discursive style
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can satisfy it, while the most "journalistic" cannot. Vith regard to style
and evaluation, then, we cannot argue about whether Ulysses could have
been "better put", because the way it was put is Ulysses, but we can argue




Then I asked : 'does a firm perswasion that a thing is so,
'make it so?'
He replied : 'All poets believe that it does.,.'
William Blake
To confuse intelligence and dislocate sentiment by gratuitous
fiction is a short-sighted way of pursuing happiness. Nature is soon
avenged....Why does religion, so near to rationality in its purpose,
fall so short of it in its texture and its results? The answer is
easy : Religion pursues rationality through the imagination.
Santayana
When one places life's center of gravity not in life but in the





In the last chapter I appeared to edge the concept of 'style' almost
out of the critical vocabulary - for without the concept of 'subject' or
'content', 'style' has no boundaries and, therefore, no identity. It may be
that the term can be retained to denote the text as a literary work, as
opposed to an historical, sociological, psychological one; so that 'Discuss
the style of x' becomes equivalent to 'Discuss x as a literary work'.
However, the model I have originally established for literature, that is,
the metaphor, does presuppose a division that, at first sight, seems to
correspond to a division between form and content, that is, the division
between subsidiary and principal subject. Indeed, in the last chapter I
resorted to the phrase 'hypothetical or imaginary fact' to designate the
events or characters or narrator, the existence of which might be
hypothetically inferred from the work, and this phrase appears to once
more invoke the concept of 'content'. This was partly due to the fact that
I was talking about the division between 'form' and 'content', but there is
another and more important reason.
Robbe-Grillet writes that it is the writer's 'manner of speaking'
which constitutes their whole enterprise, for the writer has 'nothing to
say', but 'only a way of speaking.'.1 But the notion of 'a way of speaking'
suggests alternatives, that is, alternative ways of speaking about the
same thing : And this, it must be said, is inescapably the manner in
which we perceive style. Each way of expressing, each manifestation of an
imaginary fact, or imaginary performative, indicates a different attitude
towards that imaginary fact, and it is the angle at which the text views
this 'content' which is the connotational impart, the style or rhetoric, of
that text. There is, of course, no fact but simply the manifestation, but
'style' can only be identified as such by the way in which it 'acts upon'
something else. This idea of 'variations on', or 'deviations from'
presupposes a norm, a style degree zero. The term degree zero I have
borrowed from Group p's General Rhetoric for, as we shall see, the
question of what rhetoric 'acts upon' is a very similar question to the
one that I am asking here.2 Their tentative answer to this question is
that a discourse degree zero is one reduced to its essential semantic
components; but if we apply this solution to literature then we are
simply talking not about the essence of a work but, rather, a different
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text. This emerges in the way in which Group p illustrate the concept;
'If...at degree zero a character in a story is to be assassinated, we are
forced to choose a weapon even if the particular weapon has no influence
on the development of the plot.'.3 If we define the work in terms of plot
then such an element is degree zero, but such a definition does not
retain the integrity of the work, that is, the text as literature. The only
way in which the type of the weapon could be surplus to the imaginative
suggestion of the work is if it was not specified, in which case its type
would not exist as an element in the work. (Indeed if the weapon is
unspecified, the supposition that it was any particular type of weapon
would be an alteration of the work, because being unspecified would be
one of its properties.) The critic can consider nothing in the work as
surplus or contingent without reducing that work to a different one,
without treating it as something other than literature.
What, then, does style 'act upon'? In painting we might say that
perspective and the natural colour of objects is a kind of visual degree
zero, allowing far the vagaries of light, but there is no similar
standard, aside perhaps from grammatical sense, which could serve as a
standard of literary style. Preceding or prevailing 'styles' may render a
'style' conspicuous, make the work "stylish", but there is, in truth, no
work without a style. The situation is similar with regard to architecture
or clothing : What would constitute an architectural style degree zero? A
pillar that is not Corinthian, Doric, or Aeonian can be in a 'plain style';
the possibility of differentiation presupposes that of identity and,
therefore, even if only one example of a thing exists, a stylistic
identity, an identifiable style.* We may think of Baroque as the triumph
of the excrescent, but to remove everything identifiably Baroque from a
structure would not be to reveal an architecture degree zero. Likewise
there are no variations on literature, but only different ways of being
literature.
Style degree zero within literature is, then, inconceivable, it is a
concept which makes no sense. However, if we work out the implications of
conflating those elements customarily divided into 'style' and 'content' or
'form' and 'subject' then the intuitive notion of style (or rhetoric) as
something that 'acts upon' something else can still be rescued from
meaninglessness. Having established that style generates import, that a
'way of saying', within literature, is what is said, I must now assert
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that what I have referred to as the 'hypothetical fact', that is, the
'subject', is also an aspect of style. The assertion only remains alarming
so long as we are looking for a degree zero, a basic common denominator
between manifestations, within literature itself. If the literary work is,
as I have argued, an expression of 'life is like...' then what the work
describes is also part of the style of its description : That which has
hitherto been seen as the 'what' of the work - what is described - is, in
fact, an aspect of style, a 'how' - how the world is described. This is
how, from a literary point of view, Lamb's tales are related to
Shakespeare. The counterpart to style, what style works upon, is not,
then, something within the work, that is, the 'content', rather the
counterpart to style is the world.
I now wish to propose that the relationship between the work, as a
style, and the world is the same as that between the subsidiary subject
('wolf') and the principal subject ('Man') in metaphor. The effect of the
subsidiary subject in metaphor is, as I have already described, a
filtering one, that is, it selects and emphasizes aspects of the principal
subject and thereby puts this subject in a certain 'light', in a certain
perspective. Moreover the metaphor is an affective or ideological
perception of the principal subject and, therefore, essentially rhetorical,
for this attaching of the affect or value to the fact is the defining
characteristic of rhetoric. What I now wish to turn to is the rhetoric
that constitutes the relationship between the work and the world. To do
so I must enquire into the manner in which style 'acts upon' the world,
and this will involve me to a certain extent with the question of what
is, unfortunately, known as the 'function' of literature. Strange as it may
seem to identify the literary with the rhetorical, once we have ruled out
those approaches to literature that consider it in some way directly
referential, as I did in Chapter 2, those pronouncements on the nature of
the relationship between literature and the world, or life, that remain,
that is, those pronouncements that are concerned with literature's
revelatory or instructive power on a less mundane level, all implicitly
but inevitably tend towards the demanding of literature the sort of
assertions that can only be made in rhetorical terms.
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The "Function" of Literature
What is the function of literature? This question has always had a
false ring to it for me; the use of poetry, one might well argue, is a
class that must contain all the uses that poetry is put to. There is,
moreover, something inappropriately technological in the words 'function'
or 'use', as if the idea of a 'poetical end' signalled the end of poetry,
'All art', declared Wilde, 'is quite useless.'.3 Nevertheless, in the history
of writing on literature there are three 'ends', first proposed together,
to the best of my knowledge, by Minturno in his De Poeta libri sex
(1559), which encompass all of the various answers to this question; 'to
teach, delight, and move'.3 Moreover, historically, each of these hardly
ever appears without at least one of the other two; poetry teaches by
moving, teaches by delight, moves by teaching, delights by moving, and so
on. The 'function' assigned to literature is, then, almost invariably
accounted for in terms of the production of one or more of this group of
closely related effects.
The picture is somewhat complicated by those theories that give
literature an overtly political role. Mazzoni, for example, holds that
comedy was 'invented' to show that humble life is 'happy and fortunate
and capable of infinite consolations.' and by thus keeping humble citizens
content with their state, prevent them from being 'moved to disobedience
and rebellion'."7 Mazzoni likewise attributed the invention of tragedy to
the need to prevent those in power from becoming over-confident and,
consequently, 'insupportable and insolent in their dominions'.® Similarly
Heywood defends the drama on the grounds that plays are written 'to
teach subjects obedience to their king, to show the people the untimely
ends of such as have moved tumults, commotions and insurrections; to
present them with the flourishing estate of such as live in obedience,
exhorting them to allegiance, dehorting them from all traitorous and
felonious stratagems.'.3 Rousseau makes the same point a condemnation of
literature and the arts in general, writing that they 'strew garlands of
flowers on the iron chains that bind [men], make them forget the original
freedom for which they seem to have been born, cause them to love their
slavery, and turn them into what is known as a civilized people.'.10 This
is not an idea that is likely to be found very endearing by many literary
theorists today. Lukacs, for example, writes that the work of all the
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great figures of literature from Homer onwards 'reveals an understanding',
and therefore contributes to the realization of the Marxist evolutionary
process.11 Brecht, too, dreams of an 'instructive and entertaining' theatre
that can help the 'unfree, ignorant man of our century...master the world
and himself'.12 It may be that all art is intrinsically suited to the
preservation of the status quo, or to its rearrangement, I do not know
and I do not believe anyone else does either. For myself I would tend to
think that the Goth who advized against the burning of a library on the
grounds that while the populace was "'busy about those toys, we shall
with more leisure conquer their countries'", was fundamentally right,13
However, in all these examples, though literature is given a political, or
'civil' function, this is incidental to those effects which are, we might
say, the more immediate use of literature, that is, the reader or
playgoer's use. What these theorists propose is the use of literature's
power to instruct, delight, and move; they are not, therefore, in conflict
with the notion of these three as the function of literature.
Here I wish to record the attitude towards the function of literature
that I grew up with. It is important to emphasize that this attitude was
rarely stated so explicitly as I wish to state it here, at least not in
this present century, for, though its roots go back at least as far as
Plato, we have inherited it, irrespective of the theoretical positions we
espouse, almost as a reflex. The attitude is vaguely and, therefore, well
expressed by Arnold when he writes that 'the best poetry will be found to
have a power of forming, sustaining and delighting us, as nothing else
can.'.1" This is what I was 'taught' and what I see everywhere in literary
criticism even today; for I am proceeding on the assumption that Samuel
Beckett is considered no less 'forming' and 'sustaining' by his champions
than Wordsworth is by his. Literature, then, according to this attitude is
the expression of a common, buried life of humanity, a life that appears
to be passed over by an everyday which, as Hazlitt says of society, 'is
constructed into a machine that carries us safely and insipidly from one
end of life to the other, in a very comfortable prose style,'.13 Such a
common life may be a fiercely individualistic, 'existentialist' one; the
idea is common enough, despite the contradiction involved. Literature was
supposed to form and sustain through its power to enlarge and enrich
one's experience of the world and thereby enhance and refine one's
reactions to life. The function of literature was, then, in short,
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emotional growth. This does not mean that I was trained up as a little
aesthete; being a schoolboy in the 1970's meant rather that my literary
response was more often than not channelled into the development of what
might be loosely termed a 'social conscience'; a sterile one, however, for
it chiefly manifested itself in collective self-righteousness. Auden's
opinion that poetry's purpose is not the creation of 'magic' but 'by
telling the truth, to disenchant and disintoxicate.' would have seemed
perfectly in keeping with this.1® (The even more portentous and often
repeated use of 'safe' as a pejorative term, still more so.) However, the
precise tenor of my literary education derived, as I now realize, from
certain aspects of New Criticism. Richards, for example, is quite explicit
about the value of literature lying in its providing us with the means to
compare and evaluate experiences, in supplying the 'best data available
for deciding what experiences are more valuable than others.'.17 Despite
its insistence on the 'affective fallacy', New Criticism encouraged one to
look for both a complexity and a coherence in the view of life offered by
any work, that is, it was chiefly through irony and paradox that the work
both explored and effected feelings. (An 'optional corollary' to this was
that the poet was an expert in 'feeling'.) This, then, was the function of
literature, and, though New Criticism often seemed to be characterized by
a search for objective criteria, in its assumption about the work it
demonstrated at least as great an emphasis on the 'teaching' power of
literature as any Renaissance or even Romantic school. In deference to my
critical roots I will designate this attitude the 'fallacy of literature
meaning well', for the fundamental problem with this attitude, the problem
that betrays its basic smugness, lies in the paradox of praising a thing
for showing us what is to be valued.
Of Minturno's three 'ends', 'delight' is the one most likely to be
emphasized in an informal context and passed over in a formal one, but,
as will emerge, the three - teaching, delighting, and moving - become
almost inseparable in most discussions of the 'function' of literature.
Castelvetro is unusual in holding that 'poetry has been discovered solely
to delight and to recreate the minds of the crude multitude and of the
common people, who do not understand the reasons and the divisions and
the arguments, subtle and far from the practice of ordinary men, which
the philosophers use in investigating the truth of things, and
professional men in their labours.'.1® This is an opinion in no way
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typical of Renaissance writings an the subject, in which it is mare
usually held that poetry teaches by delight or delights by teaching.19 In
contrast Richards asserts that it is as absurd to imagine 'that a
competent reader sits down to read for the sake of pleasure' as to
imagine that a mathematician sets out to solve an equation for pleasure,
or that the noise made by a motorcycle is the reason for its having been
started.20 Even if Richards' analogies were sound his is an opinion which
simply offends against experience, for, though he is trying to get at the
source of the pleasure literature provides, a question passed over by
Castelvetro, even the inventor of 'practical criticism' must allow that
without the element of pleasure such an enquiry would hardly be taking
place. But in order to show why literature can legitimately be talked
about in terms of rhetoric, I must move on to Minturno's other two ends
of poetry - teaching and moving - and examine the relationship between
the two.
As I indicated above, in talking of Arnold's opinion that literature
'forms' and 'sustains', literature is commonly held to 'teach' through its
effect an the reader's feelings, the reader's sensibility. The
instructional aspect of literature, then, inevitably appears, either
explicitly or implicitly, as a matter of morality or ideology, as a matter
of 'sense of value'. The era that appears to be most specific about the
moral end of literature is, perhaps naturally, that era with the most
specific morality; so much, indeed, a matter of concensus that its naming
is considered superfluous. Dante, writing of his Commedia, states that the
purpose of his poem is 'to remove those living in this life from a state
of misery and lead them to a state of happiness.'.21 Trissino argues that
since 'the greatest benefit that can be rendered to human beings is to
teach them to live well' and since 'the poets are those who mingle with
delight precepts designed to make the lives of men perfect, poetry should
of right be thought by everyone a most excellent thing.'.22 Elyot dscribes
comedy as 'a mirror of man's life, wherein evil is not taught but
discovered, to the intent that men beholding the promptness of youth unto
vice, the snares of harlots and bawds laid for young minds, the deceit of
servants, the chances of fortune contrary to man's expectation, they being
warned may prepare themselves to resist or prevent occasion.'.23 Sidney
too, drawing on a geometric analogy, credits comedy with teaching the
'right', 'the beauty of virtue', by presenting the 'oblique', 'the filthiness
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□f evil'.2-"- Sidney's figure demonstrates the moral certainty of the age,
for there must be an absolute, a fixed point, for there to be an oblique,
a deviation; he can even assert that the bad may repent on seeing their
actions 'contemptibly set forth', through 'the force truth hath in
nature.',25 This is, indeed, a universe in which nature means. With regard
to tragedy Castelvetro, interpreting Aristotle's catharsis as a matter of
moral improvement, writes that it has the power to purge 'fear and
compassion', to change its 'spectators from vile to magnanimous, from
fearful to firm, and from over-pitying to strict'.25 He further speculates
on the possibility of 'other kinds of tragedy, as, for example, those that
contain the changes of good men from misery into happiness, or the
change of the wicked from felicity into misery, in order that the people
may be assured by the examples that are presented, and confirm
themselves in the holy belief that God takes care of the world and
exercises special providence over his own, defending them and confounding
their enemies and his'.22 In this matter of cutting the tale to suit the
purpose the poet has an obvious advantage aver the historian, an
advantage often pointed out, in deference to Aristotle, by Renaissance
writers. Thus Cinthio writes that the 'poet presents things not as they
are but as they should be, that they may serve to instruct his readers
about life.*.25 However, though Cinthio writes that the poet's moral
function is 'to praise virtuous actions and to blame vices and by means
of the terrible and the piteous to make them odiuus to the reader.', and
Sidney that poetry 'ever sets virtue out in her best colours, making
Fortune her well-waiting handmaid, that one must needs be enamoured of
her.', this should not be taken to mean that such theorists considered
morality as something 'added' to the events portrayed, or poetry as a
form of propaganda,23 As Sidney's geometrical metaphor demonstrates, they
considered that to show virtue in its best colours and vice in its worst,
was only to show the two of them in their true colours, to show them as
they are. Tasso writes that the presentation of virtuous deeds alone can
'win over the souls of readers' but that there is nothing that cannot be
accomplished, 'in the soul', by a great poet - what Dante, Trissino,
Cinthio, Castelvetro, and Sidney propose is that poetry can accomplish a
knowledge of the true nature of good and evil.30 Mare importantly, with
regard to the question of propaganda, these writers, however they may
differ as to the method of inculcating this knowledge, all believe that
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the knowledge of good and evil, vice and virtue, is a knowledge. That a
work should do the reader 'some good' and preferably not be harmful to
society as a whole is, however vaguely conceived, not so strange an idea
today as is the idea that virtues and vices can be so identifiable, so
geometrically 'solid', as to permit us to talk about literature in this
straightforward way. It is the presence of a pervasive and uniform moral
standard which enables Spenser to define the 'general end' of his Faerie
Queeoe, as being 'to fashion a gentleman or noble person in virtuous and
gentle discipline.', and which can assume the existence of a conscience
for the play to catch,31
Morality is not, however, a factor which belongs solely to religious
equations. Though 'morality' almost inevitably suggests religious
prohibitions and prescriptions, and 'ideology' political convictions, what
they have in common is the reference to a system of values, and I will
use both of them, and interpret quotations containing them, quite
promiscuously in this single, common sense. Vhen Johnson writes that the
'end of writing is to instruct, the end of poetry to instruct by
pleasing.', the didactic overtones of 'instruct' evoke a notion of
morality, in all its geometric surety, that has a distinctly period
flavour to it, when, however, he writes that 'it is always a writer's duty
to make the world better', he expresses a thought now so cliched as to
pass unnoticed in the latest interview with an author.33 Shelley, in a
mare explicitly 'modern' vein, identifies a moral purpose in art with
dogmatism, and asserts that 'There must also be nothing attempted to
make the exhibition subservient to what is vulgarly termed a moral
purpose.', though his next sentence declares that 'the highest species of
the drama' teaches 'the human heart, through its sympathies and
antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in proportion to the possession of
which knowledge every human being is wise, just, sincere, tolerant and
kind.'.33 Goethe likewise voices a common feeling when he writes that
there is no 'poetry' in political subjects and that the poet who 'gives
himself up to a party...is lost as a poet', but if one's politics happen to
be on a 'cosmic', one might say 'metaphysical' scale, the charge of
partisanship looses its force, for one is 'revealing nature' no less than
the Renaissance writers above; thus, for Lukacs, those writers that
'understand' the Marxist evolutionary process reveal 'insights and
illuminations more profound than the superficial image mankind has of
itself at a particular time.', and, in so doing, fulfil an ideological/moral
purpose.3*
The connection between morality and literature is made in widely
different ways; Ruskin declares that it is the function of art to enforce
'religious sentiments' and perfect the 'ethical state' of mankind, and
that, consequently, 'the art of a nation...is an exponent of its ethical
state.', that 'you must be good men before you can either paint and sing',
and that 'the fineness of the possible art is an index of the moral
purity and majesty of the emotion it expresses.'; George Eliot, on the
other hand, is content to state that the writer 'can no more escape
influencing the moral taste, and with it the action of the intelligence,
than a setter of fashions in furniture and dress can fill the shops with
his designs and leave the garniture of persons and homes unaffected by
his industry.', and that the writer should therefore endeavour to provide
something more than 'spiritual gin.'.35 George Eliot is close to a modern
ideal here, that literature should have a good effect without being too
deliberate, too overt, in doing so, that is, that literature is 'concerned
with', 'addresses', 'reveals' questions of value rather than sets out to
answer them; 'A great work of literature', writes Leavis 'explores and
evokes the grounds and sanctions of our most important choices,
valuations and decisions'.35 It is an ideal even more pronounced in the
wish expressed by T.S,Eliot for a literature that is 'unconsciously, rather
than deliberately and defiantly, Christian'.3,7 Wayne C.Booth, assuming
that the novel 'means well', declares that 'an author has an obligation to
be as clear about his moral purpose as he possibly can be.', noting that
while 'it was the peculiar temptation of Victorian novelists to give a
false air of sentimental comradeship through their commentary, impersonal
novelists are strongly tempted to give the reader less help than they
should, in order to make sure that they are seen to be "serious."'.33 When
Lowell wrote that 'Whoever reads the great poets cannot but be made
better by it', his statement was at least open to the interpretation that
he was defining 'great poetry' as that sort which inevitably makes a
person better, but Booth is simply assuming that even when a work gives
little or no indication of it, as literature it must have some improving
or at least enlightening moral purpose.33 In this respect he is caught
between the wish that literature should not be too obvious about its
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improving qualities, and the belief that all "serious" or "difficult"
literature does improve.
When thinking of those who have argued against any intrinsic
connection between art and morality, it is such as Wilde - 'There is no
such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well or badly
written, That is all.' - that spring most readily to mind,40 However, what
emerges from the writings of Wilde or Pater is simply a different sort of
morality, that is, they argue against one system of values in terms of
another.4-1 We come almost full circle with Flaubert, for whom
'truthfulness' is the only morality;
If the reader can't find in a book the moral that is to be found
there, then either the reader is a fool or else the book is false
in its exactness. For once anything is true, then it is good.
Even obscene books are only immoral in that they are deficient
in truth. Things don't happen 'like that' in real life.42
I say we come full circle because, despite their differences, what
Flaubert has in common with the Renaissance writers mentioned above is
the identification of the true with the desirable. This, as I have noted,
is the real objection to the idea of a "moral" import in literature, that
whatever is imported into a representation in the way of an ethical or
ideological sympathy is somehow an adulteration or a distorting of the
truth that should characterize representation, Thus, while Sidney drew on
a geometric analogy in discussing 'truth in nature', Hawthorne compares
the pursuit of a moral purpose in a work to 'sticking a pin through a
butterfly, - thus at once depriving it of life, and causing it to stiffen
in an ungainly and unnatural attitude.',43 Lawrence employs a strikingly
similar image when he describes how the novelist, in trying to 'nail
down' the novel with a morality, must either 'kill' the novel, or fail,
through the work's natural autonomy.44 For Sidney poetry 'doth grow in
effect into another nature, in making things either better than nature
bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' and in
so doing creates ideals for mankind.45 When Sidney describes the world of
nature as 'brazen' and that of poetry as 'golden', he is praising poetry
for showing an ideal that is "more true", for Hawthorne and Lawrence this
gilded nature is at fault precisely because, in following an ideal, it is
unnatural and "false". Arnold, however, who uses 'moral', as I have used it
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here, to refer to whatever 'bears upon the question "how to live"',
provides a common ground between the two camps when he asserts that
'moral ideas' cannot be considered an interpolation in art because they
are 'so main a part of human life.'."165 This is not to say, as Newman does,
that 'poetry is ultimately founded on correct moral perception', or to
argue, with Patmore, that 'bad morality is necessarily bad art, for art is
human, but immorality inhuman.', for to hold that literature is
inescapably moral, in the sense of concerned with "how to live", is not to
make any assertions about the morality it demonstrates, or even to hold
that it 'serves a moral purpose', in the way that some of the above
theorists have suggested.4-7
Literature is a redescription, an ordering of language, language which
in its very organization is a reflection on the world, and such a
redescription, as we saw with metaphor, cannot but, by its very existence,
make assertions about what is described.4® That is, though many
subsequent theorists have deprecated Castelvetro's idea that the poet can
'cut' the tale to suit a moral purpose, it is the very 'cutting' of the
tale, the fact that a tale must be 'cut' from the world, that generates
the moral or ideological charge of the work. Poetry, writes Coleridge, is
'the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of
man into everything which is the object of his contemplation...and it
stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.'.43 This is, indeed,
what giving the world ad hominem implies; giving the world in terms of
value, the systematization of which lies in the 'cut' of the work. In
short, literature consists in making reality mean. This investment of
meaning is implicit in two views on literature that I now wish to
consider, firstly that literature in some way mediates between us and our
'essence', and, secondly that literature is in some way involved with the
resolution of 'the enigma of life'.
It is the province of the poet, writes Schlegel, 'to shed a refulgence
over the ordinary events of daily life, and to invest them with a higher
importance, a deeper meaning.'.30 The very presence of a boundary to a
narrative, that is, its identity as a work, invites us to consider it in a
different way to any other form of discourse; for to report what is not
as what is, as with metaphor, immediately signals a figurative, a "deeper"
meaning. This is most obvious with poetry, the presence of which is
announced by just this interpretative pressure being exerted on the word.
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The question here, however, will centre around the notion of investment,
of literature investing the ordinary with 'a higher imporatnce, a deeper
meaning.'. Although 'investment' suggests something put into, it is a
traditional wisdom, and one that Schlegel subscribes to, that literature
reveals the higher importance and deeper meaning of the everyday.
Coleridge, who noted the coincidence of the views expressed in his
lectures on Shakespeare with those of Schlegel, writes in those lectures
that poetry gives 'a more vivid reflection of the truths of nature and of
the human heart.'51 Lowell voices a similar opinion when he describes the
'great poet' as not only 'an interpreter between man and nature' but also
between 'man and his own nature'; 'It is he who gives us those key words,
the possession of which makes us masters of all the unsuspected
treasure-caverns of thought, and feeling, and beauty which open under the
dusty path of our daily life.'.52
Everyman is conscious that he leads two lives, the one trivial
and ordinary, the other sacred and recluse; the one which he
carries to the dinner table and to his daily work, which grows
old with his body and dies with it, the other that which is made
up of the few inspiring moments of his higher aspiration and
attainment, and in which his youth survives for him, his dreams,
his unquenchable longings for something nobler than success. It
is this life which the poets nourish for him, and sustain with
their immortalizing nectar.53
Poetry is, then, the key to 'the poetical' in life. Hazlitt describes this
ordinary life as "'mere oblivion", a dead letter : for all that is worth
remembering in life, is the poetry of it.'.5* Literature, by these lights,
is revelatory; its 'grand power', as Arnold termed it, is its
'interpretative power', by which he meant 'the power of so dealing with
things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of
them, and of our relations with them.'.55 Such a view implies that we can
hardly be said to be in touch with the world outside of our poetical
dealings with it, an implication made explicit in Bergson's aesthetic;
Between nature and ourselves, nay, between ourselves and our own
consciousness a veil is interposed : a veil that is dense and
opaque for the common herd - thin, almost transparent, for the
artist and poet..,.We had to live, and life demands that we grasp
things in their relations to our own needs. Life is action. Life
implies the acceptance only of the utilitarian side of things in
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order to respond to them by appropriate reactions : all other
impressions must be dimned or else reach us vague and
blurred....The individuality of things or of beings escapes us,
unless it is materially to our advantage to perceive it....This
tendency, the result of need, has become even more pronounced
under the influence of speech; for words - with the exception of
proper nouns - all denote genera. The word, which only takes note
of the most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of the
thing, intervenes between it and ourselves, and would conceal it
from our eyes, were that form not already masked beneath the
necessities that brought the word into existence,...Art is
certainly only a more direct vision of reality,55
Conrad echoes something of this aesthetic when he writes that what the
reader demands of the writer is, in effect, '"Take me out of myself!"
meaning really, out of my perishable activity into the light of
imperishable consciousness.1.57 It is hardly surprising that Hulme, in
some obvious irritation, describes how, for those reared on Romanticism,
verse 'always means a bringing in of some of the emotions that are
grouped around the word infinite.', and that the 'essence of poetry' is,
for them, a 'vagueness' a suggestion of being led to the 'beyond'.55 In
contrast, he continues, the 'classic' is suffused with 'the light of
ordinary day', it is 'always perfectly human and never exaggerated : man
is always man and never a god.'.53 But a tautology is rarely the sign of
an end of rhetoric, only of a shift in rhetoric; Hulme still claims that
unconventional language can give the 'exact curve' of a thing, that it is,
indeed, 'dry, hard, classical' poetry which will best do so. To what end?
My question is rhetorical, for we are still within the realm of the
investment of meaning. Eliot's view of the topic is complicated, or, one
might say, simplified, by a leap of faith.
For it is ultimately the function of art, in imposing a credible
order upon reality, and thereby eliciting some perception of an
order in reality, to bring us to a condition or serenity,
stillness and reconciliation; and then leave us, as Virgil left
Dante, to proceed toward a region where that guide can avail us
no farther.50
The imposition of a credible order is very far from a revelation of true
order. Sartre too, writing as an author, describes how the work is created
'by condensing relationships, by introducing order where there was none,
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by imposing the unity of mind on the diversity of things.' and that, for
this reason, he feels 'essential' in relation to what he has created.61
When a reader sets this order or unity in motion they too find
themselves essential in relation to it, they 'act it out'. This is, however,
a change of emphasis, for while we might still agree with Coleridge that
the 'object of art is to give the whole ad hominem', this now says
nothing about the validity of what is given.62 Carlyle writes that great
poetry 'discloses the inner harmony of things; what Nature meant', but
does nature mean, in this sense?63 Df course those writers I have
journeyed through would insist that it is only 'great' literature that can
disclose our essential nature, that can give us the whole ad bominem,
with hominem being used in an absolute sense. But for this we must have
a hominem with an absolute sense, and an affective, ethical sense at that,
for these rhapsodies have not been all for biochemistry or anatomy or
psychology. Forster talks of how characters from works belong to 'a
reality of a kind we can never get in daily life.', but the reality of this
'reality' is another matter.6"1 His concern is primarily a mundane one, but
its implications are profound;
For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake
and not as a social adjunct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre.
We cannot understand each other, except in a rough and ready
way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we
call intimacy is only a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an
illusion. But in the novel we can know people perfectly, and,
apart from the general pleasure of reading, we can find here a
compensation for their dimness in life. In this direction fiction
is truer than history, because it goes beyond the evidence, and
each of us knows from his own experience that there is something
beyond the evidence, and even if the novelist has not got it
correctly, well - he has tried....And that is why novels, even
when they are about wicked people, can solace us; they suggest a
more comprehensible and thus more manageable human race, they
give us the illusion of perspicacity and of power.66
In life we infer, by means of an analogy from ourselves, the motives of
another's act, and from these hypothetical motives we likewise infer a
hypothetical personality, but the act is the only fact we have, everything
else is speculation, a speculation we can, to a greater or lesser extent,
justify on pragmatic grounds. It would seem that if we do not know what
perfect knowledge of a person is like, then we are not even in a position
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to judge our perfect knowledge of the characters of a fiction. There are
two possible objections to this; firstly that we may claim to know
ourselves perfectly and use ourselves as a standard, secondly that the
above assumes that a character in a fiction is the same sort of entity as
a person in life. The first of these objections is hardly serious, for
even the most overreaching of us l^bws that being familiar, even perfectly r
familiar, with oneself, is a very different matter from being able to give
the kind of objective description of oneself that a novel does.
Furthermore, even if we ignore what introspection seems to confirm, that
is, that we judge characters not according to ourselves but according to
a generalized nation drawn from our experience of others, the 'illusion of
perspicacity and power' remains, for it is a hypothetical other that is
made the object of this perfect knowledge. The second objection, that the
notion of our knowledge of characters giving an illusion of knowledge
falsely rests on the assumption that a 'character' in fiction is not the
same sort of entity as a person in life, involves much wider questions
about the nature of fiction. However, even if we do not want to divide up
the work according to those divisions which its language, were it
denotational, would imply, those assertions that it makes about characters
are still part of the 'whole ad hominem' implicit in the work as a style
of description. And if the assumption of perfect knowledge of character
is part of that style, then we are back with the redescription of
humanity as comprehensible and the illusion of perspicacity. The question
of the nature or extent of the illusion finally rests on how we read.
The second manifestation of the idea of literature 'investing with
value', which I wish to consider here, is that expressed in the notion of
art being tied up with the "enigma of life". The idea that art is a
solution to this "enigma" appears a typically Romantic one - Shelley's
Defense is a good and well known example - but all assertions that some
work has 'shown' or 'told' us something of universal importance contain
some taint of it. Nevertheless it is in the nineteenth century, the age of
truly effusive writing on the nature of literature, that this attitude
finds its most forceful expression. Schlegel, as we saw, describes the
'proper business of poetry' as the represent ion of the eternal, the ever- "t
important, and the universally beautiful' by shedding 'A refulgence over
the ordinary events of daily life' and investing them 'with a higher
importance, a deeper meaning.'.ee (How one 'reveals' by 'investing' is the
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whole question of the nature of rhetoric, but I shall not deal with that
yet.) On this basis Schlegel divides drama into three classes; the least
valuable which merely presents us with 'the visible surface of life', the
more valuable, that is, those 'effective representations of human passion
where the deeper shades and springs of action are portrayed - a
delineation of characteristics, not individual but general, of the world
and of life, in manifold variety, their inconsistencies and their
perplexing intricacies - in a word, a picture of man and his existence,
recognized as an enigma', and the most valuable in which the drama will
not only describe 'the enigma of existence' but also 'solve it - extricate
life from the tangled confusion of the present, and conduct it through
the crisis of development to its final issue.'.e7 Carlyle places the Poet
alongside the Divinity and the Prophet, in his Heroes and Hero-worship,
and asserts that the Poet and the Prophet are essentially the same, in
that they 'have penetrated both of them into the sacred mystery of the
Universe....That divine mystery which lies everywhere in all beings, "the
Divine Idea of the World, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance," as
Fichte styles it; of which all Appearance, from the stormy sky to the
grass of the field, but especially the Appearance of Man and his work, is
but the vesture, the embodiment that renders it visible.'.es A
'delineation' is poetical, according to Carlyle, if it expresses a 'musical
thought', that is 'one spoken by a mind that has penetrated into the
inmost heart of the thing; detected the inmost mystery of it, namely the
melody that lies hidden in it; the inward harmony of coherence which is
its soul, whereby it exists'; poetry is, then, an 'inarticulate unfathomable
speech, which leads us to the edge of the Infinite, and lets us for a
moment gaze into that!'.es Heidegger uses a strikingly similar image in
answering the question asked by his essay 'What Are Poets For?';
In the age of the world's night, the abyss of the world must be
experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there
be those who reach into the abyss....He among mortals who must,
sooner than other mortals an otherwise than they, reach into the
abyss, comes to know the marks that the abyss remarks. For the
poet, these are the traces of the fugitive gods.70
Only the poet, according to Heidegger, can trace these marks of the
'fugitive gods', that is, of the 'holy', for the rest of humanity. This the
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poet achieves because language is the 'precinct' (templum) of Being, and
it is by constantly 'going though' this precinct, that is, by the
conversion within poetry of the language dominated reason, that we reach
Being.71 One should remember here the assigning of a transcendental
function to metaphor which I discussed in Chapter 1. For Emerson poets
are not, as for Heidegger, only priests, they are themselves 'liberating
gods' by whom he is 'invited into the science of the real',72
With what joy I begin to read a poem, which I confide in as an
inspiration! And now my chains are to be broken; I shall mount
above these clouds and opaque airs in which I live - opaque,
though they seem transparent - and from the heaven of truth I
shall see and comprehend my relations. That will reconcile me to
life and renovate nature, to see trifles animated by a tendency,
and to know what I am doing.73
The presence of so much enigma, sacred mystery, and inward harmony, the
presence of so many gods, however figurative, is a good index cf the
general tendency of this line of argument, this complex of emotions: it is
a religious tendency7A Auguste Comte held that poetry could help in the
realization of his 'Religion of Humanity', by establishing a 'really human
point of view' after the demise of the theism which hampered it. Indeed,
Comte intended that poetry should give an aesthetic form to his
philosophy and thereby make it intelligible to all, being used as the
basis of ceremonies to accompany birth, marriage, and death, when it
would serve to remind people of the Great Being - Humanity - of which
they are a part.7S A less systematic and better known expression of the
same sanctifying impulse, and of the connection between the uses of
literature and religion, is Matthew Arnold's assertion that we should
conceive of poetry as 'capable of higher uses, and called to higher
destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto.
More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to
poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us.
Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of
what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be
replaced by poetry.76,
Boccaccio had called theology 'the poetry of God', an idea which Arnold
echoes when he declares that the 'strongest part of our religion to-day
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is its unconscious poetry.', but also one which he proposes will be
reversed - literature will become a secularized theology7~* And so it has,
even among those who appear to reject all 'codes', for, whatever the
vagaries in the fortunes of organized religion, the need to be consoled
and sustained is, demonstrably, an historical constant.
What are we saying when we praise a work for its insight, for the
glimpse of the abyss it affords us, for its wisdom? One can praise a text
or a person for cleverness, for to da so only implies that one is clever
enough to follow the argument it or they present, though not necessarily
to have constructed it for oneself; but how does one verify wisdom?
Wisdom is what that person has who has assigned to each thing just the
measure of meaning and value which will enable them to form a
satisfyingly complete picture of the world, a picture which facilitates a
certain degree of systematization in the making of choices and the
assignment of priorities. (It is hardly an accident that 'wise' or
'philosophical' are often used to refer to a person whose attitude is,
more strictly speaking, stoical, for stoicism is the systematic avoidance
of all those feelings that wisdom is universally supposed to remedy.) To
praise a work for wisdom, then, is to say only that it is, at most, as
wise as oneself, for, as I have said, value is created rather than
discovered, and that this degree of wisdom is praiseworthy. Nothing gives
so convincing an illusion of depth as a mirror. Likewise, how will I know
when I am gazing into the Infinite, when I have penetrated to the inmost
heart of things, as Carlyle says, or when I have, in Heidegger's
vocabulary, experienced the abyss of the world? By spontaneous inner
conviction? This solution removes the question from the realm of
argument, and out of this realm I will not follow it. As we saw with the
notion of the transcendental function of figural language, in Chapter 1,
to subscribe to this view of literature is a matter of faith. To have
faith, in this sense, is to hold by some unverifiable ascription of
meaning and value, some wisdom which has either come to one ready-made,
or, having been invented by the individual, has become absolute to them.
'Faith' most readily suggests religious sentiment but I do not mean it to
have so narrow a designation : To be a Marxist or an Existentialist or a
Rationalist or a Humanist, to be in complete accord with the imaginative
suggestion of the works of George Herbert, or Kafka, or Joyce or Beckett,
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that is, to see life in terms of the metaphysic any of these demonstrate,
is to have a 'faith', a 'wisdom'.
For many writers, particularly those associated with Romanticism, it
is the 'imagination' which is the channel through, or ground upon, which
literature improves or enlightens the reader. Coleridge, for example,
argues that 'works of imagination...carry the mind out of self, and show
the possible of the good and the great in human character.', concluding
that in 'the imagination of man exist the seeds of all moral and
scientific improvement'.76 Shelley, the whole of whose Defence of Poetry
is a paean to 'the imagination', there calls it the 'great instrument of
moral good', and elsewhere refers to it as 'the immortal God which should
assume flesh for the redemption of mortal passion.'.76 Schopenhauer, too,
describes how 'the imagination' extends the horizon of the genius 'far
beyond the limits of his actual personal experience', and is thus 'a means
to the knowledge of the idea, the communication of which is the work of
art', though he adds that 'the imaginary object' can also be 'used to build
castles in the air congenial to egotism and the individual humour, and
which for the moment delude and gratify'.60 Writers who are primarily
interested in the relationship between art and society at large have also
given imagination an ameliorative role; Duvignaud,for example, writes that
imagination 'embraces the entire existence of man', and that 'through the
symbols offered by a work of the imagination' we 'participate... in a
potential society which lies beyond our grasp.'.61 While all this may be
true, there is also very good reason for considering imagination as the
borderland between knowledge and delusion - as much in 'aesthetic
contemplation' as anywhere else.
Imagination is often held to be a "free ordering" of the contents of
the mind; Hume writes that 'Hothing is more free than the imagination of
man and though it cannot exceed the original stock of ideas furnished by
the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power - of mixing,
compounding, separating, and dividing those ideas, in all the varieties of
fiction and vision.'.62 In this sense it is held to be that form of mental
activity which comes into play at the point where thought becomes
divorced from reality. Imagination is also, less commonly, held to be the
synthesizing power of the mind and to have privileged access to truth.
Coleridge, for example, would confine the first of these two definitions
to 'Fancy', which he describes as 'no other than a mode of memory
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emancipated from the order of time and space', while the second
definition would apply to his description of 'the imagination' as 'the
living power and prime agent of all perception'.®3 I have identified
Coleridge's description of imagination with the idea of access to truth
because, while we may perceive wrongly, only perception can give this
access. However, 'imagination', as we may define it from the use of the
word and its derivations, is characterized by just this lack of
certainty As the mind's proposing 'It is as if,..', imagination is
restricted in its epistemological claims by all that the subjunctive
suggests; 'He behaves as if he owned the place' can indicate that he does
not, that he probably does not, or that the speaker does not know whether
he does or not. Imagination enters into the search for truth through the
conditional form - 'If...then...then...' - that is, as suggesting ways by
which the truth might be found, but it cannot itself directly furnish
proof. But if imagination cannot be identified with perception per se,
must we than speak of it as 'thought divorced from reality'? It seems
this way, yet there is something of the truth lost in the word 'divorce',
for we might rather say that the imaginary is obliquely related to the
real.®®
Imagination is, of course, traditionally associated with literature,
Hazlitt calls poetry 'the language of the imagination', but here I wish to
approach this association not from the usual point of view, that is, of
creation, but from the point of view of reading.eG Schiller's description
of aesthetic contemplation is a good place to begin, since he defines it
in opposition to perception.
So long as Man in his first physical condition accepts the world
of sense merely passively, merely perceives, he is still
completely identified with it, and just because he himself is
simply world, there is no world yet for him. Not until he sets it
outside himself or contemplates it, in his aesthetic status, does
his personality beome distinct from it, and a world appears to
him because he has ceased to identify himself with it.
Contemplation (reflection) is Man's first free relation to the
universe which surrounds him.®7
To identify this type of contemplation with imagination is to make very
large claims for that form of thinking; but there are many forms of
conceptual thinking that can be subsumed under some legitimate use of the
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word 'imagine' - conceiving ('Imagine what it will be like complete'),
guessing CI cannot imagine what he is doing'), forming an opinion CI
imagine it means'). However, though I believe Schiller's to be a good
description of imagination it is another question as to whether it
adequately describes 'aesthetic contemplation'. Schopenhauer, for example,
writes that the aesthetic 'lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream, of
willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention is
no longer directed to the motives of willing, and thus observes then
without personal interest'.ss This picks up the idea of the imagination as
divorced from reality, though Schopenhauer's attitude to reality, as was
discovered in the last chapter, makes this a praise of the aesthetic.
Imagination is, however, anything but disinterested for it is the element
of self-direction, or self-dependency, which gives rise to the distinction
between imagination and perception or memory, that is, which gives rise
to the concept of imagination. For 'imagination' has a semantic identity
only through the use of 'imaginary' as an antonym of 'real', and 'imagine'
as an antonym of 'know', Thus, though the imagination is undoubtedly
powerful and profound in its effects, though it can 'so exquisitely ravish
or torture the soul', as Addison writes, 'as might suffice to make up the
whole Heaven or hell of any finite being.', it can afford no access to
truth; if it is the great moral improver then it works these effects not
by means of reason but by emotional appeal, by skill in riding the ebb
and flow of feeling, in short, by rhetoric .e9 'Man', says Hazlitt, 'is the
only animal that laughs and weeps; for he is the only animal that is
struck by the difference between what things are, and what they ought to
be.'.90 Ve might say that 'he' laughs and weeps because he can imagine
what is not, but, though the imagination may enforce our feeling of what
ought to be, with regard to what is the imaginary is surplus.
¥hy is the belief that literature can mediate between ourselves and
our essential nature or solve the 'enigma' of life so common? Because
literature answers our need for significance, its 'cut', by giving the
world ad hominem, must perforce manifest a sense of this significance, a
sense of value. Schlegel described poetry as 'investing' life with a
'higher importance and a deeper meaning', but what can it mean to 'invest'
with 'meaning' or 'importance'? It means to expect a return, to place some
value on a thing and to expect, by that act, to either ensure the value
one has placed or to get back more. It is interesting in this connection e
to consider another meaning of 'invest', that is, 'to lay seige to';
through literature, it might be said, we 'lay seige' to reality, make it
yield up some meaning to us. To 'invest' can also be to clothe, or to
endue with, but it is not some separable level of the work that is
invested with a meaning, rather the work is itself the investment, the
investiture of language with the affective or ideological. The power of
the literary to move should be, then, far from a simply peripheral
concern in any study of literature; though, again, this is an 'aspect' of
literature which objectifying trends in criticism and literary theory have
found inimical to their aims.
Longinus, in his On the Sublime, defines sublimity in poetry as that
which 'touches the spirit' of an intelligent and well read man, and leaves
'more food for reflection in his mind than the mere words convey'.31 The
power to move, to impress, has nearly always been taken as an index of
literary excellence. Young, for example, in his Conjectures on Original
Composition <1759), writes that 'Applause is not to be given, but
extorted; and the silent lapse of a single tear does the writer more
honour than the rattling thunder of a thousand hands.'.32 (In less
demonstrative periods fiction may indeed be valued for the pleasure of
being moved without being invited to show it - on the basis of the
possibly quite sound principle that an emotion suppressed is more
profound than one released.) Likewise literary criticism and theory are
more or less explicit, at different times, about this 'aspect' of literary
response. Hazlitt, for example, decribes poetry as 'the highest eloquence
of passion, the most vivid form of expression that can be given to our
conception of any thing, whether pleasurable or painful, mean or
dignified, delightful or distressing.',33 Poe feels he 'need scarcely
observe that a poem deserves its title only inasmuch as it excites, by
elevating the soul.', and that 'The value of the poem is in the ratio of
this elevating excitement.'.3-4 Lawrence likewise attributes the novel's
value to its power to address and affect 'the whole man alive', to 'set
the whole tree trembling with a new access of life'.3S Rene Vellek very
sensibly points out that the question of how literature affects its
audience is an empirical one, very sensibly but also very shortsightedly
for, as the ebb and tide of critical vocabulary shows, such a project
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would involve a prohibitive range of variables, unconfutable because not
amenable to definition.9,6 Yet affect, as we shall see, must inevitably be
part of the basis of any comprehensive description of literature.
Young, who, as we saw, holds that 'Applauding hands and dry eyes...are
a satire on the Writer's talent and the Spectator's taste.', compares such
judges and the writers they praise to 'an intoxicated host, and his
tastelss guest, over some sparkling adulteration, commending their
Champagne.'.37, The analogy is interesting, for something very like it
reappears in the epigraph to Wimsatt and Beardsley's essay on the
'affective fallacy' - 'We might as well study the properties of wine by
getting drunk.'.3S The 'affective fallacy' is, according to Wimsatt and
Beardsley 'a confusion between the poem and its results' which 'begins by
trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological effects
of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism.'.33 Poetry, they
argue, is a discourse about emotions and objects, and the emotive quality
of objects as a 'pattern of knowledge', and not the 'infliction' or
'administration' of emotion to the reader.100 They feel that this point is
worth emphasizing because the ignoring of it leads to the disappearance
of the poem 'as an object of specifically critical judgement'.101 But
against what school of thought is this admonition directed? Primarily
against such authors, deriving from Longinus, as I have just considered.
Tolstoy is explicitly unregenerate in this respect for he defines 'art' as
'a human activity consisting in this : that one man consciously by means
of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived
through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also
experience them.'.10:2 For Wimsatt and Beardsley this emphasis is mistaken
for, they assert, there is no evidence to show 'that what a word does to
a person is to be ascribed to anything except what it means, or if this
connection is not apparent, at the most by what it suggests,'.103 This
assertion, however, cuts both ways, for if meaning can be identified with
affect then discussion of affect will be quite compatible with discussion
of the work as 'an object of specifically critical judgement'. If we return
to the epigraph - 'We might as well study the properties of wine by
getting drunk.' - it emerges that the problem with Wimsatt and
Beardsley's position is that it admits of no ground between being
unsympathetic towards a particular 'pattern of knowledge' and actually
vomitting. If one wants to know what wine is like one must drink it.
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There is, moreover, a sense in which meaning can only be talked about in
terms of affect, or potential affect. If we take irony, for example, then
the meaning, in any comprehensive sense, of a passage or work that can
be called ironical can only be discussed in terms of a feeling of
superiority which one audience has over another actual or potential
audience. A similar point can be made about satire, which relies for its
semantics upon the self-satisfaction of the audience. But all literary
semantics depend upon effect, not necessarily upon the the effect we
might suppose the work seeks, but certainly upon that which it produces.
To demonstrate why this is so I must now turn to a more direct
consideration of rhetoric itself.
The study of rhetoric, or perhaps it would be better to say the
teaching of rhetoric, supposedly arose from from a purely pragmatic
origin - the fighting of legal battles, The notion of a professional
arguer gave rise to the corresponding idea of a 'science' of convincing
argument. Rhetoric, seen in this light, is a collection of abstract
formulas which can accomodate any sort of semantic content and which,
like a mathematical formula, will yield a certain result. It is just this
idea of an evaluatively-neutral manipulation of questions of value, of
persuasiveness, irrespective of the merits of the case, which Plato
attacks in his Gorgias and Phaedrus. He is concerned that the rhetorician
should not be accorded a higher status than the philosopher, for, he
argues, those techniques which are truly instrumental in discovering the
truth, that is, definition, division, and understanding, belong to the
dialectic method and therefore to philosophy. Aristotle, apparently in
contrast, begins his Rhetoric by declaring that rhetoric is the
counterpart of dialectic. Indeed he holds that the rhetorical enthymeme,
eK&iftple, and masim are equivalent to the syllogisms of logic. (The
enthymeme is an argument, based on premisses that are probable or
generally held to be true, that is used to lead to a conclusion about a
particular instance.) Fallowing Aristotle, Cicero in his De Orators
asserts that wise thinking and 'elegant speaking' are inseparable, and
Quintilian, in his Institutio Oratoria, declares the corollary - that no
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man can be a good orator unless he is also a good man,10"11 If we are to
make wise thought a necessary criterion for 'elegant speaking' then
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian cannot be argued with, but merely
redefining rhetoric as 'rhetoric directed to a good end' does not answer
Plato's original charge. Moreover Cicero's idea that the two are
inseparable cannot be squared with the notion of decorum, a notion that
is central to the concept of rhetoric, for without alternative ways of
expressing the same facts, there can be no 'better' way and, consequently,
no rhetoric,1 os
Rhetoric, in contrast to dialectic or philosophy, is just this 'dress
of thought' and, therefore, it is those subjects which are open to
differing opinion that are most amenable to it. For rhetoric, by its
emphasis on a particular interpretation is preeminently a means for
ending dialogue, though equally it could be said that it is only rhetoric
which keeps certain questions alive, A subject is manipulated by the
enthymeme, the example, or the maxim, in order to produce an evaluation,
that is, not to prove but to persuade. This foreclosure can be seen in
metaphor, which, by talking about a thing in terms of something it is
not, suppresses or emphasizes affective aspects of that thing; Aristotle's
'sunset of life', as we saw, can, as a generalization, cast a light on old
age that might not be appropriate in a particular instance. Such a
selective description, the essential aspect of rhetoric, implies a
judgement and, therefore, an ethic or ideology. The enthymeme, with its
suppressed premiss, requires a broad base of common opinion in favour of
that premiss, a context of accepted values, in order to function as an
argument. Indeed all moral or evaluative arguments must take the form of
the enthymeme, for without some non-logical moral or evaluative
assumption I cannot get from an 'is' premiss to an 'ought' conclusion,
that is, the suppressed premiss must itself be a statement that can only
be the conclusion of another enthymeme.loe Rhetoric, then, is the stamp
of the affective, the ethical, or the ideological, on discourse. Aristotle,
for example, recommends the use of the maxim on the grounds that it
displays the speaker's ethos, that is, his moral preferences or character,
advice that only makes sense within a context of accepted values. This,
it would appear, is the very reason for Plato objecting to rhetoric being
linked with philosophy;
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Whenever then an orator, who is ignorant of good and evil, finds
a people in a state of similar ignorance, and takes upon himself
to persuade them by passing an eulogium, not upon a poor ass as
though it were a horse, but upon evil as though it were good; and
when, by having studied and learned the popular opinions, he has
succeeded in persuading them to do that which is evil instead of'
that which is good, what kind of fruit do you imagine his
oratory will hereafter reap as the harvest of the seed he has
sown?107
Plato's concern is obviously not a logical positivist one, he does not
object to the concept of 'good' itself, but rather to the idea that anyone
but a philosopher should know what 'good' is.
In an essentially religious age, in an age in which the 'good' is a
given, the enthymeme will of course assume the nature of an argument, an
expression of reason. Bacon distinguished rhetoric, as a form of argument,
from logic on the grounds that 'logic handleth reason exact and in truth,
and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and
manners.'.103 In Bacon's terminology 'all persuasions that are wrought by
eloquence' are chiefly 'recommended unto reason' by the 'imagination', that
is, through 'insinuative reason', the rhetorical.103 However, despite the
fact that this description occurs in his Advancement of Learning, a work
devoted to reason in the logical sense, Bacon's account of rhetoric is not
an entirely negative one. He de^ribes how reason can be 'disturbed' by
means of logic, through sophistry, by means of rhetoric, through
'imagination' overpowering reason, and by 'morality', through the action of
the passions or affections; the last of which we might also include under
the heading of 'rhetoric'.110 Nevertheless he can claim that the true 'end
of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to
oppress it' and that rhetoric per se should no more be held responsible
for misleading that logic per se should be held responsible for
sophistry.111 This defence of the imagination can be accounted for by
Bacon's description of the source of moral 'knowledge' : 'For we see that,
in matters of faith and religion, we raise our imagination above our
reason; which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by
similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams,',112 The advantage that
rhetoric possesses is not described by Bacon in terms of cunning or
misleading, but in terms of physics : 'For many forms are equal in
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signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is
great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat,
though the strength of the percussion be the same.'.113 Rhetoric is
justified, then, according to Bacon, because, through its power of
penetrating to the imagination, it can better persuade the listener of
those 'truths' that pertain to morality and the affections.
What, then, can be called 'rhetoric'? I shall reproduce De Quincey's
answer to this question here, partly because his definjtion is so elegantly "i
put, but primarily because its emphasis leads to questions which, I here
wish to address, about the description of literature.
The province of Rhetoric, whether meant for an influence upon the
actions, or simply upon the belief, lies amongst that vast field
of cases where there is a pro and a con, with the chance of
right and wrong, true and false, distributed in varying
proportions between them. There is also an immense range of
truths where there are no chances at all concerned, but the
affirmative and the negative are both true : as, for example, the
goodness of human nature and its wickedness; the happiness of
human life and its misery; the charms of knowledge and its
hollowness; the frailty of human prosperity in the eyes of
religious meditation, and its security as estimated by worldly
confidence and youthful hope. In all such cases the rhetorician
exhibits his art by giving an impulse to one side, and by
withdrawing the mind so steadily from all thoughts or images
which support the other as to leave it practically under the
possession of a one-sided estimate.1'"1
This is in keeping with Bacon's definition of rhetoric as 'insinuative
reason', as that form of argument that deals with reason 'as it is planted
in popular opinions and manners.'.113 The enthymerae and the maxim can be
characterized as 'arguments' from popular opinion or custom. As well as
this historical aspect of rhetoric, it is important to note that rhetoric
is a temporal effect, indeed it is this characteristic alone which allows
rhetoric to appear as such within an historical period. The 'impulse
toward' and 'withdrawal from' that characterizes rhetoric is only
explicable in terms of a shift in attention, that is, rhetoric necessarily
implies a beginning and a duration. This is brought out by Bacon's
distinction between 'reason' and 'affection' on the grounds that 'reason
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beholdeth the future and sura of time' while 'affection beholdeth merely
the present'.113 Bacon accounts for the power of rhetoric to make
affections 'behold' only the present, by asserting that 'the affections
themselves carry ever an appetite to good', that is, what he calls the
'truths' of morality.117 It would be better, however, to describe this as
an 'appetite' for value, for as Bacon's explanation stands it will not
explain what he acknowledges elsewhere, that is, that rhetoric can make
valuable to the affections that which he would not classify as 'good'.
This brings me to Bacon's account of 'poesy', which he also holds can
'raise and erect the mind' to 'magnaminity' and 'morality'.113 Although he
does not explicitly connect rhetoric with poetry, he describes both in
terms of 'insinuation' and the action of the 'imagination'; this parallel
is further emphasized by the distinction he makes between poetry, which
submits 'the show of things to the desires of the mind', and reason,
which 'doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things'.113
The connection between rhetoric and poetry has often been made;
Puttenham, for example, who described poetry as 'the first Rhetoric of the
world', describes the poet as 'of all others the most ancient Orator, as
he that by good and pleasant persuasions first reduced the wild and
beastly people into public societies and civilities of life, insinuating
unto them, under fictions with sweet and coloured speeches, many
wholesome lessons and doctrines.'.120 Similarly explicit is George
Campbell, two centuries later, who asserts that 'Poetry indeed is properly
no other than a particular mode or form of certain branches of r-
oratory.'.121 However, what is more interesting, and more revealing, is the
consistency with which different writers have, like Bacon, written of
literature in terms that are compatible with the description of rhetoric.
Sidney believes that he deserves to be 'pounded' for 'straying from
poetry to oratory' in his Defense, but finds that in 'wordish
consideration' their affii^ty justifies the 'digression'.122 This can be I
accounted for in terms of the great influence exerted by such writers as
Cicero and Quintilian during the period in which Sidney was writing, but
it can also be accounted for in terms of an awareness on Sidney's part of
what comprises the province of rhetoric, that is, by his possession of a
term, now 'lost', to cover the range of poetical effects and the means by
which they are produced. Longinus describes how it is the essence of
rhetoric to make us 'seize upon the stronger element, so that we are
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attracted away from the demonstration of fact to the startling image, and
the argument lies below the surface of the accompanying brilliance.'.
But by what means has the orator here concealed his figure?
Obviously by its very brilliance. For in much the same way as
dim lights vanish in the radiance of the sun, so does the all-
pervading effluence of grandeur utterly obscure the artifices of
rhetoric. Something of the same kind occurs also in painting. For
although light and shade as represented by colours may lie side
by side on the same surface, it is the light that first catches
the eye and seems not only to stand out, but also to be much
nearer. So also is it with literature : by some natural affinity
and by their brilliance, things which appeal to our feelings and
sublime conceptions lie nearer to our hearts, and always catch
our attention before the figures, overshadowing their artistry,
and keeping it out of sight, so to speak.123
If there is an objection that one can make to this account then it is
that in describing how brilliance 'obscures the artifices of rhetoric'
Longinus is setting the horse after the cart, for the obscuring of
artifice is itself a property of rhetoric. Vhen Tasso advizes the poet
that he 'should not show feigned things in the light of the sun, but
rather in the darkness, like goods that in that way are more easily
sold.', that he should 'elevate' what is low, 'give the effect of being
generally known and illustrous' to what is obscure, 'supply art to the
simple, ornament to the true, authority to the false.', he is speaking,
unmistakably, in terms of rhetoric.12'4 Likewise Mazzoni echoes Aristotle's
advice to the orator (and, incidentally, Booth's to the novelist), when he
advizes the epic poet to resort to overt moral judgements in order to
demonstrate his ethos to the audience.12S
Even as the term 'rhetoric' was falling out of favour and, therefore,
out of any use but a derogatory one, theorists were becoming more
'explicit' about the rhetoric of literature; thus Wordsworth writes that
'The appropriate business of poetry...her appropriate employment, her
privilege and her duty, is to treat of things not as they are, but as they
seen to exist to the senses, and to the passions.'.12G Despite this
declaration Wordsworth goes on to describe how certain kinds of 'vicious'
poetry can 'dazzle' and 'beguile' by 'absurdities, extravagances, and
misplaced ornaments', such rhetoric is not, however, according to
Wordsworth, 'genuine', for 'genuine' poetry is 'as permanent as pure
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science1.127 Hunt, echoing Bacon's more defensible position, holds that
poetry 'begins where matter of fact or science ceases to be merely such,
and to exhibit a further truth; that is to say, the connexion it has with
the world of emotion, and its power to produce imaginative pleasure.'.12®
A gardener, Hunt continues, will tell you that this flower is a 'lily',
this is a 'matter of fact'; the botanist will tell you it is of the order
of 'Hexandria Managynia', this is a 'matter of science'; but Spenser tells
us that it is the 'lady' of the garden, and Ben Jonson that it is 'The
plant and flower of light', this is the 'poetical sense' of the flower, 'the
beauty of the flower in all its mystery and splendour.'.129 We could
examine this idea from the opposite direction by imagining an account, in
the first person, of childhood religious belief, It might begin thus;
As a child I believed in heaven and hell.
There is no poetry in this, it is simply the decription of a certain state
of affairs, it conveys no feeling, it does not give the 'inwardness', the
affective aspect of what is described. Let us introduce the element of
'childhoodness' in a more direct way;
Once upon a time I believed in heaven and hell.
The alteration introduces childhood both by association - 'Once upon a
time...' is a traditional opening of children's stories - but it also
conveys the fabulous world of childhood, a world that is continuous with
the fairy tale, and governed by its laws. The belief in heaven and hell,
however, is still not immediately present, it is simply mentioned. Let us
try again;
Once upon a time there was a heaven and a hell.
Now we have a poetical rendering - a rendering that includes a great deal
more than the first rendering and which could only be made synonymous
with it by the ignoring of almost all that it conveys - but also a
sentence, like any that would contain 'flower of light', that describes a
literally impossible state of affairs. Also, like 'flower of light', it is
ambiguous outside of its context in a way that 'lily' or 'As a child I
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believed in heaven and hell' are not. Even the 'slightest touch of genuine
humanity', writes Patmore, 'is of more actual and poetic value than all
that is not human', for 'Nature has no beauty or pathos...but that which
the mind invests it.', and thus it is 'the state of mind' which reflects
and is given expression by nature which is the 'true subject' of
poetry.130 Pater, likewise writes that 'just in proportion as the writer's
aim, consciously or unconsciously, comes to be the transcribing, not of
the world, not of mere fact, but of his sense of it, he becomes an artist,
his work fine art', for literature is representation 'as connected with
soul, of a specific personality in its preferences, its volition and
power.'.131 In more sophisticated mood there is Richards' description of
metaphor as 'a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of
elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience.', since 'what
is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally
present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be
smuggled in.'.132 The concept of the enthymeme, the heart of rhetoric,
implies just this 'smuggling in', this giving of the world ad hominem,
'Life', writes Henry James, 'has no direct sense whatever for the subject
and is capable...of nothing but splendid waste.'.
Life being all inclusion and confusion, and art being all
discrimination and selection, the latter, in search of the hard
latent value with which alone it is concerned, sniffs round the
mass as instinctively and unerringly as a dog suspicious of some
buried bone.133
How latent is the value art discovers? That is, would it not be better
here to say 'invents' or 'invests'? Hugo wrote that drama must be a
'concentrating mirror, which...concentrates and condenses the coloured
rays, which makes of a mere gleam a light, and of a light a flame.'.13'4 A
gleam is a comparative thing, as Longinus said, a gleam is a spark in
darkness, a light is an illumination, a banishment of that darkness, a
flame is a centre of attention; one may only be magnifying but this
process necessarily entails the gradual eradication of the context and it
is thus an altering, a changing.133 Aristotle, it should be remembered,
distinguished between comedy and tragedy on the grounds that comedy aims
to present men as worse than they are, tragedy as better.133 The
seventeenth century writer Pierre Nicole saw this alterative effect of art
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as leaving the way open for a more sure poisoning of the mind; 'What
makes the danger greater is that comedy removes all the remedies which
might prevent the evil impression it makes; the heart is softened by the
pleasure of seeing it; and the mind is wholly occupied with externals and
drunk with the follies it sees represented, and consequently beyond the
state of Christian vigilance'.137 Johnson, in the following passage on the
novel, likewise implicitly recognizes the rhetorical potential of fiction
though, unlike Nicole, he believes that this can be as much a matter of
moral instruction as corruption;
These books are written chiefly to the young, the ignorant, and
the idle, to whom they serve as lectures of conduct and
introduction into life. They are the entertainment of minds
unfurnished with ideas and therefore easily susceptible of
impressions, not fixed by principles and therefore easily
following the current of fancy, not informed by experience and
consequently open to every false suggestion and partial account.,.
For this reason these familiar histories may perhaps be made
greater use of than the solemnities of professed morality, and
convey the knowledge of vice and virtue with more efficacy than
axioms and definitions. But if the power of example is so great
as to take possession of the memory by a kind of violence, and
produce effects almost without the intervention of the will, care
ought to be taken that, when the choice is unrestrained, the best
examples only should be exhibited, and that which is likely to
operate so strongly should not be mischievous or uncertain in
its effects.133
This is, however, only one aspect of giving the world ad hominem, and its
tone encourages the modern mind to slip over it with "this is what was
once thought", forgetting that today we are no less assured of certain
certainties very like these, though we see them only vaguely and the
conventionality of their expression hardly registers as such. 'Because the
Mind of Man requires something more perfect in Matter, than what he
finds there,' writes Addison, in terms sufficiently abstract to rise,
through metaphor, above the status of historical curios, 'and can never
meet with any Sight in Nature which sufficiently answers its highest
Ideas of Pleasantness.,, it is the part of the Poet to humour the
Imagination in its own Notions, by perfecting Nature where he describes a
Reality, and by adding greater Beauties than are put together in Nature,
where he describes a Fiction.'.133 Camus notes that style, which he
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describes as the unity and boundary of the 'recreated universe' of the
work, is the 'correction which the artist imposes by his language and by
a redistribution of elements derived from reality...It attempts in the
work of every rebel, and succeeds in the case of a few geniuses to impose
its laws on the world.'.1,40 In a footnote Camus approvingly cites
Delacroix's opinion that 'it is necessary to correct the inflexible
perspective which (in reality) falsifies the appearance of objects "by-
virtue of precision".'A1 There are overtones of Lukacs' 'partisan
objectivity' in this assertion, for every mannerism of style, that is,
style per se, is the expression of an ethical sympathy. Lawrence
recognizes this when he writes that because 'a novel is a microcosm, and
because man in viewing the universe must view it in the light of a
theory, therefore every novel must have the background or the structural
skeleton of some theory of being, some metaphysic.'.1"3 Most explicit
about this metaphysical temper inherent in the poetic or literary is
Matthew Arnold, who defines the 'end and aim of all literature, if one
considers it attentively' as nothing but 'a criticism of life.'.1,43 This
'criticism of life' must, however, be made 'in conformity with the laws of
poetic truth and poetic beauty', that is, it must be made through 'truth
and seriousness of substance and matter, felicity and perfection of
diction and manner'.1""4 It makes this 'criticism', exhibits this
metaphysic, according to Arnold, through its 'powerful and beautiful
application of ideas to life, - to the question ; How to live.'.1"5 He
gives the following three examples of 'moral ideas';
Mor love thy life, nor hate; but what thou liv'st,
Live well; how long or short, permit, to heaven.1"5
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair1"'7'
We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.1"3
As ideas these fit easily into De Quincey's description of topics that
allow of opinion, and which cannot be definitely settled, that is,
concepts about which definite assertions can only be made within the
realm of rhetoric; Arnold implicitly declares as much when he writes that
poetry 'attaches its emotion to the idea'.1"3 But are these answers to the
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question 'How to live'? Tchekhov wrote that in observing, selecting, and
combining, the artist, we might say 'the work', presupposes a question,
but that it is only the 'correct setting' of the question, not its
solution, that is 'obligatory for the artist.'.150 Robbe-Grillet voices a
similar thought when he writes that 'the function of art is never to
illustrate a truth - or even an interrogation - known in advance, but to
bring into the world certain interrogations (and also, perhaps, in time,
certain answers) not as yet known as such to themselves.'.1S1 However, a
question, particularly a question that admits of no answer, is itself an
assertion, it asserts that something is problematic and presupposes a
choice of answers, of meanings - "When did you stop beating your wife?".
Many theorists, then, have talked about literature in terms of
rhetorical effects, not only when praising it but also, on occasion, when
villifying parts of it. Robbe-Grillet, for example, describes how in the
'bourgeois' novel 'the word functioned as a trap in which the writer
captured the universe in order to hand it over to society.'.152
Significantly it is metaphor that he singles out as the primary means by
which this is done, for he holds that far from simply expressing a
comparison, it 'actually introduces a subterranean communication, a
movement of sympathy (or of antipathy) which is its true raison d'etre.'.
What would the village lose by being merely "situated" in the
valley? The word "huddled" gives us no complementary information.
On the other hand it transports the reader (in the author's wake)
into the imagined soul of the village; if I accept the word
"huddled", I am no longer entirely a spectator; I myself become
the village, for the duration of a sentence, and the valley
functions as a cavity into which I aspire to disappear.153
Such analogies, he declares, are too insistent not to reveal an 'entire
metaphysical system" in the work, for the sentiment is, by means of
metaphor, made to appear to derive from and find fulfilment in the
world.1 Thus metaphor, as I wrote in Chapter 1, appears to be the most
rhetorical of rhetorical figures. But why should I care that the village
is even "situated" in the valley? Robbe-Grillet seems to believe that
literature can 'just say' without saying anything, without trying to
establish a contract with the reader, as if to bring a hypothetical
village to my attention were to assert nothing. My contention is that
this is not so; however it will be well to consider some of the ways in
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which various writers have sought to distinguish, either explicitly or
implicitly, the literary from the rhetorical.
De Quincey, whose definition I began with, distinguishes 'eloquence'
from 'rhetoric' on the grounds that 'eloquence' is 'the overflow of
powerful feelings upon occasions fitted to excite them.', while 'rhetoric'
is, in contrast, 'the art of aggrandizing and bringing out into strong-
relief ,by means of various and striking thoughts, some aspect of truth
which of itself is supported by no spontaneous feelings, and therefore
rests upon artificial aids.'.155 This distinction, however, like many made
in that period when writers seemed to write primarily for writers,
produces no difference with regard to the effect upon the audience - the
distinction from this point of view is only between intentional rhetoric
and unintentional rhetoric. I have let De Quincey's 'eloquence' stand for
the poetical here because of its obvious affinities with Wordsworth's
conception of poetry, however, Hazlitt had earlier used 'eloquence' in a
sense that appears synonymous with 'rhetoric';
The difference between poetry and eloquence is, that the one is
the eloquence of the imagination, the other of the understanding,
Eloquence tries to persuade the will, and convince the reason :
poetry produces its effect by instantaneous sympathy. Nothing is
a subject for poetry that admits of dispute.155
The most conclusive criticism of this passage is contained within the
passage itself; poetry and eloquence are both types of eloqence! That we
are such stuff as dreams are made of is only indisputable to the extent
that we feel it is a statement without sense. Despite the difference in
vocabulary the basis of Hazlitt's distinction is much the same as De
Quincey's, the difference between 'persuasion' and 'instantaneous sympathy'
lying in the reader's temperament rather than in any intrinsic properties
of different works, Newman, in the same tradition, describes how 'Poetical
eloquence consists, first in the power of illustration - which the poet
uses, not as the orator, voluntarily, for the sake of clearness or
ornament; but almost by constraint, as the sole outlet and expression of
intense inward feeling.'.15'7 Perhaps the most famous, and clear,
expression of this idea is to be found in Kill's description of poetry as
'overheard';
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Poetry and eloquence are both alike the expression or uttering
forth of feeling, But if we may be excused the seeming
affectation of the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is
heard, poetry is overheard. Eloquence supposes an audience; the
peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie in the poet's utter
unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself
to itself, in moments of solitude, and bodying itself forth in
symbols which are the nearest passible representations of the
feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind.
Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds,
courting their sympathy, or endeavouring to influence their
belief, or move them to passion or to action.153
For the reader, of course, poetry is eloquence. The passage remains,
however, a good description of what seems to be the difference, but this
very seeming to be signals the presence of rhetoric; indeed, in that the
'poet's utter unconsciousness' is more apparent than real, poetry is
another degree of artifice again. James, who provided me with the title
'The Illusion of Life', writes that we 'feel that we are touching the
truth' in proportion to the degree to which art offers us 'life without
rearrangement' and 'in proportion as we see it with arrangement do we
feel that we are being put off with a substitute, a compromise and
convention.'.159 This is the naivety of James' position; that the
appearance of truthfulness should be more truthful than the appearance of
falsity, of artificiality. For James, the novelist must have the 'power to
guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to
judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life in
general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any
particular corner of it'.160 This "gift" of being able to take a mile from
an inch, from which springs the fallacy of praising the artist for
insight, is no more than speculating in a convincing manner, the
conviction that it produces in the reader can only exist, in contrast to
what James says, by virtue of a shared convention - "Yes, this is the way
things are.". (One might here remember again the enthymeme.) On a more
esoteric level Heidegger holds that poetry 'measures' the language that is
the 'master of man', and thereby creates a 'dwelling for man in the
world.151 The act of measuring does not, of course, presume either an
amount to be measured or even a standard unit of measurement,
nevertheless it is an act of appropriation, of taking the world ad
hominem. The 'literary', writes Robbe-Grillet, is that which 'functions
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like a grid or screen set with bits of different coloured glass that
fracture our field of vision into tiny assimilable facets.'.1152 The novel,
he believes, is particularly dedicated to this enterprise of controlling
the world by 'assigning it a meaning', and thus 'because of it, the world
has only, little by little, lost all its life,'.1153 However, this sentiment
occurs in an essay entitled 'A Future for the Hovel', for Robbe-Grillet's
project is the construction of a world, within the novel, that is 'more
solid and more immediate' than the 'universe of "signification"' which the
novel has previously offered;
In this future universe of the novel, gestures and objects will be
there before being something; and they will still be there
afterwards, hard, unalterable, eternally present, mocking their
own "meaning," that meaning which vainly tries to reduce them to
the role of precarious tools, of a temporary and shameful fabric
woven exclusively - and deliberately - by the superior human
truth expressed in it, only to cast out this awkward auxiliary
into immediate oblivion and darkness.1"
To be there, to be in literature at all is to be something, to assume a
meaning, to be part of a fabric. The logical conclusion to Robbe-Grillet's
argument is the rejection of literature, for to write is to bring
something to the attention, to give it a meaning, to present it as an
object worthy of attention because of the part it plays in a larger
whole.1 A more defensible position is that adopted by Mazzoni who,
while classifying poetry with sophistry, in that it 'propounds feigned
things to our intellect in order to regulate the appetite', holds that it
is justified in doing so when its end is to improve.ies Thus there can
be, according to Mazzoni, a poetry which is sophistic in a bad sense, and
a poetry which can be sophistic in a good sense, depending on whether it
tends to 'disorder' the will or make the will 'conformable with the
just',167 (Interestingly, from the point of view of the role of criticism,
he later writes that since the 'judgement' given by the author can be a
matter of controversy, there is 'perhaps...no less utility derived from
raising the question whether the writer has judged well and whether the
precept that can be obtained from his judgement is the best one.'.1ss)
Mill makes a point similar to Mazzoni's in answering Bentham's charge
that all poetry is misrepi^esentation' in that, as Mill summarizes him, it
consists 'essentially in exaggeration for effect : in proclaiming some one
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view of a thing very emphatically , and suppressing all the limitations
and qualifications.'.153 Mill allows that the charge is just and even
asserts that 'all writing which undertakes to make men feel truths as
well as see them, does take up one point at a time, does seek to impress
that, to drive that home, to make it sink into and colour the whole mind
of the reader or hearer.I.170 However, he continues, poetry is 'justified
in doing so, if the portion of truth which it thus enforces be that which
is called for by the occasion.', so that while all writing 'addressed to
the feelings has a natural tendency to exaggeration...we must aim at too
much, to be assured of doing enough.'.171 For Mill there are truths of the
sort that can be expressed rhetorically, so that his defence of literature
runs parallel to a justification of rhetoric - this, we shall find, is
always the case.
The Metaphysia,
Literature is not representation but description, and description of
what is (the world) in terms of what is not. It is for this reason that
it is, inevitably rhetorical; for the description stands in an analogical
relationship to reality and we cannot have such an analogy or metaphor,
for its own sake, without a rhetorical aspect.172 In Chapter 1 I stated
that figurative language is, paradoxically, a meaningful deviation from
the use that characterizes meaning, that it is the use of usage. I now
wish turn to what was only touched upon in that chapter - in discussing
fables - that is, the imaginative suggestion not of the isolated phrase,
but rather of the narrative as a whole, This cumulative significance we
derive from a work corresponds to what has been, misleadingly, called the
author's 'outlook', 'vision', or 'philosophy'.
Aristotle considered that poetry is more worthy of serious attention
than history, because it is concerned with 'universal truths, and is,
therefore, more 'philosophical'.173 Elyot describes poetry as 'the first
philosophy that ever was known, whereby men from their childhood were
brought up to the reason how to live well',17* Sidney, who makes a
similar point when he describes poetry as 'the first light-giver to
ignorance', elsewhere calls the poet 'the right popular philosopher.'.175
Likewise Arnold gives poetry the same function as philosophy and
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simultaneously sets it above "philosophy" when he describes it as
'nothing less than the most perfect speech of man, that in which he comes
nearest to being able to utter the truth.'.17*5 Though the term 'philosophy'
has almost completely gone out of use in a literary context, along with
'message', for reasons I shall come to, the belief expressed by these
authors is not simply an historical curiosity. The terms may have been
replaced by 'vision', 'outlook', or 'attitude towards' but each of these
expresses the same feeling that the work, as a whole, or even the writer,
as an ouevre, is making some one, unified assertion about reality, is
demonstrating some definable attitude towards life,
This 'philosophy', 'outlook', 'vision', or 'attitude' I will here refer
to as the 'imaginative suggestion' or 'metaphysic' of the work. By
'metaphysical' I mean those assertions that are made, within or without
literature, about the tenor of existence, its 'feel'; such assertions as are
answers to questions like 'Why am I living? What purpose has my
existence? Which of these things is of absolute importance? What should I
do?'. What an enquirer after such questions seeks is not knowledge but
direction and/or consolation, for they are questions the answers to which
must inevitably belong to the realm of rhetoric. A great deal of
apparently disparate thought can be gathered under this heading of
'metaphysical', for though the Lord Mayor's "philosophy of life" and
Sartre's Being and Nothingness may differ greatly with regard to their
degree of systematization, the consistency of the argument they advance,
or even their 'poetry', they are both concerned with "man's place in the
universe", with how one ought to live, with, in short, "the meaning of
life". This, then, is the sense in which I will apply the term
'metaphysical' to literature. A work can be said to demonstrate a single,
definable metaphysic for the same reason as it can be said to be
metaphysical at all, that is, by virtue of the fact that it is bounded, a
discrete piece of language framed between two covers and, as such, cannot
help but have a unity, the unity which it has. In literature, as I wrote
in Chapter 3, the reflection on the universe is manifest in the selection
and presentation of material for the attention of the reader, by the
relationships of proximity, similarity, symmetry, closure, and
continuation which exist within the constellation created by this
boundary, that is, by the style. A disconnected urinal in an art gallery
invites a different mental set to one lying in a dump, but literature is
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another degree of artifice again, for language itself is a framing, a
creation of boundaries. This is why I have insisted that all literature
has 'organic form'; for if the metaphysic or imaginative suggestion is the
cumulative significance then all that is in the work contributes to this;
it is the decision not to consider any nuance as negligible, any
connotation as surplus which constitutes the making literary of a text.
Literature does not, of course, appear as a matter of conclusions, of
answers that can be verified or falsified - not until it falls into the
hands of a critic, at least. Nevertheless we can speak of the work as an
argument, an argument that resides in the nature of the agreement between
the world and its description within the work. When we speak of the
'world' of the novelist or poet we can mean nothing more than our own
world at. a different, figurative, level of language, and this is a tacit
acceptance of the metaphysical nature of that 'world', for it presupposes
a significance to be abstracted.17,7 What lies behind our voluntary
subjection to this 'world', this abstraction and crystallization, this
pattern of significance? The answer probably lies in two aspects of
imaginativeness - amusement and discovery - but also in the desire for
an affirmation of our sense of human significance, in the desire to
experience the world ad hominem, Fictions, then, move us not because we
have been lulled into believing that the events they describe really
happened, nor because we already believe that the events they describe
did happen, are happening, and will very probably always happen, rather
we are moved, our attention is caught by the text because it manifests an
atmosphere which we wish to prevail. This, we might say, is the motive of
the will in the 'willing suspension of disbelief'.
Is there some way that we can separate literary metaphysics from
'philosophical' metaphysics? This separation was something quite often
attempted by those philosophers who, having renounced metaphysics and
yet recognizing the affinity between the statements made by metaphysics
and those to be found in poetry, sought to exempt poetry from their
renunciation. Ayer, for example, in Language, Truth and Logic,
distinguishes between metaphysics and literature on the grounds that the
metaphysician writes 'nonsense' while believeing he is 'primarily
concerned with the expression of true propositions', while the poet writes
nonsense 'because he considers it most suitable for bringing about the
effects for which his writing is designed', that is 'the creation of a
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work of art'.17® By 'nonsensical' Ayer means 'meaningless', a term he
applies to any sentence which expresses a proposition which is neither
analytic (necessarily true) or empirically verifiable.179 However, though
he seems to consider poetry as a legitimate activity and metaphysics as
not, he does not go on to explain why the creation of a work of art
should legitimize meaningless propositions, and so we must leave his
aesthetic speculations as they stand.
Such criteria as Ayer sets out for 'meaningfulness' will obviously not
satisfy its common, almost universal 'metaphysical' sense of
'significance'. This is the kind of meaning which is sought in order to
serve as the basis for choosing between possible courses of action.
Moreover it could be argued that if a proposition was truly 'meaningless',
that is, without a meaning, it could not be understood let alone
understood to be 'meaningless' in the sense of unverifiable. There are
other ways of considering metaphysical systems, aside from the point of
view of logicality or verification. Thus, for example, Bertrand Russell
writing on the 'melancholy optimism' of Plotinus;
A philosophical system may be judged important for various
different kinds of reasons. The first and most obvious is that
we think it is true...But truth is not the only merit that a
metaphysic can possess. It may have beauty, and this is certainly
to be found in Plotinus; there are passsages that remind one of
the later cantos of Dante's Paradiso, and of almost nothing else
in literature,.,Again a philosophy may be important because it
expresses well what men are prone to believe in certain moods or
in certain circumstances. Uncomplicated joy and sorrow is not a
matter for philosphy..,Only joy and sorrow accompanied by
reflection on the universe generate metaphysical theories.1®0
Russell is using 'philosophy' in a popular sense here, that is, not in the
sense of an activity concerned with the structure of truth and valid
argument, but rather in the metaphysical sense of a blend of narrative
and direct rhetorical appeal. Indeed, he explicitly makes the comparison
with poetry. Why, however, do I describe 'philosophical' metaphysics as a
blend of narrative and direct rhetorical appeal? If we consider even that
apparently anti-metaphysical metaphysic 'Existentialism' we find that it
is just this, the description of certain psychological states together
with some emotiove generalizations about the nature of existence, which
are taken as the grounds for making recommendations as to conduct.181
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Consider, for example, the drama of the universe crushing the thinking-
reed in that passage from Pascal with which the study of Existentialism
usually begins, for here the universe, far from being indifferent, as the
passage seems to want to say, is capable of 'arming itself', can 'kill'
rather than let die, have an advantage, and even be capable of ignorance :
it is an animated universe. This animation is contained in the series of
metaphors that runs through the passage;
Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a
thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush
him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the
universe were to crush him, a man would still be more noble than
that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the
advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows
nothing of this. All our dignity consists, then, in thought.1®2
It is only by passing over the metaphoricalness of the passage that it
can be made to sustain an assertion of the dignity of man but without
the metaphors the assertion would not exist in the first place.1®3
I have singled out Existentialism because it is a metaphysic, or
collection of metaphysics, which supposedly denies inherent significance;
that other forms of significance-giving, the religious, could also be
described, even in its theological aspect, as a collection of stories and
injunctions.ied However, for a closer look at 'philosophical' metaphysics
I wish to examine a passage from Schopenhauer, at one time a poet's
philosopher and still valued for the 'poetry' of his writing;
Thus his [Man's] existence, even when we consider only its formal
side, is a constant hurrying of the present into the dead past, a
constant dying. But if we look at it from the physical side; it
is clear that, as our walking is admittedly a constant prevented
falling, the life of our body is only a constant prevented dying,
an ever-postponed death : finally, in the same way, the activity
of our mind is a constantly deferred ennui..,The life of every
individual, if we survey it as a whole and in general, and only
lay stress on its significant features, is really always a
tragedy.1 ®s
It would be equally valid to deduce from the passage of time that we are
constantly being born, to describe our walking as a triumph over gravity,
a constant remaining upright, and to draw an analogy between this last
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"fact" and the energetic and fecund nature of our mental activity. What
are significant features to Schopenhauer may not be so to you and me,
and, despite his claim to objectivity, or formality, what he presents us
with is an emotive interpretation of facts - the passage of time, the
mechanics of walking - which are, in themselves, perfectly neutral.
(Tragedy is, of course, a literary form.) This, then, is rhetoric as I have
defined it above, and one might see from its presence here why George
Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), considered that the study
of rhetoric 'properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaintance with
%
ourselves; it not only traces the operation of the intellect and
imagination but discloses the lurking springs of action in the heart.'.1ss
However, what I wished to find was some way of distinguishing between
literary and philosophical metaphysics, for no-one would confuse a page
of Sartre with a page of Shakespeare (though other cases are more
problematic). The difference might be said to lie in the fact that while
literature is descriptive and immediate, metaphysical philosophy is
prescriptive and tends to abstraction,1 e7 Both express an attitude,
through style, but in literature this expression is a more pervasive
quality that it is in metaphysical philosophy. This difference is very
much a matter of degree, the "philosophical" text expresses a metaphysic
while the literary work Manifests one, we might say, but the two
obviously tend towards one another to a greater or lesser extent on
different occasions.
When one thinks of 'poetic thought' it is of such explicit statements
as Gray's 'Elegy', Wordsworth's 'Prelude', or perhaps Proust's A la
recherche du temps perdu, contain - of the wistful, the stoic, the
pessimistic, or the mystical - but though such statements are not
necessarily identifiable with the metaphysics manifested in any of these
works, neither can one claim that they are irrelevant to them. Arnold
wrote that Wordsworth's 'poetry is the reality' while his 'philosophy...is
the illusion', and that one could not do him justice until one had
dismissed 'his formal philosophy.',lss This 'formal philosophy', we may
presume, is that metaphysic which can be constructed from certain details
of Wordsworth's works, but as an abstraction it cannot claim to be the
metaphysic manifest in those works; this we saw with Pascal. To argue
that the poetry and 'philosophy' run counter to one another is to argue
that the poetry too says something, but to dismiss Wordsworth's overt
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metaphysical statements is to do as much violence to the metaphysic
manifest in his work as does identifying that metaphysic solely with
those overt assertions. As I said earlier, from a critical point of view
nothing is surplus to the work.
The question of overt metaphysical statements or abstract reflections
on the world is one that is especially important to the method of
criticism and so I will deal with it at some length here. As I said, when
one thinks of 'poetic thought' it is to such propositions that one's mind
turns; a reviewer of the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations described it,
approvingly, as 'the iron rations of literature', as if were one to boil
down literature the precipitate, the quintessence, would be a collection of
quotables. But it is quatables, that is, overt metaphysical assertions
that I now wish to consider, and by this I mean such things as the
following;
We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.133
The still, sad music of humanity.130
Les vrais paradis sont les paradis qu'on a perdus.131
I will refer to such epigrams, aphorisms, or apercus, as sentential, to
distinguish their degree of explicitness from that to be found in the
event or situation described, the choice of adjective, or the generalizing
metaphor (which are equally metaphysical in character.) As we saw in
Chapter 2, one must walk a narrow path between insisting that language in
fiction is referential and that it is non-referential if one is not to
become involved in paradox, for the relationship of fiction to reality is
one of metaphorical appropriateness rather than literal correspondence.
However, there is a sense in which 'Tintern Abbey' asserts that humanity
has 'still, sad music' and the Tempest asserts that 'We are such stuff as
dreams are made on'. That such generalizations are made 'in character' is
an irrelevance; the assertions are made, even if only momentarily, by the
work - they are there on the page. This is not to make the mistake of
suggesting that Shakespeare advizes one to, above all else, put money in
one's purse; indeed, once one overcomes the idea of looking for a
personality behind the work rather than in it, a certain amount of
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resistance to treating such sentential as reflections on the world also
disappears. There is a unity in what the work says, inevitably, but this
may be the sum of even contradictory reflections.
In an essay by Morris Weitz, concerned with such sententia^and called e.
'Truth in Literature', he claims that though such statements are in the
nature of empirical statements the 'well-wrought reader' does not allow a
rejection of them 'to enter into his response to the work of art.'.'92 He
describes how a 'philosophy' can emerge from a work as follows;
Given the presence of symbolism plus the general claims about
experience, we soon pick out a larger pattern of claim about the
world, and perhaps, in same cases, a whole theory of behaviour in
regard to some phenomenon. Never printed as such, the theory is
yet suggested or implied by the total combination of invented
characters, places, things, events, their symbolic associations,
and the reflections of the author.133
(As an example of such a 'basic truth claim' in a novel he attributes to
Proust the idea that 'love is an illusion and cannot bring us happiness'.)
Despite the comprehensiveness of this description he holds to two points
that render his position questionable : firstly, he attributes the
reflections on the world to the author, which makes him reject as
negligible all those assertions that are made 'in character', and,
secondly, he believes that only 'most' literary works contain such a point
of view.15"1 It is not surprising, then, that he believes the reader can,
and should, prevent their response to the sententia from entering into
their response to the work, for he makes such sententia into something
accidental to the work. This is crude reading, as crude as making the
opposite assumption and ignoring everything but the overt metaphysical
assertions, This latter is what I will call 'taking the book at its word',
as one does when ascribing to Pascal the description of an indifferent
universe, which means, of course, not taking the book at its 'word'.
But what of an author's 'philosophy' in the sense of a consistent
type of statement about the world running through the work's sententia?
Bene Wellek, in a review of Leavis' Revaluations, takes Leavis to task for
not making explicit, in his discussion of Blake, ¥ordsworth, and Shelley,
"'the romantic view of the world'" which the three poets have in common.
Leavis replies that 'For the critic, for the reader whose primary interest
is poetry, those three poets are so radically different, immediately and
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finally, from one another that to offer to assimilate them in a common
philosophy can only suggest the irrelevance of the philosophic
approach.1955 The kind of approach Wellek is urging, Leavis suggests,
assumes that 'poets put loosely what philosophers formulate with
precision.',1955 Furthermore this kind of extrapolation can only be
achieved by ignoring what is unique to each work, by specializing the
kind of sense that one is looking for, and often ironing out
inconsistencies in that sense, as they appear in the stylistic qualities;
If, in reply to my charge that Shelley's poetry is repetitive,
vapourous, monotonously self-regarding and often emotionally
cheap, and so, in no very long run, boring, Dr Vellek tells me
that Shelley was an idealist, I can only wonder whether some
unfavourable presumption has not been set up about idealism.197
Moreover if one's abject in reading was to inform oneself about idealsim
then a study of Berkeley, Hegel, or F.H.Bradley would be more to the
purpose than a study of Shelley.
"The good thing about doing English Literature", someone once
remarked to me, "is that it's a little bit of everything." It is a little
bit of history, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and so on, in the sense
that as soon as one begins to talk about culture, character, or ideas, in
an analytical setting, shades of these disciplines are evoked. This is
true and it is also a 'good' thing about literary studies, but literary
criticism, to deserve the name, should be above all the study of the
individual work with reference to its individuality. The danger of
introducing any of these disciplines, and their intrinsic reference
points, wholesale into criticism is that the work itself gradually gets
pushed further and further out of the picture until one is left with an
historical, or a sociological, or a psychological, or a philosophical
essay on text T, instead of an essay on work T. This is not merely a
distinction in terminology; there will be a genuine difference between an
essay on the cognitative and emotional import of Shelley's work, and an
essay on idealism illustrated by quotations from Shelley, just as there is
a difference between discussing Pope's lines as a comment on the relation
between form and content, and discussing them as poetry. (As a general
rule we might say that generalization introduces a certain insensitivity
to the particular.) However, the bald statement that literary criticism
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should be primarily concerned with the imaginative suggestion of the
individual text explains very little. I must justify such an assertion, for
the mere wish to keep literary criticism as a separate discipline does
not achieve this. I will return to this question in Chapter 6.
Rhetoric and Belief
'All great poetry', writes Eliot, 'gives the illusion of a view of
life.', for 'every precise emotion tends towards intellectual
formulation.'.1915 However, though he attributes a 'philosophy' to Dante he
warns against generalizing from this example, for 'great poetry' need not
have a 'great philosophy' behind it;
As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods;
They kill us for their sport.
What makes such lines 'great poetry', though they are 'poor philosphy',
according to Eliot, is that they express 'in perfect language, some
permanent human impulse.'.139 Eliot concludes from this that poetry is
not a 'substitute' for philosophy or theology or religion, that its
'function is not intellectual but emotional', and 'cannot be defined
adequately in intellectual terms.'.200 But Shakespeare's lines do not
express even a poor philosophy according to my earlier definition; they
express a view of life, certainly, but such views are a matter of
metaphysics, of rhetoric. (Russell, too, spoke of the value of a
metaphysic lying in its expression of 'what men are prone to believe in
certain moods or in certain circumstances.'.) Likewise what he does
describe as 'great philosophy' is a system of thought that falls within
the metaphysical category; 'E la sua volontade e nostra pace.' may be
great poetry but the existence of that God to which 'sua' refers is an
emotional rather than philosophical matter.201
To express a thing rhetorically, that is, to make 'poetry' out of a
view of life, is, as De Quincey says, to give the 'impulse' to one side of
a two-sided question, while withdrawing it from the other, so as to leave
the mind 'practically under the possession of a one-sided estimate.'. We
cannot talk about this swaying of the emotions toward an at least
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partially exclusive estimate without considering the nature of belief, for
rhetoric, so defined, and the definition seems adequate, is precisely a
matter of producing conviction where no proof is possible. And yet, to
talk about literature in terms of belief...? This is one reason why De
Quincey's description seemed so apt to my purposes, for 'impulse towards'
suggests something bath playful and momentary, something, above all,
non — intellectual, In contrast 'belief in' suggests something static,
something with a far clearer outline, the product of an intelllectual
process. But a belief is no less a belief for being hazy or transient. But
belief arising from emotion...? It is customary to think of emotion in
almost exclusively physiological terms, and there may be someting to this
- some, after all, have considered thought itself to be the product of a
reflex inhibited in its motor aspect - but if we are to deal with even
the cruder nuances of poetical metaphysics, even from the pragmatic point
of view I intend to adopt, we cannot start down among the nerve cells for
there is too far to go from there before we even get to hunger, let alone
angst or piety. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that the very existence
of metaphysics presupposes a causal connection between emotion and
belief.
The frame of reference we employ, the terms we use in criticism
depend upon what type of meaning we ascribe to, what tenor of belief we
invest in, the terms we encounter in the literary work. 'Pragmatism', as a
theory of meaning, has been seen as a mediator between metaphysics and
logic, and, as such, an examination of it may prove useful in mediating
between 'poetry' and and "common sense", since it is the quality of this
mediation which establishes the type of discourse of the critical piece.
As Peirce formulated the pragmatic approach, meaning is arrived at by
translating an ordinary categorical singular statement in which a
predicate is applied to an object ('This is hard') into one, or several,
conditional or hypothetical statements - 'If operation 0 were to be
performed on this, then E would be experienced' - thus 'This is hard'
becomes 'If one were to try and scratch this, one would not succeed'.202
The last sentence derived is the pragmatic meaning of 'hard'; if a term
resists such a translation then it is scientifically meaningless, though
it may evoke images or stimulate emotion. To develop the meaning of a
term we have therefore, according to Peirce, 'simply to determine what
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habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it
involves.', for it is what is 'tangible and practical' which is 'the root
of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be'.203
Understanding a declarative sentence consists, then, in being disposed to
accept or reject it in certain concrete situations; our idea of what a
sentence describes is our idea of the sensible effects we would
experience or observe from it. As we might expect, this emphasis on the
concrete situation and on experimentation makes this approach
unsympathetic towards any sort of metaphysics, which, by definition,
treats of what is impervious to the senses, and therefore a subject which
Peirce describes as 'much more curious than useful, the knowledge of
which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep
clear of it'.20"1 In all this there is no mention of truth, though
obviously a statement which contains a term which cannot be so
translated - for example, 'God is One' - cannot be true or false. However
this pragmatic method was extended by William James in a way that is
particularly pertinent to the subject of belief. In a sense we have
reached our journey's end with Peirce's notion of habit and sensible
effect, but it is necessary to clarify how we might apply this to the
literary metaphysic, and, to that end, we must take a detour to see where
we cannot go with it.
James, though he allied himself with Peirce's approach, did not reject
metaphysics; in fact he saw in the pragmatic method a means of deciding
between competing metaphysical statements. He held that, since there can
be no difference anywhere that does not make a difference somewhere else,
'no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a
difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact,
imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen,', then the
pragmatic method could be used to 'interpret' every idea by tracing its
practical consequences, 'to find out what definite difference it would
make to you or me, at definite instants in our life, if this world-formula
or that world-formula be the true one.'.2°s So far I would consider this
uncontroversial, it is little more than a restatement of Peirce's position
and it outlines considerations that were very much in my mind when I
spoke of the 'imaginative suggestion' of the work. But James' pragmatism
is more than a matter of interpretation, it is a theory of 'truth'. For
James ideas become true 'in so far as they help us to get into
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satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarise
them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of
following the interminable succession of particular phenomena,2°e
A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies
the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience
to his beliefs in stock. It must both lean on old truth and grasp
new fact; and its success...in doing this, is a matter for the
individual's appreciation....The reasons why we call things true
is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' means only to
perform this marriage function....The true is the name of whatever
proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for
definite assignable reasons....If there be any life that it is
really better we should lead, and if there be any idea which, if
believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it would be
really better for us to believe in that idea, unless, indeed,
belief in it incidentally clashed with other greater vital
benefits.207
James goes on to say that the 'vital benefits yielded' by beliefs are
potentially incompatible, and that 'the greatest enemy of any one of our
truths may be the rest of our truths.'.20® The concept of truth is
extended to cover even metaphysical assertions - if we will lead a better
life by believing in the existence of God, or moral absolutes, or an
obligation, in recognizing our own freedom, to recognize the freedom of
others, then it is 'true' that such things exist - for 'true' here is what
will 'carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any
other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying,
saving labor'.20® It is the notion of individual satisfaction as the
touchstone of belief, and therefore, truth, which is the problematic
aspect of this theory, and the point at which it touches on literary
metaphysics. Many reports may be coherent but they do not make a state-
of-affairs actual; they are only made so, made true, by their
correspondence to an actual state-of-affairs. As with the
'representational' power of language, we must at some point be able to
point to what is actually in the world, outside of any proposition or
body of propositions, if we are to justify the truth of a belief. James
does not define what 'good' means in 'good in the way of belief, but once
a person has built a coherent edifice of belief to their own satisfaction,
it is often the case that it answers so many needs, becomes so
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comfortable, that even when its initial premisses are proved false or
meaningless, the person persists in their belief, not because it retains
any truly explanatory power, but because it satisfies the desire for
coherence - it allows them to remain emotionally at ease.
According to James pragmatism can harmonize empiricism with
religious thought, for it 'converts the absolutely empty notion of a
static relation of "correspondence"...between our minds and reality, into
that of a rich and active commerce...between particular thoughts of ours,
and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their
parts and have their uses.'.210 This is to suggest that reality is
prepared to meet us half way, which is the one thing which reality, as
that which exists independently of anybody's opinion about it, will not
do. (The promiscuous attitude towards truth contained within this theory
finds one popular expression in the idea that truth is relative to the
individual - that what is true for me is not so for you. But it is
clearer to speak of something being true of one person and not another.)
We can pragmatically justify the adoption of a principle, since this
adoption is an act, and an act can be justified by showing what ends or
goals are served by performing it. For example, the principle of the
Uniformity of Nature, as the basis of the principle of induction (Ai is X,
A2 is X, As is X, and so on, therefore all A's are X), can only be
rendered probable by induction, a process which presupposes what, in this
case it sets out to prove, Though neither true nor false, our adoption of
it can be justified by the end results of scientific investigation. If we
were to ask whether it is 'true' that every effect has a cause, the only
answer could be, likewise, 'So far.', and so if we are bothered by the
sound of a tap dripping, it is wisest to adopt the approach of examining
our taps. Dne cannot believe 'p' without behaving as if 'p' were true, but
one can behave as if 'p' were true without believing that it is. We are in
a similar position with theories, which will always contain some term
that denotes something not directly observable, such as protons and
electrons, the existence of which is inferred from many things which we
do observe and which we presume to be effects of them. A theory is an 'as
if' which has explanatory power, and, to this end, it cannot simply be a
summary but must explain even such facts as were not known when it was
devized. To talk of their being 'fashions' in fundamental particles is
perhaps justified, but we confuse the issue if we consider the word is
- 216 -
being used in the same sense in which we would use it when talking about
skirt lengths.
But what of a theory which offers us no rules according to which we
could deduce perceptive propositions, or from which there was no
observable effect, for which, in other words, there was no possibility of
verification? One attitude would be to consider that the assertions which
such a theory makes are not assertions at all. (This is Carnap's position
- that such a theory is without sense, 'it does not. speak about anything;
it is nothing but a series of empty words'.211) I have already defined as
'metaphysical' those beliefs which, though perhaps abstracted from
experience, claim to give knowledge that cannot be readily verified by
experience. Such is their nature that they may summarize but they do not
explain; in that they do not allow us to predict future experiences they
add nothing to our knowledge of the world other than an emotional
colouring and a knowledge of the possibilities of their own kind. While
they may have no empirical content such theses, or pseudo-theses, do
evoke thoughts, and feelings, so that while they may be logically
irrelevant, to call them meaningless would be to overstate the case -
'Quadruplicity drinks procrastination' may evoke or express nothing, but
the same could not be said of 'God is One' or 'Man is condemned to be
free'.
If we take a rather familiar metaphysical assertion we can see both
how it is 'meaningless' and how it can have significance, that is,
pragmatic consequences. According to the idealist thesis since all our
knowledge of the external world is ultimately based on sense-perception,
we have no guarantee that the world continues to exist, or to exist in
the same form, when it is not present to our senses, that is, no
guarantee that it exists independently of our idea of it. If, however, this
is so then no experiment could be devised to verify it, since the
experiment itself would have to be, however indirectly, perceived. Thus
the naive realist who believes that what they see and feel is really
there, and the idealist who believes that what they see and feel are their
idea, are in exactly the same position with regard to the world, If we
chose to talk about the world as if what was unperceived did not exist it
would not necessarily be false to the way we experience the world, but it
would be unnecessarily complex, since it would involve no practical
difference in the way we use the world. In short, it does not matter
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whether the idealist thesis is correct or not, but accepting it would
introduce completely useless complications into the way in which we
describe the world. But if the theory itself entails no pragmatic
consequences, the holding of it certainly can. In the way I have explained
it there is little poetry, little emotional charge, in the assertion, but
the opening of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea is a different
matter;
"The world is my idea" : this is a truth which holds good for
everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it
into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does
this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom.212
Given that this is only a psuedo-assertion, what can it signify? In the
absence of an informative content, in a text that is not in a position to
refine itself through argument, that is, in a work read as literature,
whatever is on the page is part of the final sense. What construction,
then, can be put on '"The world is my idea'"? What does it suggest? One
type of thought for which it could almost be the motto is the autistic;
that type characterized by mental activity being controlled and shaped
primarily by the wishes of the individual, rather than the conditions
imposed on it by the real nature of objects and events. Idealism is, of
course, a theory of reality, so that invoking the 'real' as a contrast
would be, to a certain extent, an unfair manoeuvre. But is not this denial
of reality as what exists independently of anybody's opinion about it, the
whole emotive charge of the phrase? If we convert it into sense then it
means nothing, our only answer could be 'So what?', but its imaginative
suggestion is little connected with any sense that it could legitimately
bear; it appears to center the world around the individual reader, to
exalt wishful thinking, to reduce the concrete to the abstract, the
intractable and external to the personal and internal. (In the same way
the religion that tells us that the world is an illusion - compared to
what? - will not actually make the ground any less hard or the stomach
more full, but it can change one's attitudes to these realities.)
Schopenhauer's lines cannot be substituted, salva veritate, for any others
because there is no truth to save; a characteristic which often appears
in the definition of the literary. (Indeed if it were a meaningful
assertion then it could not bear the imaginative suggestion that it does,
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for it is the impassibility which generates the emotion and the emotion
the belief, the significance that it has.) Thus other sentiments may be
related to it, but their suggestion will never be identical. When, for
example, The Tempest declares that we are such stuff as dreams are made
on, an assertion about the unreality of reality similar to Schopenhauer's
is being made, though the emphasis lies quite differently, But, insofar as
we can say that two such statements are related, indeed, simply in saying
that there is a type of statement of which these are examples, it becomes
obvious that there is no small amount of rhetoric in calling them
'meaningless', for it is through a type of meaning, that is, significance,
that they are related.213
What is happening when such an 'irrelevant' assertion actually
acquires relevance? It begins with a small disturbance in language which
is transmitted gradually further and further from its starting point. An
analogy based an another language will help : Pragmatically speaking 'A
sharp' is 'B flat', in that coming across either one would play precisely
the same note; the facts they represent, in terms of pitch, are identical.
But let us imagine that one is transcribing a tune and this pitch is the
first one that one comes across; in that either method of representation
will faithfully represent the fact, either manner of notation will do
quite as well. If, however, an 'A' subsequently occurs we will have to
decide either change the first note to 'B flat' if it has been written 'A
sharp', or indicate with our new 'A' that it is no longer 'A sharp'. If we
do not observe this musical syntax then our transcription will not
faithfully represent the original tune. So when it is announced that "The
world is my idea" it would not matter if all that followed were adjusted
to what this phrase could sensibly mean, if the 'intervals' between words,
as they correspond to facts, was maintained. But when we are told that
the realization that the world which surrounds us 'is there only as an
idea' is the goal of 'philosophical wisdom', we have changed from what is,
potentially, a different way of talking about the same facts, to a claim
that what is being presented is a new, and startlingly suggestive,
emotionally-charged fact. This is equivocation. If one does not observe
the syntax one's representation, one's semantics, go astray. The
difference between this instance and our musical analogy is that here the
'music', the world, is directly available to confirm or deny any
individual transcription. If some writer want to rewrite my life as a
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novelette, or a scherzo, as a caprice, or a lament, I do not have to take
their word for it that this is the way life is, though there may be
various reasons (in the sense of 'motives' rather than 'grounds') why you
are, at one time or another, inclined to do so.
All striking language, all language that tends towards the 'literary'
or 'poetical', contains something of this disturbance. Take, for example
the following statement of the pragmatic principle I have described - 'A
difference that makes no difference is no difference'. There is a sense in
which the meaning of this is obvious, especially when it occurs within
the context in which I have placed it; all that is necessary is that one
replace the first 'difference' with 'distinction'. But the statement is
striking because the original 'difference' that turns out not to be one is
evoked, that is, it is not simply mentioned as a hypothetical one, it is
part of the argument of the whole. Thus there is the suggestion of a
paradox underlying the statement, a momentary implication that we can
have a difference which is not a difference. Likewise it is almost
impossible to take Wittgenstein's 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereon we
must keep silent.' as the tautology it is, for the 'whereof' must refer to
something mystical, must it not? Neither of my examples may be great
poetry but they are quotable, they are striking and it is this element of
rhetoric which makes them so, for the only way to make language striking,
to make it ring, to create the quotable, is to lie a little; as I am doing
here.
It might appear that the metaphorical use of language would quickly
run foul of such a pragmatically orientated definition of meaningfulness.
Poe puts it most poetically;
The demands of truth are severe. She has no sympathy with the
myrtles. All that which is so indispensable in song, is p|bcisely -r
that with which she has nothing whatever to do....In enforcing a
truth we need severity rather than efflorescence of language. We
must be simple, precise, terse....He must -.be theory-mad who, in
spite of these differences, shall still persist in attempting to
reconcile the obstinate oils and waters of poetry and truth.21'1
However, it is precisely the hypothetical translation which Peirce
outlines upon which metaphor depends for its semantic import.215 In the
case of metaphor the operational aspect is carried out in the
imagination, by means of emotional sympathy, it is a matter of
recognition rather than experiment, and the translation is looser, more
idiomatic, more likely to provide a compound of meanings than a single
one. There is then a further process involved - the working out of
consequences, to find if we agree with, or 'like', the metaphor. Though
recognition can be seen as a form of agreement, in that our understanding
presupposes the aptness of the metaphor, we can distinguish between
knowing what is meant by a word, for example 'Kraut', and subscribing to
its connotational import, between what we recognize as part of our
culture and what we ourselves believe. This second process also takes the
form of 'if then', but its object is different. Both processes constitute
making the implicit explicit and are thus the basic form of criticism,
but the degree to which one or the other is emphasized marks a rough
division between two styles of literary criticism. When the first process,
by which we discover what the metaphor means, that is, by which we make
explicit the connection between the work and the world at its most basic
level, predominates then the criticism appears primarily 'analytical'.
When this process is extended by the second, the working out of what
follows from what the metaphor implies, then we may say that the
criticism appears primarily 'critical' in the sense that it begins to
involve judgements that go beyond meaning in a restricted, denotational
sense, and into pragmatics, that is, significance. There is a difficulty
here in expressing the difference involved in that both processes involve
making the implicit explicit; the making explicit of connotational
meaning. What primarily distinguishes them is that the second process
extends its discussion of the work further into the world, it is to a
greater degree involved with the world independently of the work, and
consequently finds itself 'answering back' to the work much more so than
it would if it were primarily concerned only with translating, or
explaining it. Meaning or significance in the second sense, in the sense
in which it is pursued further into the world, is 'meaning' in the sense
of effect - 'A means B' being translated as 'A has B as its consequence',
or 'B is the effect of A', rather than 'B could be substituted for A'. (Any
other conception of criticism is committed to nothing more than disguised
pleonasm, to reading over again, to reading for the reader.) In that the
poetical or literary is, notoriously what defies paraphrase, or rather,
what we wish to save from paraphrase, and our experience with
Schopenhauer may indicate why this is so, it may be that what I have
called the 'critical' approach will turn out to be the approach which
literary criticism, as an autonomous subject, can most properly consist
I do not for a moment want to suggest that literature sets out to
tell us how to see the world, and therefore, how to live - I do not think
it is passible to talk about what literature "sets out to do" - what I do
wish to suggest is that, by influencing the way we think and the quality
of our feelings, qualities which do effect the way we perceive the world,
literature does in fact do just these things.
We can define 'belief' as the acceptance of the existence of a certain
state-of-affairs, the putting of one's trust in the truth of a statement,
or the efficacy of a principle. But belief may be more or less explicit,
and our use of the word 'believe' extends from the description of
knowledge, direct acquaintance with a state-of-affairs, to opinion, or
belief based on grounds short of proof, that is, provisional conviction.
There is a justification for this range of usage, for, in practice,
knowledge and opinion shade into one another imperceptibly, though at
their two extremes they are easy to distinguish; in everyday life we
behave as if certain things were facts though our grounds for doing so
would probably make a scientist or logician pale, were it not for the
fact that both these sets of people find that, outside their disciplines,
they must do likewise or do nothing. Allowing every proposition a degree
of belief corresponding to its degree of credibility may be 'perfect
rationality', but for the moment I must lay aside considerations of
rationality and, in order to see what belief is in practice, adopt a more
psychological approach, Belief, then, as it is defined within the
discipline of psychology, . is any enduring feature of a person's cognitive
life, an idea felt to be true and acted upon when appropriate situations
arise, often accompanied by an emotional state. For the sake of clarity I
should say that here I am concerned not so much with temporary feelings
as with permanent or semi-permanent emotional or volitional dispositions.
Beliefs are often systematically related to one another, as would appear
natural, but the sort of stereotypic personality that the psychologist is
of.
concerned with is of no interest here; the areas of feeling which
metaphysics and literature are concerned with are more subtle and less
tangible than those which the psychological questionnaire is often
manifestly fishing for.
The essence of a belief, then, is a disposition to respond in a
certain way to a certain situation. What then of metaphysics, which do
not, by definition, present us with new facts, and, therefore, with any
reason to change our dispositon towards any situation? Most metaphysical
systems in the philosophical sphere rely, as we have seen, on the
exaggeration of some rhetorical paradox, or linguistic analogy; the
infusion of reality with some difficulty of logic or the interpretation of
the forms of language. Like my example of idealism, or the conviction
that time or matter are unreal, such ideas begin with an isolated but
emotionally-charged model of analysis, or form of expression, and seek to
assimilate all modes of discourse to it. The model is based on a use of'
words which begins by merely disturbing the restrictions upon which
their normal meaning depends, and then goes on by ignoring them. We
might compare the original intuition of the metaphysician with that once
alive and supple wood used by the proto-Venetians - just as time and tide
turned it to the stone-hard foundations over which rose all the baroque
intricacies of Venice, so the metaphysician's arguments turn the original
poetical impression into a system in which the intuition becomes, or
appears to become, something quite different. But the emotive foundation
should not be overlooked, for the imaginative suggestion of the idea will
be the greater part of its significance; far this reason it might be
better to speak of a 'metaphysical temper' rather than a 'metaphysical
philosophy'.
As we saw with Pascal, it is only by denying the figurativeness of
the metaphysical assertion that it can be made to assert something about
the world, but without this figurativeness the assertion could not exist
at all. We might, therefore, speak of the significance of the metaphysical
assertion as that 'nostalgia' that is left behind by the way in which it
itself cancels out what it momentarily appears to assert, the vacuum
created by its impossibility. That the figure should be 'concealed by its
very brilliance', as Longinus terms it, is part of the paradox of
metaphysics already touched on in the conclusion to Chapter 1; for though
the only significance a metaphysical assertion can have is pragmatic,
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that is, its emotional significance, it has, by definition, no pragmatic
meaning. If it does not appear as meaningless, does not collapse on
itself, it is because the impossibility it momentarily asserts is a
desirable impossibility; this is why I have said that the very existence
of metaphysics presupposes a causal connection between emotion and
belief. The 'object' of poetry, writes Wordsworth, 'is truth, not individual
and local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external
testimony, but carried alive into the heart by passion; truth which is its
own testimony, which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to
which it appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal.' - which is
to say, not truth at all.2ie The expression of a view of life that so
moves us, that gives the 'impulse' to one side of a two-sided question,
that we allow to comprehend the whole in the exclusive, even if only for
its duration, is perceived by us as poetical. Without affect, then, there
is no literariness, no poetry. The metaphysical temper that is manifested
in any literary work is unlikely to be explicitly revisionary, in the
manner of any of the great world religions, or of Schopenhauer, Heidegger,
or Sartre, since the description of the world as a style is usually
highly specific; though a distinction could be drawn here between the
lyric poem and the novel, on the basis of the novel's (usually) greater
intensity, its relative comprehensiveness and the greater investment of
time necessary to read it.217. My discussion of metaphysics has mainly
been an unsympathetic one; what we are left with is the idea that they
are no more than a form of spiritual colonization - that metaphysics is
not so much a matter of what words can legitimately mean as who is to be
'master' of our perception of the world. But we still have some way to go.
We saw with idealism that it could be squared with fact if only we
rearranged the rest of our way of talking about the world in accordance
with it, but, since the idea makes no practical difference, it would mean
only an increase in complexity, and it seems vain to employ a greater
number of concepts than is necessary in order to describe the same facts.
If we leave aside, for the moment, the fact that literature is fiction,
and, therefore, immediately suspect, we can say that, as I argued earlier,
the very ordering and placing of emphasis that constitutes style
predicates something about what is ordered that is more than the things
themselves. It could perhaps be argued that being entertained by a work
is an act rather than an intellectual process, but it would seem closer to
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the truth to say that it is the two things inextricably woven together.
Ve have already met with the distinction between the 'representative' and
the 'expressive' functions of language, but we may here take a closer look
at it, for it can lead to a misleading simplification.
How, many linguistic utterances are analogous to laughing in that
they have only an expressive function, no representative
function. Examples of these are cries like "Oh, Oh" or, on a
higher level, lyrical verses. The aim of a lyric poem in which
occur the words "sunshine" and "clouds," is not to inform us of
certain meterological facts, but to express certain feelings of
the poet and to excite similar feelings in us. A lyric poem has
no assertional sense, it does not contain knowledge.21®
The problem is that literature is more analogous to telling a joke than
to laughter, and, for this reason, responding to it cannot but involve
cognitive processes. Carnap, from whom the above quotation comes,
contrasts poetry with philosophical metaphysics on the grounds that
while the former expresses 'temporary feelings' the latter expresses
'permanent emotional or volitional dispositions.'.21® It would seem,
however, that all forms of literature can express both these things, and
that a distinction between literary and philosophical metaphysics cannot
be drawn an these grounds. However, Carnap further distinguishes between
the 'non-theoretical' character of the arts and of philosophical
metaphysics by saying that while the arts do not lose any of their high
value for personal and social life in possessing this characteristic,
philosophical metaphysics does, because it 'gives the illusion of
knowledge without actually giving any knowledge.'.220 This is a point to
which I shall return, but, in itself, it does not explain wherein the value
of which it speaks may lie.
Reading a work is more than simply examining an orientation towards
the world, for this reading requires a sympathy towards that orientation
in so far as it involves the investment of time in making the work's
centre of attention my centre of attention. To say that this sympathy is
unconnected with the world, with life 'outside' the work, is, then,
shortsighted primarily because of this investment; in reading this work I
am not only not reading that work but I am not doing anything else
either. Even if one's object is just, in that chilling phrase, to 'kill
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time', there are many different ways of doing so, the element of choice
remains.
The picture of philosophical metaphysics I have given is almost
wholly negative, but is, there some way in which literature can be
exempted from what has been said? We might remember Mill's answer to
Bentham's charge that all poetry is 'misrepresention' and consists
'essentially in exaggeration for effect : in producing some one view of a
thing very emphatically, and suppressing all the limitations and
qualifications.', that is, that such rhetoric is justified when it
undertakes to 'make men feel truths', and that one 'must aim at too much
to be assured of doing enough.'.221 The order in the world which the work
manifests, it might be said, may be as much a revelation as an invention,
and the pleasure we derive from it may come as much from being
undecieved as deceived. Let us imagine that my own personal bias is that
the world is, at least potentially, very pleasant, and that life itself is
beautiful; while I could not prove either by logic or empiricism, I am
often aware that both logic and empiricism are being abused when the
grounds for believing the opposite are put forward. The attitude, or
principle, is a vague one but I can justify its adoption, for my private
use, pragmatically, in that it has so far involved me in none of the
abuses of the intellect or imagination which other possible orientations
towards the world entail, that is, I do not have to deny or invent facts
in order to sustain it - it requires only possibilities. (However, if I
need -to be reminded, to have my personal bias confirmed, is it not for
the very reason that it is my construct rather than something simply
there?) When a work presents a more pessimistic orientation I consider it
poor not merely because it is 'not to my taste' but also because in
pessimism I find the response of a mind which having failed either to
identify or obtain what it wants, has settled for the lesser happiness of
being systematically miserable, even at the expense of denying what can
exist. The different collections of facts which the two general feelings -
optimism and pessimism - are inferences from may appear to the mind as
a conflict, but they must both have a real existence in order to do so.
As Chesterton wrote, apropos the 'pessimism' of Byron, 'The popularity of
pure and unadluterated pessimism is an oddity; it is almost a
contradiction in terms. Men would no more recieve the news of the failure
of existence or of the harmonious hostility of the stars with ardour or
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popular rejoicing than they would light bonfires for the arrival of
cholera or dance a breakdown when they were condemned to be hanged.'.222
In the universal darkness which the pessimist pronounces their own light,
whether it be integrity or superior knowledge of the darkness, or, as
with the Existentialists, 'rebellion', 'authenticity', or 'good faith',
shines twice as bright, and is, indeed, a cause for rejoicing. But does
this mean that the rhetoric of pessimism is more rhetorical, less honest,
than some other form? As we have seen, there is a difference between the
degree of rhetoric involved in, for example, 'A difference that makes no
differed is no difference.', and "'The world is my idea" : realization of c-
this is the goal of philosophical wisdom.', and so it may, indeed, be
possible to speak of one rhetoric being more rhetorical than another, and
even to hold that one rhetoric may be necessary to counterbalance
another, to bring the subject to a mid point where no, or at least very
little, rhetoric exists. It could be argued, for example, that compared to
the seriousness with which we consider life, that is, compared to the
concrete nature of the significance we posit in our life, we are such
stuff as dreams are made of.223
In this sense the most profound pleasure that we derive from
literature is the pleasure of recognition, the pleasure of recognizing our
own experience in essentia (in that the metaphysical unity of the work
only exists by virtue of this essence), in recognizing our feelings
'objectified', The relationship between the reader and the work is, then,
an interaction rather than a matter of static contemplation; in reminding
us of that emotional tenor which certain configurations of events have
inspired in us, and in placing what we recognize, however subliminally, as
its essence, the metaphysic that generalizing from that emotional tenor
creates, once more into the world, at a different point, the work suggests
to us that this emotional tenor could belong to more than a single
isolated configuration, but could be the pattern of a life, or of life - it
'verifies' that tenor. (The distinction between 'the pattern of a life' and
'the pattern of life' is an important one that I will take up again
elsewhere.) One might then speak of one of the effects of literature being
the affirmation of the affective aspect of our sense of human community;
literature can sustain and vindicate this sense, whatever we have chosen
that it should be.22"1 To this extent literay taste, as I will argue in the
next chapter, is not divorced from more comprehensive orientations
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towards the world. We may perceive the attitude expressed by a
metaphysic, whether literary or otherwise, as simplistic or profound, mean
or magnificent, banal or powerful, bland or dramatic, but we cannot prove
it to be either absolutely true or false in its descriptive aspect.2:25
Pessimism is only more rhetorical than any other metaphysic in that it
appears to remain unaware, and to propogate a lack of awareness, as to
what it pragmatically means, that is, it is another degree of hiding what
is really said, of ensuring that affect is subliminal. One may believe in
God and know what one's motives for doing so are, but the pessimist must
go on hiding their true celebration or their pessimism would become a
contradiction - 'He's only happy when he's miserable'. The 'world' which
we begin to inhabit as we read is always our awn world from a new angle,
it is a metaphor of our world, our world 'seen through' the style. The
degree to which we can pass into this world, take it as truly descriptive
of the possibilities of our own, that is, the degree to which we judge the
metaphor to be apt, is the measure of our evaluation of the work and our
sympathy with its metaphysical temper.
The metaphysic is that apparently irreducible imperative, the basis
upon which significance is itself ascribed, and the reader or critic's
conception of it is that "human nature", that "life" or "world" which they
assume themselves to have in common with the author, and, in the critic's
case, with the reader. Such is the nature of this ascription that we can
only distinguish between the importance of a thing and the importance we
attach to it, once that attachment is broken. The relative breadth or
narrowness, subtlety or crudity of this conception will thus, as I have
said, be the major determining factor in the reader or critic's approach
to the work and their evaluation of it. There is no objectivity here,
except in a negative sense, only degrees of willingness in the critic and
reader to subject their own conceptions of, and assumptions about, value
to investigation; for though it is impossible to prove what, with regard
to value, is essential to humanity, it can be proved what is only
contingent to it. 'Perfect rationality', writes Russell, 'consists, not in
believing what is true, but in attaching to every proposition a degree of
belief corresponding to its degree of credibility,'.2:2S But the degree of
credibility which a metaphysic possesses is, by definition, an illusion
induced by rhetoric, an hallucination of significance.
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Literature as 'The Debauchery of Thought'
Thought In action has for Its only possible motive the
attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to
belief is no part of the thought itself ....The action of thinking
may incidentally have other results; it may serve to amuse us,
for example, and among dilettanti it is not rare to find those
who have so perverted thought to the purpose of pleasure that it
seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they
delight to exercise it may ever get finally settled...This is the
very debauchery of thought.
F'eirce227
Nothing which we know of exists 'in-itself', in the sense of not
being relative to the mind, though, obviously, if our knowledge consists
of facts, then those things exist independently of that relation. There
are, however, states-of-affairs which belong almost solely to the
individual mind, the orderings which are the result of private, possibly
idiosyncratic, determination. Most fallacious arguments, unless the point
is very complex or obscure, issue from such idiosyncracies. A politician
may use a fallacy consciously, relying on the collective idiosyncracy of
his audience, but the sort of non-logical 'argument' I wish to discuss
here is the sort that begins in sensation rather than cogitation, and
which is more likely to be an unconscious disposition. Fashion too may
play a part here; we have probably all at one time or another adopted
some way of looking at the world which came to us from an external
source and which, though far a little time it seemed to express what we
were, in retrospect appeared to be half a matter of being true to
ourselves and half a matter of lying to ourselves. While I would not go
as far as Peirce does, when he says that every creed was 'as an
historical fact invented to harm somebody', it seems that placing oneself
inside any systematically ordered metaphysic (and even the mast
rigorously anti-metaphysical philosopher embodies a metaphysic, in our
literary sense, in tone of voice) almost invariably requires the
rationalizing of some of our sensations out of existence, and the
rationalizing into existence of others.2253 While the analysis of sensation
may lead to its refinement, to a change in what action arises from it, or
what beliefs we hold in conjunction with it, and, therefore, ultimately its
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actual strength, the sensation itself, as an immediate link with the
world, and, perhaps more indirectly, with auselves cannot be bullied or
cajoled into or out of existence, be it in the interests of coherence or
poetry, without some part of that world or ourselves disappearing from
view.
Since this work is exclusively concerned with literature you might
still expect at this point some sort of distinction to appear that will
redeem literature from its association with metaphysics. I might say
that, while the respective qualities of philosophical and literary
metaphysics are distinguished primarily by degrees of emphasis, and while
they are both frequently used far the same purposes - navels as
textbooks and metaphysical essays as entertainment - this difference in
degree represents a difference in kind. So it does; one is literary
metaphysics and the other is philosophical metaphysics! I might say that,
with regard to effect, in literary metaphysics sensation is not
'rationalized1 into or out of existence, but rather gently persuaded -
though, obviously, Voltaire and George Eliot demonstrate different degrees
of gentleness. But then I could also argue just the opposite - that, in
conflating idea and description, literature is more aggressively
metaphysical than "philosophy". I could write that our consciousness that
fiction is fiction undermines the very metaphysic it creates, or that by
objectifying that metaphysic, by making it an object, it allows us to
separate the significance attached by it to the world, even as that
attachment takes place. But it is only by being a fiction that it
manifests a metaphysic. Perhaps I could write, most convincingly of all,
that the imaginative suggestion of the work only becomes a metaphysic
once it come^ into contact with literary criticism, for there is some
truth in this.223 Perhaps I could join a circus if I was a
contortionist.
In whatever manner I consider that our sympathy, involved in the
very understanding of a description as literature, is set in motion by
the work I must come back, however reluctantly, to the idea that the
motive and function of thought is the production of belief. It is
important, however, to remember here that I am not talking about what is
presented at a literal level, that is, not about in what manner we believe
in Macbeth, or Lilliput, or the Cheshire Cat, psychologically fascinating
as this question is, but rather the sympathetic participation of the
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imagination in the metaphysics manifested by these things. Belief,
whether provisional or firm, is the orientation of the mind towards a
particular state-of-affairs. Peirce who, in uncharacteristically poetic
fashion, describes belief as 'the demi-cadence which closes a musical
phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life', distinguishes its three
properties as being, firstly, that it involves the cessation of doubt,
secondly, that it establishes a rule of action, and, thirdly, that it is
something that we are aware of.330 But if we are to hold good to the
connection we have made between belief and its pragmatic consequences
then we must reject the hypothesis that belief, as a cessation of doubt
and the wellspring of action, is always present to the individual's
awareness. While the significance of a belief may be determined by the
mode of action which it gives rise to, the habits which it involves, often
the motivating belief of an action is only implicit in the action itself,
or in other beliefs which rely upon it. It may be better for us to refer
to this orientation of mind revealed in an action as an 'attitude' rather
than a 'belief', since it is more in keeping with normal usage, 'beliefs'
usually being only those attitudes which their possessor can articulate.
Furthermore we should recognize that an attitude is not simply a resting
place for thought; as a rule, conscious or unconscious, for action it is
also an influence upon further processes of thought as the individual is
faced with new situations and ideas. This last is important, for it is
only by keeping it in mind that we can form a clear pictui~e of just what
sort of process imaginative suggestion is, and just what function the
critic might usefully fulfil in making explicit what is implicit in the
work.
I have already examined the sort of beliefs or attitudes that the
significance-giving aspect of literary description generates through its
rhetoric. 'The commonest novel,' writes De Quincey, 'by moving in alliance
with human fears and hopes, with human instincts of wrong and right,
sustains and quickens [the] affections. Calling them into action, it
rescues them from torpor.'.331 Sartre too writes that by 'fixing' an
aspect of reality in writing, the work makes that aspect 'intentional',
the reader has the 'guarantee' that the connections established by the
work 'have been expressly willed,'.332 Moreover, part of the enjoyment of
the reader, continues Sartre, lies in a feeling of being 'essential' in
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relation to the world, in a 'feeling of security...which stamps the
strangest aesthetic emotions with a sovereign calm.'
It has its origin in the authentication of a strict harmony
between subjectivity and objectivity. As, on the other hand, the
aesthetic object is properly the world in so far as it is aimed
at through the imaginary, aesthetic joy accompanies the
positional consciousness that the world is a value, that it, a
task proposed to human freedom.233
Chesterton makes a similar point, though in a different idiom, when he
writes that even as the blackest of pessimisitic artists writes 'some
shameless and terrible indictment of creation, his one pang of joy in the
achievment joins the universal chorus of gratitude, with the scent of the
wildflower and the song of the bird.'.23'1 And for the reader, too, the
thing has been said, the significance given, the universe has been made
metaphysical and infused with value, and the reader, irrespective of the
nature of their own values, has been made thereby essential in relation
to the metaphysical universe. But Sartre is wrong, for nothing can make
us essential to the world. That the work is 'intended' is of the utmost
importance, but insofar as it is intended by another it becomes a second
nature; the reader feels essential because within literature the world is
given ad hominem, it is tamed by being made significant. One instance of
rhetoric may sway one to this evaluation and another instance to that,
but rhetoric per se is the purveying of a sense of value.
This is perhaps especially evident with the novel.235 Lawrence wrote
that though the novelist may try, by 'helpless, unconscious predilection',
to 'nail down' the novel with a morality or ideology, the novel will
either 'die' or get up and walk away with the nail.235 This may be so, but
I am tired of the hammering as the nail goes in and the tugging and the
rending as it comes out again; the novel may exchange one ideology for
another, but it never frees itself from ideology per se, even its own
undermining is a matter of appearance, a superficial phenomenon, for this
too is the expression of an ideology. The separate identity of the nail
and the novel is, then, an illusion, for their are no works, even for such,
let us say, heavy-handed novelists as Balzac, Mauriac, or Lawrence
himself, apart from those works that bear their names.
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Literature, by giving significance, tames the world. For the literary
is characterized by, indeed exists by virtue of, a host of concepts which
do not exist in the world; destiny, fate, finalities (other than death),
the real existence of the past, meaning in accident, absolute meaning. Of
all terrible things, the most terrible is time and yet literature turns to
it again and again, because time cannot appear in literature or even in
writing; to write is to fix the moment and make it significant, and it is
just the negation of significance which makes the experience of time what
it is. Death, too, that most uncompromising of events, cannot appear
without a significance in literature, because nothing appears without
significance in literature. Uewman saw in the fate of characters so 'good'
as Romeo and Juliet, and Ophelia 'something inconsistent with correct
beauty, and therefore unpoetical.'; today a happy ending might seem
contrary to 'poetic justice', though so revealing a phrase would be
unlikely to appear in the explanation as to why it should appear so.237
'Poetic justice' is what we call the ultimate significance we desire from
a work and the phrase is no less appropriate in connection with admirers
of Kafka or Beckett than it is in connection with admirers of Dickens.
Is all literature, then, by its very nature, 'spiritual gin'? It is. But
such an assertion must be placed in some sort of context in order to be
properly understood. I wrote earlier that the opposite of style is the
world, but this does not mean that style ceases at the limit of the work,
nor that style, and all that it implies, is solely a property of "art
objects". For in life it would appear that the degree of rhetoric
appropriate to the case is always in inverse proportion to the degree
that the case generates. It is about those things concerning which
literariness is least appropriate that you are most 'literary', in the
sense of tending towards those concepts that I have described as
characterizing literature, for in these instances you appeal to fate and
absolute meaning almost as a reflex - sometimes, it is true, too much is
not enough but sometimes anything is too much. You desire poetic justice
in life too; not simply the religious but every metaphysic is an
expression of this desire, for every raetaphysic is the adaption of
reality to a more emotionally satisfying form, and every sense of fate or
absolute meaning, every feeling that x deserves y, is the expression of a
metaphysic.233 The common life is not 'prose' : Life imitates Art,233 All
these stories are a means of taming the world (a 'wild' landscape is an
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uncultivated one); literature is the systematization of these stories we
tell ourselves, it is those stories as we find them in books.2/10 (The
word 'author' derives from the Latin auctor, meaning one who augments, a
title given to conquering generals who brought new territory.) If we were
to say that one lives by stories or in stories, or one simply lives, what
would be overly sententious about such a statement would be the claim
that one can 'simply live', especially when such a claim is written down,
or even spoken. 'I also had my illusions,', Wilde writes in his De
Profundus, 'I thought life was going to be a brilliant comedy, and that
you were to be one of the graceful figures in it. I found it to be a
revolting and repellent tragedy....But while there were times when I
rejoiced in the idea that my sufferings were to be endless, I could not
bear them to be without meaning.h25*1 It is something much more basic
than simply charm that flies 'At the mere touch of cold philosophy.'.
To apply logic to the poetical is to break a butterfly upon a wheel,
but to apply the appearance of it is to do worse. I am enamoured of
literature and would have the reader of this work enamoured of literature
also, but only for what it is. Whether literature is the debauchery of
thought or simply thought at play is finally a matter of how we read and
how we criticize. For, as we have seen, all poetical language, indeed
perhaps all memorable phrases, slips towards a certain 'anarchy' of
thought, the disturbance of syntax in order to introduce a semantic
import which runs counter to either the logical possibilities of language
or the empirical fact. (There are, of course, works in which the
raetaphysic is so pathologically divorced from reality that no pleasure
can be derived from them by the reflective mind, though no doubt they
give pleasure to those whose metaphysical temper is in sympathy with
them.) But though individuals, perhaps the majority of people, will find a
resting place, a niche, for their metaphysical sympathies, in romances, or
'existentialist' novels, or thrillers, in this school or that school, or
whatever was last published in 'serious fiction', (habitual poetry readers
are rare), the most fruitful use we can make of literature is to range
widely and freely across time and genre, to try and test, through the
imagination, those metaphors for our life which works both ancient and
alien embody, to have no sooner sampled, sympathized with, and weighed up
the metaphor than to move on. For while anarchy, as self-rule, of the
spirit is the essence of entertainment, if we stay in one literary niche,
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constrict our imagination to a narrow compass, we are, in effect,
'elevating' one literay metaphysic to the status of a "philosophy", and
our entertainment then becomes something other than self-rule. Moreover,
the boundary between style and world is a matter of constant personal
discovery. Here we come back to the two ways of criticizing, or types of
critical emphasis - the thematic and the metaphysical. A theme, even if
its elements are in conflict with every other part of the work, can be
found in any work, but to pursue it, to talk as if the passing on of that
which, when defined, is no more than a banal platitude or a philosohpical
psuedo-assertion, were the heart and soul of our experience of the work,
or as if the passing on of truths about psychology, or sociology, or
politics, or time, or free will, were the main point about literature, is
indeed the very debauchery of thought.
There is an important corollary to this view of the literary work as
the expression of a metaphysic, and criticism as the examination of this
metaphysic by relating it to the world through one's own response - it
changes the traditional question 'Should criticism be evaluative?' into 'In
what manner should criticism be evaluative?'. For, except in the technical
aspect, that is, in the discovering of how this collecton of words has
generated this imaginative suggestion, literary criticism, in that it is




But it will be asked, whether this method of analyzing
metaphysically matters of feeling and sentiment, will not be
attended with many inconveniences? Whether it will not often
engage us to enquire into the reasons of things which have no
reason at all, damp our pleasure by leading us into the custom
of discussing coldly what was designed by nature to touch and
to inflame, and put such shackles upon true genius, as to render
it servilely timorous, and check it's enterprizing ardour?
D'Alembert
Incorrectness of taste may arise, either from the dulness of our
internal senses, or from the debility of judgement. The former
renders our sentiments obscure and ill-defined, and therefore
difficult to be compared. The latter incapacitates us for
perceiving the relations even of the clearest perceptions, or
the most distinguishable qualities. In either case, the mind is
distracted with suspense and doubt. This is an uneasy state,
from which we are desirous to extricate ourselves by any means.
If we have not vigour of taste enough, to determine the merit of
the object, by its intrinsic characters, we take up with any
standard, however foreign or improper, that can end our
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Taste : Beauty
Although 'beauty' is not a word that readily springs to mind in
connection with the evaluation of literature I will use it here for two
reasons; firstly because it is perhaps the only specifically aesthetic
evaluative word that there is and so its sense, though far from fixed, is
less likely to slip and slide through the variety of contexts that the
more general 'good' can; secondly, as a word used for a long time in
connection with literature and still used in works on general aesthetics,
by using it from the outset these other standpoints, that is, the
historical and the aesthetic in general, may be brought in without
constant recourse to translating one set of terms for another. Moreover
'beautiful' is quite a common form of positive appraisal in more
spontaneous, informal contexts. That this should be so is, indeed, strange
and demonstrates a contradiction within the common sense attitude
towards the concept, for, while the person who subscribes to this
attitude will talk as if 'beauty' were an objective category they will also
insist, in argument, that it is a purely subjective one. This would seem
to suggest that there is a certain metaphysicality in this common-sense
attitude, perhaps the result, as with many such contradictions, of
intuitive feeling seeking to make some sort of compromise with an
irrefutable but inimical piece of popular philosophy. Consider Nietzsche;
Nothing is more conditional - or, let us say - narrower - than
our feeling for beauty. Whoever would think of it apart from
man's joy in man would immediately loose any foothold. "Beautiful
in itself" is a mere phrase, not even a concept. In the beautiful
man posits himself as the measure of perfection; in special cases
he warships himself in it...Man believes the world itself
overloaded with beauty - and he forgets himself as the cause of
this. He alone has presented the world with beauty - alas! only
with a very, all-too-human beauty... He has humanized it, that is
all. But nothing, absolutely nothing, guarantees that man should
be the model of beauty. Who knows what he looks like in the eyes
of a higher judge of beauty?1
Nietzsche's attitude to the concept of beauty is an example of what might
be described as the common-sense attitude; that "beauty is in the eye of
the beholder" is a truth readily verified by observation of the
differences between the tastes of individuals. The afflatus of the passage
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consists in the dismissive attitude towards the humanization of the
world, as the 'vanity of the species', and in the implication that there
is a 'higher judge'.2 However, since we cannot, logically, ever transcend
what we are, everything, absolutely everything guarantees that 'man' is
the model of beauty. The real problem, philosophical or otherwise, is to
discover what it is in the eye of the beholder that gives rise to the
concept of beauty. For this 'eye' has been perhaps a misleading metonym.
Spinoza, who also held that beauty 'is not so much a quality of the object
which is perceived as an effect in him who perceives it.', writes that if
our eyes 'were more long-sighted or more short-sighted, or if our
temperament were other that it is, things which now appear to us
beautiful would appear to be ugly and things which now appear to be ugly
would appear to us beautiful.'.3 What this demonstrates, he elsewhere
asserts, is that 'each one judges concerning things according to the
disposition of his own mind, or rather takes for things that which is
really modifications of his imagination.', for 'things cannot, except with
respect to our imagination, be called beautiful or ugly, ordered or
confused.'.Likewise Hume writes that 'there is nothing, in itself,
valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but
that these attributions arise from the particular constitution of human
sentiment and affection.', and Montesquieu, in his 'Essay on Taste',
declares that beauty does not have a 'positive nature' but is 'merely
relative to the nature and operations of the soul.', that is, that the
sources of 'beauty, goodness, &c. lie within us, and, of consequence, when
we enquire into their causes, we do no more than investigate the springs
of our mental pleasures.'.3 This insistence that aesthetic response is
connected with 'temperament', 'the disposition of the mind', 'sentiment or
affection', or 'the nature and operations of the soul', as these three
philosophers variously have it, would seem to suggest that this response,
this sense of beauty, is far from arbitrary. Indeed it is a commonplace,
generally obscured by the first burgeoning of theoretical reflection, that
a statement about a person's tastes in literature or even the other arts,
is usually taken as a statement about the person's temperament or
disposition in general. As Schiller writes.
Beauty is therefore an object for us, since reflection is the
condition under which we have a sensation of it; but it is at the
same time a state of our personality, since feeling is the
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condition under which we have a conception of it. It is then
certainly form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same
time life, because we feel it. In a word, it is at once our state
and our act,s
Yet why is it, if taste is so generally acknowledged to be an integral
part of a person's mental life, should it be almost inevitably talked
about, theoretically at least, as if it were something autonomous and
inscrutable? Moreover, as something irrelevant to criticism.
To say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder is not, analogous to
saying that blue is in the eye of the beholder, and it is not analogous
because, excepting physiological defects, the perception of colour does
not vary from person to person. As Po^ writes 'Tis with our judgements as p
our watches, none / Go just alike yet each believes his own.'.7 Vhat it
means to 'believe' one's own taste, or how this piece of wit might teach
us not to believe what we believe, are difficult questions, but the
general implication is a common one. Although Pope would have taken the
real existence of good and bad taste for granted the very word 'taste'
itself has come to have a hollow and conventional ring about it. Thus
Herbert Read; 'Much as I dislike the idea of "taste" (for the good taste
of one generation is the bad taste of the next, and in time even the bad
taste of a period becomes the "chic" of a later age) there is nevertheless
a certain exchange of appreciative gestures which is part of the
civilized behaviour of a society.'.® Read's reasons for disliking the idea
of 'taste', and, by implication, the idea of the evaluation of literature
are commonplace. Nelson Goodman, for example, writes that evaluation
'distorts and even inverts the whole task of the philosophy of art';
[The! primary task of aesthetics is to discriminate and
interrelate the aspects under which works of art are to be
perceived and comprehended....Judging the excellence of works of
art or the goodness of people is not the best way of
understanding them.®
This sounds reasonable but the analogy between the moral appraisal of a
person and the evaluation of a work is one that begs the question, for
before we can examine a 'work of art' we must decide that this is what it
is, rather than simply a representation (if it is visual) or a fiction (if
it is written). (Moreover, is there really something to 'understand' about
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a work of art other than why we like, or dislike, its company?) The 'term
work of art' presupposes this distinction. Unless we are to allow that
everything that comes to us labelled 'art' is actually distinguished from
other representations or fictions by virtue of this label (as, in common
parlance, a person who writes verse is a 'poet') then we must allow that
if 'art' is not an 'evaluative' word then it is at least a discriminatory
one. But to say that this representation or fiction is 'art' need not be
to say more than that it is worthy of a certain kind of attention.10
Northrop Frye, for example, in pursuit of a 'systematic structure of
knowledge' concerning literature would banish 'all casual, sentimental, and
prejudiced value judgements, and all the literary chit-chat which makes
the reputations of poems boom and crash in an imaginary stock exchange.',
for 'whatever dithers or vacilllates or reacts is merely leisure-class
gossip.' and can 'no more be a part of the structure of criticism than the
Huxley-Vilberforce debate is a part of the structure of biological
science.'.11 His list of poets on the 'stock exchange', Milton, Donne,
Tennyson, and Shelley, is unremarkable enough - the presence of these
names in a scholarly work of criticism will raise no eyebrows - but is
this because they are God-given as poets? Are these works poetry because,
as children, we found them on the poetry shelves in the library? A little
later in the same 'Polemical Introduction' Frye writes;
Comparative estimates of value are really inferences, most valid
when silent ones, from critical practice, not expressed
principles guiding its practice. The critic will find soon, and
continually, that Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet
to work with than Blackmore.12
Not only does Frye think Milton a more rewarding poet than Blackmore but
he asserts that you will too, that is, not only does he make evaluative
judgements but he also claims universal validity for them. However, if
value does exist, he believes that it is best to keep 'silent' about it!
That Frye's two views are incompatible does not, however, make either of
them necessarily false. What must be remembered is that somewhere
somebody chose Milton, Donne, Tennyson and Shelley, over a host of their
minor contemporaries, and that this choice was repeated - over and over
again, one would hope. 'Milton is a more rewarding and suggestive poet to
work with than Blackmore'; it is time then to sell Blackmore and buy into
Milton.13 Frye's analogy of the stock exchange is as dishonest a one as
could be imagined, for it suggests, by mixing up two forms of value, that
aesthetic evaluation is a mercenary and opportunistic thing rather than a
reflection of just this consciousness that one poet is more 'rewarding
and suggestive to work with' than another. This 'stock exchange' is a sign
that we do not simply inherit the value judgements that are handed down
from some mythical time in the past when critics were "right", whatever
that can mean. Moreover changes in the evaluation of a work are always
intimately bound up either with changes in the understanding of the
nature of the work, or in the more general perception of values, or both
together, But these very changes in the perception of the work and in the
more general context of values are cited by Frye as a reason against
making value judgements; 'Every age, left to itself, is incredibly narrow
in its cultural range, and the critic, unless he is a greater genius than
the world has yet seen, shares that narrowness in proportion to his
confidence in his taste. V-4 He imagines how a critic of the early
nineteenth-century might praise Bowdler's edition of Shakespeare for
rescuing "'what is immortal in our great poet from what the taste of his
time compelled him to acquiesce in.'", and how a critic today, passing
over Dickens' melodrama and sentimentality as an embarrassment, would
settle on everything in Dickens 'darkly and ambiguously ironic, or hostile
to Victorian standards', thus producing a Bowdlerized version of
Dickens.1 s Then how does Frye know that Milton is more rewarding than
Blackmore? Or does he know it and know that he does not know it? If Frye
knows that his age is a narrow one then he must know how it is so and
be able to see beyond its confines, if he does not know then he cannot
suppose it is, merely by analogy with former ages, for his supposition,
confined as it is, cannot take form. We have the same problem with the
'test of time'; if everybody waits for it then it is never made.ie If
'excellence' emerges gradually then it is only as a result of local but
persistent evaluative judgements, throughout time, by people who are not
concerned with awaiting the 'test of time'. Every age may be, as a whole,
narrow but the narrowness of every age is similar in quality, that is,
the basic axioms of stupidity are universal and timeless, but that person
who lives the life only of their own times, that is, who has nothing they
have not inherited from the inevitably bowdlerizing mainstream of
thought, will always be a bad critic.17" Moreover value judgements are not
prophecies, though it is a popular misconception that they should be, to
say that a critic who derogates something that is later popular was
'wrong', and one who praises what is later popular was 'right'. Frye
appears to be worried about being 'proved wrong' by a subsequent
generation, as if the fact that the Elizabethans thought Seneca a greater
dramatist than any of his Greek predecessors should mean that we should
forever suspend judgement on the relative merits of Shakespeare and
McGonagal. There is nothing inherently wrong with a permanently
suspended judgement or even a total rejection of the concept of judgement
- but criticism cannot proceed without it. The study of literature does
not presuppose any value in literature itself, since the value of the
study may lie in the mental exercise of studying per se, but, as I have
argued in the last two chapters, literature is a concept which exists
only by virtue of a sense of 'literary value'.
The fact that evaluative judgements appear not to be a matter of
proof or falsification must bring us back, however, to the primary
abjection to them; that is, that taste, not being accountable to the
intellect, cannot be discussed. Thus Schiller;
Experience can give us answer whether there is a Beauty....But how-
there can be a Beauty...neither reason nor experience can teach
us.1 e
Kant considers that we discern beauty with the imagination rather than
the intellect; that is, we refer the representation not to its object, with
a view to knowledge, but to our feelings of pleasure or displeasure in the
representation itself. He concludes, therefore, that 'The judgement of
taste is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic -
which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than
subjective.',13 An aesthetic judgement, then, according to Kant, 'does not
deal with any concept', since there can be no transition from concepts to
feelings of pleasure or displeasure.20
The delight which we connect with the representation of the real
existence of an object is called interest. Such a delight,
therefore, always involves a reference to the faculty of desire...
Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do
not want to know, whether we, or anyone else, are, or even could
be, concerned in the real existence of the thing...All one wants
to know is whether the mere representation of the object is to
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my liking, no matter how indifferent I may be to the real
existence of the object of this representation...everything turns
on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not
on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of
the abject. Everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful
which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and
not a pure judgement of taste....For, since the delight is not
based on any inclination of the subject (or on any other
deliberate interests), but the subject feels himself completely
free in respect to the liking which he accords to the object....he
must believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight
from everyone. Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if
beauty were a quality of the object and the judgement
logical...although it is only aesthetic, and contains merely a
reference of the representation of the object to the subject...21
This idea of disinterest as the defining property of the aesthetic is a
widespread one; Montesquieu writes that an object is termed 'beautiful'
when it 'appears merely agreeable without being advantageous', and
Coleridge that 'beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and
aloof from, and even contrarily to, interest.'.22 Schopenhauer uses the
same idea to account for the pleasure that is connected with the
perception of beauty;
[It] is quite obvious that the beautiful as such excites pleasure
in us without having any kind of connexion with our personal
aims, that is to say with our will....[When] an aesthetic
perception occurs the will completely vanishes from
consciousness. This is the origin of the feeling of pleasure
which accompanies the perception of the beautiful. It therefore
rests on the abolition of all passible suffering.23
This last argument, with its premiss that pleasure is a purely negative
state, is so framed that it is impervious to qualification and so I must
leave it as it stands. What Schopenhauer's position has in common with
that of Kant and Coleridge, however, is the attempt to distinguish
aesthetic pleasure, as it appears in the reaction 'This is beautiful', from
more earthly pleasures, that is, pleasure which arises from the perception
of what Kant terms the utility or perfection of an object.2A Schopenhauer
attempts to achieve this by making the sense of beauty the highest type
of pleasure, Kant and Coleridge by making it a different sort of pleasure,
both however depend upon the independence of aesthetic judgement from the
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intellect and the will. Poe, too, writes that the 'sole arbiter' of poetry-
is 'taste', and that poetry, as 'the rhythmical creation of beauty', has
only incidentally anything to do with 'the intellect or with the
conscience', with 'truth, which is the satisfaction of reason, or...passion,
which is the excitement of the heart.'.25 If aesthetic judgement is
independent of the intellect/will then 'taste' can only be a matter of
visceral reaction, belonging not even to psychology but rather to
biochemistry. 'Taste', writes Leibniz, 'is something like an instinct.' and
can be distinguished from understanding by the fact that it 'consists of
confused perceptions for which we cannot give an adequate reason.'.2e
'Natural taste', writes Montesquieu, 'does not consist in a thearetick
knowledge, but in the quick and exquisite application of rules which, in
speculation, may be really unknown to the mind.'.22 Likewise Santayana
writes that aesthetic values and preferences 'spring from the immediate
and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part
of our nature.'.2® 'The sense of beauty', declares Coleridge, 'is intuitive',
the necessary corollary of which, according to a strict definition of
'intuition', is the position taken by Frye - that the sense of aesthetic
value is 'individual, unpredictable, variable, incommunicable,
indemonstrable'.2® But what can it mean to say that taste is
'unpredictable'? Does it mean that the tastes that people have are
constantly suprising us? Yet if taste is autonomous and arbitrary,
independent of the intellect or personality, why should we expect any
particular type of preference of anyone, why should it ever be necessary
to say that taste is 'unpredictable'? This will not do, however, for being
able to predict someone's taste is riot the same as being able to account
for it.
It may strike us at first as strange that almost all of those writers
tk«t I have marshalled here to speak against the possibility of accounting
for taste, have also argued that taste can be improved. Leibniz, for
example, who wrote that taste 'consists of confused perceptions for which
we cannot give an adequate reason.', states, in the next breath, that to
'have good taste, one must practice enjoying the good things which reason
and experience have already authorized.'.30 This is rather like Frye's
implied belief that great art is God-given, that it is enough for good
critics to do nothing in order for excellence to triumph; far who will
authorize the authority? Voltaire, too, writes that the 'intellectual taste
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is much more formed by education and culture, than the sensual one', and
requires 'time, instruction, and experience,'.31 Gerard holds that while
'judgement' is 'implanted in very different degrees in different men,',
nevertheless 'the principles of taste may be improved very much beyond
their original perfection,',33 The idea that 'tastes are not to be
disputed', he continues, 'would imply that our natural principles of taste,
unlike all the rest of our mental faculties, and our bodily powers, are
incapable of being either improved or perverted ; it would infer that it
is absurd to censure any relish, however singularly gross'.33 The idea
that taste is formed by education and culture, and can be improved, relies
upon a connection between taste and cognition. It is often argued that
since many people who once thought A was good now, having been exposed
to B, think B is better, while the movement never takes place in the the
opposite direction, from B to A, with the same effect, then this movement
constitutes an improvement in taste. <1 have deliberately avoided being
specific about A and B since to give examples might, for some readers,
bring the argument to a premature close.) This is not, however, always
the case; many people who have been exposed to what the literary
establishment would call 'good' literature, prefer to relax with what that
establishment and they themselves would call 'trash' literature. This,
they would say, proves nothing, since they know it is 'trash'; but a
preference is a preference and what the habit proves is that their avowed
taste, implicit in the use of 'good' and 'trash', is simply snobbery. But
let us go back to this movement from A to B and the idea of taste being
improved. All the preceding shows is that taste changes, or can be
changed in a certain direction. There is always a 'good taste'; thus an
Elizabethan might be weaned off Sophocles and onto Seneca, a Restoration
reader might be taught to appreciate Otway more than Shakespeare. That
taste commonly changes in certain predictable ways does not necessarily
entail that taste can be 'improved', for this concept presupposes that
which it was intended to prove, that is, the existence of a standard of
'good taste'. 'Human nature', writes Addison, 'is the same in all
reasonable creatures ; and whatever falls in with it, will meet with
Admirers amongst Readers of all Qualities and Conditions..,,[For] it is
impossible that anything should be universally tasted and approved by a
Multitude, tho' they are only the Rabble of a Nation, which hath not in it
some peculiar Aptness to please and gratify the Mind of Man.'.3A There is
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even a ward, though not a very attractive one, to cover this universality
of taste - intersubjectivity. But the idea of taste as intersubjective,
like the scholastic 'occult causes' and the eighteenth-century lusus
naturae, explains little and proves less, for that a judgement is
widespread does not make it, necessarily, the outcome of a ratiocinative
process, That tastes change, or can be changed, and that a certain
concensus always exists as to what is 'good' and 'bad', then, tells us
nothing about whether the process of evaluation is intellectual or
otherwise.
In the eighteenth-century, the heyday of discussion on 'taste' at an
international level, it was generally held, if not always very clearly
stated, that literary 'taste' was something more than a sensual matter.
Voltaire, for example, while admitting that literary taste, like the
'sensation of the palate', is a 'quick discernment, a sudden perception', a
relishing of what is good and a rejection of what is bad which, moreover,
'requires the influence of habit to give it a fixed and uniform
determination.', is at pains to insist that the word 'taste', in connection
with art, is to be taken metaphorically,35 It is the mind, according to
Voltaire, that is 'touched and affected' by the perception of beauty and
thus, while the common saying that there is no disputing about taste may
be true of the palate, 'the maxim is false and pernicious, when applied to
that intellectual taste'.3& Addison, too, insists that 'taste' is to be
understood as a metaphor, adding however that it 'would not have been so
general in all Tongues had there not been a very great Conformity
between' what he calls 'Mental Taste', which pertains to the arts, and
'Sensitive Taste' which pertains to the palate.37 'The Pleasures of the
Imagination,', he writes elsewhere, 'taken in their full Extent, are not so
gross as those of Sense, nor so refined as those of Understanding.'.33
Likewise Alison asserts that 'The emotions of taste may therefore be
considered as distinguished from the emotions of simple pleasure by their
being dependent upon the exercise of our imagination, and though founded
in all cases upon some simple emotion, as yet further requiring the
employment of this faculty for their existence.'.33 Such writers had no
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doubt-, then, that taste was a matter of emotion and intellect; Gerard, for
example, writes that it is 'no difficult matter to trace a...connexion
between taste and character in individuals.', and in contrast to the
apparently tentative, non-committal approach of Frye, we find Gibbon
declaring that 'The poetical fame of Ausonius condemns the taste of his
age,'.AO However, the pleasures to be derived from the apprehension of
beauty are, as Addison wrote, 'not so refined as those of the
Understanding', and the spontaneity of aesthetic judgement, that is, the
fact that it is a 'sudden perception', prevented those writers from
identifying aesthetic pleasure with 'interest', as we saw with Kant's
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. Hume, for example, held that there is
'something approaching to principles in mental tastes; and critics can
reason and dispute more plausibly than cooks or perfumers.', but that
there is also 'a considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and
worth, and...education, custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently
vary our taste of this kind.'.
How, it is evident, that this sentiment must depend upon the
particular fabric or structure of the mind, which enables such
particular forms to operate in such a particular manner, and
produces a sympathy or conformity between the mind and its
objects. Vary the structure of the mind or inward organs, the
sentiment no longer follows, though the form remains the same.
The sentiment being different from the object, and arising from
its operations upon the organs of the mind, an alteration upon
the latter must vary the effect, nor can the same object,
presented to a mind totally different, produce the same
sentiment.'11
Taste, then, according to Hume as to those writers I have so far
mentioned, is a matter of the psychology of the reader. Thus D'Alembert
describes how the philosopher as critic 'begins by giving himself up to
the high and lively sensations of pleasure' that arise from the first
impression of a work, then 'recollects himself; extends his researches to
the causes of his satisfaction; singles them out one after another;
distinguishes carefully between illusory sensations, and deep and lasting
impressions; and by this analytical procedure is rendered capable of
pronouncing with judgement concerning the merit of a work in general',42
Thus the 'philosophical connoisseur', according to D'Alembert, will not
allow 'the poets's attention to please the external sense' to 'justify his
- 247 -
E: s/ £u 1 ui «■» .i on
dispensing with the more important obligation of satisfying the reason
and imagination of his readers, by the justness of his ideas, and the
sublimity of his views.'.'13 But even if literary taste is more than a
sensual matter there remains the problem of value itself, for while we
may account for taste, how are we to account for the sense of value in
itself?
First of all we should note that there are no self-guaranteeing
criteria of value; value is never inherent in facts but is ascribed to
them by human agency. For this reason Ayer concludes that aesthetically
evaluative words, like ethical ones, are employed 'not to make statements
of fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain
response.'.'1'1 Accordingly, no criteria can be found for determining the
validity of such judgements, 'not because they have an "absolute" validity
which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense experience, but
because they have no objective validity whatsoever.'.'15
[The! purpose of aesthetic criticism is not so much to give
knowledge as to communicate emotion. The critic, by calling
attention to certain features of the work under review, and
expressing his own feelings about them, endeavours to make us
share his attitude towards the work as a whole.'15
The only verifiable facts, therefore, that the critic communicates are the
descriptive propositions he formulates about the work. If we accept this
argument then it seems we must also accept that it is impossible for one
person to contradict another on a question of value. Yet, if we do not
immediately succumb to the vertigo which the rigourous logic of
linguistic philosophy so often inspires, we will see that there is more to
be said on the subject than this. Writing ten years later Ayer adds that
it does not follow from his argument that two people cannot
'significantly disagree about a question of value, or that it is idle for
them to attempt to convince one another.'.'1'7 In practice most disputes are
about questions of fact; it is only when our antagonist maintains their
contrary attitude without disputing any of what we consider to be the
relevant facts that we reach a point at which discussion is fruitless.'1®
I shall return to the question of the context of values later in this
section, but, for the moment, I wish to look more closely at this question
of relativism. Why Ayer's original position seems so discouraging to my
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enterprise is that such phrases as 'simply to express certain feelings',
and 'no objective validity whatsoever' have themselves strong evaluative
overtones. (Yet how little of what we feel to be fundamentally important
to us could we, indeed, express in terms other than emotive, in terms
that would be objectively valid in the sense Ayer appears to mean?)
According to the relativistic position, to say that "x is good" is to say
no more than "I like x", and the only way to contradict such a statement
would be not "No, it isn't", but rather "No, you don't". Given the wide
differences in literary taste, and since 'good' always implies comparison,
this position can seem to bring us to an impasse. Thus Beardsley;
It is easy enough to be discouraged by it, and to conclude that
the only thing we can do in talking normatively about aesthetic
objects is to say how they appeal to us and others like us...We
cannot argue people out of a liking for raw onions, it might be
said; how can we expect to argue them out of a liking for Mickey
Spillane, or Rock and Roll?"-9
Beardsley here seems to believe that 'taste' in connection with literature
is not a metaphor at all. But what if we replace 'taste' with, for example,
'preference'? In the last two chapters I have tried to show that
literature does express an attitude towards the world, that every work
has a rhetoric which can be approached through the exploration of what
sort of person one would have to be to enjoy the work in question.
Perhaps this modern aversion to the connection between taste and the
personality arises precisely because, it being impassible not to make
value judgements on literature, one does not want those value judgements
to spill over into the judgement of any individual, just as in liberal
parlance one cannot make a generalization about a national character
unless it is favourable, so that 'The French have such a feeling for x'
demonstrates culture connoisseurship and 'The French are a bunch of x so
and so's' demonstrates, far the same reason, that you are a prejudiced
ignoramus. Moreover, in an age, in contrast to the eighteenth-century, in
which literature is discussed predominantly in cognitive terms, how is it
passible to carry on disclaiming a connection between taste and
cognition?
Before continuing I must distinguish between that beauty which the
dictionary defines as a combination of qualities that 'delights the
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sight', and that beauty which it defines as a combination of qualities
delighting 'the moral sense, or the intellect', It is only the second, and
vaguer of these which is of interest to me here, 'Beauty', it is true, is a
word that suggests a non-cognitive response; even such farmalistic
attempts at objectifying the criteria for* visual beauty, as, for example,
the Golden Section, do not explain why such a geometric proportion should
evoke this response. The two terms 'good' and 'beautiful', behave in many
similar ways and have often been identified with one another.50 They are
most commonly distinguished, however, on the grounds that a 'good' thing
is pleasing because it serves a purpose while a 'beautiful' thing is
pleasing in itself. Kant expresses it thus;
Objective finality can only be cognized by means of a reference
of the manifold to a definite end, and hence only through a
concept. This alone makes it clear that the beautiful, which is
estimated on the ground of a mere formal finality, i.e. a finality
apart from an end, is wholly independent of the representation of
the good. For the latter presupposes an objective finality, i.e.
the reference of the abject to a definite end.51
It is true that the idea of beauty relying upon a thing embodying certain
conceptual or cognitive qualities runs into the difficulty that
considering a thing beautiful seems more likely to be a spontaneous
reaction than the end of a cognitive process. However, it may be that, if
we want to keep to this notion, then literature must be exempted from
aesthetics altogether. 'Beauty', writes Tasso, oblivious to the idea of
subjectivity, 'is a work of nature, and since it consists in a certain
proportion of limb with a fitting size and beautiful and pleasing
colouring, these conditions that once were beautiful in themselves ever
will be beautiful, nor can custom bring about that they will appear
otherwise,' but 'In respect to...words it may be conceded (since they have
nothing to do with our contention) they are best that are most approved
by practice, for in themselves they are neither beautiful nor ugly but
they apppear such as custom makes them'.52 Once the various elements of a
work have been distinguished and the mode of their combination
discovered, that is, once the semantics of the whole are grasped, it seems
unlikely that there is some other objective quality left over, namely the
'beauty' of the work. It is meaningless to ask whether a thing is
beautiful because we think it is, or do we think it is beautiful because
it is. Beauty is a positive response to some quality that the sum of the
elements possesses in our 'eyes'; to say that beauty has intrinsic value
is, therefore, a pleonasm; the considering of a thing beautiful is an
evaluation of that thing - albeit spontaneous. This evaluation, then, is
an evaluation of the work's semantics, of its metaphysic or imaginative
suggestion. ¥e can have 'beauty' as a spontaneous aesthetic evaluation of
literature, but not so long as we continue to believe that the aesthetic
response is a disinterested one, an end in itself. It is because
literature is a matter of words that it is, critically, a much more
approachable art form than, for instance, music. For, though a certain
type of music can become associated with a certain social milieu and,
thereby, come to signify it, music is a language unto itself, working its
effects in an immediate, visceral manner. In contrast, the language of
literature, even when ordinary usage is stretched to its figurative
extreme, is at the most only a modification of our everyday language and,
consequently, the world it describes.
In the quotation from Russell in the last chapter he states that one
of the merits a metaphysical system can possess, irrespective of its
truth value, is beauty, and in that chapter I tried to show what this
beauty might consist of. For, while to the intellect such a metaphysical
system may appear to be no mare than futile speculation, there is
something in its significance-giving which is emotionally satisfying - it
manifests an atmosphere we wish to prevail, it 'glamourizes' existence.
Findlay, adopting an approach reminiscent of both Kant and Schopenhauer,
describes the 'aesthetic field' as 'one of suspended conception, of pure
having something before one for contemplation : it is a field essentially
divorced from the Yes-No of belief and conviction, as it is divorced from
the other Yes-No of practical concern with its necessary involvement in
reality.'.®3 What I wish to propose, however, is that the perception of
beauty or aesthetic value is rather a 'Yes, yes, yes' and that, with regard
to literature, beauty can be defined as that property which an idea
possesses when it embodies or represents for us the end of a desire.SA
With this proviso, that it should be a desire that cannot possibly be
fulfilled. For the significance of the metaphysical assertion, as I wrote
in the last chapter, is that 'nostalgia' that is left behind by the way in
which it itself cancels out what it momentarily appears to say, the
vacuum created by its impossibility. (Perhaps this is why the beautiful
in general and the poetical in particular are so often attended by a
certain wistfulness, even pain.) If the aesthetic appears independent of
the will and intellect, that is, disinterested, then it is so insofar as
the appeal of metaphysics must always run counter to reason - the
pleasure of the beautiful is always a pleasure derived from the momentary
abnegation of reason.55 If beauty appears as the suspension of interest
it is because metaphysics must evade the intellect in order to exist and
be significant. The response of 'beauty' does not rely, then, on a belief
in the reality of what is pointed to by, or embodied in, a work. The
pleasure arises not from the belief that this 'poetic justice' can ever
really exists, but from the idea of it, which does exist in the mind of
the reader as they read. When in a work we spontaneously perceive a
metaphysic which answers our wish for the world to be thus, for our
being in the world to be thus, then that work is perceived as beautiful
or "valuable in itself".55 (To what extent this is true of other art forms
I cannot say, though there may be every reason for supposing that
literature is a radically different case from music or the visual arts in
this respect.) Beauty is often described as a harmony of some sort
between elements in the object itself, but we might now modify this idea
and say that beauty is a harmony of some sort between the abject and its
perceiver. One of two things may have happened when a person ceases to
perceive something as beautiful; it may be that the object, under further
observation, ceases to satisfactorily manifest the metaphysic they desire
to exist, and thus ceases to be symbolic; or the metaphysic is made to
some extent conscious, becomes a deliberate interest, and is found to be
itself unsatisfactory.57
'Beautiful' in regard to literature is, then, a species of 'good', and
it is to this term that I shall now address myself. When we say that
something, for example a knife, is a 'good' knife we are stating that the
grounds for our liking consist of the capacity of the knife to perform in
a certain way, fulfil a certain role, that is expected of its kind; it
successfully fulfils the function of the class of objects to which it
belongs. Statements of value, then, are proposed solutions to the problems
arising from situations in which a choice has to be made between
particular actions (using this or that to fulfil the function of a knife),
and are always concerned with the projected consequences of those
actions. The commendation requires some end in view, not called into
question at the time of choosing; what Howell-Smith calls the 'contextual-
background' of the use of 'good' in any particular situation.ss Thus, for
example, 'good' poetry for Minturno would be poetry that accomplished the
ends he proposes for it, that is, to 'teach, delight, and move', for
Johnson it would be poetry that succeeds in 'uniting pleasure with truth,
by calling imagination to the help of reason.', and for Stevenson it would
be poetry that makes 'man's know ledge...answerable to the facts of life'.53
However Minturno does not question the value of teaching, delighting, and
moving, Johnson the value of pleasure and truth, nor Stevenson the value
of making our knowledge 'answerable to the facts of life'; for each of
these writers the value of these things is given, it is the contextual-
background of their particular evaluations. The connection between even
acknowledged ends and immediate instrumental satisfaction may, however,
be weak or strong. There are, nonetheless, several sources of evaluative
criteria for literature which we can discount at the outset; these I have
already dealt with in the chapters 'Literature and Reality', 'Form and
Content', and in the first part of 'Literature and Rhetoric'.50 Indeed, all
that has been said so far has been said with the aim of, firstly,
accounting for effects in literature, and, secondly, of finding out what
makes sense in literary criticism, that is, what can be legitimately said
and how we can verify our intuitive feelings about a pronouncement on a
work. Literary criticism is a field in which interpretations and
evaluations are made, at least in its informal aspects, largely
unreflectingly - the reconstructed logic of the two often bearing no
relationship to their actual logic - with the consequence that all that
seems left for us to do is to agree or disagree with the pronouncement,
without ever being able to get to grips with how it was formulated.
Evaluative statements, when they are overtly made, come in many
shapes and sizes which I will divide, for convenience, into four groups,51
The first group we might look at are those statements of value made on
generic grounds; the work is good because it fulfils the artist's
intentions, is an example of successful expression, is skilful, is new and
original, is sincere. All of these statements, along with those related
ones based on historical criteria (the work is good because it is
'radical', 'experimental', 'important in the history of), I have already
dealt with in Chapter 2.
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The second group are statements which we might characterize as
'moral' evaluations, or evaluations based on the pragmatic value for the
reader; the work is good because it is uplifting and inspiring, is morally
edifying, promotes desirable social and/or political ends, is effective
social criticism, is subversive. The last three of these, and perhaps the
second, would be difficult to prove of any literary work; the legitimacy
of such claims could only be established by demonstrating not only that
the work was potentially these things, but that it had actually produced
an effect on society, or had morally edified. If we claim a work is good
because it fulfils a certain function then we must prove that it does in
fact fulfil that function. (It may turn out that such evaluations are only
possible on a private, personal level.)
Thirdly, there are those evaluative statements which implicitly claim
that the work is informational in some way; the work is good because it
is profound, has something important to say, conveys a significant view
of life, gives us insight into a universal problem. I have already dealt
with the objections that might be made to these criteria of evaluation in
Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Lastly, there is that group in which evaluation appears to be based
on affective reasons; the work is good because it gives pleasure, is
interesting, is exciting, is moving, has a powerful emotional import. This
last group could be derived from either the second or third groups above,
if we take, as I believe we must, the effects produced as deriving from a
pleasure in the edifying or profound.
It may seem odd not to confront such evaluative descriptions head-on,
to have made such statements as "New and original describes a work's
historical status, not its value", or "There is much writing that is
exciting, but which is not good". However those statements listed in the
four groups are normative ones; they each presume, as a basic premiss
that originality, or the production of excitement, or whatever, is the
standard of value for literary works. Each of these evaluative statements
thus implies the following argument.
If a work is x/produces x then it is good.
This work is x/produces x.
Therefore this work is good.
If we replace x with one of the qualities from our group of evaluative
statements then we can see that in many cases the resulting argument is
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one to which perhaps no critic has ever assented, and yet all of the
evaluative statements listed above are quite commonly employed. The
advantage of formulating the critical evaluation in the way I have done,
so as to bring out its implicit premiss, is that it makes us aware of the
implications of what is being said. By following the evaluation back to
its source we can begin to discover the poetics, the definition of
literature, that underlies it. Here, as elsewhere, I am concerned with what
1 i tera ture can be.
But why should the question of evaluation appear in a work concerned
with interpretation, at all? Because criticism is not criticism without an
evaluative aspect. Psychology, sociology, history, stylistics, and
linguistics will yield the 'how?' and the 'why?' of a work. Criticism is
concerned with the 'so what?' - and this is a matter of evaluation. The
one type of evaluative statement that I will here pursue at any length is,
therefore, that which is concerned with the pragmatic consequences of the
work for the reader on an affective level, that is, those evaluative
statements that express moral or ideologically orientated theories.
Moral or Ideological Criticism
A moral or ideological approach to literature is usually defined as
one that evaluates it with reference to the world 'outside' literature, to
society or a general ethical sense, in short, to life. This is usually
contrasted with a formal or intrinsic approach, which evaluates literature
in terms of its 'intrinsic nature' which evaluates it as a more or less
autonomous thing. So long as we consider the aesthetic response as a
'feeling', writes Ducasse, 'its value is immediate and intrinsic, and
consists in the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the state.', but when
the aesthetic response is considered as an 'impulse' or the seed of an
'impulse' then 'its value is as usual to be measured in terms of the
eventual significance of the impulse...[and] the terms in which we
commonly appraise conduct are therefore potentially applicable to it,'.e2
Now, as we saw in the last chapter, the literary metaphysic is just this,
the 'seed of an impulse', even when considered only from the point to
view of feeling. Moreover, in literature there is no formal quality
without a characterizing significance and no significance which does not
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exist by virtue of the relationship between the work and the world.
Therefore, every 'formal' theory of value is, in reality, either a
disguised ideological/moral theory or not a theory of value at all.63 This
point is another example, and literary theory and aesthetics abounds with
such examples, of the fact that what we say about literature looks very
different depending upon whether we are considering it as a 'great
abstraction', as Art, or as a common and ordinary experience, as reading
a book.
Richards comments that until 'This is beautiful' is translated into
'[this] causes an experience in us which is valuable in certain ways.' it
remains a 'mere noise signalling that we approve of the object we have
so designated.6"1 This is so, but Richards is unduly optimistic about this
philosophical breakthrough, for by the same lights the terms in which we
explain why the experiences it causes are valuable will also be 'mere
noise'. As I shall argue later, this very postponement of the 'noise of
approval' is of great significance to criticism, for criticism only exists
at all by virtue of it. (For the moment let me say that there is
something naive in Richards' account, for although the usual counter to
'This is beautiful' is 'No it isn't' rather than the apparently more
philosophically defensible 'No, you don't', that such a statement is a
statement about oneself is implicit in its role, at least in informal
contexts; such statements of preference always signal that a conversation
has moved to a more intimate level, they are, indeed, more personally
informative about oneself than are 'personal details'.6S> The critic,
according to Richards, must have a 'general theory of value' if his
statements are to be neither vague nor arbitrary,66 Richards' own
'psychological' theory of value is reminiscent of Utilitarianism in its
rather reductive appeal to appetencies and aversions, psychological
necessities, and the desire for 'maximum satisfaction'.67 Like Mill, also,
he is too much committed to a reasonable, liberal humanism to doubt that
one can get from thirst to Shakespeare in a smooth series of logical
steps. Indeed to build up a profound ideology, in logical steps, from such
simple and basic foundations is an impossibility, as the great variety of
ideologies that have been so built demonstrates. This is not to say that
Richards' had no ideology, only that, like a great many Anglo-Saxon
critics, it was of the only half-conscious, implicit sort that is left
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untouched by introspection or speculation. This should not be taken as a
derogation of this sort of ideology, for, given the nature of ideologies,
it is no more nor less 'true' than a conscious, explicit one - it may
sleepwalk but it does so no less sure-footedly for that, and, though this
may be a taint of Anglo-Saxon prejudice in myself, it is probably more
likely to be sincere than the sort of ideology that can be made explicit.
However, an "ideology", as it is popularly conceived is just that
which is specific about what constitutes the 'good' and the 'bad', the
desirable and the undesirable. Moreover it is commonly distinguished from
morality on the grounds that while morality is a matter of conscience, of
feeling, an ideology is a matter of intellectualization - that they are
private and public things respectively. That such a distinction belongs
only to appearance is implicit in the distinction itself, for it supposes '
that the ideologist believes in what they do not believe. This point is an
important one, for it is impossible to talk about ideological criticism as
distinct from any other sort without subscribing, albeit momentarily, to
this popular conception. This I shall return to later, but for the moment
let us look at those evaluative approaches that are "recognizably
ideological".
Ideological Criticism : Perhaps the most famous statement of an
evaluative procedure in which the aesthetic object is to be judged solely,
or chiefly, with respect to ideological standards occurs in Plata's
Republic;
But if the state is to be run on the right lines, every possible
step must be taken to prevent "anyone, young or old, either saying
or being told, whether in poetry or prose, that god, being good,
can cause harm or evil to any man....We agree, surely, that our
good man does not think death holds any terror for another who
is a friend of his....Then we should be quite right to cut out
from our poetry lamentations by famous men, We can give them to
the less respectable women characters or to the bad men, so that
those whom we say we are bringing up as guardians of our state
will be ashamed to imitate them....I am afraid that we shall find
that poets and story-tellers are in error in matters of the
greatest human importance. They have said that unjust men are
often unhappy and just men wretched, that wrong-doing pays if
you can avoid being found out, and that justice is what is good
far someone else but is to your awn disadvantage. We must forbid
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them to say this sort of thing, and require their stories and
poems to have quite the opposite moral.es
Yet, at the same time, he states that his reason for banishing such works
from his ideal state is 'not that they are bad poetry...indeed the better
they are as poetry the more unsuitable they are for the ears of
children'.What then is this 'good' poetry, which he considers 'bad'? His
answer does not come until much later; if his taste does not square with
his ideological convictions it is because his taste has been formed by a
flawed society, it is because his taste is in error. Plato is here
critically reflecting on his own response in the light of certain
convictions about truth and reality. He judges the effects of poetry in
the light of what he believes to be an ultimate reality lying beyond that
of appearances. However he neither describes, nor claims to have direct
knowledge of, this Good, which would explain why he is still willing to
admit that he may be wrong in his argument.70
Plata's two main charges against poetry are worth repeating in full
here. Firstly; that 'If he [the poet] really knew about the things he
represented, he would devote himself to them and not to their
representations...We may assume, then, that all poets...have no grasp of
truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat,
including human excellence.'.71 Secondly; that poetry 'has a terrible power
to corrupt even the best characters, with very few exceptions', so that
'[The] only poetry that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the gods
and paeans in praise of famous men; once you go beyond that and admit
the sweeet lyric or epic muse, pleasure and pain become your rulers
instead of law and the rational principles commonly accepted as best.'.73
He concludes, however, that;
Brought up as we have been...we are bound to love poetry, and we
shall be glad if it proves to have high value and truth; but in
the absence of such proof we shall, whenever we listen to it,
recite this argument of ours to ourselves as a charm to prevent
us falling under the spell of childish and vulgar
passion....because the issues at stake, the choice between
becoming a good man or a bad, are even greater than they appear,
and neither honour nor wealth nor power, nor poetry itself,
should tempt us to neglect the claims of justice and excellence
of every kind.73
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¥hat perhaps makes us feel unsympathetic towards Plato's attitude, if
indeed we do feel unsympathetic towards it, is not so much that he would
banish certain types of literature - it would be a rare kind of critic
who would finish a condemnatory review with an exhortation to the author
for more of the same - but that, firstly, he divorces his feelings
towards literature from his convictions about it, and secondly, his
convictions about reality and the ideal state are probably not our own.
But let us consider a few more "recognizably ideological" critical
positions.
Mazzoni considers that the 'norm and rule' of poetry should be the
'civil faculty', that is, that faculty which is concerned with man as a
social or civil being, since the proper mode of recreation is no less a
civil matter than the legality of actions7a
low this delight that is brought about by poetry can be
considered in two ways, that is, either for itself alone, free and
untrammeled by all laws, or as subordinated to and ruled by the
civil faculty. Of the first sort is the end of that poetry that
was subordinated to sophistic, and therefore deserves censure,
for it is such as disorders the appetite with immoderate pleasure
and renders it in every way a rebel to reason, and causes
infinite injury and harm to virtuous life,7S
This division allows him to assert that Plato, whose treatment of poetry
in the Republic was something of an embarrassment to Renaissance
writers, had only intended that the sophistic sort of poetry sould be
driven out of his ideal state. Likewise Comte, while not banishing poets
from his ideal state, would exclude them from 'political authority',
because the very 'mental and moral versatility which makes them so apt
in reflecting the thoughts and feelings of those around them, utterly
unfits them for being our guides.'.7e He too identifies art and rhetoric,
describing poetry as the most 'idealizing' of the arts, and oratory as
'only Poetry in a simpler phase'.7"7 nevertheless, like Plato and Mazzoni,
he sees a role for the right sort of poetry in idealizing the values of
the state, for art can serve 'to construct types of the noblest kind, by
the contemplation of which our feelings and thoughts may be elevated...,it
should surpass realities so as to stimulate us to amend them.'.7® This
judging of the worth of literature by reference to a theory of social
values also characterizes the approach which perhaps most readily
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springs to mind when one thinks in terms "ideological criticism", that is,
Marxist criticism. (It is easier to speak of the critical practice of
Marxists rather than of 'Marxist critical practice', since this latter
covers a variety of different approaches.) Lukacs, for example, is
concerned with the 'realized intention' of the work, the 'ideology or
weltanschaung' that underlies it and in relating it to the historical
class struggle. Thus in his 'Ideology and Modernism' he concludes by
asserting that 'the obsession with psychopathology in modernist
literature' is to be understood as expressing a 'desire to escape from the
reality of capitalism.', a desire which, moreover, implies 'the absolute
primacy of...the condition from which it is desired to escape....[And] the
unalterability of outward reality'.79 From a Marxist point of view then,
if 'modernism' celebrates the impotence and meaninglessness of human
activity then 'modernism' is bad. Of course criticism that grows from
such broad ideological premisses as Marxism can became quite double-
jointed in its application, thus another Marxist critic might argue that
'modernism', in making abjective, in demonstrating the ideology that
Lukacs delineates, in fact works against the status quo.
The only thing that remains consistent, through the various Marxist
literary theories is the terminology and the reference to Marxist theory
as the evaluative standard.90 Thus Etienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, in
their 'On Literature as an Ideological Form', assert that to grasp the
ideology of a work one must be able to 'analyse the nature and expression
of class positions in literature'.91 What is novel in their approach is
that they consider that the study of literature should be approached 'in
terms of a theory of the history of literary effects'; the evaluative
standard is thus made actually intrinsic to such a study, for it is the
relationship between history and literature which makes literature
ideological, and what history should be, from a Marxist point of view, is
a constant.92 Since, according to Balibar and Macherey, literature in a
bourgeois society is founded on 'the imaginary solution of implacable
ideological contradictions', that is, 'a presentation as solutions of the
very terms of an insurmountable contradiction by means of various
displacements and substitutions.', the first principle of analysis should
be the discovery not of the works unity, 'which is illusory and false',
but of 'signs of the contradictions (historically determined) that
produced' the work and appear as 'unevenly resolved conflicts' within
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it.®3 The work, or perhaps it would be better to say 'text', then, in
making an 'imaginary synthesis' between the class position of the author
and the 'contradiction' of reality, rather than simply 'expressing' (.sa
mise en wots) an ideology, actually 'displays' (wise en scene) it; so that
the work's 'inability to subsume' a hostile ideology reveals the
limitations of that ideology.®'1 However, literature by taking a
'standpoint', making a 'declaration' from within the 'contradictions' of
bourgeois society contributes to the development of that
'contradiction'.®® Thus, from a point of view of literary effect, once
placed within 'a general schooling process', literature will contribute to
the maintenance of bourgois ideology as the dominant ideology,®® Balibar
and Macherey conclude; 'We can now say that the literary text is the
agent for the reproduction of ideology in its ensemble. In other words, it
induces by the literary effect the production of "new" discourses which
always reproduce (under constantly varied forms) the same ideology (with
its contradictions).'.®7 This, I take it, is a broad condemnation of
bourgeois literature in terms of its social effect, but there is some
conflict in it; for, if the bourgeois text can only cause the production
of more bourgeois texts, how did this piece by Balibar and Macherey come
about? Furthermore it is difficult to tell whether from the standpoint of
social effect, which is necessarily an evaluative criteria in a Marxist
context, the same bourgeois literature might not be 'good' in another type
of post-bourgeois society? These questions are, however, by-the-by, for
what I primarily wished to demonstrate, in following Balibar and
Macherey's argument, are the twists and turns, the double-jointedness, the
seemingly quite arbitrary reversals that can characterize an evaluation
of literature in terms of its social effects.®® The question of effect is,
after all, primarily an empirical rather than theoretical one and the
insurmountable difficulty, in this regard, is the absence of a control -
we do not have the same literary output in two or more different
historical contexts, nor two or more different literary histories
corresponding to the same historical context. This is not so great a
problem when making connections between local literary effects and short-
term fashions in sensibility but on any larger historical or social scale
the difficulties are insurmountable. When it comes to the discussion of an
individual work the use of such concepts as 'bourgeois ideology', 'class
struggle', and 'means of production', are like trying to paint a miniature
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using a house-brush - held between the feet. However, though it is
possible to reject Marxist critical practices for being crudely
ideological and/or based on erroneous premisses, it is not possible to
reject them merely on the grounds that they are ideologically motivated,
for this rejection itself expresses an ideology and can only be made on
ideological grounds. 'Bourgeois anarchist individualism' has its
manifestoes too, it is just that they are rarely so conspicuous as such.
If Plato or Marxist critics are so often held up as models of
ideologically dogmatic attitudes towards literary evaluation it is not
because they are doing anything fundamentally different from other
critics, but because they appear so systematic, so calculating, so
dogmatic about it. When Wilson points out that the weakness of of the
Symbolists was their tendency to 'overemphasize the importance of the
individual', to have been 'preoccupied with introspection sometimes almost
to the point of insanity', and to have 'endeavoured to discourage their
readers, not only with politics, but with action of" any kind', we are more
likely to ask ourselves if these qualities can be fairly attributed to the
authors in question, than to ask if such qualities are actually
weaknesses.The difference between what we perceive as evaluative and
what we perceive as merely descriptive is a function of the extent to
which we share the contextual-background of the critic's own values. Some
critics, like Sartre, will declare it openly:
We assert against certain critics and against certain authors
that salvation is achieved on this earth, that it is of the whole
man and by the whole man and that art is a meditation on life
and not on death.30
Though we may, of course, still have to wait for more specific comments
before we can grasp what they mean. Others, perhaps more wisely
circumspect, like Wilson, simply assume a shared contextual-background of
values with their reader. How many of us, indeed, could sum up and
communicate our beliefs and our values in a way which we believed would
do justice to them? More often, I would say, we only discover or became
aware of them through the friction they create when brought into contact
with the beliefs and values of another. Our formulation of them will then
take the form either of negation or affirmation - this is, indeed, how
value emerges in the critical work.
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All explicitly "ideological" approaches to literary evaluation are
based on the premiss that we should not 'neglect the claims of justice
and excellence of every kind', though perhaps not all exponents of them
would admit, as Plato reluctantly does, that literature could do so and
still be 'good'. The most conspicuous, as I have said, are those whose
idea of the claims of justice are most systematized and self-conscious,
such as the religious or Marxist. But the connection between this idea of
justice and the role assigned to literature, and therefore the evaluation
of individual works, is open to a wide variety of interpretations -
probably many people have held views on life and social justice that are
similar to Tolstoy's but Tolstoy's own personal idea of this connection
produced a comparative evaluation of works which very few have ever
agreed with. The one constant is that the overtly ideological critic, as
the moralistic critic, is that one who appears to treat the book as
though it were propaganda. But the evaluation of literature is always
based upon an appraisal of its effect, if not necessarily on a belief that
it will lead to immoral acts or contribute to the ascendency of bougeois
values, at least on whether or not its metaphysic is worthy of our
sympathies. No work is devoid of a reflexive predicate because all, as
works, posit that they are worthy of attention, that they are, as we have
seen, significant in some general way. The arguments against ideological
or moralistic criticism usually assume that only certain individuals have
an ideology or a morality, that it is, moreover, something extrinsic to
those individuals, and that what is possessed by 'the rest of us' is no
more than a natural common sense. Thus it is usually attacked for
applying standards to the evaluation of literature that are foreign to the
nature of literature; an identifiable system of values is, after all, the
possession of other people - our awn is invisible. But let us now turn to
what is "recognizably moral" criticism.
Moral Criticism : All those innumerable normative descriptions of
literature that describe its purpose in ethical terms imply that moral
effect may be an evaluative criteria for literature. Thus Eliot;
Literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a
definite ethical and theological standpoint. In so far as in any
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age there is common agreement on ethical and theological matters,
so far can literary criticism be substantive.'91
The Renaissance, as I have said elsewhere, was particularly explicit about
this moral function; Cinthio declares that both comedy and tragedy
'endeavour to introduce good morals', Minturno that by seeing and hearing
what horrifies us in the theatre we may learn to be more stoical, and
Guarini that comedy and tragedy, between them, restore the 'symmetry' of
life, the former by dispelling the gloom that settles as a result of too
much seriousness, and the latter by calling back 'the relaxed and
wandering soul' to solemn matters.92 Minturno's image of the tragic poet
as 'physician' - the primary sense of Aristotle's catharis was a medical
one - recurs in Collingwood's Principles of Art where art is described as
'the community's medicine for the worst disease of mind, the corruption
of consciousness.', in Artaud, when he writes that 'Theatre is the only
place in the world, the last group means we still possess of directly
affecting the anatomy, and in neurotic, basely sensual periods like the
one in which we are immersed, of attacking that base sensuality through
physical means it cannot withstand.', and in Richards' Principles of
Literary Criticism, in a negative sense, where he describes how 'bad
literature, bad art, the cinema, etc., are an influence of the first
importance in fixing immature and actually inapplicable attitudes to most
things.', in making their consumers 'functionally unable to face facts'.93
Eliot, too, is explicit;
The fiction that we read affects our behaviour towards our fellow
men, affects our patterns of ourselves. Vhen we read of human
beings behaving in certain ways, with the approval of the author,
who gives his benediction to this behaviour by his attitude
towards the result of the behaviour arranged by himself, we can
be influenced towards behaving in the same way...,The author of a
work of imagination is trying to affect us wholly, as human
beings, whether he knows it or not; and we are affected by it, as
human beings, whether we intend to be or not. I suppose that
everything we eat has some other effect upon us than merely the
pleasure of taste and mastication; it affects us during the
process of assimilation and digestion; and I believe that exactly
the same is true of anything we read....What happens is a kind of
inundation, of invasion of the undeveloped personality by the
stronger personality of the poet..,.So far as we are taken up with
the happenings in any novel in the same way in which we are
taken up with what happens under our eyes, we are acquiring at
- 264 -
Eva.1 uat ± on
least as much falsehood as truth....We are learning something
about life from these authors direct, just as we learn something
from the reading at history direct; for these authors are only
really helping us when we can see, and allow for, their
differences from ourselves.3*
So direct a relationship as that which Eliot proposes, between the moral
health of art and the moral health of the individual is, however, rarely
made, at least in such explicit terms. Tolstoy's program is exceptional in
this respect.
The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of real art,
aided by science, guided by religion, that peaceful co-operation
of man which is now maintained by external means...should be
obtained by man's free and joyous activity. Art should cause
violence to be set aside. And it is only art that can accomplish
this.35
But, as I have said, the comparative evaluation of works that Tolstoy
arrived at through the application of this standard has been found by
most subsequent critics to be so unsympathetic as to discredit Tolstoy's
concept of the 'task of art' itself. Richards, for example, despite his
emphasis an the usefulness of art, writes that one of the ends of having
a general theory of value is to enable the critic to 'defend accepted
standards against Tolstoyan attacks',35 The connection between literature
and morality is now usually made in a more circumspect way, it will
appear either only implicitly or as a connection between art and
civilization', art and 'culture', art and 'ideology' (bougeois, patriarchal,
and so on). That the connection will appear is almost inevitable,
particularly in a theoretical context, for as soon as the critic is called
upon to explain why literature should be of any serious interest some
argument, clear or obscure, will emerge as to how it tends, in Howells'
words, 'to make the race better and kinder'.37 Thus Hough, for example,
writes that literature 'offers us the raw material for moral judgements
and it offers us far more material than any one individual life can do.'
and is, thereby, 'an extension of our moral experience.'.33 He takes it as
self-evident that this extension is valuable and, with unconscious irony,
quotes Milton to that effect - 'I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered
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virtue.'." What, indeed, could be more fugitive and cloistered than a
morality based upon one's experience of literature?
If we want to assert that literature, or art in general, has, or is
capable of, a beneficial moral effect then the onus is on us to produce
evidence to this effect. For myself I have never been struck by any moral
superiority in those who have had the privilege of a literary education,
neither is it immediately obvious to me that it is the want of this
particular privilege that can easily account for what is generally agreed
to be anti-social behaviour. Throughout his career, George Steiner has
been asking himself and his readers one fundamental question, upon the
answer to which, he believes, rests the whole ideal of the humanities -
How can literary and artistic values and hideous inhumanity exist in the
same community?100 Although Steiner disavows the tradition which makes
literary excellence depend upon moral effect he is still, in his concern
for the relationship between the two, very much within it. Indeed, as I
wrote above, it is almost impassible to consider literature in a larger
theoretical context or in connection with ends without confronting this
question. Clive Bell cuts this particular Gordian knot by stating that
'Rapture suffices.'.101
Further we cannot go. When asked why we hold a particular state
of mind to be good, the state of aesthetic contemplation for
instance, we can but reply that to us its goodness is self-
evident. Some states of mind appear to be good independently of
their consequences. No other things appear to be good in this
way. Ve conclude, therefore, that good states of mind are alone
good as ends. To justify ethically any human activity, we must
inquire - "Is this a means to good states of mind?" In the case
of art our answer will be prompt and emphatic. Art is not only a
means to good states of mind, but, perhaps, the most direct and
potent that we possess.102
I will have more to say about this attitude in the next section. Nowadays
it is, however, those positive appraisals of literature in general which
are not too specific about what might constitute a beneficial moral
effect, which appear most reasonable. We may remember Lawrence's
injunction against nailing down the novel with a moral, an injunction that
seems just as much directed towards the reader. There is, however, a
morality contained in this, for the novelist, according to Lawrence,
'commits an immoral act' by trying to enforce a predilection, because he
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'prevents the possibility of a pure relationship, a pure relatedness'
between 'a human being and the other human being or creature or thing*
they are related to by emotion, and this relationship, according to
Lawrence, is 'the only thing that matters'.'103 Baudelaire too seems to
claim that 'Rapture suffices.' when he writes that art is useful 'Because
it is art.', and that 'Beauty is the single ambition, the exclusive aim, of
taste.'.10/l
A whole crowd of people imagine that the aim of poetry is some
sort of lesson, that its duty is to fortify conscience, or to
perfect social behaviour, or even, finally, to demonstrate
something or other that is useful....If we will even briefly look
into ourselves, question our souls, bring to mind our moments of
enthusiasm, poetry will be seen to have no other aim but
itself....Poetry cannot, except at the price of death or decay,
assume the mantle of science or morality; the pursuit of truth is
not its aim, it has nothing outside itself.1 os
But in the same essay he shows, like Lawrence, that his attack on
morality is really a defence of morality, for he also asserts 'I do not
mean to say that poetry does not ennoble manners - that its final result
is not to raise man above the level of squalid interests; that would
clearly be absurd.'.1 oe Rather he believes that the deliberate pursuit of a
moral aim will not serve the ends of morality. As he writes elsewhere;
Virtue is no laughing matter to be sure, and no writer in his
senses has ever thought of taking the line that works of art
ought to run counter to the great moral laws. The question at
issue therefore is to determine whether the so-called virtuous
writers are tackling successfully the problem of inspiring love
and respect for virtue, whether virtue is satisfied with the way
her cause is being served.107
The retreat from overt moral criticism takes the form of either very
abstract, implicit notions of value, or evaluative statements being
reserved for generalizations about literature and art.
Aesthetic ism : Hot surprisingly, the activities of overt moralizers or
ideologists have prompted, from time to time, a reaction which has taken
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the farm of asserting that only aesthetic, not moral, judgements should
be passed on literature. Thus Vilde;
There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are
well written, or badly written. This is all.1oe
The password of the Aesthetic Movement which, for many, Vilde represented
was 'art for art's sake', or, as Pater modified it, 'art for its own
sake'.103 Aestheticism claims to judge literature purely on the basis of
its "intrinsic value", rather than by any standard which is foreign to it;
by what it is rather than by what effect it has.110 As we have seen,
however, there can be no such thing as intrinsic value. An object can
only have value as a means to something else, and this was in fact
assumed in the criticism of aesthetes such as Baudelaire, Vhistler, Vilde,
and Pater; for them a good work was one which provided pleasure through
possessing a certain formal quality they called 'beauty'. What the slogan
'art for art's sake' rather misleadingly expresses is in fact primarily an
attitude towards life rather than a definite critical standard for
evaluating works. Thus Pater, in his 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance;
The service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the
human spirit is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and
eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand
or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the
rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement
is irresistably real and attractive to us, - for that moment
only. lot the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the
end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a
variegated, dramatic life, how may we see in them all that is to
be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most
swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus
where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest
energy? To burn with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this
ecstasy, is success in life....Veil! we are all condamnes, as
Victor Hugo says; we are all under sentence of death but with a
sort of indefinite reprieve...Some spend this interval in
listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among
"the children of this world", in art and song. For our one chance
lies in expanding this interval, in getting as many pulsations as
possible into the given time....Of such wisdom, the poetic
passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake,
has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing
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but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply
for those moments' sake.111
This is itself an ideology, a morality, it proposes a 'good' and claims
that art is the best means of achieving this 'good'. In that it judges art
primarily as a source of pleasure, Pater's view is closer perhaps to the
average person's evaluative standard than many other apparently less
exotic critical ideologies. (Indeed, Vilde's 'Art never expresses anything
but itself.' is the logical conclusion to the ubiquitous Kantian notion of
aesthetic pleasure as 'disinterested'.112) Any person who reads for no
other reason than to pass the time to some extent leans towards
aestheticism.113 Pater's statement of the argument is distinctive because
of the place he affords the pleasure derived from art in his felicific
calculus - at the top.
What is interesting about this passage, and why I have called the
slogan 'art for art's sake' misleading, is that in it Pater appears to
abjure all ideology;
With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its
awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desparate effort to
see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about
the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be forever
curiously testing new opinions and counting new impressions,
never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or
of our ora.114
Plainly he associates all ideology with a certain betrayal of the self,
and a certain obscuring of the true nature of the artistic object.115 That
his own argument is the statement of an ideology is not apparent to him.
Adorno's pronouncements on ideology, strikingly similar to Pater's, again
can only, like the latter, make sense when seen as a reaction to what
they find to be an uncongenial relation between art and the prevailing
ideology;
We must be especially wary of the present insufferable tendency
to drag out at every slightest opportunity the concept of
ideology. For ideology is untruth - false consciousness, a lie. It
manifests itself in the failure of art works, in their intrinsic
falsehood, and can be uncovered by criticism...The greatness of
works of art lie solely in their power to let those things be
heard which ideology conceals.115
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Just as Pater and Wilde were reacting against the Victorian idea of a
'literature of purpose', and Baudelaire against the 'Ecole du bon sens',
Adorno is reacting against the prevailing Marxist approach. Both accuse
the opposition of seeing art only as instrumental to some further end.
What Adorno, 'in contrast', values it for is that, in preserving man's
prehistoric sense of unity with nature, through its mimetic power, it
prefigures the possible restoration of that condition by political and
social transformation. 'Good' or 'genuine' art, for Adorno, is that which
is 'de-aestheticized', aware of its own illusory nature, and which,
therefore, does not offer consolation to the undesirable present, but
presents a hope for the future which may aspire to imitate it at its most
Utopian. If Pater's creed was 'art for the intensity of living's sake' then
Adorno's is 'art for the future of man's sake'; neither of them can claim
to value art 'for its own sake',117 An interesting variation on the
political approach, reminiscent of the ambiguity to be found in Plato, is
that of Marcuse;
Art can express its radical potential only as art, ...Art obeys a
necessity, and has a freedom which is its own - not those of the
revolution....The abolition of the aesthetic form, the notion that
art could become a component part of revolutionary (and
prerevalutionary) praxis..,is false and oppressive : it would mean
the end of art....The tension between art and revolution seems
irreducible, Art itself, in practice, cannot change realty, and art
cannot submit to the actual requirements of the revolution
without denying itself.11®
The 'revolution' is for Marcuse a 'good', a desired end, but so also are
the effects of art, his conception of which he outlines earlier in the
essay. If he appears more flexible, less ideologically motivated than
Adorno, it is because he is prepared to allow that he finds in art a
value that makes him unwilling to countenance the destruction of that
art, even if it will serve the larger aims of the ideology to which he
owes his main allegiance.11® This is not, of course, to say that his
grounds for valuing art are not based on a belief that it produces
effects which he considers desirable, that there is not an ideology,
however vaguely conceived, behind his evaluation.120 Naturally a
politically or religiously motivated person can declare "I know it is a
good book, but I would not let it be published", but this is quite a
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different class of' statement from a purely evaluative one. The first part
is an evaluation of the book itself, the second, most probably, the
expression of a belief that it would have what the speaker considers an
undesirable effect on the reading public; the two are not incompatible.
The Place of Evaluation in Criticism
It is the metaphysic of the work, as earlier defined, which provides
the basis for the only type of evaluation that can truly be said to be
'aesthetic', in the sense of concerned with the work as literature,
because, given that words are neither beautiful nor ugly in themselves, we
must refer to import before we can begin to evaluate. However, there is,
as I wrote before, no procedure we can use to discover whether any
particular metaphysic is "better" than any other one, for all metaphysical
claims can have, by definition, no validating procedure that would turn
them into truth. The evaluation of literature depends upon the question
'What sort of person do I want to be?', but this question is itself
subjective, it rests upon no foundation other than my own sense of value,
my own sense of what sort of person I want to be. Aesthetics rests upon
aesthetics.
But if the question of literary value is, then, circular, there is,
nevertheless, much that can be meaningfully said at various points on
this circle. If all value judgements are, ultimately, nonsensical, then we
can at least, as I wrote above, postpone the nonsense within literary
criticism, for, while the placing of value upon any work may be non-
logical it need not be unaccountable. As we have seen with 'good' most
evaluations have a contextual-background of values derived from the
attitudes and larger interests of those who make them, and this is also,
I have proposed, the case with aesthetic value. Most theories concerning
beauty as an evaluative criteria do not appear to share this assumption,
but in most of them it is tacitly made. ¥e do not move from one set of
values to another without some connecting process; we discover value,
distil it out of our existing values and the experience of our own
responses. This does not necessarily commit us to an infinite regress in
explaining the grounds of our evaluative judgements, only some
exploration of the consequences we believe that imaginative participation
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in, or sympathy with, the metaphysic would entail. Again this must
inevitably be largely a private matter, for the question of effect on a
public scale is an empirical one and if the critic deliberately addresses
it then they are in the realm of hypotheses. 'Gentlemen,' writes Anatole
France, 'I am going to speak of myself in connection with Shakespeare,
Sacine, or Goethe.', and this is as much as the critic can do - what use
it may be is for the critic's readers to decide.121 If we cannot argue
about taste, then we can at least discuss it, for even without a norm,
though such a norm could conceivably exist, we can say that I prefer
things more sweet or you prefer things more bitter than some specified x
- such statements establish the norm of the speaker. Thus if I say x is
banal you may say "Look at these riches, this profundity, this truth" -
but I can answer that it is comparatively rich, but not sufficiently, that
this truth is a truism, that taken all in all x is still banal and you,
being shallow, are easily impressed. (The night is only comparatively
darker than the day, but it is the night.) This may have been what Vilde
had in mind when wrote that 'The highest, as the lowest, form of
criticism is a mode of autobiography.'.122 "This work is good" is not the
sort of construction which often appears in critical work, outside of the
reviewing kind, nor do definitions of the critic's values often precede
their discussion; criteria for evaluation are implicit in their comments
of the work itself, their emphasis, perhaps even their choice of work. For
instance, at the end of an introduction to Laclos' Les Liaisons
Dangereuses, Stone writes;
Towards the end of his life he proposed writing another book to
show that true happiness could be achieved only in family life.
Admirers of this book will probably not regret that so worthy an
intention remained unfulfilled.123
At a stroke he declares that if we admire the book we do so because we
sympathize with the 'glamour' of its 'charming monsters'.12,a Similarly
Karl and Hamalian, writing about the murderer Moosbrugger in Musil's Man
Without Qualities and 'existential literature' in general;
Moosbrugger, despite the horrors of his crime, is perhaps vaguely
superior to those around him, for he understands his unique
situation...he gains a kind of freedom denied to those shackled
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by externalities....Existential fiction is painful for the very
reason that it strips life of its deceptions.,.125
(You may have had the experience of being disinclined to read a work
precisely because of the criteria by which its champions have praised
it.)
If, as I said before, two critics are divided as to the value of a
work yet in agreement about its "interpretation", what they may still
debate are the criteria they derive from their contextual-background of
values, and these are founded in the two respective critics' beliefs about
the world. "Fa you don't" is not the only disagreement we can make with
"I like it", we can also approach the problem thus - "If you understood
what your position entails, what its implications are then perhaps you
wouldn't", When faced with a different evaluation of a work, the nature of
which is fixed, there are really only two courses open to us; we can see
the reasons for the contradictory evaluation and agree with it, or we can
see the reasons for the contradictory evaluation and dissent from it. If
we understand the reasoning behind the evaluation, disagree with it, and
yet still allow that it is valid, then we are contradicting ourselves.
"This is good" does not only equal "I like it" but also "I like it because
p, qt r, and so on". If we have good reasons for liking a work then we
have good reasons for saying why others might also. This is not the same
as saying "What I desire is desirable", though the contrary position
assumes that human nature varies so radically from person to person that
any form of education would be impossible. Critical judgements,
particularly of value, are not made independently of any other sort of
judgement; even when they are merely inherited they are still made with
the desire to conform.
This contextual-background of values was, naturally, much emphasized
in the eighteenth-century; Gerard, for example, writes that a 'prevailing
turn or disposition of mind', by which he means a narrowness of mind,
'often makes us unable to relish any thing but what falls in with it, and
thus perverts and prejudices our judgement.'.125 Moreover it is such a
narrowness or pervertedness, he continues, that gives rise to 'the
depravity of public taste, and the pernicious influence it has on public
entertainments and dramatic works : and hence, in a great measure, the
connexion of the taste of a people with their morals.'.122 This has
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probably been so In every age, though the intelligentsia of any age, t
particularly when they approve 'on principle', are just as likely to
demonstrate a similar narrowness. Coleridge, like Gerard, emphasizes 'the
close and reciprocal connexion of just taste with pure morality.', and
goes so far as saying that no person can understand the writings of
Shakespeare without a knowledge of 'the heart of man' that is informed
with Christian humility.12® Eliot, less specifically, asserts that 'the
development of genuine taste, founded on genuine feeling., is inextricable
from the development of the personality and character...,One's taste in
poetry cannot be isolated from one's other interests and passions; it
affects them and is affected by them, and must be limited as one's self
is limited.'.1231 Even less specific and more formal again is Richards who
writes that 'literature and the arts' are the chief means by which, under
the influence of other minds, we pass 'from a chaotic to a better
organized state', and that they are, therefore, essential to a 'free, varied
and unwasteful life'.130 He holds that literature is valuable because it
generates what he considers the 'most valuable states of mind', which are
'those which involve the widest and most comprehensive co-ordination of
activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation, and
restriction.'.131 As a corollary of this he believes that 'bad taste and
crude responses are not mere flaws in an otherwise admirable person.'
but, rather, they are 'a root evil from which other defects follow.'.132
Helen Gardner, who holds that the 'primary critical act is a judgement,
the decision that a certain piece of writing has significance and value,',
asserts that literature 'appeals through my senses and imagination to my
capacity to recognize order and harmony and to be delighted by them...to
my experience as a human being, to my conscience and moral life.'.133
Aldaus Huxley, likewise, writes that we 'tend to think and feel in terms
at the art we like; and if the art we like is bad, then our thinking and
feeling will be bad.', and, more interestingly with regard to the idea of
literature as a 'cultivation' of reality, that 'Just as the uncivilized try
to copy the civilized - even when the civilized are quite unworthy of
imitation - so does life try to copy art - even when it is bad art.'.134
This may not seem a serious enough problem, the problem of literary
evaluation, to be the subject of a discussion that appears to border on
the ethical, but I too believe that what people do with their imaginations
and the quality of the alternative worlds they are offered is,
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demonstrably, of fundamental importance to so many aspects of their life
as to encompass the quality of the whole.
Because literary taste is neither so refined as that of the intellect
nor so gross as that of the palate, the question of the relationship
between enjoyment and approval is a complicated one. As Gerard points
out, even with regard to the 'external senses' a 'person may perceive in
himself an unconquerable antipathy to a particular species of food; and
yet, if he can trace its origin to an accidental disgust, he will
not...pronounce that food either unwholesome or unpalatable, he will not
be surprised that other men are fond of it, but on the contrary believe,
that himself also should have been fond of it, if he had not happened to
contract an unreasonable prejudice against it.'.133 Moreover, as he writes
elsewhere, there is 'a remarkable difference between sentiment and opinion
: no man can hold an opinion for a moment after he has discovered it to
be false ; but a man may clearly perceive a sentiment to be wrong, and
yet find it for a long time impossible to abandon it.'.133 Eliot, likewise,
writes that for 'literary judgement we need to be acutely aware of two
things at once : of "what we like", and of "what we ought to like".' which
requires an awareness of both of 'what we really feel' and of 'our
shortcomings; for we do not really know what we ought to like unless we
also know why we ought to like it, which involves knowing why we don't
yet like it.'.137, Ve find this tension between principle and instinct
expressed in Saint-Evremond's Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672), for
though he is obviously an admirer of Greek tragedy and believes that 'the
most Christian actions, and the most useful truths would produce a kind
of tragedy that would please us the least of anything in the world.', he
can write that 'should a man translate even the Oedipus, the best
performance of antiquity, into French, with the same spirit and force as
we see it in the original... nothing in the world would appear to us mare
cruel, mare opposite to the true sentiments which mankind ought to
have.'.133
D'Alembert observes that though it appears 'a miserable
occupation...to be disputing against our agreeable sensations' and though
we may ask 'what obligations shall we lie under to philosophy if it
manifestly tend to diminish our pleasures?', yet such is 'the unhappy lot
of humanity that the knowledge we acquire serves only to give us a
mortifying view of the scenes of error and illusion, through which we
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have passed, and is, almost always, attended with the diminuition of our
pleasures.'.133 When one feels constrained to consider all things as
equal, or the freedom to choose as good in itself, then choice evaporates.
One cannot argue about feeling? Perhaps, but one can recognize a shallow
feeling, a false feeling or a mean feeling, a feeling that is not what it
at first declares itself to be. Yet, as Johnson writes, 'To convince a man
against his will is hard, but to please him against his will is...above
the realm of human abilities.1.1'10 Moreover, so convenient a distinction
between notional and real assent can quickly lead to the manufacturing of
'appropriate' emotion rather than true response. But this is an artificial
problem, for why should it be part of the critic's role to convince a
person to like something against their will? Rather like Frye's idea that
the critic can be 'wrong' or 'right' about a work's value, depending on its
reputation, this is a pseudo-problem that often arises in connection with
evaluation and stems from the critic's desire to justify or validate their
criticism before the fact. According to this position, a self-guaranteeing
criteria for the use of the word 'good' runs thus; 'x has a higher
aesthetic value than y' means 'x is, or would be, liked better than y by
all qualified perceivers'. Gerard, for example, writes that the 'polite and
knowing are chiefly touched with those delicacies which would escape the
notice of a vulgar eye.' and John Dennis, in his Taste in Poetry (1702),
remarks that 'To conclude that a Play is good because Mr.Granville is
pleased by it, is but a reasonable way of arguing. But to say that it is
good because it pleases the generality of an Audience is a very absurd
one.',1'11 But what are the qualifications of the qualified perceiver? If an
individual has read all those books liked by the critical establishment
of their day, then they will perhaps be qualified to perceive when these
qualities, which they believe them to have in common, occur in a new
book. If an individual has read every top-ten bestseller in the last fifty
years then they will perhaps be qualified to perceive when these
qualities liked by the majority of the reading public of their day, occur
in a new book. Surely the difference lies in the literary critic being
able to produce a reasoned argument for their preferences. But on what is
this argument to be based? Ve are back once more at the beginning; to
claim that the critic's ability to interpret, to discover and demonstrate
the metaphysic of the work, to account for the imaginative suggestion,
justifies the critic's evaluation of that work is a non sequitur. For
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nothing can ultimately justify evaluation. Yet there is something in
Gerard's and Dennis' argument; Cicero relates how when Antimachus Clusius,
a poet, was abandoned by his entire audience but for Plato, he read on
because Plato was 'worth all the rest', and there seems some .justification
in this.1"12 Here is Addison's suggestion to anyone wishing to know if
they have 'a fine taste in Writing';
If a Man would know whether he is possessed of this faculty, I
would have him read over the celebrated Works of antiquity,
which have stood the Test of so many different Ages and
Countries; or those Works among the Moderns, which have the
sanction of the Politer Part of our Contemporaries, If upon the
Perusal of such Writings he does not find himself delighted in
an extraordinary Manner, or if, upon reading the admired Passages
in such Authors, he finds a Coldness and Indifference in his
Thoughts, he ought to Conclude, not (as is too usual among
tasteless Readers) that the Author wants those Perfections which
have been admired in him, but rather that he himself wants the
Faculty of discovering them.1"-3
If there is a qualified perceiver who is qualified independently of their
committment to a standard that is derived from some external source then
it is the perceiver who critically reflects on their own response, and an
integral part of this reflection must be a consideration of the
descriptions of, and arguments for, the value of works that are provided
by other critics/readers. But if a critic wants to influence then they
must write influentially, being a critic does not confer a mandate in the
realm of aesthetics. Who, then, is to be the final arbiter of whether or
not a work is 'good'? The answer is simple : I am. Yet Montaigne's motto
'Que sfais-je?' entails the rather large responsibility of finding out.
Taste as Discernment
To be a critic, then, is to be concerned with value in general, for
'literary value' only exists in the context of other values. This is made
explicit by Richard's when he writes that 'The critic...is as much
concerned with the health of the mind as any doctor with the health of
the body.', for 'To set up as a critic is to set up as a judge of
values.'.1 (This is not to say that such is the critic's conscious aim.)
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Gerard writes that the 'chief utility of criticism lies in promoting
correctness of taste.', a sentiment that is echoed by Eliot when he writes
that the end of criticism is 'the elucidation of works of art and the
correction of taste.'.1Apropos of this elucidatory aspect of criticism,
Gardner defines the function of the critic as 'to assist his readers to
find the value which he believes the work to have.'.1^ However, the
critic cannot prove that any work has value, for proof and value are oil
and water. What the critic can do however is prove that a particular work
has the value which they attributed to it. Evaluative statements may be
just noise but in the postponement of this noise consists the discipline
of literary criticism.
This brings us to that other meaning of 'taste' which those
eighteenth-century writers, mentioned above, often emphasized - taste as
the power of discernment and analysis. Thus Gerard writes that 'vigorous
internal senses' even when 'attended with the greatest delicay of
passion.' are not alone sufficient for 'good taste', but must be 'aided
with judgement, the faculty which distinguishes things different,
separates truth from falsehood, and compares together objects and their
qualities.'.1'1'7 'A Man of fine taste in Writing', declares Addison, 'will
discern after the same manner, not only the general Beauties and
Imperfections of an Author, but discover the several Ways of thinking and
expressing himself, which diversify him from all other Authors', and
should be able to 'enter into the very Spirit and Soul of fine Writing,
and show us the several Sources of that Pleasure which arise in the Mind
upon the Perusal of a noble Work.'.1/ls Voltaire writes that the perception
of beauty, 'in order to constitute true taste, must not be a vague and
confused sensation; but must be attended with a distinct view, a quick
and comprehensive discernment of the various qualities, in their several
relations and connexions, which enter into the composition of the object
we contemplate.' and D'Alembert that 'the philosophical analysis of a work
consists 'in distinguishing well Cthe various sources of the pleasure we
receive from the work! and keeping them separate from each other, that so
we may refer to each what properly belongs to it, and may not attribute
our pleasures to causes that have no sort of influence in their
production.'.1 This separation of legitimate from illegitimate criteria
for critical analysis and evaluation has been the main subject of this
thesis so far and it is, indeed, the critical, or uncritical, habit of
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catching the nearest way which has occasioned my project.150 However, as
I have written above, discovering the source of the pleasure one derives
from a work is not the same thing as tracing the sources of those
pleasures per se. D'Alembert elsewhere defines 'taste' as 'the Faculty of
distinguishing, in the works of art, the various qualities which are
adapted to excite pleasure or disgust, in winds that are susceptible of
delicate sentiments and perceptions.', and this is perhaps the more
correct emphasis.151 I will let Gerard summarise this eighteenth-century
ideal :
*
A critic must not only feel, but possess that accuracy of
discernment, which enables a person to reflect upon his feelings
with distinctness, and to explain them to others. Taste perceives
the particular beauties and faults, and thus supplies the facts
for which we are to account, and the experiments from which our
conclusions are to be deduced. But these conclusions cannot be
formed without a vigorous abstracting faculty, the greatest force
of reason, a capacity far the most careful and correct induction,
and a deep knowledge of the principles of human nature. One does
not merit the name of a critic, merely by being able to make a
collection of beauties and faults from performances in the fine
arts; to tell in general, that those please, these displease; some
more, some less....They are its rude materials, and nothing more.
And to exhibit them is the whole that taste can do. In order,
therefore, to form an able critic, taste must be attended with a
philosophical genius, which may subject these materials to a
regular induction, reduce them into classes, and determine the
general rules which govern them. In all this operation, respect
must be had to the subjects in which the excellencies or
blemishes reside, and to the similitude of the qualities
themselves, or of the sentiments which they excite....It is not
enough to discover that we are pleased or displeased; we must
ascertain the precise species of either; and refer it to the
sentiment or the expression; to the design or the execution; to
the sublimity or beauty; to wit or humour.152
This is also my ideal. What, as a critic, I must be able to discover is
the 'I know not what' from which my pleasure or distaste springs; a
quality that is both in myself and in the work. This concept of the 'I
know not what' went, naturally enough, hand in hand with the idea of
taste as discernment in the eighteenth century. Thus Feijoo; 'In many
productions of lature and even of Art men find, beyond those perfections
subject to their comprehension, another kind of mysterious beauty which
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torments their intelligence in proportion as it pleases their taste, which
their senses can touch and reason cannot decipher; so it is that when
they wish to explain it, not finding words that satisfy their idea of it,
they let themselves fall, discouraged, into the formless assertion that a
certain thing has an "I know not what" which pleases, which enchants,
which bewitches; and there is no profit in asking them far a clearer
revelation of this natural mystery.'.153 Montesquieu describes those
'qualities to which we give the name of Je ne sgai quoi.' as a separate
category from the 'beautiful, good, agreeable, natural, delicate, tender,
graceful, elegant, noble, grand, sublime, and majestick', but none of these
terms, within the realm of literature, is itself an explanation, and so,
though they may be a rough division of response, each contains an 'I know
not what'.1 5/1 Vhat is important to note here is that, because I cannot
examine the source of pleasure within myself beyond a certain point,
anything like a complete answer to this enigma can only be found in the
other direction, that is, in the discovering of just what properties of
the work produce the feelings that I have. It is the discovering of this
'I know not what' that constitutes the entire discipline of literary
criticism, as distinct from more general literary studies, and it is the
willingness to look, and, perhaps, the ability to find it, which defines
the critic. For when it is asserted that there is no disputing about
taste, what the speaker has in mind is not the 'what' of values but the
'why'. The 'what' of' the sources of pleasure in a work may be divided into
various categories and examined; 'What was the effect? Did it proceed
from this or that quality?'. It is for this reason that, as I have written
elsewhere, a wide critical acquaintance with literature is important, for
an essential part of this process of discovery will be the comparing of
the effect produced by such and such a quality in this context and the
effect produced by it in another. In this way the ascription of that
effect to the specific qualities of the work is refined, almost by a
process of elimination.
It is to this process, of discovering what properties of the work can




Without pursuing that curious and obscure problem of the meaning of
interpretation farther, it occurs to me as possible that there may¬
be an essential part of error in all interpretation, without which it
would not be interpretation at all...
T.S.Eliot
'Critics explain!' What do they explain? The artist, if he is a real
artist, has by his work transmitted to others the feeling he
experienced. What is there, then, to explain? If a work is a good
work of art, then the feeling expressed by the artist - be it moral
or immoral - transmits itself to other people. If transmitted to
others, then they feel it and all interpretations are superfluous. If
the work does not infect people, no explanation can make it
contagious. An artist's work cannot be interpreted. Had it been
possible to explain in words what he wished to convey, the artist
would have expressed himself in words. He expressed it by his art,
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Against Interpretation
Before beginning to discuss interpretation, it will be well to
consider if there is not a real and, moreover, quite common grievance
expressed by the slogan 'art for art's sake'. This is a grievance against
the perceived insensitivity of certain types of critical analysis towards
the objects of their study, and often against what is believed to be the
insensitivity of critical analysis per se. There are several different
expressions of this, from the anti-intellectual "What has all this got to
do with a simple story?" to a more intellectual position which may take
the farm of one of two related convictions; that criticism, even if
possible, serves no purpose, or that what is valuable or 'great' about a
work is not available for analysis and that it is, therefore, 'murder to
dissect'.
I will try to deal only with the second of these two convictions
here. This rests on the belief that what is essential to any work cannot
be conveyed by anything but that work. There is little criticism, however,
that would claim to reproduce exactly the effect of the work which it
discusses; this is a function which the work itself performs perfectly.
What the critic will probably produce is a summary of what they consider
to be the salient points, but, given that, as we have seen, every part of
a work must be considered immanent in every other, will any summary or
abstraction ever be able to faithfully describe the original effect of the
work? This question of how a statement can be 'true to' what it purparts
to describe is one which draws us into what are, philosophically, rather
deep waters. The argument, of which Hegel's is perhaps the most
systematic expression, is that one cannot claim to understand a statement
until one knows everything which characterizes the entities which it
describes, and everything which, in turn, characterizes those
characteristics ad infinitum. Thus every statement is chronically suspect;
Truth is at first taken to mean that I know how something is.
This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness; it is
formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense
consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion.1
For Hegel 'truth' is not simply the correspondence between an actual
state-of-affairs and our idea of it ('mere correctness') but rather the
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correspondence of a thing with itself, thus an abstract truth must be
'false' because it appears as something other than its object. 'Truth',
then, for Hegel, is a kind of genuineness. But I am dealing with this
problem on a smaller scale than that on which he envisages it; that is,
as it effects the work and its critics, rather than the universe and the
mind. Taken at its face value the argument that any description or
definition of a thing, since it is not the thing itself, can neither be
simply true or false, has rather extraordinary implications, not least of
all for the argument itself, The fact is that the truth and falsehood
provided by 'mere correctness' are the basis of our knowledge and this
correctness is quite sufficient to legitimize our normal usage of the two
terms. All we need to know about an entity in a statement in order to be
able to understand that statement are those properties which enable us to
recognize the entity; we do not need to know everything about a thing's
relationships with everything else in order to recognize it. Hor do we
need to know, or take into account, these relationships in our discussion
providing we do not violate what we believe to be the integrity of the
work.
But what of this integrity; for there is some truth, with regard to
literature, in the idea that all formulations about a text, to a certain
extent, point away rather than towards that work as it actually is.
Consider Poulet;
I am constrained to acknowledge that all subjective activity
present in a literary work is not entirely explained by its
relationship with forms and objects within the work. There is in
the work a mental activity profoundly engaged in objective forms;
and there is, at another level, forsaking all farms, a subject
which reveals itself to itself (and to me) in its transcendence
relative to all which is reflected in it. At this point, no object
can any longer express it; no structure can any longer define it;
it is exposed in its ineffability and in its fundamental
indeterminacy, Such is perhaps the reason why the critic, in his
elucidation of works, is haunted by this transcendence of mind.
It seeems than that criticism, in order to accompany the mind in
this effort of detachment from itself, needs to annihilate, or at
least momentarily to forget, the objective elements of the work,
and to elevate itself to the apprehension of a subjectivity
without objectivity.2
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This passage is a goad description of the problem which the 'mutual
immanence' of the work poses for the critic, but it also contains an
objection to criticism arising from an idea we have already met in
considering the nature of metaphor, that is, that the truths proposed and
the effects created by great works of literature are to some extent
mystical, and, therefore, beyond the reach of analytical explication,
Lowell, too, writes that 'Precisely what makes the charm of poetry is that
we cannot explain anymore than we can describe a perfume,'. 3 (Why this
might be so we have already seen in Chapter 4.) 'Whereof one cannot
speak', as Wittgenstein says at the end of the Tractatus, 'thereof one
must be silent.'.'1 But this is a necessary truth which cuts both ways; if
the mystic is not a matter of words, then it is no more a matter for
literature than for criticism. As Neurath commented, in connection with
Wittgenstein's remark, 'One must indeed be silent, but not about
anything.'.® Moreover it should be remembered that criticism is a
junction, a meeting place of two reader's, that is, the critic and the
reader of the criticism as readers of the work under consideration.
Unless we keep in mind that the work is a 'given', nothing that can be
said about criticism will make sense.
But what of the transcendental aspect of literature, particularly in
intensely poetical uses of language? Consider Hegel's description;
This double usage of' language, which gives to the same word a
positive and negative meaning, is not an accident, and gives no
ground for reproaching language as a source of confusion. We
should rather recognize in it the speculative spirit of our
language rising above the mere 'Either-or' of understanding,..This
content is called a mystery, because it is hidden from the
understanding; for the latter does not get the length of the
process, which this unity is, and thus it is that everything
speculative, everything philosophical, is for the understanding a
mystery.®
I would agree with Hegel that the ambiguous nature of language usage can
be used, as it is in poetry and paradox, to subvert an habitual way of
perceiving the world, to reveal to us a previously unconsidered rigidity
in our conceptual manipulation of the world. However, for Hegel, the
'either-or' which such language transcends is not merely that of opinion
but of understanding itself, the logical principles of identity (if p then
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p), and contradiction (if p then not not-p) which make language possible;
yet Hegel himself can differentiate between between the negative and
positive meaning that the same word may possess!7 We can report an
experience on the edge of words but never one beyond them.s We may
occasionally feel that language is too 'anaemic' to faithfully report what
we know, but even if we define our experience only in negative terms we
are still inside language. To quote one more variation on Wittgenstein;
'That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak.'.9 Moreover there
is nothing so futile as complaining about the inadequacy of language, for
it announces that whatever one is about to say is a lie.
A metaphysic, by definition, can 'mean' no more than what the holding
of it entails. There is an important sense, however, in which I am not
simply appealing to the idea of a logic of the emotions, as expressed in
Pascal's famous phrase 'The heart has its reasons which reason knows
nothing of.1.10 There is a piece of metaphysical equivocation in this
phrase which is important here, for if we take this to mean anything
more than 'Our knowledge of the workings of the mind is incomplete.', we
fall into the same confusion occasioned by a shift in syntax as we did
with 'The world is my idea'. The equivocation lies in the fact that it
suggests not just that we are motivated in ways and by means unknown to
us, but that there is an alternative standard of reason to the one which
rests on such principles as 'black is black' and 'white is white' (and
'grey is grey'), a standard which presumably rests on other principles
but which is still analogous to the reason of which we are aware. But
these rules, the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction, and the
excluded middle, are those without which no other truths could be
formulated and which are thus presupposed in every linguistic utterance;
they are the presuppositions of all consistent, non-self-contradictory
thinking. Any A of which we speak is itself, and not not-itself, nor does
it have a property and not have it. The idea of language exists only by
virtue of such principles. (I am not suggesting that it is for the
expression of this idea that Pascal's phrase is remembered, or that when
it is quoted it is in order to express this idea, only that it is
remembered, is quoted, is felt as profound, because it contains this
suggestion of the impossible, that is, because as one passes through it
to its sense, as one resolves its paradox, one encounters a metaphysical
propostion along the way; the heart does have reasons of which reason
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knows nothing.) There may be elements in our life we cannot express, but
'cannot' means 'cannot'; what I cannot verbally formulate to my own
satisfaction I can hardly expect to communicate to another by means of
language. Even if we do accept that they may be an alternative standard
of reason we cannot hope to talk meaningfully about it. I have already
said, however, that logic, though indispensible to the construction of
argument, cannot be the substance of an argument where literature is
concerned. One of the curious aspects of the common and false notion that
'logic' and 'emotion' are antonyms, is that it seems to rest on the idea
that emotions are not facts, that an account of the emotions cannot be an
account of facts. If one conceives of the work as an object of criticism,
that is, the work as literature, lying beyond the grasp of words then
there is no form of criticism, in words, that is of any relevance to it.
There is a choice then, to put one's faith in language and criticize or to
subscribe to the ineffability of literature and have nothing more to do
with its discussion; for the idea of ineffability cannot exist within
discussions of literature and certainly cannot be a premiss in a
particular criticism.
Before leaving this subject I shall consider one last approach which
has sometimes been described as an ani-interpretative, that is
Deconstruction. Because, however, there are so many Derrida's in
circulation at the moment, before proceeding I will just set out what I
understand by the word.
What Derrida sets out to prove is that what is called a 'modification
of presentation', that is, 'representation', is not something that happens
to presentation but is rather something that 'conditions it by bifurcating
it a priori.'.11 He begins from the observation that^appears to be no way, tWrc
in Husserl's philosophy, of distinguishing between the transcendental ego
which guarantees truth and the worlt^ self, that is, no difference that I
would allow for the development of a language in which truth is not
'deformed by some real contact'.12
Since self-consciousness appears only in its relation to an
abject, whose presence it can keep and repeat, it is never
perfectly foreign or anterior to the possibility of language...,But
since the possibility of constituting ideal objects belongs to
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the essence of consciousness, and since these ideal objects are
historical products, only appearing thanks to acts of creation or
intending, the element of consciousness and the element of
language will be more and more difficult to discern. Vill not
there indiscernibility introduce nonpresence and difference
(mediation, signs, referral back, etc.) in the heart of self-
presence?1 3
From 'the outset', then, we 'operate (within) a structure of repetition
whose basic element can only be representative.', for a 'sign which would
take place but "once" would not be a sign; a purely idiomatic sign would
not be a sign.'.1"1 Since a 'signifier (in general) must be formally
recognizable in spite of, and through, the diversity of empirical
characteristics which may modify it.', and in spite of 'the deformations
which the empirical event necessarily makes it undergo', and since 'each
signifying event is a substitute (for the signified as well as for the
ideal form of the signifier).', then 'I cannot enter into an "effective"
discourse without being from the start involved in unlimited
representation.'.15 The 'presence of the perceived present' can, then,
'appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a
nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation' - 'As
soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception
and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial
impression and primordial retention, we admit the other [that is,
nonpresence and nonevidencel into the self-identity of the...blink of an
instant.'e This 'alterity', Derrida proposes, 'is in fact the condition
for presence, presentation, and thus for Vorstellung [representation] in
general; it precedes all the dissociations that could be produced in
presence, in Vorstellung.'.17 The idea of this 'bending-back' that is
'irreducible in presence or in self-presence', leads Derrida to assert that
'trace or difference is always older than presence and procures for it
its openeness'.13 Moreover, he asks, should it not 'prevent us from
speaking about a simple self-identity "[in the blink of an instant]"?',13
The 'ideal object...independent of the here-and-now acts and events of the
empirical subjectivity which intends it' is nothing outside the world but
'must be constituted, repeated and expressed in a medium that does not
impair the presence and self-presence of the acts that aim at it'.20 The
element in which this appears to happen is that element which does not
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appear to have a worlc^/ for® - the voice; 'My words are "alive" because I
they do not seem to leave me: not to fall outside me, outside my breath,
at a visible distance; not to cease to belong to me, to be my disposition
"without further props.'".21 But this apparent transcendence of the voice,
this 'self-presence of the animating act in the transparent spirituality
of what it animates, this inwardness of life with itself ...supposes, then,
that the speaking subject hears himself in the present'.22 'The operation
of "hearing oneself speak"', continues Derrida, is an auto-affection of a
unique kind.', for 'the subject can hear or speak to himself and be
affected by the signifier he produces, without passing through an
external detour, the world, the sphere of what is not "his own.'".23
However, this 'proximity', this apparent ideality, is 'broken when I hear
myself speak, I see myself write or gesture.'.2"1 To admit that auto
affection is the condition for self-presence is again to deny that 'pure
transcendental reduction' (that is, the suspension of individual realities
to arrive at what Husserl called 'a science of pure consciousness') is
possible - we cannot grasp it in 'its identity, its purity, or its origin,
for it has none,'.25 This discontinuity, Derrida describes as differance:
This movement of differance is not something that happens to a
transcendental subject; it produces a subject. Auto-affection is
not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that
would already be itself (.autos). It produces sameness as self-
relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as the
nonidentical...All the concepts of metaphysics - in particular
those of activity and passivity, will and nonwill, and therefore
those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc. -
cover up the strange "movement" of this difference. But this pure
difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living
present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the
impurity putatively excluded from it. The living present springs
forth out of this nonidentity with itself and from the
possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace.
This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple
present whose life would be within itself; the self of the living
present is primordially a trace...This protowriting is at work at
the origin of sense. Sense, being temporal in nature,..is never
simply present; it is always already engaged in the "movement" of
the trace, that is, in the order of "signification.".25
Thus 'just as expression is not added like a "stratum" to the presence of
a pre-expressive sense, so, in the same way, the inside of an expression
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does not accidentally happen to be affected by the outside of
indication.'; they are inseparable from the start, or as Derrida terras it,
the addition of indication to expression, and expression to sense 'comes
to make up for a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a primordial
nonself-presence.' .27>
Understood thus, what is supplementary is in reality difference,
the operation of differing which at one and the same time both
fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to
primordial division and delay. Difference is to be conceived
prior to the separation between deferring as delay and differing
as the active work of difference. Of course this is inconceivable
if one begins on the basis of consciousness, that is, presence,
or on the basis of its simple contrary, absence or
nonconsciousness.23
Vhat Derrida is ultimately trying to show is that the concept of a pure
'for-itself of self-presence' is not so much the primordial basis of
perception as a 'supplement', a 'primordial substitution', an "'in the place
of", an ' in-the-place-of-itself - 'The strange structure of the
supplement appears here: by delayed reaction, a possibility produces that
to which it is said to be added on,'.23 So what? Every statement, even
such a straightforward perceptual one as "I see a particular person by
the window", structurally implies, according to Derrida, that its content
'is ideal and that its unity is not impaired by the absence of perception
here and now.'.30 Moreover it is a statement that can be understood by
anybody (of the same language community) irrespective of whether they
are present or 'infinitely removed in space and time'; that this should be
so is the very condition for the possibility of meaning, of speech.
However, Derrida holds that 'My nonperception, my nanintuition, my hie et
nunc absence are expressed by that very thing that I say, by that which I
say and because I say it.'.31 For 'the general structure of signification'
actually requires this separation of intuition from speech for it is only
the fact that 'the total absence of the subject and abject of a statement
- the death of the writer and/or the disappearance of the objects he was
able to describe' does not prevent a text from meaning something that
'gives birth to meaning as such'.32 Even when I tell myself 'I am' this
expression 'has the status of speech only if it is intelligible in the
absence of its object, in the absence of intuitive presence - here, in the
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absence of myself.' ('That I am also "alive" and certain about it figures
as something that comes over and above the appearance of the meaning.'33)
This leads him to assert that the 'anonymity of the written I, the
impropriety C?1 of the I am writing, is...the "normal situation.'" for 'The
autonomy of meaning with regard to intuitive cognition...has its norm in
writing'.3A This is, almost certainly, a new thought though not a
particularly controversial one. leither we might say is his conclusion
that the notion of being as presence, that is 'the absolute proximity of
self-identity, the being-in-front-of the object available for
repetition...whose ideal form is the self-presence of transcendental life',
is undermined by the fact that in reality the living present is, in one
sense, deferred ad! infinitum, or modified a priori.3S All this could
perhaps be just another example of philosophy running on the spot; for
the question 'So what?' still receives no answer in my here and now. My
'here and now'? Let me explain. * What am I to made of this insight I had
been having now?
But, to proceed deconstructively (like Icarus, as Derrida writes?),
that is to proceed by way of hypallage, (.hysteron proteron? hyperbaton?
metalepsis?), what was this deconstruction now, that, in becoming non
self-contradictory, became, even as, it being self-contradictory, it
disappeared? How did his followers create/reconstruct Deconstruction in
Derrida? Let me return to the more familiar "metaphysics" of time. To
prevent confusion in the following I shall use 'Deconstruction' to refer
to the practice of those critics who acknowledge, or have acknowledged,
the writings of Derrida as their theoretical reference point. Like all
work that is at once complicated and replete with paradoxical flourish,
Derrida's is especially prone to derivative 'slogan philosophizing' - a
venerable tradition in literary theory that goes at least as far back as
Castelvetro's Aristotle's 'three unities', Like those other flourishes I
considered when talking about metaphysical language, they are, if taken
literally, at once significant and meaningless - 'The sign is wrought by
fiction.', 'A text remains forever imperceptible.', 'Speech is the
representation of itself.'.36 The first thing to note, then, is that
Deconstruction, in the literary critical sense, is nothing so fundamental
as a strategy (except in the etymological sense, in that it believes
%
itself a body of combatants led by a general), but is rather a collection
of manoeuvres, and, as such, only of interest to me here in so far as it
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implies a poetics, a definition of literature. I shall therefore consider
only two of these manoeuvres, but two which are especially pertinent to
my concerns - the discovering of 'self-subversion' in the text, and the
constant gesturing towards an infinite regress in meaning.
Derrida himself has written that it is the critic's task to 'produce'
the significance of the relationship between the way a writer uses
language and the way that writer is (unknowingly) dominated by
language.37 He demonstrates what this procedure might be in his
discussion of Plato, where he writes that 'the system here is not, simply,
that of the intentions of an author who goes by the name of Plato.', not
'primarily that of what someone meant to say'.3e This may certainly be a
striking thought when applied to philosophical works (though here, as
elsewhere, Nietzsche precedes Derrida), but as our discussion of
intentionalism has shown, it is certainly not a new one in literary
criticism.33 What is important however is the effect of the adoption of
this particular (apparently) anti-intentionalistic standpoint back into
literary criticism. That a work can mean (to me) something quite contrary
to what it means to mean, is a statement that only makes sense, as we
saw with Hurd and Schorer, from an intentional point of view.
Deconstruction, in this respect, takes a step forward only by stepping
backwards. To distinguish itself from what might appear to be merely
reinterpretation, it invokes a meaning that is intentional (a vouloir-
dire), and sets itself in opposition to it. But intentionalism, when it
really is intentionalism, is only, as we have seen, an absence of
interpretation. Thus the whole manoeuvre becomes a pleonasm, a revolution
that preserves the tyrant in order to preserve the revolution. The idea of
a text that subverts itself, like the idea of a 'technical failure', only
makes sense if we hypothesize two texts, the one we have and an ideal one
existing either in my expectation or the author's intention. It might be
objected that I have followed precisely this path in discussing
Schopenhauer's 'The world is my idea', and Pascal's passage about the
'thinking reed' that is crushed by the universe. But what I set out to
prove with these two examples was simply that, whatever shelf marks the
respective volumes bear, these passages can only be read for what they
are as literature; no concept of intention is involved.
This last brings us to the second of the two manoeuvres I wish to
consider, the gesture towards the infinite regress of meaning. Derrida
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may be a literary critic of philosophy but like many critics, perhaps all,
he philosophizes about the works he criticizes. In claiming him as a
model, then, Deconstruction has reasserted, even if only implicitly, the
notion that works can 'tell', 'show', 'reveal', and so on. Indeed the notion
of a work consisting of intentions and counter-intentions requires that
the work be given some kind of philosophical status to begin with, for
how can inconsistency be a feature unless consistency is a implicit
model? As with the first manoeuvre, the assertion is contained in a
denial, in this case the denial of a final meaning to be found in a work.
But what would a final meaning be? Everything one writes about a work,
given that what it expresses can be described, albeit reductively, as no
more than a mood, is provisional from the standpoint of the future - but
one is never in the future. What Deconstruction seems to envisage is what
Chirico called 'the solitude of signs' - 'an eminently metaphysical
solitude...which excludes a priori every logical possibility of...psychic
education.'.*10 (This I believe is probably the result of trying to
consciously 'think differance'.) Yet Deconstruction carries on writing,
even indulging in that 'we' which becomes inexcusable with the very first
burgeoning of real scepticism. The gesture towards the infinite regress
of meaning serves, indeed, only to confine scepticism, for it brings it
into the discussion, makes it discussable. Doubt is only meaningful
(possible) in cases where testing is possible, and the possibility of
testing, of enquiring, presupposes something that is not doubted and not
tested. The certainty, the lever which is used to overturn certainty, is,
in this case as in every case, language itself! To lapse back into the
idiom once more - Deconstruction, to be such, must remain hidden in what
is thought after or during the writing, it can never be written;
Deconstruction can have no audience.
At this point we may look at some of the complaints - aside from
those of irrelevance, already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter -
traditionally brought against criticism, to see if same of the points
already discussed in this thesis, arising as it does from theoretical
considerations, find a reflection in non-theoretical contexts. Consider,
for example, Johnson;
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Criticism has sometimes permitted fancy to dictate the laws by
which fancy ought to be restrained, and fallacy to perplex the
principles by which fallacy is to be detected; her
superintendence of others has betrayed her to negligence of
herself, and like the ancient Scythians, by extending her
conquests over distant regions, she has left her throne vacant to
Ijer slaves.41
The main complaint against critics is that, in Jonson's words, they 'bring-
all wit to the rack', or, as Pope writes 'In search of wit, they lose their
common sense'.42 'The whole set of 'em', writes Sterne, 'are so hung round
and befetished with the bobs and trinkets of critic ism...their heads...are
stuck so full of rules and compasses, and have that eternal propensity to
apply them upon all occasions, that a work of genius had better go to the
devil at once, than stand to be pricked and tortured to death by 'em.'.43
Likewise Johnson writes that 'A commentator has indeed great temptations
to supply by turbulence what he wants of dignity, to beat his little gold
to a spacious surface, to work that to foam which no art or diligence can
exalt to spirit.', and Voltaire that; 'The world is filled with critiques,
which, by the aid of commentaries, definitions, and distinctions, have
succeeded in obscuring the simplest and clearest knowledge....[The critics]
have talked learnedly concerning things which should be felt with
ecstasy; and, even if their rules were correct, of what little benefit they
are!'.44
I have quoted predominantly from eighteenth-century authors because,
though they are speaking of critical practices that are quite different
from those of the present, I intend that the reader should find what is
appropriate in them, should find how what is said is applicable to
contemporary criticism. But the historical dimension is germane, for we
tend to look back in wonder at the more arcane subjects and disciplines
of the past, to ask in wonder 'How could anyone have studied this?', 'How
could people have gone on for generation after generation without ever
realizing the vacuity of what they were doing?'. Ve can do so because we
forget that we are seeing the subject through the eyes of its subsequent
critics, that when a subject is part of 'learning', of knowledge, all one's
energies are involved not in criticizing but in mastering that learning,
in becoming like one's teachers. (Many a school thrives on the principle
that wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, there I can
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get away with anything.) The current (?) vogue of theory has not improved
this state of affairs, for this too has its schools, its dogmatism, its
obfurscating jargon; the main change is that now works of theory have
pride of place over works of literature on the student's bookshelf.
Critical theory, in the latter half of this century, has moved from a
chatty, instinctive, enthusiastic nonsense, to a tortuous, artificial,
jargon-ridden (and, therefore, elitist), nonsense. In this chapter I will
address some of the reasons why this should be so, that is, why the
republic of letters should periodically find it necessary to cry out for a
dictator.
But do critical principles matter? Vhat the history of criticism
seems to show, particularly in its pre-professional stage (chronologically
the longest), is that the quality of criticism is unconnected with the
soundness of avowed critical principles, But today critical theory is a
subject in itself and if we are to have avowed principles (implicit
principles we must have), if we are to turn our attention to principles,
even only as objects in themselves, then their soundness does matter. As
has emerged in previous chapters, the greatest obstacle to literary
theory has been the tendency to explain the poetical with the poetical, so
that amidst the bustle of debate it is eloquence rather than reason which
carries the day, and even the mast extravagant of hypothetical poetics
can find followers if it is presented with sufficient panache. Pseudo-
science, it should be noted, has ever been one of the most papular forms
of poetry.
Criticism
Before going on to consider what critical interpretation is, or can
be, let us begin by asking what its function has been supposed to be :
Vhat, then, is criticism for?
Then criticism the Muses' handmaid proved,
To dress her charms, and make her more beloved...
These lines by Pope express perhaps the most common conception of
criticism, that is, to introduce, to explain, to second literature. The idea
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that criticism is of direct help to the creation of literature is,
however, not common. So direct connection as that posited by August
Schlegel when he writes that 'The comparing together and .judging of the
existing productions of the human mind, necessarily throws light upon the
conditions which are indispensable to the creation of original and
masterly works of art.', or by Lunarcharsky, when he writes that
'the...critic must be a teacher in his attitude towards the writer....[It]
is, in fact, precisely as a result of the cooperation between the
important writers and the most gifted literary critics that truly great
literature has always arisen and will continue to arise.', is rarely
asserted.*5 Arnold writes that criticism may 'prepare for' or 'render
possible' great literature;
It is the business of the critical power...'in all branches of'
knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the
object as in itself it really is.' Thus it tends, at last, to make
an intellectual situation of which the creative power can
profitably avail itself. It tends to establish an order of ideas,
if not absolutely true, yet true by comparison with that which it
displaces; to make the best ideas prevail. Presently these new
ideas reach society, the touch of truth is the touch of life, and
there is a stir and growth everywhere; out of this stir and
growth come the creative epochs of literature.*7
Patmore makes a similar point when he asserts that 'although good
criticism cannot produce art, it removes endless hindrances to its
production, and tends to provide art with its chief motive-power, a
public prepared to acknowledge it.',*s But it is James who is most
enthusiastic about the role which criticism may play; the critic, for
James, can be 'the real helper of the artist, a torch bearing outrider, the
interpreter, the brother.',*9 Unlike Arnold he sees the critic's role as
seconding the existing work rather than creating the conditions for its
creation, but elsewhere he writes in terms that seem to imply that
critical analysis can actually produce better art. Thus, in 'The Art of
Fiction' he writes that the English novel, which 'had no air of having a
theory, a conviction, a consciousness of itself behind it', might be
improved if the novel itself became more 'discutable', that is to say,
more an object of analysis,50 This is a dubious proposition, for I
remember myself being under the illusion that whatever can be explained
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in an arty way must be art, and it is an illusion the effects of which I
still see everywhere demonstrated. We are prone to overrate a work in
proportion to the trouble it has cost us, whether in reading, or, even
mare so, in the ingenuity we had to employ in criticizing it. But this is
something I shall come to shortly.
By far the most common concept of the role of criticism is that it
seconds literature for the reader. 'The critic's task', writes Gardner, 'is
to assist his readers to read for themselves....to display the work in a
manner which will enable it to exert its own power.'.S1 Elsewhere she
writes that;
Elucidation, or illumination, is the critic's primary task as I
conceive it. Having made the initial act of choice, or judgement
of value, I want to remove any obstacles which prevent the work
having its fullest possible effect. Because a poem already speaks
to me I want to find ways to ensure that, as far as possible, it
says to me what it has to say and not what I want it to say, and
that it says it in its own way and not in mine.52
Gerard, in similar vein, writes that every critic 'who really merits the
name...teaches justness of thinking, by explaining the kind and degree of
every excellence and blemish, by teaching us what are the qualities in
things to which we owe our pleasure or disgust, and what the principles
of human nature by which they are produced.',53 Gerard's ideal, that the
'chief utility of criticism lies in promoting correctness of taste.', is
echoed in a more modern idiom by James' asssertion that criticism should
be 'the very education of our imaginative life';
The effect, if not the prime office, of criticism is to make our
absorption and enjoyment of the things that feed the mind as
aware of itself as possible, since that awareness quickens the
mental demand, which thus in turn wanders further and further
far pasture.s,a-
Thus the critic is, in Frye's words, 'the pioneer of education and the
shaper of cultural tradition.'.ss But how is this enjoyment made self-
conscious? Thus Knights;
We have to elucidate the meaning...and to unravel ambiguities; we
have to estimate the kind and quality of the imagery and
determine the precise degree of evocation of particular figures;
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we have to allow full weight to each word, exploring its
'tei^fecular roots', and to determine how it controls and is t
contolled by the rhythmic movement of the passage in which it
occurs. In short, we have to decide exactly why the lines 'are so
and not otherwise'. As we read other factors come into play. The
lines have a cumulative effect. 'Plot', aspects of 'character' and
recurrent 'themes' - all 'precipitates from the memory' - help to
determine our reaction at a given point. There is a constant
reference backwards and forwards....A play of Shakespeare's is a
precise particular experience, a poem - and precision and
particularity are exactly what is lacking in the greater part of
Shakespeare criticism, criticism that deals with Hamlet or
Othello in terms of abstractions that have nothing to do with
the unique arrangement of words that constitutes these plays.33
This emphasis on discernment and detail, on 'the unique arrangement of
words', is one that I myself made at the end of the last chapter, but is
it really any more than an injunction to tell the truth about a work to
the best of one's ability? And, seen thus, seen as an injunction to tell
the truth about a work, does precisian of statement necessarily entail
particularity of description? That what can be said of this work can also
be said of that work does not mean that when it is said of this work it
does not have a different meaning, point to a different and unique set of
facts, to that which it has when it is said of that work. The critical
discourse, writes Croce, 'is empty for the reader who does not enter into
a relation with' the original; moreover if it is to be precise enough to
be of interest to one who has entered into some relation with the
original, then perhaps it must inevitably be empty for one who has not.37
The 'main function of criticism', according to Knights, 'is to prompt
other readers to fresh insights, based on fresh disciplined explorations
of their own.'.33 This statement is at once liberal and dogmatic, it
proposes criticism as an open ended subject but also limits criticism to
the sort of detailed analysis, the 'disciplined exploration', which is
described above. There are two questions we might ask about this approach
: Is it the best way of producing fresh insights? Does it constitute
being a 'handmaid to the Muse'?
'Particular criticism' is always, for reasons already discussed in
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis, an approximation. It is an
approximation because it can never do what the work does, so that,
however detailed it may be as criticism it must always rely on the force
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or precision of its abstractions in order to tell the truth about the
work. 'By breaking the forms of poetry into words and metaphors,
comparisons, figures, syntactic connections, rhythmic schemes, and so
forth,' writes Croce, 'we do not grasp the character of poetry, which is
revived and contemplated only in the total intuition of its oneness; but
we end up by putting together a pitiful heap of lifeless fragments, which
can be discarded as worthless.'S9 When I was 'doing literature' in school
and as an undergraduate it was always the 'particular', scholastically
complicated, 'mechanical', criticial works to which I went in order to be
illuminated about an author; this meant a preference for the book over
the essay, the new over the old, the analytical over the discursive, the
detailed over the vague, Vhat I wanted from criticism, and expected from
criticism, was, in short, hard facts about the 'meaning' of the work, hard
facts with which to beat out my little gold into the required essay, But
what gave rise to, what has been the draw of, 'particular criticism'? It
is tempting, and would perhaps be justified, to propose a causal
connection between the rise of 'particular criticism', the existence of
'Literature' as an academic subject, and the demise of a general public
for critical works. But there is something more fundamental to the nature
of literature at issue here. Vhat I wanted from criticism, and, indeed,
from 'Literature', was that it should open works to me. Were they, then,
closed? No. Vhat I wanted, however vaguely I then conceived the desire,
was a knowledge. My conception of what form this knowledge might take
has grown vaguer still with time, but I would hazard to say that it had
some connection with the validation of the literary.
'Particular criticism', then, arises in response to the very dreamlike,
intractable, nature of our memory of the work. 'There is nothing more that
can usefully be said about a novel', writes Lubbock, 'until we have
fastened upon the question of its making', for 'there are times when a
critic of literature feels that if only there were one single tangible and
measurable fact about a book... it would be a support in a world of
shadow'.so Among these shadows, he continues, 'there is a spark of light
that tempts us, there is a hint of the possibility that behind them, we
may touch a region where the shadows become at least a little more
substantial.'; this saving light lies in the fact that the 'author of the
book was a craftsman', and, therefore, the critic must overtake him at his
work and see how the book was made.'.G1 Even when this is not explicitly
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stated as a guiding principle in any particular criticism it is implicit
in the vocabulary used, thus Bmpson writes of a 'subdued pun' being 'made
to imply', and how a writer 'by the failure of the antithesis shows he is
merely thinking of...'.62 Knights declares that the 'Malcolm-Macduff
dialogue has at least three functions.', but 'the main purpose of the scene
is obscured unless we realize its function as choric commentary.'.63 This
may begin merely as a matter of diction rather than response, for it can
be simply one way of talking about effect, but it can also turn criticism
into a detective mystery, and lead, as I believe it has done, to the idea
that everything in 'great literature' is explicable in terms of purpose,
and that whatever can be so explained is somehow automatically art. This
mannerism, if mannerism it is, has the advantage of lending an air of
objectivity to the critic's response. This element 'serves to', this
element 'is intended to make the reader', this element 'is placed here in
order to' - these are things that can be equally said of claptrap, they
are simply ways of avoiding the personal pronoun. But there is a reason,
more important than any of these, against the use of such formulas, which
is that they give a totally misleading impression of the experience of
literature.
The same motivation and result can be found in what I will call
'thematic' or 'aspectival' criticism. The 'themes' of a work are not the
metaphysic, as I have described it elsewhere, though they will contribute
to it, rather they are those parts of the narrative which appear to
'move', to 'develop'. As such they are what the text declares and one's
tendency, in criticizing, is to grab at this declaration as at a safety-
line, a reassuring rationality in the largely uncanny experience of a
work. This process of abstraction I have called 'taking the text at its
word', that is, the searching out of themes, of what is declared by its
development, what used to be called the 'message', and its removal from
the work in the interest of a neat elucidation. This process of
abstraction and independent development can „ be extended, a second or
third reading produces more examples to illustrate the particular theme,
or it can begin again with a different object; and in this manner the
critical world unravels the original fugue of the work. Thus we have
essays on 'Themes in the Alexandria Quartet', the Alexandria Quartet as
'Ward Continuum', as 'Gnosticism', as 'Time, Space, and Eros' or 'Time,
Space, and Language', as 'Heraldic Universe', as 'The Problem of Structure',
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as 'Romantic Anachronism', as 'Baroque Novel', as 'An Investigation of
Modern Love1, as 'Tarot', as 'Groddeckian It', as 'New Romanticism', as 'The
Evolution of the Artist'. It is a very democratic form of criticism.eA
Aspectival or thematic criticism proceeds by the discovering of such
characteristics as the occurrence of synonymous terms or ideas, often as
metaphorical restatements (tautolagia), the_ repetition of key words
(.tautotes), and the repetition of terms surrounding clauses - in the
manner of sentential functions - by which a correspondence emerges
through two elements resolving similar problems with similar solutions
(.symploche). Thus, for example, we are spontaneously aware of a
significance in a work's ending in the same place that it began
(.epanalepsis). As the parentheses in the last two sentences suggest, these
characteristics form a rhetoric which we employ in elucidation; they are
the empirical data of criticism, whether we employ them consciously or
otherwise. As such they are indispensable and I have no quarrel with
them. The study of rhetoric, as we saw in Chapter 4, can show us how the
work becomes significant, can 'trace the operations of the intellect and
imagination' and disclose 'the lurking springs of action in the heart.'
and thus, perhaps, show why the significant is such. But if they are a
safety-line to the critic, the means of justifying the critic's thesis,
then they are often one which will lift the critic out of the work as a
whole, because what the text declares, its most overt characteristics from
a critical point of view, is not identical with what that text is as a
work. This more elusive, atmospheric thing is the vehicle of the
metaphysic, the imaginative suggestion. The thematicization of the text is
certainly the most straightforward procedure but we might liken it to
filleting a fish; the bones are undoubtedly part of this fish, but once
they are removed most of the fish is still left behind - dead.
Criticism, it might be said, is always concerned with the
apprehension of a quality so complex, so dependent upon its original
expression, as to forever elude point by point analysis. This emphasis on
being right, then, should not obscure the fact that the value of some of
the best criticism lies in its being a starting point rather than a
conclusion, and a starting point not for further criticism but for
increased enjoyment.65 Ambiguity, abstraction, the absence of exemplary
instances, then, does not necessarily mean a lack of precision or a
rejection of the role of criticism as seconding literature. On the
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contrary, while 'particular criticism' may be invaluable in creating the
new 'particular essay' there are many reasons, why it should not best
answer that end. But 'particular criticism' is only a means, a
justification, or a prelude to what is popularly considered the end of
criticism, that is, the discovery of the 'meaning' of the work. And here
we see why, in a formal setting, so much emphasis should be placed upon
it - for to say something, already possessing a meaning, has another
'meaning' not immediately obvious, to say, in fact, that this everyday
object has a hidden meaning, is a proposition that stands in need of
justification. ¥hat Frye has to say about the necessity of criticism is
interesting in this respect, because it makes explicit what is only
implicit in the writings of most critics:
[Criticism! has to exist. Criticism can talk, and all the arts are
dumb....And, whatever it sounds like to call the poet inarticulate
or speechless, there is a most important sense in which poems
are as silent as statues. Poetry is a disinterested use of words;
it does not address a reader directly....The artist, as John
Stuart Mill saw in a flash of insight, is not heard but
overheard. The axiom of criticism must be, not that the poet does
not know what he is talking about, but that he cannot talk about
what he knows.
I have already discussed Mill's moment of blindness in Chapter 4, Poetry
'knows' nothing. From whence, then, does criticism derive the 'knowledge'
it passes on?
There are three meanings we can give to 'interpretation', based upon
the three meanings of the Greek verb hermeneuein from which comes
'hermeneutic'; firstly, to express or to say; secondly, to explain; thirdly,
to translate."57 The first of these I shall leave aside for the moment, for
it will become important later on, the second is relevant to criticism
only in the sense in which it refers to 'accounting for' what is
expressed, the third might characterize the form of criticism we are now
concerned with, and is, as I wish to show, irrelevant to the text as a
literary work. What I will here call the 'occult school' of criticism
thinks of itself primarily as these last two - explanation and
translation. I have called it the occult school after Hazlitt's
description;
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There is a another race of critics who might be designated as
the Occult School-vere adepti. They discern no beauties but what
are concealed from superficial eyes, and overlook all that are
obvious to the vulgar part of mankind, Their art is the
transmutation of styles.63
This approach to criticism holds that the work must contain a hidden or
latent meaning or sense, a conceptual unity that is more than or other
than the what is overtly presented, that is the story, in the case of a
narrative, or the 'literal' statement, in the case of a poem. There is
something alluringly arcane in this notion; the critic becomes an expert
as deciphering. The praise which this school seeks and, within its own
ranks, recieves is not so much, 'Yes, that is it exactly.' as 'How clever, I
would never have thought of that.'.
One of the key concepts for this school is that of 'symbolization', a
concept which is essential to the belief that whatever can be explained
in an arty way must necessarily be art, and, moreover, that the degree of
sophistication in this explanation is necessaily an index of the
aesthetic value of what is being explained. 'Symbolizes' is used to
replace everything from 'represents', through 'is symptomatic of, to 'is
an example of, because it carries with it an (undeserved) aura of
interpretative subtlety. 'The hero arrives at the castle, a symbol of his
safety from the world.'; why 'symbol'? 'The hero reenters the symbolic
womb of the castle.'; why 'womb', with all it connotes? Why not simply
'The hero returns to a place of safety.'? 'Place of safety' is as abstract
as one can became unless one wishes, and the wish is evident in the first
two examples, to create, by introducing the dubious third term, a junction
between the facts of the work and just about anything else one feels like
saying at that moment.
To criticize a work, according to these lights, what one requires is
an Idea. The Idea is the thing. How is one to approach the work? There it
lies, one has read it and now one has something to write, or rather, one
has to write something. The result is a turning of the whole of literature
into a concept-association test. Moreover it is always the unobvious that
is fundamental to 'critical progress'.The need to justify criticism at
each critical instance, coupled with the 'pretence to empiricism'
described elsewhere, has made this method the norm. But what would be
lost by a critical essay on work x being known by the name of that work?
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Certain possible answers to this question will emerge in the rest of this
chapter but we might note two effects of such a procedure here; firstly,
it appears to introduce no third term, no thing to be known about work x;
secondly, it places a great emphasis on the critic's name.
There is one last manifestation of the 'will to objecticity' (or
'pretence to empiricism'), which I wish to turn to before leaving the
subject. This is a form which does not appear to create any of those
faults which we have heard complained about above. Eliot presents the
case for this form thus; 'Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be
interpreted; there is nothing to interpret; we can only criticize it
according to standards, in comparison to other works of art; and for
"interpretation" the chief task is the presentation of relevant historical
facts which the reader is not assumed to know.'."70
[It] is fairly certain that 'interpretation'...is only legitimate
when it is not interpretation at all, but merely putting the
reader in possession of facts which he would otherwise have
missed....Of course the multiplication of critical books and
essays may create...a vicious taste for reading about works of
art instead of reading the works themselves, it may supply
opinion instead of educating taste. But fact cannot corrupt taste;
it can at worst gratify one taste - a taste for history, let us
say, or antiquities, or biography - under the illusion that it is
assisting another. The real corrupters are those who supply
opinion or fancy...71
But taste, as we have seen, cannot rely on fact. Can we, then, 'educate
taste' (Eliot's definition of the function of criticism) with fact?
In order to 'understand the arts thoroughly', writes Voltaire, 'it is
necessary first to understand the manner of their development'.72 But in
what sense 'understand'? Certainly to understand the development of
literature we must understand the manner of its development, but to say
this is to say nothing. Vellek asserts that literary history is 'highly
important for literary criticism as soon as the latter goes beyond the
most subjective pronouncements of likes and dislikes.', and that the
critic 'who is content to be ignorant of all historical relationships'
will 'constantly go astray in his judgements.'.73 It is this proposition
that I will examine here.
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In his essay 'The Teaching of English and. History' L.C.Knights
describes literature as 'simply the exact expression of realized values',
values that are 'never purely personal' but which are bound to be
'rooted...in a social milieu - to the life of the time.'.7,4 But if the
values are exactly expressed, perfectly realized, in the work itself then
a consideration of literary history or the life of the time is,
theoretically at least, redundant in the criticism of that work; the kind
of judgements that a knowledge of literary history might produce, such as
'original', 'derivative', 'radical', 'important in the history of', or even
'fake', are, as we have seen, not aesthetic judgements. Looked at from the
point of view of the usefulness of literature to history what Knights has
to say is equally curious, for he asserts that the work of poets 'can be
made to yield highly important evidence of the standards current in their
generation: evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way.'.7®5 If the
evidence cannot be obtained in any other way then it is only evidence
about the values expressed in the works themselves. The problem is
the same from whichever side we approach the question; if we say that
history is necessary to supply evidence about the values embodied in a
work then we are saying that the values to be found in a work are
something other than those we find in the work itself, if we say that
something is true of a social milieu on the basis of evidence provided
solely by literature we presuppose a direct connection the existence of
which it was our very task to discover, that is, we prejudge the issue of
whether or not literature, in this particular instance, provides us with
evidence about general social values. In the absence of a control all we
can say is that this particular period of literary history was
simultaneous with that particular period of time, for, having only one
example of history and one example of literary history, we are not in any
position to experiment with alternative connections between the two and
therefore prove the necessity of the connection which exists. Literary
history is only evidence, in any scientific sense, about literary history.
But what of the relation of literary history to the individual work?
Johnson writes that 'though to the reader a book be not worse or better
for the circumstances of the author, yet there is always a silent
reference of human works to human abilities, and as the inquiry how far
man may extend his designs, or how high he may rate his native force is
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of fax- greater- dignity than in what rank we shall place any particular
performance, curiosity is always busy to discover the instruments, as
well as to survey the workmanship, to know how much is to be ascribed to
original powers, and how much to casual and adventitious help.'."7® This,
as we have seen with intentionalism in Chapter 2, the critic must resist
ceaselessly if they are to be concerned with the aesthetics of the work,
with the work as literature. Nevertheless, several writers have emphasized
the dependency of art oxx its backgound, on, in Taine's formula, la race, le
milieu et la wbment, from which it sprang or, not to prejudge the issue,
in which it first existed. Hegel, fox- example, had earlier written that
'every work of art belong to its own time, its own people, its own
environment, and depends on particular historical and other ideas and
purposes'.77 Literature, writes F.Schlegel, is 'the quintessence of the
most distinguished and peculiar productions by which the spirit of an age
and the character of a nation express themselves', and that it is in
literature that 'the genius of an age or the character of a nation is
unmistakably expressed'.70 This is an idea that has also received more
modern expression, for example by Tomars in his Introduction to the
Sociology of Art - 'Esthetic institutions are not based upon social
institutions: they are not even part of social institutions: they are
social institutions of one type axxd intimately interconnected with those
others.' - and Duvignaud in his Sociology of Art;
The only guarantee the artist has of success depends on the
extent to which he can make a group of people believe in him and
respond to his work; he cannot, then, be indifferent to the
values of that group. This is precisely what the artist is
concerned with: nature as the artist describes it cannot be
nature 'as it really is' because it has been twice transformed -
once by society and again by the artist....No artist, therefore,
imitates or merely rediscovers a nature which, already
transformed into an image and reshaped by societies, cultures and
different groups, is for him nothing more than a symbol whereby
he can increase his audience's participation.73
One can see how a sociologist or an historian might be interested in this
relationship between a work and its epoch, but what is the significance
of the relationship far literary criticism? Sainte-Beuve writes;
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I maintain that in reading over old papers and their most
successful critiques we never find more than half the article in
print - the other was written only in the reader's mind. You are
to suppose a printed sheeet of which we read only one side - the
other has disappeared, is blank. And this other side, which would
complete the thing, is the deposition of the public at the time, 5
the office or part of the editor which it supplied, and which
sometimes was not the least intelligent or effectual part. To be
just we must effect a restoration of this disposition now, when
we judge these old critics, our forerunners.®0
Likewise August Schlegel holds that 'no man can be a true critic or
connoiseur without universality of mind, without that flexibility which
enables him, by renouncing all personal predelictions and blind habits, to
adapt himself to the peculiarites of other ages and nations - to feel
them, as it were, from their proper central point'.31 But there is a
difference between a personal predilection and a blind habit. For while it
is true that the critic, to understand the work as a unity, that is, to be
honest to what is in the work, must feel it from the centre, the critic
does not do so by becoming a Medieval or Elizabethan or Second Empire
person, for these too would have blind habits that would obscure the
significance of the work. Vhat I mean by this is that, for example, while
the sixteenth-century ideal of kingship might tend to appeal to us most
directly as an historical curiosity rather than an emotional complex, in
that it is significant, as an element of a work, only by virtue of
analogy, we might say that the ease of sixteenth-century 'interpretation',
that is, contemporary familiarity with what is portrayed, was just as
great an obstacle to criticism as our present unfamiliarity ,ss One can
indeed tell when one has begun to separate nature from nt^ure (and the t-
critic is always looking for nature); the contemporary begins to look old
fashioned begins to show its style, so that even the latest television
advertisment looks "dated", in that one sees the blind habits from which
it springs and to which it appeals. (A thing becomes "dated", as opposed
to simply not contemporary because it is not, in essence, what it thinks
it is - this is why the "dated" always appears overly self-conscious.)
'Beauty', writes Baudelaire, 'is made up, on the one hand, of an element
that is eternal and invariable, though to determine how much of it there
is is extremely difficult, and, on the other, of a relative circumstantial
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element, which we may like to call, successively or at one and the same
time, contemporaneity, fashion, morality, passion."33
The dependency of aesthetic worth on its age is implicit also in
those writers who have asserted the need to be contemporary. Saint-
Evremond writes that, though he admires 'the design, the economy, the
elevation of spirit, the extent of knowledge which are so visible' in the
works of the ancients he believes that 'the differences of religion,
government, customs, and manners have introduced so great a change in the
world that we must go, as it were, upon a new system, to suit with the
inclination and genius of the present age.'.®* Robbe-Grillet too writes
that 'the systematic repetition of the forms of the past is not only
absurd and futile, but that it can even become harmful: by blinding us to
our real situation in the world of today, it keeps us ultimately, from
constructing the world and the man of tomorrow.'.es As this quotation
shows, this call to contemporaneity should often be understood as simply
one way of recalling contemporary artists to the importance of artistic
evolution, that is, it implies that repetition and imitation can lead to
the nonaesthetic - though theoretically this is not inevitable. The
fallacy which it nevertheless contains is demonstrated by Robbe-Grillet
himself when he writes that a writer 'who produces a pastiche skilful
enough to contain pages Stendhal might have signed at the time would in
no way have the value he would still possess today had he written those
same pages under Charles X.'.se This, as we have seen in Chapter 2, can
only make sense from an intentionalistic point of view, that is, it does
not make sense from an aesthetic one.
Treating a work as the communication of someone separate from that
work is, as we have seen, a commmon practice, but we can draw a
distinction between seeking to reconstruct the authors intentions from
the work and seeking to restore them from other sources or on the basis
of certain presuppositions about the nature of the work. The farmer need
be no more than one way of talking about what is really on the page, for
to talk about the author's intentions in this way is to talk about what
was done in terms of what the 'author' did. It is the latter that can lead
to distortions in the perception of the work itself. The phenomena of
historical intentionalism, as we saw in Chapter 2, can be said to
encompass certain approaches that rely on historical criteria for
deciding on significance. (What I mean by 'significance' here is the role
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something plays in the imaginative suggestion, the xnetaphysic of the
work.) Much of the obfurscation that exists within criticism and much of
the hostility that exists towards it is the result of confusing
'significance', as it is here defined, with meaning; meaning is what can
be preserved in paraphrase, significance is what cannot. Though as a
critic I must 'read as an Elizabethan' with regard to meaning, I can only
read as a critic with regard to significance, The significance of the
work as an object of criticism, that is, the significance of the work per
se, is, in this sense, timeless because, as a critic, this is always the
significance it has for me. Moreover, while it is an interesting exercise
to see how a work may reflect or react against values than were
commonplace at the time it was written, but it is only seeing how a work
reflects or reacts against my own values that actually constitutes what
might be called aesthetic criticism. As I wrote with regard to evaluation,
the question of my limitations as a late twentieth-century man is of no
interest to me, I have never been anybody else and I never will be anbody
else, such limitations as I know I have I can strive to overcome, such
limitations as I cannot know I have I cannot take into consideration. As
a critic I wish to know the effect of the work and that is something I
can only verify with reference to myself.®7
But what does it mean to call significance 'timeless'? Shakespeare,
according to Johnson, 'holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of
manners and life.', but he does so, Johnson continues, because his
characters 'are not modified by the customs of particular places,
unpractised by the rest of the world...or by the accidents of transient
fashions or temporary opinions: they are the genuine progeny of common
humanity, such as the world will always supply, and observation will
always find.'.3® Elsewhere he writes that 'as poetry has to do rather with
the passions of men, which are uniform, than their customs, which are
changeable, the varieties which time or place can furnish will be
inconsiderable,'.®® All social forms, all variations, we might say, are
'nature methodized' and their significance is theijffore amenable, if e
history has not effaced their formality, to the critic. Forster appears to
take this line when he dismisses considerations of periods, schools,
biography, tendencies, influences, dates, 'gossip', which he classifies as
'psuedo-scholarship', in favour of imagining all the novelists of history
at work simultaneously in the same room.30 This can however lead to a
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rather parochial attitude towards the foreign and ancient, a way of
making everything over in our own image; this is no fault so long as that
image is self examined, so long as we are reading not as a representative
but for ourselves. But we should not emphasize translation or
transformation either, for I am merely talking about what is inevitable,
that is, the fact that what I can understand of a work, the significance I
find in it, whether I believe I am reading as an Elizabethan or not, is
the significance I find.31
I wrote above that literary history was, theoretically at least,
redundant to the criticism of the individual work. Why 'theoretically'?
Eliot writes that 'The danger of studying [Shakespeare! alone is the
danger of working into the essence of Shakespeare what is just convention
and the dodges of an overworked and underpaid writer; the danger of
studying him together with his contemporaries is the danger of reducing
a unique vision to a mode.'.32 In the best of all possible critical worlds
this point would make no sense for if Shakespeare does contain
weaknesses, whatever their source, then a consideration of Shakespeare
should show them as such even if we do not study his contemporaries, on
the other hand if he is a great writer, standing head and shoulders above
his contemporaries, then, if we approach the work as a work, the
greatness we delineate must be left untouched by any subsequent knowledge
of his contemporaries. Gardner, even while championing an historical
approach, likewise writes that part of the 'fundamental danger of the
approach to a writer through the study of his age is that it encourages
us to attempt to interpret...the exceptional by the average.'.33 But again
this would seem to make sense only if we allow into criticism those non-
aesthetic and therefore non-critical judgements from intention, such as
'original', 'derivative', and so on. But, as I have said, literary history
is only theoretically redundant. It is true that, although aesthetic value,
like all value, is comparative, we do not need to know all of a writer's
contemporaries in order to be able to see or say why that writer is
great, but it is nevertheless often useful, just because we do not live in
the best of all possible critical worlds, to have this knowledge in order
to see in what manner that writer is great. A wide knowledge of
literature, a knowledge of the possibilities of literature, is, in practice,
necessary for criticism because it is only by making comparisons that we
can come to refine our ascription of what effect belongs to what cause. I
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may want to say that this work by Shakespeare has this effect because it
has properties x, y, and z, but I read another work which has properties
x, y, and z, which does not produce the same effect. So I must return to
Shakespeare and look more closely. Thus every work I read, of whatever
sort, better enables me to criticize, because every work introduces me to
a new configuration of variables. A writer's contemporaries may be, then,
especially relevant to the 'understanding' of that writer because they not
only provide more variables but also variables that are probably more
closely related ta^style of work under consideration, and a consideration tVe
of which will, therefore, lead to a greater refinement in the description
of just what it is that produces this affect in this work. That the
relationship is historical is, however, only accidentally relevant.
Ve might, provisionally, describe the significance of a work as its
'So what?'. Far the work, by virtue of its rhetorical nature is always a
pressure, an invitation, a confirmation, a denial, a resistance, an
embrace. It requires me to occupy a certain place with regard to its very
existence, and the significance of this place to me is the significance of
the work.3-4 Significance, then, is a pragmatic thing, it is the
relationship between the work and the reader's life,3S For this reason
criticism is not simply a matter of learning to 'speak the language' of
the work's milieu or of making that work 'speak our language', rather it
is a matter of assimilating the concerns of the work, of collapsing these
two things. Barthes, too, describes the task of criticism not as the
discovering of something 'hidden' in the work, but rather as the 'fitting
together' of the 'language of the day...and the language of the author', so
that 'If there is such a thing as critical proof it lies not in the
ability to discover the work under consideration but, on the contrary, to
cover it as completely as passible with one's awn language.',9"3 This could
be a description of what I mean by a criticism which is true to the
literariness of the work but for one thing, which instead turns it into
simply a description of just one of the present types of occult criticism;
for by 'language of. the day' Barthes means the vocabularies of
Existentialism, Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Structuralism.37 These
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languages are no less external to me, no less historically determined,
than the 'language' of the work. Indeed, in that at least three of them
are, as autonomous theories, primarily metaphysical in nature, their
deployment in criticism is more likely to bury the work than simply
'cover' it. The language I must 'cover' the work with must be a language
that can be altered by this very process, that is the language of
myself.9(3 Such a language, as I have painted out in the section on
intentianalism, cannot be described as 'historically determined' for
wherever determination appears to me as such it ceases to exist, indeed
this language of myself is the only language that I can know which is
not relative. 93 Thus it is the only language I know that can adequately
describe the significance of the work in itself. This I shall return to in
a moment.
This question of significance depends upon another, that is: What
does imaginative participation in the metaphysic of the work entail, what
is its nature? Thus Dilthey;
The possibility of experiencing religious states in one's own
life is narrowly limited for me as for my contemporaries. But
when I read through the letters and writings of Luther, the
reports of his contemporaries, the records of religious disputes
and councils, and those of his dealings with officials, I
experience a religious process, in which life and death are at
issue, of such eruptive power and energy as is beyond the
possibility of direct experience for a man of our time. But I can
re-live it. I transpose myself into the cicumstances....Only in
this way do they [Luther and his contemporaries] become
accessible to us. Thus the inner-directed man can experience many
other existences in his imagination. Limited by circumstances he
can yet glimpse alien beauty in the world and areas of life
beyond his reach.100
Do I 'transpose myself into the circumstances' to which the work directly
refers, reconstruct the significance that it might have for a religious
person? Only indirectly, so indirectly indeed that it is misleading to
describe the process thus. Rather I transpose it into my circumstances,
for another's beauty is no beauty to me, a significance is only a
significance for me. Hence my emphasis on metaphor as a model of the
literary in this thesis, far what I feel I feel in other terms - without
this transposition, which the figurative invites and allows, literature
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would be truly a dead letter. We can be said to understand a word or
sentence only because we s^buld have spoken it ourselves. This is true, but
it should be added that we can understand it only as we could have
spoken it ourselves.
The question of whether the meaning of the work resides
independently of the reader's relation to it, that is, whether significance
is a property of the work or an activity of the reader, is meaningless.
But it is a question which I must address, if only because of its
persistence elsewhere. (Moreover I must make it clear that when I have
used the personal pronoun here, as when I used it in the last chapter, it
was not intended as a mannerism, not a substitute far 'one', I was not
using myself as a representative critic, or describing what we do; when I
say 'I' I mean just that - myself.) Some have given the reader the role of
co-creator; thus Lubbock writes that 'The reader of a novel - by which I
mean the critical reader - is himself a novelist; he is the maker of a
book which may or may not please his taste when it is finished, but of a
book for which he must take is own share of the responsibility.'.101
Likewise Wilde, perhaps more ambiguously, writes that 'It is the
spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors.'.102 Empson expresses it
thus;
Lacking rhyme, metre, and any overt device such as comparison,
these lines are what we should normally call poetry only by
virtue of their compactness; two statements are made as if they
were connected, and the reader is farced to consider their
relations for himself. The reason why these facts should have
been selected for a poem is left for him to invent; he will
invent a variety of reasons and order them in his own mind.
This, I think, is the essential fact about the poetical use of
language.103
Todorov, in a similar vein, describes the goal of allegorical exegesis,
which he identifies with criticism, as being to find 'a different meaning
for a text (or for a segment of text) already possessing one.'.10'1
Gadamer, apparently in contrast, holds that the work 'does not exist in
itself nor is it experienced in a communication accidental to it, but it
gains through being communicated, its proper being.'. los But to what
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extent are 'invents', or 'different meaning', or even 'proper being',
justified here? Is it not more honest, though less dramatic, to say that
the reader supplies what the work only implies? If this is so, then the
meaning, or, it would be better to say, 'significance', which the reader
supplies must be potential in the work, implied and controlled by it, and
also finally accountable to it. If we wish to make 'responding to'
synonymous with 'creating' then the reader could be described as a co-
creator, novelist, poet, but this is merely a poetical way of talking and
can mean no more than has ever been meant by 'reading'. Martin Buber
probably comes closest to the mark when he writes that 'We do not find
meaning lying in things nor do we put it into things, but between us and
things it can happen.', 1oe But what of the significance I find?
It is the nature of criticism to deal with what cannot be
systematized and objectified, that is with metaphysics, but metaphysics
is itself an attempt to systematize and objectify what is not amenable to
these two processes; it is the very impossibility of this project which,
as I have said, creates the metaphysical and makes it significant.
Perhaps it is a reflection of this desire that has periodically created a
similar demand within criticism for objectivity and system. For such
demands have usually entailed beginning with a denial that considerations
of affect are essential to criticism, that is with a denial of the
literariness, the metaphysicality, of literature. (This desire, then, is
itself, a metaphysical one!) Thus criticism, according to Ransom, 'must
become more scientific, or precise and systematic' and will only achieve
this by abjuring all 'vocabulary which ascribes to the object properties
really discoverable in the subject, as: moving, exciting, entertaining,
pitiful,..great,..admirable... beautiful',1°7' Likewise Frye writes that the
'first step in developing a genuine poetics is to recognize and get rid of
all meaningless criticism, or talking about literature in a way that
cannot help to build up a systematic structure of knowledge.'.10® What
Frye wants of criticism is 'progress', and a thus a way of distinguishing,
a priori, what is genuine criticism and what is not.103 To this end he
demands that the critic should 'let his criticial principles shape
themselves solely out of his knowledge of' literature.110 He is right to
demand as much for, as he says, 'to subordinate criticism to an
externally derived critical attitude is to exaggerate the values in
literature that can be related to the external source', but fails to see
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that the scientific model is just such an external source, it is indeed
the model of all those other sources that so distort the literary-
work.111 'It is clear', writes Frye, 'that criticism cannot be a systematic
study unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to be so.';
Frye's 'literary anthropology' is certainly concerned with what is a
quality of literature, but it is only a quality, an aspect, for the
delineation of archetypes, as Jung often stressed, does not constitute an
explanation, that is, it is a starting point not a goal.112 Whatever
'dithers or vacillates or reacts is mere leisure-class gossip' writes
Frye, but who could argue that literary criticism has ever been more than
'leisure-class gossip', or ever could be more while still faithfully
reflecting the nature of its abject, for whatever dithers, vacillates, and
reacts, is alive.113
This is my objection to aspectival criticism, that is, criticism which
discusses the work 'as x' or 'x in' the work, that, in destroying the
integrity of the work, it cannot be said to be concerned with literature
except in a very marginal way. Moreover it distorts the nature of
literature, for the aim of criticism, whether explicitly stated or simply
implied, in that a poetic must underly every critique, is to teach us 'how
to read'. A method of criticism is already an interpretation of literature,
in that, as a method, it must contain a definition of its object, and this
definition will, perforce, delimit what is seen and how what is seen is
understood. Aspectival criticism, then, encourages us to read literature
as something other than literature, to read the work as a text. Dissection
is not, of course, strictly speaking, murder, though vivisection is - if
thematic or aspectival criticism does not immediately strike us as a form
of violence then it is because these forms of criticism have taught us to
forget that the work is a living thing, as much an experience as an
object.11A
Genuine criticism, according to Hazlitt, should not so much give the
'superficial plan and elevation' of a work, as if it were 'a piece of
formal architecture.', as 'reflect the colours, the light and shade, the
soul and body of a work' : if this second set of terms seems hopelessly
vague in its figurativeness, it should be noted that it is no less so than
the first.113 This conception of criticism is shared by Sainte-Beuve, who
writes that the 'essential thing for active and practical criticism...is
not so much a profound knowledge of things as a lively feeling for them,
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a power of inspiring taste for them, and of surrounding oneself with its
atmosphere.', and Lawrence, who writes that;
Literary criticism can he no more than a reasoned account of the
feeling produced upon the critic by the book he is criticizing.
Criticism can never be a science: it is, in the first place, much
too personal, and in the second, it is concerned with values that
science ignores. The touchstone is emotion, not reason. Ve judge a
work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and
nothing else.11G
Yet this idea that the personal is the guiding and controlling element,
the essence, of critical procedure will, apparently, hardly yield criticism
as an academic subject, as a discipline, let alone a science, and, for this
reason, it is an idea that critical theory has constantly attacked.
Bodkin, for example, advizes that 'unless we attempt, by the help of
comparative psychological study, to measure and allow for our own
"personal equation" in criticism, we are apt to feel as though our own
personal responses were "matters of universal experience".'.117 For James
the critic is one who offers 'himself...as a general touchstone....He has to
understand for others, to answer for them; he is always under arms.'.113
Richards likewise warns against 'mere autobiography', for the critic's
'judgement is only of general interest in so far as it is representative
and reflects what happens in a mind of a certain kind, developed in a
certain fashion.'.113 Riffaterre develops this idea that, as Vimsatt and
Beardsley write, the poem is 'not the critic's own and not the author's'
but 'belongs to the public.', by proposing the concept of a 'superreader';
'what is blurred in a response is its content, the subjective
interpretation of that response', thus the critic must employ a
"'superreader'" composed of other critics, translators, historical
dictionaries, philological footnotes, other readers.120 The critic will
then be able to follow, according to Riffaterre, the 'normal reading
process' of perceiving the poem as its linguistic shape dictates, for
everything that 'holds up' this supperreader can be described as 'a
component of the poetic structure.',121 But is this 'supperreader' anything
more than myself, for I can be an informed I, without being false to my
individuality? This I shall return to, for it is essential to this
argument, but for the moment it is important to note why Riffaterre
believes this concept is necessary. He requires some outside validation
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of, some general consensus on, what is poetical in the poem because he
believes that 'the poem may contain certain structures that play no part
in its function and effect as a literary work of art'.122 But as we have
seen a literary work of art is just that type of text in which everything
must be considered as essential; coincidentally it is Baudelaire himself,
whose poetry is the specific subject of Riffaterre's essay, that best
expressed this when he wrote that 'There are no minutiae in matters of
art.'.123
Some critics have advocated a deference to psychology as one solution
to the 'problem' of relativism. Richards, for example, writes that it is a
'prime necessity' for criticism to analyse, in psychological terms, 'the
mental events which make up the reading of a poem'.12,4 Psychology, as a
science, he writes elsewhere, has a direct bearing on what he considers
to be the three qualifications of a good critic - the ability to
experience, 'without eccentricities, the state of mind relevant to the work
of art he is judging.', the ability to 'distinguish experiences from one
another as regards their less superficial features.' and the "ability" to
be 'a sound judge of values.'.125 Read makes a similar point when he
writes that in order to save criticism 'from becoming the province of
emotional dictators, we must hasten to relate it to those systems of
knowledge which have to a great extent replaced transcendental
philosophy.' and preeminently, because 'it is so directly concerned with
the material origins of art.', psychology.125 This might be so if the
mind, as it is presently conceived by psychology, was in any way co¬
extensive with the person, but this is not the case, Vhat psychology
gives us are rigmaroles, the rigmaroles of affection, of prejudice, of
sexual attraction, of grief, that is, the description of an object which is
already, in the first instance, 'nature methodized'. For this reason the
'emotional dictatorship' of psychology and psychoanalysis is far worse
than any I can invent as an individual, for their vocabularies give a
pseudo-objectivity, they replace explanation with taxonomy. With
*
psychoanalysis I can prove that I love what I hate and hate what I love,
that I am repelled by what attracts me and attracted by what repels me;
for this reason its value to occult criticism is immeasurable. With
regard to the psychological aspect of the experience of reading, then,
nothing could be more harmful than a deference to established
psychological categories, far it offers me the chance to name rather than
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explain, to tidy up rather than inspect, to blind with "science" rather
than persuade with insight. This is no less true of an informed,
academically respectable, grasp of psychology than it is of the layman's
popular idea of psychology. Apropos this last I might make the more
general point that the popularization of psychological concepts has made
it more true than ever that perhaps the greatest obstacle to self-
knowledge is self-analysis.
There is one particular form of what might be called 'psychological
criticism' which deserves special mention here, if only because it does
seem to be a genuine contribution to knowledge - archetypal or myth
criticism. The question is, however, whether or not it is literary
criticism. This is a form which, in that it can be said to encompass
allegorical interpretation and the idea that literature presents
representative or ideal types, has had a long history. I will quote at
length from Boccaccio because what he says is important not only as an
early example of myth criticism but also, in a more general way, to my
later argument.
[The] ancient poets, so far as it is possible to human capacity,
followed in the footsteps of the Holy Spirit, which, as we read
in the sacred Scriptures, revealed its lofty secrets to future
times through the mouths of many writers, making them beneath a
veil speak what it intended at the proper time to show in deeds,
without any veil....In the green bush in which Moses saw God like
a burning flame, the Holy Spirit wished to show us the virginity
of Her who was purer than any other creature, and that she was
to be the dwelling and shelter of the Lord of nature and that
she would not be defiled by the conception or the birth of the
Word of the Father. By Nebuchadnezzar's vision of the statue made
of several metals struck down by a rock that was changed into a
mountain, the Spirit wished to show all suceeding ages that they
ought to submit to the doctrine of Christ, who was and is the
living rock, and that the Christian religion born of this rock
would became a thing immovable and eternal, as we see that the
mountains are....Similarly our poets, when they feigned that
Saturn had many children and devoured all but four of them,
wished to have understood from this fiction nothing else than
that Saturn is time, in which everything is produced, and as
everything is produced in time, it likewise is the destroyer of
all and reduces all to nothing. Of the four children that he did
not devour, the first is Jove, that is the element of fire; the
second is Juno...that is the air..,the third is Neptune...that is
the element of water; the fourth and last is Pluto...that is the
earth, lower than any other element. Likewise our poets feigned
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that Hercules was changed from a man into a god, and Lycaon into
a wolf. By this they wished to show that by acting virtuously, as
Hercules did, man becomes a god by participation in heaven, and
that by acting wickedly, as Lycaon did, though he appears a man,
he is truly to be called by the name of that beast which is
known by everyone to have the quality most like his vice. So
because of his rapacity and avarice, qualities like those of a
wolf, it is feigned that Lycaon was changed into a wolf. Likewise
our poets feign the beauty of the Elysian Fields, by which I
understand the sweetness of paradise. From the darkness of Dis I
learn the pain of the inferno.12'7
For the present moment what I am mainly interested in is the latter part
of this passage, where Boccaccio identifies the pagan Elysian Fields and
Dis with the Christian Heaven and Hell. A similar conception of
interpretation is found in Frye's discussion of Milton's Lycidas\ 'If we
ask, who is Lycidas? the answer is that he is a member of the same
family as Theocritus' Daphnis, Bion's Adonis, the Old Testament Abel, and
so on.'.12® Such an answer, Frye holds, 'goes on building up a wider
comprehension of literature and a deeper knowledge of its structural
principles and recurring themes.'.12® It is true that such an approach
makes the circle of our references ever wider, the display of our
erudition increasingly impressive, but is our comprehension deepened?
This approach, when properly conducted, implies that we understand the
particular instance well enough to be able to discover parallel instances
in other contexts but if that is all we understand of the instance then
what we are doing is intrinsically anti-aesthetic in that it does not
address the unique nature of the work; what is produced is a sort of
literary anthroplology in which ythe work becomes an anthropological or
psychological text. With regard to literary criticism, then, if the element
which is regarded as archetypal in the work is really potent, that is,
significant in a general way, then that significance belongs to the work
in question, to follow it from its context to the world of myths and
thence to its significance is an unnecessary detour, and one which is
likely to result in a blunting of our sense of its particular significance
in the literary work.130 If we feel that we could not find the full
significance of the element as the expression of an archetype just by
consideration of the work on its own, then we must allow that this
element does not express the archetype that we have in mind. If
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literature contains archetypes then to criticise it, as literature, we do
not need to make these sorts of comparisons, if it does not then, to
criticize it as literature, we cannot make these sorts of comparisons.
Let us return to Boccaccio. When he draws the parallel between the
Elysian fields and Heaven or the burning bush and the Immaculate
Conception, the justification of what he is doing is that the former
things tell 'beneath a veil' what will one day appear in deeds, that is,
literally. The simple multiplication of instances cannot be so justified.
Consider Fielding;
Though perhaps, during the changes which so long an existence
may have passed through, [Mrs.Tow-wouse] may in her turn have
stood behind, the bar at an inn, I will not scuple to affirm she
hath likewise in the revolution of ages sat on a throne. In
short, where extreme turbulency of temper, avarice, and an
insensibility of human misery, with a degree of hypocrisy, have
united in a female composition, Mrs.Tow-wouse was that woman;
and where a good inclination, eclipsed by a poverty of spirit and
understanding hath glimmered forth in a man, that man hath been
no other than her sneaking husband.131
To say that a certain character is an instance of a Trickster figure or a
Mrs.Tow-wouse will tell us something of that character, providing we
understand the nature of the archetype, and may be useful if we have not
read the work in question! But otherwise to so name a character is only
to lead us to look for attributes that the character may not contain, to
bring it into line with a type and enable us to talk about aspects of
something quite other than the work as a unique work. Such a naming may
be useful if we are making a catalogue of instances of the Trickster
figure, which is why I have said that archetypal criticism may be a
contribution to knowldege, but with regard to aesthetic criticism, that
is, criticism concerned with literature as literature, this procedure is
only a potentially misleading distraction. To give a thing a name rather
than an explanation is to create only the illusion of analysis. If
Boccaccio's comparison of the burning bush and the Immaculate Conception
seems, like the comparison drawn by Augustine between loah's Ark and the
crucifixion, enlightening it is because it tells us, whether we believe in
the same literal truth or not, about the possible human significance of
both instances. To draw the parallel between the burning bush and the
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Immaculate Conception, or the Elysian Fields and Heaven, is only of
interest, then, if we can account for both; 'account for' in the sense of
discover what values the instance embodies, what complex of emotions it
appeals to. These examples are extremely complex but at a simpler level I
might show the difference by considering, for example, the fact that
heroic trials in fairy tales and folk stories usually come in groups of
three. On coming across an example of this we may allude to every other
example of a similar situation we can think of, collate them and announce
that three is an archetypal figure, with a significance that resides in
the very structure of the psyche. (Boccacio or Augustine would probably
relate all instances of three's to the Trinity.) Alternatively we can
simply note that two is the minimum number of instances required to
establish a pattern, so that by the third instance we are prepared to
have our expectations confirmed or overthrown, and, therefore, that three
is the minimum number of trials in which the hero can encounter the
pattern, learn from it, and bring events to a crisis. With the case of
making Saturn stand for Time, the 'accounting for' is complete and we
need hardly go any further, for time does not 'stand for' anything else,
at least not in the sense that the Elysian Fields, Bis, Heaven, and Hell
do.132 The case of Lycaon's transformation into a wolf is similarly
straightforward, though that of Hercules transformation into a god is
not.
In some instances reference to the psychology of the possible
audience can be simply one way of talking about the possible effect of a
work; such is the case when Addison describes how 'The Ladies are
wonderfully 'pleased to see a Man insulting Kings, or affronting the Gods,
in one Scene, and throwing himself at the Feet of his Mistress in
another.'.133 But in this, rather limited, sense all criticism is
psychological.
Certainly we go to others to discover what we may have overlooked,
to see if they can account for effects for which we cannot, but unless I
can validate their conclusions myself, that is, make them my own,
deference to them is no more than falsifying my experience of the work.
But why should my experience of the work be of any interest to anybody
else? This is the question that has prompted the mistaken urge to
objectivity, for the answer it requires is one that will validate the
critical procedure per se, that is, that will ensure the value of my
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criticism before the fact - and this cannot be done. There is no reason
why my experience of the work should be of interest to anyone, the best I
can hope for is that it may turn out to be.13A (It is quite a different
question to ask 'How can I criticize?'; this is a question I have tried to
answer in the rest of this thesis.) But what of that which I do not know,
or have not noticed? I do not know it and have not noticed it, and
afterwards if you can show me why I have written drivel as a consequence
and I will then know and notice and do better next time. But I can only
ever write what I know. What the call to objectivity is really asking me
to do is to defer or appeal to knowledge - psychological, 'philosophical',
anthropological, sociological, and so on - which I cannot verify myself,
it declares that only when I am talking about what I do not have direct
experience of am I saying anything worth saying. As for my
idiosyncracies, as I have written before, if I could take them into
account they would not be an issue for me, if I cannot take them into
account then they are not an issue for me. It is important to remember
that the work exists, is available, and will not be hanged on my
testimony. Criticism is useful, according to Addison because it is
'impossible for a Han of the greatest Parts to consider anything in its
whole Extent, and in all its variety of Lights.'.13S Eliot likewise writes
that criticism 'from age to age, will reflect the things that age demands;
and the criticism of no one man and of no one age can be expected to
embrace the whale nature of poetry or exhaust all its uses.'.13S
Nevertheless if I do not try and embrace and exhaust the whole of poetry
for myself, I have not even criticized.
Throughout this thesis I have been concerned with the idea that a
certain critical emphasis, in making literature perform the function to
which it is least suited, deprives the text of its aesthetic centre of
gravity, and can, incidentally, create a type of discourse in which life,
as it is discussed by the critic, also loses its centre of gravity - a
centre which if not located in one's own experience is located nowhere.
What form, then, could a genuinely aesthetic criticism take? Only one, I
would argue, that keeps a constant awareness of our immediate, pre-
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history, or to knowledge, or even to another systematic non-literary
metaphysic, but rather in relation to our wider interests as they can be
reflected in literature. This form, then, is an extension of what I might
call the 'natural response' to a work, for, though we may not be able to
say precisely what mental states are invoked by the reading process,
everyone knows when they find a book depressing or exhilarating, exciting
or dull. The work is an enigma only for criticism, that is, the problem of
interpretation is only the problem of the formal description of the
work's effect. (For even when a reader's description is nonsensical, as
when they describe a work as 'sincere', 'predictable', 'unrealistic' - these
non sequiturs often do reflect genuine, if "undiscovered", properties of
the work for that reader.)
Aesthetic criticism, then, would trace back these feelings into the
work which has invoked them, and delineate the connection, that is,
critically reflect on its own response. For if we wish to be still talking
of what is essential to our experience of reading a work, then it is as a
metaphysical suggestion, or statement, that we must discuss it, and this
is a matter not just of our opinion about literary form but also our
opinions about reality. To take a famous example of a work in which the
imaginative suggestion is a matter of debate, we might consider Paradise
Lost; whether we believe that the work is predominantly on the side of
the angels or predominantly on the side of the devils is very much a
matter of which we consider to be the more valid representation of human
potential - the description of Adam and Eve in Paradise, or the speeches
of Satan. The strictly philosophical aspect of such a question lies not in
the response itself, but in the refining of the assertions we make about
that response. There is no reason why one person's 'answer' to Paradise
Lost should be the same as another's. This is why, if I listen closely,
every time I hear a 'we' or an 'our' in such contexts I also hear a
sermon.
The aim, then, that I appear to be proposing for criticism, as an
activity concerned with literature as literature, is the reconstruction of
the experience of reading the work. But how is the memory of reading
related to the literary work? For is not this memory the most intangible
of things? Thus Lubbock;
- 322 -
I r> t..ta v p reta l.- A or>
To grasp the shadowy and fantasmal form of a book, to hold it
fast, to turn it over and survey it at leisure - that is the
effort of the critic of books, and it is perpetually defeated.
Nothing, no power, will keep a book steady and motionless before
us, so that we have time to examine its shape and design. As
quickly as we read, it melts and shifts in the memory; even at
the moment when the last page is turned, a great part of the
book, its finer detail, is already vague and doubtful. A little
later, after a few days or months, how much is really left of it?
A cluster of impressions, some clear points emerging from a mist
of uncertainty, this is all we can hope to possess, generally
speaking, in the name of a book. The experience of reading it has
left something behind, and these relics we call by the book's
name; but how can they be considered to give us the material for
judging and appraising the book?137
But Lubbock is here inverting what should be the task of criticism for
the first reading, the reading of the work as a work, must be the
immediate object of reflection for aesthetic criticism. The work as one
examines it subsequently, in order to discover what properties or
qualities might be responsible for the significance one found upon first
i
reading, can more properly be called a relic or artifact, for now one is
reading it as a text, that is, as a source of information. This memory is
a better grasp of the imaginative suggestion of the work than one can
subsequently reconstruct from an examination of that work precisely
because of its vague nature, its lack of detail, for it is the very nature
of a literary work that part is swallowed into the whole, that
significance is cumulative. The examinaton of the work that accompanies
reflection on the first reading is made in order to clarify, that is, to
become aware of distinctions within the imaginative suggestion that will
amount for that suggestion, but these distinctions and connections, if c
their delineation is to faithfully illustrate the imaginative suggestion
of the work, must be those that were contained in the original experience
itself. An opinion of a work, then, is something one starts with, not
something one arrives at. Analysis is not discovering what one thinks of
a work, but why one thinks what one thinks.
In the last chapter I wrote that literary criticism can be called a
discipline only in so far as it postpones the noise of metaphysics, that
is, that taste must be considered as a power of discernment as well as a
state of sensibility. The whole of the discipline of criticism rests on
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Dryden's proposition that figures may 'be hidden sometimes by the address
of the poet' and thus 'work their effect upon the mind without
discovering the art which caused it.'.13S Thus Gerard writes that, 'Our
mental operations, though of all things the most intimately present to us,
are of such a subtile and transitory nature, that, when they are reflected
on, they in a great measure elude our view, and their limits and
distinctions appear involved in obscurity and confusion.',133
It is the critic, it is he who not only feels strongly, but is
also capable of reflecting on his feelings, of accounting for
them, of distinguishing their objects, and tracing out their
causes, that is naturally allowed to take the lead in pronouncing
concerning works of tatse...1/to
This power of discernment is something that has often been insisted on.
Addison, for example, writes that an aspiring critic should read Locke,
for 'an Author who has not learned the Art of distinguishing between
Words and Things, and of ranging his Thoughts, and setting them in
proper Lights, whatever lotions he may have, will lose himself in
Confusion and Obscurity.'; Sainte-Beuve that the proper enquiry of the
critic concerns 'how the work was done, not on what or why.'; and Leavis
that the critic is only such 'in so far as he observes a disciplined
relevance in response, comment and determination of significance,' and
remains concerned with the work 'as something that should contain within
itself the reason why it is so and not otherwise.'.1 A1
The fine distinction, it emerges, is everything in criticism; a simply
plausible account will not do. This is why I have stressed the importance
of wide reading, for every new work we read, by bringing to our notice
the affect of a new configuration of variables, will make us better able
to distinguish between what is essential and what is accidental to an
affect, make us better able to criticize. This places the function of
'critical principles' in a new light. (By 'principles' I here mean not
those concerning the self-consistency of the critical project per se, that
is, such principles as I have tried to establish in this thesis, but
rather those principles that emerge from criticism itself, which are
concerned with what element in a work can be credited with having
produced what affect.) The creation of principles is, indeed, periodically
proposed as the goal of criticism.1 But such an emphasis is misleading,
- 324 -
I n t.. tsf y- p t «? t.- 1\. i o rt
for though principles may emerge and though, as Gerard notes, we tacitly
acknowledge such principles whenever we give reasons for a critical
judgement, these 'principles' must always be held to be more provisional
than any in science.1 Given the invisibility of rhetoric and the
difficulty of accounting for every variable that may be operative in any
effect, one should set out on any particular criticism with the aim more
of modifying than confirming them; as if, indeed, each work were the
first work one had ever read. With regard to criticism one's acquaintance
with literature comes into play when, having formulated a causal
connection between the work and its affect one tests this formulation
against past experience. I may, indeed, have to replace my formula with
some other description, but only in the interests of becoming truer to
the actual affect I first felt.
In general we can say that every enquiry begins with an assertion
that is vague and complex, and proceeds by replacing it, where passible,
with a number of separate but more precise assertions, each one of which
will be less complex than the original. We may analyse a complex
assertion into several separate ones, some of which are true and some
false - this is what happens when an old theory gives way to a better
one - but a vague assertion may be neither. The force of any
generalization depends on the amount that it excludes; its ability to lead
us to expect one thing instead of another, one state of affairs rather
than another. A proposition, or hypothesis, which is consistent with
anything whatsoever, in the sense that nothing can count as refuting it,
explains nothing.
Perhaps the most striking and consistent example of criticism as
accounting for effect that comes to mind is De Quincey's 'On the Knocking
at the Gate in Macbeth';
From my boyish days I had always felt a great perplexity on one
point in Macbeth. It was this The knocking at the gate which
succeeds to the murder of Duncan produced to my feelings an
effect for which I never could account. The effect was that it
reflected back upon the murder a peculiar awfulness and a depth
of solemnity; yet, however obstinately I endeavoured with my
understanding to comprehend this, for many years I never could
see why it should produce such an effect. Here I pause for one
moment, to exhort the reader never to pay any attention to his
understanding when it stands in opposition to any other faculty
of his mind.1-4"1
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He recounts how despite that his reason told him the passage could not
produce the effect it did, he 'waited and clung to the problem until
further knowledge should enable me to solve it.'.1"-5 He finally does so by
analogy;
Or, if the reader has ever been present in a vast metropolis on
the day when some great national idol was carried in funeral
pomp to his grave, and, chancing to walk near the course through
which it passed, has felt powerfully, in the silence and
desertion of the streets, and in the stagnation of ordinary
business, the deep interest which at that moment was possessing
the heart of man, - if all at once he should hear the death-like
stillness broken up by the sound of wheels rattling away from
the scene, and making known that the transitory vision was
dissolved, he will be aware that at no moment was his sense of
the complete suspension and pause in ordinary human concerns so
full and affecting as at that moment when the suspension ceases,
and the goings-on of human life are suddenly resumed. All action
in any direction is best expounded, measured, and made
apprehensible, by reaction.1
To paraphrase, or even quote in part, the way in which this insight is
applied by De Quincey to the scene in Macbeth could not do justice to
that application. I therefore refer the reader to the original. It is
short, apparently full of digressions, and without any specific references
to or quotations from the play, but it is also appears to me to be one of
the most purely critical pieces in the history of criticism. What is
interesting to note about the process De Quincey describes is that he has
had to wait for the rhetoric of the scene to discover itself to him.
Rather as with a dream, deliberate self-analysis emerges as an obstacle
to self-knowledge. It is for this reason that criticism to order can be
described as one of the greatest enemies of sound criticism, for it
encourages the construction of makeshift explanations, encourages one to
find a reason rather than the reason far affect, and, ultimately, to the
misrepresentation of that affect in the interests of consistent argument
- to a reductio ad rationem. But De Quincey's account could serve not
simply as an example of the critical process, for it also
(coincidentally?) contains a description of the analysis of literary
metaphysics per se, in that a metaphysic only appears as such, only
allows its significance to appear as a construct, in the cessation of its
immediate significance for me, that is, through contrast or reaction.
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In what has been said so far many of the reasons for my preferring
to approach the work on the basis of its imaginative suggestion, that is,
its literariness, will have been made clear, however, given that this
method is both laborious, and less 'conclusive' than that which
elucidates the work thematically, it will be as well to recall what was
said about evaluation in the last chapter. Its advantage is principally
that it is closest to the experience of reading, to what is actually in
the work itself, and thus to the true basis of evaluation. This makes it
more relevant to what I believe to be the main point of criticism - the
exploration of literary taste as an integral part of thought and feeling,
for literary taste is no more than intellect and feeling as experienced in
the interaction of the individual imagination with the work.
The metaphysic, however, in contrast to the themes we may find, can
only be given in blurred outline. It is, by definition, the suggestion of
the whole and is only manifested in the whole, and yet, in delineating
and illustrating it, I am constrained to use such connections as
'contributes to' and 'another aspect of and to describe it in a reductive,
sequential pattern. The critical process, then, almost invariably, falsely
implies a starting point in our conception of the work, for, at least at
the stage of reflection, each element is a factor in the nature of every
other, each occasion presupposes the antecedent world as active in its
own nature.1 Air This mutual immanence is a natural fact of the work that
cannot easily be represented in criticism, though without it criticism
would have no subject. This difficulty is related to another problem, that
of the 'hermeneutic circle', which it will be well to consider here, for
despite the relationship it would be a great mistake to identify the two.
Dilthey describes this 'general difficulty of all interpretation' thus;
'The whole of a work must be understood from individual words and their
combination but full understanding of an individual part presupposes
understanding of the whole.'.1 The notion of the hermeneutic circle,
then, is that there is no starting point for understanding, no
«►
understanding without presupposition. The concept of mutual immanence
appears to confirm this, for we might say that in the literary work each
sentence, with regard to significance, follows from its succesor. Spitzer
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applies this idea to the creation of the critical work in the following
manner;
Why do I insist that it is impossible to offer the reader a
step-by-step rationale to be applied to a work of art? For one
reason, that the first step, on which all may hinge, can never be
planned: it must already have taken place. The first step is the
awareness of having been struck by a detail, fallowed by a
conviction that this detail is connected basically with the work
of art; it means that one has made an "observation," - which is
the starting point of a theory, that one has been prompted to
raise a question - which must find an answer....The inference
from "patterns" is nothing but an anticipation of a whole deduced
from the known examples.1
The critic, according to Spitzer, must 'work from the surface to the
"inward life-center" of the work: first observing details about the
superficial appearance of the particular work...then, grouping these
details and seeking to integrate them into a creative principle...and,
finally, making the return trip to all the other groups of observations in
order to find whether the "inward form" one has tentatively constructed
gives an account of the whole.'.1®0 That is, the critic passes from the
style to its 'psychological etymon', the 'radix' in the writer's soul,
which is the Weltanscauung of that writer/work.1®1 This 'psychological
etonym' is 'a kind of solar system into whose orbit all categories of
things are attracted: language, motivation, plot, are only satellites of
this mythological entity'.1®2 Although Spitzer places this 'psychological
etonym' in the mind of the author it is not necessarily an
intentionalistic concept, and we can, for the present purpose, identify it
with what I have called the metaphysic of the work. However Spitzer
believes that the hermeneutic circle means that intuition must be a
necessary component of criticism, for this mens, which creates a unity in
the style of the work, can be initially no more then a hypothesis for the
critic.1 ®3
But though understanding is sequential, in that we can identify it
with the first reading (which cannot be other than sequential), while
criticism may be about the first reading it is not that first reading.
Spitzer's position presupposes that criticism, as the activity of creating
a critique, is simultaneous with reading - which it is not. This mens or
'psychological etanym', what Croce calls the 'generating motif which
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shapes and animates' the work as a whole, is necessarily not an
hypothesis, or belief, far the affect of the work is known, is a given for
criticism.1 SA The 'inward form' is immediately present in the experience
of the work as a whole; what the critic seeks is the means of
transmission, that is, the source, Criticism, then, does not involve us in
the hermeneutic circle for we are not seeking to discover something which
we must already have found in order to know what we are looking for,
rather we are asking 'How did I discover what I have?'. This search may,
as I have said above, enable the critic to formulate more precisely this
etonym or metaphysic, but this is itself only giving a more faithful
reconstruction of the original significance as it first struck one, before
one had formulated it.
I wrote above that the mutual immanence of the elements of a work
cannot easily be represented in criticism, though without this mutual
immanence criticism would have no subject. Criticism would have no
subject because this mutual immanence is simply a reflection of the fact
that form and content are inseparable within literature, that is, that no
element in the text is surplus or contingent when that text is considered
as a literary work. Criticism, however, must necessarily introduce what we
might call, borrowing a term from Derrida, differance. This manifests
itself in two ways : Firstly, the deferral of significance we must make
in reading is almost inevitably erased by the omniscience of hindsight in
writing the criticism itself. Secondly, there is the substitution of
elements and the reversal of relationships that we mentally rehearse in
trying to discover the precise source of an affect, which, while arising
from a recognition of the inseparabilty of form and content, appears at
the same time to treat the two as separate.1 ss This substitution and
reversal, by which we arrive at why the work is as it is, why it has this
effect, is even less likely to be explicit, either to the critic, or in the
criticism. "But it just says..." complains the ani-interpreter, yet change
one word and the entire effect is different.1 se
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Throughout this thesis I have tried to serve a maieutic function with
regard to certain themes in the history of literary theory, to make
explicit certain ideas only latent in this tradition. Thus, for example, I
have tried to show how far the limits of 'truth to life' can extend before
we begin to involve ourselves with non-literary standards, what the
notion of non-paraphrasability implies about the relationship betwen farm
and content, and how the justification of literature must always involve
the justifying of rhetoric. But above all I have tried to demonstrate how
everything that can be meaningfully said about literature points towards
its being essentially metaphorical. (If I have leaned more towards the
history of criticism prior to the beginning of this century, despite that,
in terms of volume, this might seem an inbalance, it is because it is
only what is said in wonder, in admiration, and, perhaps, in puzzlement
that really reveals the paradoxical nature of literature - what has been
written with one eye on literature and one eye on theoretical consistency
almost inevitably misses its mark.) Coming now towards the end I wish to
turn to one last 'moment' in this tradition, a point at which several of
the latent ideas I have been concerned with brush so close together as to
almost constitute an explicit statement of one of the main theses of this
work. This is De Quincey's description of the 'literature of power';
There is, first, the literature of knowledge; and, secondly, the
literature of power. The function of the first is - to teach; the
function of the second is - to move : the first is a rudder; the
second, an oar or sail. The first speaks to the mere discursive
understanding; the second speaks ultimately, it may happen, to
the higher understanding or reason, but always through affections
of pleasure and sympathy. Remotely, it may travel towards an
object seated in what Lord Bacon calls dry light; but,
proximately, it does and must operate, else it ceases to be a
literature of power, on and through that humid light which
clothes itself in the mists and glittering iris of human
passions, desires, and genial emotions....What do you learn from
"Paradise Lost?" Nothing at all,...Vhat you owe to Milton is not
any knowledge, of which a million separate items are still but a
million of advancing steps on the same earthly level; what you
owe, is power, that is, exercise and expansion to your latent
capacity of sympathy with the infinite, where every pulse and
each separate influx is a step upwards - a step ascending as
upon a Jacob's ladder from earth to mysterious altitudes above
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the earth. All the steps of knowledge, from first to last, carry
you further on the same plane, but could never raise you one foot
above your ancient level of earth : whereas, the very first step
in power is a flight - is an ascending movement into another
element where earth is forgotten.157
Here we have the rejection of direct referentiality, and the emphasis upon
an appeal 'through affections of pleasure and sympathy', but here also
there is the movement towards transcendentalism, towards 'sympathy with
the infinite' in a realm 'where earth is forgotten.'. But what is this
realm? It is, according to De Quincey, that of the 'great moral capacities
of man'.1ES It is true, then, that literature teaches nothing, for their is
no knowledge to be communicated in this realm. (At the most we may learn
about ourselves, through reaction.) It is giving the world ad hominem.
Scriptures speak not of the understanding, but of the "the
understanding heart," - making the heart, i.e., the great intuitive
(or non-discursive) organ, to be the interchangeable formula for
man in his highest state of capacity for the infinite. Tragedy,
romance, fairy tale, or epopee, all alike restore to man's mind
the ideals of justice, of hope, of truth, of mercy, of retribution,
which else (left to the support of daily life in its realities)
would languish for want of sufficient illustration....What is
didactic poetry?...The predicate destroys the subject : it is a
case of what logicians call contradictio in adjecto - the
unsaying by means of an attribute the very thing which is the
subject of that attribute you have just affirmed. Ho poetry can
have the function of teaching.,..Poetry, or any one of the fine
arts (all of which alike speak through the genial nature of man
and his excited sensibilities), can teach only as nature teaches,
as forests teach, as the sea teaches, as infancy teaches, viz., by
deep impulse, by hieroglyphic suggestion. Their teaching is not
direct or explicit, but lurking, implicit, masked in deep
incarnations,1E9
Which is to say that is 'impresses'. But what is it that speaks to the
understanding of the heart, that speaks to the excited sensibility in
terms of the reality of ideals? Poetry does not teach, writes De Quincey,
and poetry teaches 'as nature teaches, as forests teach, as the sea
teaches, as infancy teaches, viz., by deep impulse'. This is his own
contradictio in adjecto. Perhaps he has in mind Wordsworth's 'impulse
from a vernal wood', which again can 'teach' the 'heart* ('That watches and
receives') about good and evil.1EO But this 'impulse' also echoes another
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- that 'impulse' which, according to De Quincey is the goal of rhetoric.
That which speaks to the understanding of the heart, which impresses
without passing on knowledge is rhetoric, or, more particularly, the
rhetoric of metaphysics. And perhaps this is why De Quincey feels he must
try, as we saw Mazzoni, Bacon, Wordsworth, Hazlitt, Newman, Mill, James,
and Robbe-Grillet also try, to dissociate the description of literature
from the description of didacticism, or spiritual colonialism, which it
constantly threatens to become. At the best, as we saw with Bacon and
Mill, all that can be achieved is a distinction between two types of
rhetoric.
Thus those writers who emphasize the unique nature of art, that is,
those writers who wish art to be valued 'for its own sake', almost
invariably tend towards a realization of its rhetorical nature. 'A Truth
in art', writes Wilde, echoing De Quincey's definition of the questions to
which rhetoric applies, 'is that whose contradictory is also true.'.161 But
the same 'realization', less self-consciously expressed, lies dormant in
Hazlitt's declaration that nothing is a subject for poetry 'that admits of
dispute.', in Wordsworth's opinion that the 'truth' of poetry does not
stand upon 'external testimony, but is carried alive into the heart by
passion', and in Gadamer, when he writes, 'That truth is experienced
through a work of art that we cannot attain in any other way constitutes
the philosophic importance of art, which asserts itself against ail
reasoning.'.16,2 It is also there in those innumerable writers,
representing almost every critical school, who make of literature what I
have called 'a correpondence course in the University of Life', that is,
who write as if literature could 'tell', or 'show', or 'provide data'. (From
a rhetorical point of view, the definition of rhetoric as the giving of
judgements an cases in which no basis can be found for decision, places
rhetoric within the category of aporos, which Fortunatanius classifies
under asystata, that is, those issues which have no right to be
considered at all! 1S3)
We are all sometimes like Vathek, we wish to know even such sciences
as do not exist, and cannot exist; sciences of fate, of God, of love,
Literature, as affirmation, is a means, both inside and outside of
criticism, for the tacit construction of such sciences, Just as
philosophical metaphysics and those expressions, the main power of which
relies on the distortion of logical syntax in the direction of the
- 332 -
I n -t.& v% pi v4 » t.. <ih 1 on
desirably impossible, literature too provides us with a vehicle, in the
form of metaphor, of poetical conceit, by which our fears are overcome or
given in to, our desires neglected or affirmed, in which what we want (or
perhaps know?) of reality is manifest to our own satisfaction. To
contrast philosophical and literary metaphysics is, however, a false way
of approaching the problem. Metaphysicality may appear in philosophy only
where philosophy is not philosophy, where it is primarily literary, in
that we find it beautiful (the persuasive expression of a desirable
impossibility). From the point of view of literature, as an evaluative or
aesthetic category, we may say, then, that metaphysicality is the property
of an expression which makes it literary. If we look back now at the
problem posed in the conclusion to Chapter 1 (that is, what form of
analogy is involved in the relationship between scientific and
metaphysical analogy) we might now say that analogy is what appears in
science, but that when this analogy is misunderstood, or when our
interest stops with its expression isolated from its scientific
usefulness, then we have metaphor in the literary sense. It does not
matter which word ('analogy' or 'metaphor') we assign to which type of
discourse (science or literature), so long as we recognize that they are
distinguished by our state in contemplating them. Perhaps 'metaphor'
should be reserved for literature, since, while scientific analogy can be
taken in a metaphysical/literary way, that is, as metaphor, metaphor in
literature cannot be taken in a scientific way - though it is, in fact,
just this momentary taking in a scientific way which produces
metaphysics. As we have seen, it is only by denying the figurativeness of
the metaphysical assertion that it can be made an assertion about the
world, though it exists only by virtue of this f igurativeness. The
significance of the metaphysical is that nostalgia left behind by its
cancelling out what it appears to assert. If the aesthetic appears
disinterested, that is, independent of the will and intellect, it is
because the appeal of metaphysics must always run counter to reason -
for we do not allow the metaphysical assertion to collapse on itself, to
totally disappear. The pleasure of the beautiful, then, is always a
pleasure derived from the momentary abnegation of reason.
To describe the impression that poetry leaves in the human mind,
the word "melancholy" was spontaneously born on man's lips. And
indeed the conciliation of the opposites, in whose conflict alone
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life throbs; the vanishing of passion, which together with
suffering bring an indefinable but volutptuous warmth; the
detachment from terrestrial surroundings, which render us brutal,
even if they are the surroundings where we enjoy, suffer, and
dream; this elevation of poetry to the heavens - all is like a
looking back, with no regret, but at the same time not without
tears....A veil of sadness seems to envelop beauty, but it is not
a veil: it is the very face of beauty.1 ^
The aesthetics of Benedetto Croce, from whom the above quotation comes,
is constantly poised on the edge of this realization that the
'conciliation of opposites' which the aesthetic is said to produce is in
fact the self-contradiction of metaphysics. (His assertion that, in the
aesthetic, language is its own end, leads him to speak of the concept of
'art for art's sake' as 'unchallengeable and indeed a "truism"
or...tautology'.ies) We look back without regret because we appear to find
the solution to the 'brutality' of thwarted transcendence, the sadness
enters in because this transcendence thwarts itself. The aesthetic, then,
can be described as that state or act wherein I decieve myself as to the
epistemological content of the work. Can we ask for a characterization of
this deception? This question makes no sense, for we are asking for what
we already have, indeed, for that which we had to begin with - the
aesthetic. (The problem is to recognize the solution as such.) But it is
precisely because the aesthetic is that which I wish to remain ineffable
that the subjects of aesthetics and literary theory are so replete with
paradox with contradictio in adjecto, that the definiition of the
aesthetic itself is almost invariably paradoxical.
This truth about art is implicit in the first instance of the use of
the word aesthetic in connection with it, in Baumgarten's Reflections on
Poetry. He there defines that which is aesthetic in contrast to logic,
which he describes as 'the science of knowing things philosophically,
that is...the science for the direction of the higher cognitive faculty in
apprehending the truth'.1SS
The Greek philosphers and the Church fathers have already
carefully distinguished between things perceived...and things
known...It is entirely evident that they did not equate things
known with things of sense, since they honoured with this name
things also removed from sense (therefore, images). Therefore,
things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the
object of logic; things perceived tare to be known by the
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inferior faculty as the object] of the science of perception, or
aesthetic.1 e7>
We cannot know what is not true. What is aesthetic is what we do not
make known to ourselves. That he does not equate perception with the
visual can be discovered from the course of his argument.1 ee The 'lower
cognitive faculty', that which perceives the perfect sensate discourse of
the poetic, may be equated with De Quincey's 'heart', that which will
respond to rhetoric. For the defining property of the 'sensate' for
Baumgarten is its indistinctness; thus he describes desire as 'sensate',
in that it may derive 'from a confused representation of the good'.ies"
If my evaluation of a work changes, then, from day to day it is
because my 'conception' of my life changes from day to day. Though I
bring presuppositions to the work it does not follow from this that I
presuppose the nature of the work. (We have seen, however, with New
Criticism, how such presuppositions can enter in.) Rather the relationship
between before and after the work is always, within limits, an undecided
one, for my life is something that constantly lies before me, as a
possibility, my reality is always a series of from now on'a.170 A critical
method which, instead of concentrating on literature's metaphorical
rendering of affective experience, its interpretation of life, treats it as
a report of abjective truth which can be superimposed upon experience,
which instead of seeing it as a manifestation of that desire which can
only be fulfilled by metaphysics, sees it as information about the world,
introduces an artificiality into its account of our experience of reading.
The work does not show us anything; it either tries to suggest something
to us, or reminds us of something. Metaphorical aptness is not scientific
truth, thus, though, while actually reading, the idealization of the
metaphysic must perforce stand between us and reality, if we do not
afterwards set it in its rightful place, that is, beside reality, we
involve ourselves in a morass of deception, of artificial perception and
sentiment, for just in so far as we concern ourselves only with
emotionally neutral elucidation of what seems most systematically
organized in the work - its themes - just in so far do we sever that
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connection with the world which gives the work its significance, or
denies the work its significance.
But no metaphysic, it would appear, can be more true than another. If,
then, aesthetic value lies in the metaphysic, should we not conclude that
there is nothing to choose between works, and nothing to do in the way
of interpretation but explode their metaphysicality? What, then, of the
critical approach which concentrates on the imaginative suggestion, of
the work? At this stage it is easier for me to explain how one might
proceed with a metaphysic with which one is not in sympathy, though, of
course, one can say nothing about a work without that degree of sympathy
which constitutes understanding. The first means is by constructing an
agument which takes as its premiss something that is assumed in the
metaphysic, and deducing a consequence from it that would be unacceptable
either to one's audience or to the more explicit intentions of the
metaphysic. (By "intentions' I mean not those of the author but rather
those intentions made explicit by the placing of emphasis within the work
- what is made the centre of attention, where, and for how long.) This
procedure of demonstrating that the first stated principles of a position
require a conclusion that the holder of the position themselves would
find repugnant, is the usual way in which arguments on value are carried
out, since, as we saw in the last chapter, without certain shared criteria
of value no argument as to comparative value is possible. This assumes a
shared contextual background of values, certain common concerns, in one's
audience, however remote from the multitude of explicitly stated ones,
but, insofar as the alternative of not making this assumption is not to
discuss questions of value at all and, therefore, never to find out
whether it is the case or not, we can pragmatically justify the adaption
of this assumption.
Though by far the easiest thing to do with a metaphysic, from an
analytical point of view, is to explode it, to be worth criticizing a work
must first of all be worth reading, and this description seems to limit
criticism only to an anti-aesthetic, a philosophical, role. Perhaps the
usefulness, or even greatness, of any piece of criticism, of whatever
persuasion, lies in showing us that a work is interesting and
entertaining in a way we might not have discovered for ourselves. Yet
there is more than a little truth in Poe's assertion that 'poetical
excellence' is not excellence if it require to be demonstrated as such: -
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and thus, to point out too particularly the merits of a work of art, is to
admit that they are not merits altogether.'.171 Why this might be so we
have seen from the description of the metaphysicality of the aesthetic.
Does a recognition of the nature of the aesthetic, then, bring us
inevitably back to the idea of the ineffability of literature? If this
were so it would certainly account for the notion of the criticial
process as itself not open to analysis, as what Plato would have called
an arete, something that can be learnt by experience but. the principles
of which cannot be communicated. This belief has been expressed by
several critics. Thus Arnold, for example, having given a collection of
lines from Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton, writes;
If we are thoroughly penetrated by their power, we shall find
that we have acquired a sense enabling us, whatever poetry may
be laid before us, to feel the degree in which a high poetical
quality is present or wanting there. Critics give themselves
great labour to draw out what in the abstract constitutes the
characters of a high quality of poetry. It is much better simply
to have recourse to concrete examples; - to take specimens of
poetry of the high, the very highest quality, and to say: The
characters of a high quality of poetry are what is expressed
there....But if we are asked to define this mark and accent tof
great poetry] in the abstract, our answer must be: No, for we
should thereby be darkening the question, not clearing it. The
mark and accent are as given by the substance and matter of that
poetry, by the style and manner of that poetry, and all other
poetry which is akin to it in quality.17:2
Poe too, in his 'The Poetic Principle' seeks to convey his 'conception' of
this principle by quoting a collection of poems which he believes
demonstrate it.173 'Even the most accomplished of critics', writes Eliot,
'can, in the end, only point to the poetry which seems to him to be the
real thing.'.1
What then of discernment? Of the reconstruction of reading? Here is
an impasse. Reference to experience does not help; memory tells one that
this or that piece of criticism encouraged one to read, or reread, or
'illuminated', that work, but on returning to the criticism in question one
finds that it rarely achieved this by 'critical' means, that is, by
statements about the work consistent with its being a literary work.
Thus, for example, it has been, strangely enough, historical criticism, or
perhaps it would be better to say, literary history, which has most often
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served, for me, the ends that are traditionally proposed for criticism.
This fact has much puzzled me, for such historically orientated studies,
as I have written elsewhere, cannot be identified with literary criticism
as a discipline in itself, But I believe the solution to this puzzle may
lie in the fact that an historical study, in telling me about a work while
placing it in a strange and exotic context (its period), foreshadows the
experience of reading, in that it makes the work seem at once strange,
exotic, uncanny, an adventure that is ultimately intelligible only in
terms of a leap of sensibility. Strictly literary criticism, on the other
hand, appropriates the work, for if it can be mediated in this way for
me then it is part of the 'new', amenable to what I already know, and
therefore uninteresting. This is a paradox to which there seems no
solution. For when you read, inspired by criticism, you read to confirm or
confute, to explore other avenues of the present, the all-too-narrow
present, and this is no adventure. Perhaps, then, the most criticism can
hope to do is to replace, by whatever means, the puzzled or indifferent
distance with a more enticing one, to prompt curiousity, to encourage the
reader to pay attention. This distance must remain, however, an absolute
distance, a distance I can only bridge imaginatively. Thus when I read
about Seneca's career under Hero I am placed at an intriguing distance;
when I read of Eliot 'dining at his club' I am simply estranged. Perhaps I
could say, then, that this distance is itself an aesthetic one, in that its
truth does not matter.
Since poetry, or literariness, depends on that moment when we
entertain the existence of a desirable impossibility, and on letting that
moment pass as what it is, on metaphysicality, we can, in one sense,
speak of destroying it by analysis. For in directly addressing what is
said, in seeking to halt the moment and examine it, we take away all that
poetry consists of. The individual work, or the moment can reconstitute
itself, the reader may gather up its pieces, and it may thus become again,
even for the critic, simply the poetical moment. But is this direct
address, the address of analysis, anti-literary and therfore uncritical?
It is true that it can concern itself with the literariness of literature,
but at the same time it will not answer the traditional end of criticism
as the 'handmaid of the Muse', as seconding art. Perhaps, then, it is best
not to address the poetical directly, with analysis, but rather to
approach it obliquely, to illuminate rather than dismantle, to recall the
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moment rather than record its passing; to talk of literature in terms
derived from its own essential nature, to be poetical about poetry. It may
be so.
Telling the truth about a work is something quite different from
being truthful about a work - in the sense that discernment and
particular analysis aim at truthfulness, aim at being truthful accounts.
There is another 'moment' in the history of criticism, or poetics, which,
like the echoes of De Quincey's definition of rhetoric in his description
of the 'literature of power', appears to me as especially revelatory. It is
J.Middleton Murray, in, aptly enough, an essay on metaphor;
Probably the world of true imagination of which these miracles
are the common substance is for ever inviolable by intellectual
analysis. Even to apprehend its subject-matter the intellect must
suffer a sea-change, so that it is no longer itself and cannot
perform its proper function. Restore its power to the intellect
again, and that which it seeks to understand has ceased to exist
as what it really is.175
I am not suggesting that the interpretation of literature is impossible,
not in the sense, at least, in which those writers against interpretation
such as Hegel or Poulet, imply that it is impossible. Rather I am
suggesting that the perfection of those 'methodical', 'analytical'
approaches to literature which constitute criticism as a discipline, can
only result in the bypassing of what is essentially literary about
literature. Such criticism is merely an attempt to square the circle, In
contrast, discussion of a work that is truly aesthetic, that is, criticism
made up of statements about the work consistent with its being a work
must, so to speak, abandon geometry. Why, then, have I spent so many
pages arguing for rationality in criticism? Because the irrational,
illogical, elements of criticism I have addressed - the reference to
'realism' as a standard for literature, the separation of form and
content, the notion of literature as a matter of knowledge, the idea of
value-free criticism - are all attempts to make the experience of
literature something other than it is, are all a reductlo ad rationem of
the aesthetic, a 'de-aestheticizing' of the aesthetic.
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In Chapter 3 I argued that if literature was to be meaningful it must
be amenable to paraphrase but that it is not paraphrasable as literature.
I have rejected the idea of the ineffability of literature here for the
same reason. (We do not, of course, have any qualms about making explicit
what is implicit in works we dislike - they are 'failures of art'.) The
notion of transcendence always involves, we might say 'exists for the
sake of, positing a distance - the distance between that which
transcends and that which is transcended - as a value. But we might
equally say that literature, as a use of language, does not 'come up to'
that, the world, which it has so often been said to surpass, to transcend.
All transcendence, since there are no two sides to language, is this - a
'falling short' that produces the illusion of meaning I have called
'significance'. The 'restored intellect' thus always finds that the
aesthetic 'has ceased to exist as what it really is.'. The great difficulty
here, particularly as we are so accustomed to the emotional charge of the
idea of transcendence, is not to allow this statement of relative position
to become a statement of comparative value.1The aesthetic, while it
may be the antithesis at reality, is not the antithesis of life; rather it
is a form of life.
That the aesthetic is what we wish to be ineffable is a truth which
everyone who, starting from a love of literature, has gone on to 'do'
literature, will have discovered; the aesthetic apprehension of literature,
that is, the apprehension of its imaginative suggestion, which we begin
with, is the truest apprehension of the aesthetic we will ever have -
critical knowledge serves, in the main, only to erase it. In this sense,
all the various problems I have addressed in this thesis are the same
problem - how to preserve intact, within literary theory, the aesthetic
nature of literature, how to define the text as a literary work. When
criticism does prove useful, in an aesthetic way, it does so, I believe,
either by accident - by creating an intrigue in connection with the work
- or through its suggestiveness, that is, through allowing us to re-
experience some dominant aesthetic quality in the work simply by giving
voice to it. Such suggestive criticism would be Eliot's description of
Donne feeling thought 'as immediately as the odour of a rose', or Renard
describing Mallarme as 'untranslatable, even into French'. Such stray
phrases are, I believe, genuinely aesthetic criticism. (Perhaps the
ambiguity of that last sentence should be left intact?) But the creation
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of such phrases could hardly constitute an academic discipline. What,
then, of the discipline of criticism? Occult criticism (aspectival,
thematic, psychoanalytical, and so on) is worse that useless from an
aesthetic point of view, because the race for ingenuity which it depends
upon is fundamentally anti-aesthetic. 'Particular criticism' (that which
relies on what I have called 'discernment') and literary history are
useful as mental disciplines, in the way that all mental disciplines are,
and do give a knowledge of literature in itself. From the point of view
of aesthetic criticism, of 'saying the aesthetic', they lay the ground,
create an intimacy with literature in which such 'saying' may take place.
However, with regard to the essential nature of the literary all
interpretation, all 'talk about books', is a form of displacement activity
- something we do in the face of that which seems to demand we do





Appndix ; Forrfial :i. s»n*»
By 'formalism' I here mean any approach to the work which is
primarily interested in what it discerns as the formal properties or
structure of the work. In the history of aesthetics in general such an
approach, more often associated with the visual arts, has usually been
part of an attempt to systematize the aesthetic itself, and thereby bring
a certain scientificness to its study. The more contemporary formalistic
approach to literature, represented here by Todorov, Barthes, and
Jakobson, that I want now to consider is not primarily concerned with
measuring the beautiful, but the scientific aspiration is still explicit;
Todorov, for example, writes that 'the structural analysis of literature is
nothing other than an attempt to transform literary studies into a
scientific discipline...a coherent body of concepts and methods aiming at
the knowledge of underlying laws.'.1 Barthes, too, considers that the
'text', at the same time as it is 'a critical value' is also 'a scientific
(or at the very least, epistemological) concept', and he is concerned to
show that discourse has its 'units, its rules, its grammar', that a
discourse is, indeed, 'a long "sentence"' and the proper object of a
'second linguistics', just as the sentence is itself the object of existing
linguistics.2 It is, then, the discernment of the language (langue) of
which each narrative is an 'utterance' (parole), that is Barthes' aim.3
Jakobson proposes a similar project; 'the history of literature (art),
being simultaneous with other historical series, is characterized, as is
each of those series, by a complex network of specific structural laws.
Without an elucidation of these laws it is impossible to establish in a
scientific manner the correlation between the literary series and other
historical series.'.4 Jakobson, therefore, holds that 'the essential
literary-critical question' is the 'individuality and comparative
characteristics of poems, poets, and poetic schools', and, like Barthes,
believes that this is a question that 'can and should be posed in the
realm of grammar.\s In an essay by Jakobson, such as that on Yeats'
'Sorrow of Love', there is much detailed talk of -ing-forms, nouns,
prenominal and post positive attributes, pronouns, adverbs, articles,
connectives, finite verbs, sound, predication, and the coordination and
subordination of clauses; but what, one might ask, does 'Doomed like
Odysseus' mean, what is its effect?® He concludes an essay on two poems
by Puskin by writing that, despite 'their differences, both "I loved you"
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("Ja vas ljubil") and "What is there for you in my name?" ("Cto u imeni
tebe maem?') illustrate essential features on Puskin's poetic grammar, in
particular, his sliding between juxtaposed grammatical categories, eg,,
different cases or different combinatory meanings of one and the same
case, in a word, his continual change of focus.'.7 This seems all very
well, but how would this account for the fact that the first poem,
according to the translation, is very 'weak' and the second very 'strong'?
These are not, of course, the correct questions to be asking, they are
evaluative questions and Jakobson's very project is a levelling one - to
find the grammar of the poem, the poet, and the poetic school.8 Likewise
in Jakobson and Levi-Strauss' essay on Baudelaire's 'Les Chats' what is
recognizably literary criticism, in a loose traditional sense, seems all
confined to a few remarks at the end of the detailed formal analysis.8
Such analyses are primarily contributions to linguistics, as is a
'structural' analysis like Barthes' 'The Struggle with the Angel', though
here it is a prototypic linguistics that is the goal, the 'second
linguistics' which he outlines in his 'Introduction to the Structural
Analysis of Narratives'.10 But are these also a contribution to the study
of literature? This is a question I cannot answer with a simple yes or
no, for certainly the details which such essays address are the same
details as the critic addresses, and yet, I would argue, they are essays
in linguistics rather than criticism.
Barthes describes the 'goal of all structuralist activity, whether
reflexive or poetic', as the 'reconstruction' of 'an "object" in such a way
as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning of this object.',11 This
description, allowing for a certain rhetoric in terms such as
'reconstruction' and 'object', could also apply to that form of literary
criticism which is principally interested in affect, indeed Barthes'
project in 'The Structural Analysis of Narratives' is comparable in
certain ways to that • which I will undertake in more "technical" parts of
this thesis. Yet, and here lies the difference, my theoretical exposition
is intended to serve as a basis, an anchor perhaps, for discussion of the
form that literary interpretation or criticism can take, that is, it is in
no way intended as an end in itself. Johnson wrote that 'however minute
the employment may appear of analysing lines into syllables, and whatever
ridicule may be incurred by a solemn deliberation upon accents and
pauses, it is certain that without this petty knowledge no man can be a
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poet, and that from the proper dispositions of single sounds results that
harmony that adds force to reason and gives grace to sublimity, that
shackles attention and governs passion.'; an observation that the critic
should take to heart, for the way in which the work 'shackles attention
and governs passion', that is, the rhetoric of the work, is the province
of the critic.12 This does not entail, however, that the critical work
should be an inventory of metre and phonetics, for while I agree
completely that, in the unfortunate phrase of the school Jakobson
epitomizes, the 'proper decoding' of the work depends upon a consideration
of the minutiae of its structure, and that this is an end in itself for
the linguistic essay, which has as its final goal a comprehensive theory,
it is only the groundwork for the critic, who is principally interested in
the individuality of the work. Moreover it is a groundwork which need not
necessarily appear at all in the critical essay. If everything one wants
to say can be traced back to the words of the work why then produce
evidence of this, why not simply assume the connection? One addresses
readers, after all. Rather as I.A.Richards does in his Principles of
Literary Criticism, the formalist or structuralist approach begins 'too
far back' for its methods to be of any direct use in discussing the finer
nuances of literary effect, and thus, in an essay which attempts to
combine the two disciplines, the final impression is often of a small
insight squeezed out of a heap of technicalities; an insight, moreover,
which might have been obtained with much less trouble to the reader.13
It is not, then, so much a matter of what is to be looked at, as of
what is to be talked about, for linguistics is to criticism what forestry
is to piano-playing. In Chapter 4, 5, and 6 I will be much concerned with
literature as rhetoric and criticism as the analysis of rhetoric but here,
in discussing formalism, it will be well for me to explain why I would
distinguish my approach from a formalist one. Barthes, in the essay
mentioned above, specifically states that the 'linguistics of discourse' he
proposes once bore the name of 'Rhetoric', and in an essay written in the
same year, called 'Rhetorical Analysis', declares that it is rhetoric that
makes 'a verbal message a work of art'.1-4 He goes on to describe how the
'sign' of the text is formed by the 'function' of expression, the
'signifiers', and content, the 'signifieds'; a distinction the usefulness of
which he appears about to renounce when he declares that literature is a
'connotative semiotics' since the signifier 'may' contain a signified that
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'is different from the signifieds of the language', as, for example, Faites
avancer les commodites de la conversation ('Bring forward the comforts of
conversation') which signifies both an instruction and 'preciosity',15
Though he concludes that literature is, therefore, 'specifically a message
which puts emphasis on itself,', his primary interest is in its rhetoric
(again it is made to sound as though it is something the work has!), in
the construction of 'a general system of sub-codes, each of which is
defined in a certain state of society by its differences, its distances,
and its identities with regard to its neighbours', that is, a 'sociology of
forms of classification' - a project that is strangely reminiscent of
Taine's.15 Even at this stage in the argument, if the crudity of the
Sausserian model, and the erroneous belief that all rhetoric is both
'given' and literature, could be overlooked, there appears no a priori
reason why such a project might not be in harmony with, or, indeed, be
the distant goal of, a literary criticism which concerned itself primarily
with affect and the production of affect; but in the final paragraph
Barthes asserts that 'the formal nature of the object [rhetorical
analysis] seeks to study (the literary message) obliges us to describe in
an immanent and exhaustive fashion the rhetorical code (or codes) before
setting this code (or these codes) in relation with the society and
history which produce them and consume them.' - and this, it seems to me,
purely as a matter of logistics, cannot be commensurate with literary
criticism as a subject distinct from linguistics,17 In his 'Introduction
to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' Barthes writes that 'meaning
must be the criterion of the unit : it is the functional nature of certain
segments qf the story that makes them units - hence the name "functions"
immediately attributed to these first units.', but does not appear to
realize that there is no such thing as a non-functional unit in literature
for a 'functional' unit to exist in contrast to, nor that to talk of
significance only at an elementary level is to ignore the significance of
the work as a whole, for to work from such units 'upwards' in an
exhaustive fashion in never to arrive at the work per se.is Auerbach, in
his Mimesis, moves from close stylistic analysis to considerations of
genre and effect that are very broad indeed, but he does so in leaps and
bounds; one realizes very quickly that he is in fact working 'downwards',
that is, justifying to himself, and, more often than not, to the reader,
his overall impression of the work in question.15
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If what balance of stylistic or formal 'criticism' and affective or
impressionistic criticism any theoretical piece is advocating is difficult
to decide until its author begins to apply its principles, how am I here
to distinguish my own approach from that of the 'formalists' described
above?so By the following anecdote from Addison about a pedant;
Upon enquiry I found my learned friend had dined that day with
Mr.Swan, the famous punster; and desiring him to give me some
account of Mr .Swan's conversation, he told me that he generally
talked in the Paranomasia, that he sometimes gave in to the
Plocd, but that in his humble opinion he shone most in the
Antanaclasis .21
The formalist would, theoretically, be quite satisfied by this answer
though they would probably prefer to also have the relevant proportions
and the order of the figures. This is not disparagement - the
rhetoricians interest is rhetoric. Jakobson or Barthes would eventually
use this data to decide what class or group Mr .Swan belonged to and to
advance more general propositions about this class or group, but the
answer, even as it stands, would certainly be useful to them. A much
wider variety of interlocutors, representing a variety of critical
approaches, would find this answer totally inadequate. The reader, that
is, the person who is asking because they are thinking about buying the
book, or inviting Mr .Swan to dinner, would want to know what he said, or
what he was like. My analogy should not be taken as meaning that Mr .Swan
stands for 'the author'; Mr .Swan, on the contrary, is, to all purposes, the
work, for the learned friend can speak with certainty about nothing other
than his experience of Mr .Swan. The psychoanalytical critic, of all
potential critics other than the formalist, might be most interested in
knowing that Mr .Swan used the Paranomasia, Place, and Antanaclasis, for it
may be that such figures, whatever their 'content', follow and reveal the
springs and levers of buried neuroses and psychoses, that is, that they
are the psychological content of the text. For most, however, even if they
were familiar with the specialized vocabulary of rhetoric, such an answer
would seem inadequate, though not irrelevant, because it would not be
sufficient information to form a distinct impression of Mr .Swan's
conversation. My own approach could be characterized by the following two
questions - 'What was it (the meeting) like?' or 'What was he (the work)
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like?', and 'What made you think that?'. 'Like' is, as emerged in Chapter 1,
a word of vague though subtle use, but if, at this stage, you imagine what
sort of information either form of the first question would normally
elicit, and what information about a work would be analogous to it, then
a clear picture begins to emerge. This is, however, something I will
return to. The second of these questions is, in fact, a request for the
sort of information, though a little more detailed, that the learned
friend gives, and if a critique is to be a critique, and not just a bald





Chapter 1 : Metaphor
1. Michel de Montaigne 'Of Experience', The Essays of Michel de Montaigne
(1585-86), translated by Charles Cotton, 3 vols., revised by V.C.Hazlit,
(London, 1926), III, p. 323.
2. Ibid., p. 323.
3. Ibid., p. 338.
4. In conversation they should always appear in this last light, for here
they seem to demand that they should be followed by reverential silence
and they therefore break the rules of spontaneity, free-exchange, and
self-expression which belong to conversation.
5. Francis Bacon 'Of Studies', Essays (1625), many editions.
6. Montaigne Essays, III, p. 322.
7. Montaigne 'Of the Vanity of Vords', Essays, I, p. 352.
8. Aristotle On the Art of Poetry, translated by T.S.Dorsch in Classical
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(ch. 21, p. 61). (Hereafter referred to as Aristotle's Poetics). (Twining
translates this as 'A metaphorical word is a word transferred from its
proper sense', Poetics translated by Thomas Twining (1789) in Aristotle's
Poetics, Demetrius on Style, and Other Classical Writings on Criticism,
edited by T.A.Moxon, (London, 1941), pp. 4-57, (p. 40). S.H.Butcher, in his
Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, (London, 1898), translates it
as 'the application of an alien name by transference', 1457".)
9. Ibid., p. 61, (1457").
10. In Twining's translation our first example is rendered as 'Secure in
yonder port my vessel stands' and the explanantion as 'For to be at
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more clearly metaphorical than the rendering in Dorsch's translation,
though which is more true to the original Greek I cannot say.
11. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 21, p. 61, (1457").
12. Ibid,, p. 61, (1457").
13. Aristotle Rhetorica, translated by V.Rhys Roberts, The Works of
Aristotle Translated into English, edited by W.D.Rass, 11 vols., (Oxford,
1924), XI, 1411".
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14. 'Analogy or proportion is an extra quality which all metaphors
contain, more or less obviously....Aristotle is not very perceptive in
making metaphor by analogy into a separate category since analogy
applies to all metaphors.' Christine Brooke-Rose A Grammar of Hetapbor
(London, 1958), pp. 4, 206. (She also mistakenly asserts that he abandons
the distinction in the Rhetoric.)
15. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1407®. Roberts comments on this passage, in the
index, that Aristotle's analogical or proportional metaphor is 'metaphor
in its modern sense'. This remains to be seen.
16. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 22, p. 65, (1459®). Twining translates this as
'a quick discernment of resemblances', p. 45.
17. Aristotle Rhetorics, 1405®. The distinction between 'kindred' and
'similar' will occur again.
18. For instance, though I cannot see the resemblance, which others can,
between any particular baby and any particular adult, I have no doubt
that, with the aid of careful measurement, its existence could be
demonstrated to me. I would still hesitiate, however, to call it a
likeness.
19. I.A.Richards The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York, 1936), p. 116.
20. The second example is the first sentence of James Joyce's 'The Dead'.
21. Solomon E.Asch 'The Metaphor : A Psychological Enquiry' in Renato
Tagiuri and Luigi Petrullo (eds.) Person Perception and Interpersonal
Behaviour (Stanford, 1958), pp. 86-94.
22. Ibid., p. 89.
23. Likewise 'sharp person' is not the antithesis of 'blunt person', t
Manfred Bierwisch discusses such norms and relational components in non-
metaphorical language in his 'Semantics' in John Lyons (ed.) New Horizons
in Linguistics (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 166-184.
24. Immanuel Kant Critique of Judgement (1790), translated by James
Creed Meredith, (Oxford, 1952), § 59, pp. 222-23.
25. Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 93.
26. C.K.Ogden and I.A.Richards The Meaning of Meaning (London, 1944), p.
111. Cleanth Brooks also speaks of the terms in poetry 'continually
modifying each other, and thus violating their dictionary definitions.'
'The Language of Paradox' in Allen Tate (ed.) The Language of Poetry
(London, 1942), pp. 37-61, (p. 44).
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27. Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 94.
28. Ibid., p. 116.
29. Ibid., p. 94.
30. Max Black 'Metaphor', Models and Metaphors : Studies in Language and
Philosophy (New York, 1962), pp. 25-47, (p. 38). See aslo Vimsatt and
Beardsley; 'in understanding the imaginative metaphor we are often
reduced to consider not how A (vehicle) explains B (tenor), but what
meanings are generated when A and B are confronted or seen each in the
light of the other.' W.K.Wimsatt and Monroe C.Beardsley The Verbal Icon :
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Kentucky, 1954), p. 127. Also Levin; 'the
meanings P and Q fuse into a whole...yet preserving their relative
independence; this results in a fluctuation of perception between P and Q
in which each meaning as it filters through the other'. Yu.I.Levin 'The
Logic of Metaphor' (1969) translated by Christopher English in Russian
Poetics in Translation, vol. 2, Poetry and Prose (Oxford, 1976), pp. 5-21,
(p. 7).
31. Black 'Metaphor', pp. 38-39. This 'interactive' view is anticipated in
Scleiermacher's description of metaphor: 'Upon closer scrutiny this
distinction [between between the literal and the figurative] disappears.
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stands in its own series and should be determined only in those terms.
Therefore, it retains its own meaning. In metaphors this connection is
only suggested, and often only a single aspect of the concept is
emphasized. For example....we speak of the lion as the king of the
animals. But a lion does not govern, and kings are not entitled to devour
others on the principle that "might makes right." Such a single usage of
the word has no meaning, and usually the entire phrase must be given.'
F.D.E.Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819 (1819, 1828) in Hermeneutics : The
Handwritten Manuscripts by F.D.E.Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle,
(1958), translation of second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack
Forstman, (Missoula, 1977), XIV.8.
32. Ibid., p. 39.
33. Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 116.
34. Richards Meaning of Meaning, p. 213.
35. John Press The Fire and the Fountain : An Essay on Poetry (London,
1955), p. 182.
36. Press The Fire and the Fountain, p. 184.
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37. Freudian psychoanalysis is arguably nothing if not a semantic
theory. See Charles Ryecroft 'Introduction : Causes and Meaning' in
Charles Ryecroft <ed.) Psychoanalysis Observed (London, 1966), pp. 7-22.
38. 'To His Coy Mistress', 11. 23-24.
39. Interestingly, to use the seasons metaphorically to apply to the
progress of life is, despite the contrast spoken of, to cast life in a
more optimistic light than some alternative might - the seasons are, or
at least appear, immortal. 'Everything in Nature, by our strange
inclination to Resemblance, shall be brought to represent other things,
even the most remote, especially the Passions and Circumstances of human
Nature in which we are more nearly concern'd.' Francis Hutcheson An
Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), third
edition, (London, 1729), IV, iv.
40. David Hume Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning
the Principles of Morals (1777), edited by L.A.Selby-Bigge, third edition
revised by P.H.Nidditch, (Oxford, 1975), p. 24.
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Criticism, edited by Anthony Seal, (London, 1955), pp. 166-228, (p. 202).
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regard to biblical interpretation: 'As I have already shown, [the writer!
can show examples from other scriptural texts; and if no such examples
are available, he uses his reason: through consideration of the nature of
whatever symbol he is treating he can find the appropriate allegorical or
moral meaning. For example, if the text speaks of precious stones, of
birds, of beasts, or of anything to be taken figuratively, there is always
a connection to be drawn based on the natural qualities; and even if this
is not clearly stated anywhere in the Scriptures, still an examination of
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Sermon Ought to be Given (c.1100), translated by Joseph M.Miller in
Joseph M,Miller, Michael H.Prosser and Thomas V.Benson (eds.) Readings in
Medieval Rhetoric (London, 1973), pp. 162-181, (p. 177).
44. Black 'Metaphor', pp. 40-41.
45. Ibid., p. 46.
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comparison or any other kind of literal statement, but has its own
distinctive capacities and achievements..,.It would be more illuminating in
some of these cases to say that metaphor creates the similarity than to
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Metaphor demands 'simultaneous awareness of both subjects' but is 'not
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being overzealous in defining 'interaction1.
47. Ibid., p. 41.
48. Nelson Goodman Languages of Art : An Approach to a Theory of
Symbols (.London, 1969), p. 71.
49. Ibid., p. 73. Also 'a set of terms, of alternative labels, is
transported; and the organization they effect in the alien realm is guided
by their habitual use in the home realm.' p. 74. A similar point is made
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the Study of Poetical Language' in Thomas A.Sebeok (ed.) Style in Language
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116. E.A.Wallis Budge Egyptian Religion : Egyptian Ideas of the Future
Life (1899), (London, 1979), pp. 3-6.
117. Aristotle Rhetorica, Mil",
118. Joseph Addison The Spectator No. 421, 3 July, 1712.
119. 'The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock', 11. 8-9.
120. C.S.Lewis 'Bluspels and Flalansferes : A Semantic Nightmare' in
Rehabilitations and Other Essays (London, 1939), pp. 133-158, (p. 138).
121. Ibid., p. 142. Hence the two terms in the title,
122. Ibid., pp. 143-44.
123. Ibid., p. 140.
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124. Ibid., p. 141.
125. Ibid., p. 145.
126. Ibid,, pp. 146-47.
127. Whether they are the addition of the carver or the original
observer, or if they entered in at some intermediate stage between the
two, is not material to the argument.
128. This presumes the pupil understands the conventions of
representation, that is, that the word 'elephant' does not refer to the
size, colour, woodenness, and so on, of the carving.
129. This example owes an obvious debt to Wittgenstein, whose later
philosophy arguably proceeds almost exclusively by means of such
suggestive metaphore.
130. 'The home realm of the schema is the country of naturalization
rather than of birth', writes Goodman, for 'what is literal is set by
present practice rather than by ancient history.' Languages of Art, p. 77.
131. Lewis 'Bluspels and Flalansferes', pp. 151-52.
132. Ibid., p. 154.
133. Ibid., p. 151.
134. Ibid., p. 155.
135. See note 8.
136. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 21, p. 62, (1457to).
137. Metaphor 'requires attraction as well as resistance - indeed, an
attraction that overcomes resistance.' Goodman Languages of Art, pp. 69-
70.
138. 'Application of a term is metaphorical only if to some extent
contra-indicated.' Ibid., p. 69,
139. Demetrius On Style, 86, p, 222.
140. Ibid., 87, p. 222. A similar view is taken by Bede; '[CatachresisI
differs from metaphor in that metaphor bestows another name to an object
which already has a name; catachresis makes use of another name because
the object lacks a specific name,' The Venerable Bede Concerning Figures
and Tropes (c.700), translated by Gussie Hecht Tannenhaus, in Joseph
M.Miller et al (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, pp. 96-122, (p. 108).
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This distinction relies on the, untenable, view that metaphor is always a
substitution.
141. Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of language, p. 101.
142. 'We could not "cross kinds" to advantage were such crossings the
usual things - for then we could neither call it crossing nor would we
have kinds t.o cross.' David Burrell Analogy and Philosophical Language
(London, 1973), p. 221.
143. 'What we call literalness is a last stage in a long-drawn-out
historical process.' Owen Barfield 'The leaning of the Word "Literal"' in
L.C,Knights and Basil Cottle (eds.) Metaphor and Symbol, Proceedings of
the Twelfth Symposium of the Colston Research Society, (London, 1960), pp.
48-63, (p. 57).
144. 'The mind will always try to find connections and will be guided in
its search by the rest of the utterance and its occasion....Words are the
occasion and means of that growth which is the minds endless endeavour
to order itself.' Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 126, 131.
145. Some of the classic psychological experiments in concept formation
and language acquisition have been based on such a procedure, See, for
example, Edna Heidbreder 'The attainment of concepts : Terminology and
methodology' Journal of General Psychology, 1946, 35, pp. 173-189. J.Berko
'The child's learning of English morphology' Word, 1958, 14, pp. 150-177.
146. 'Metaphor, or something like it, governs both the growth of language
and our acquisition of it.' W.V.Quine 'A Postscript on Metaphor' in Sacks
On Metaphor, pp. 159-160, (p. 160). Richards Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 92.
147. Friedrich Nietzsche 'On Truth and Lies in a Monmoral Sense' (1873)
in Philosophy and Truth : Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the
early 1870's, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, (Sussex, 1979),
pp. 79-97, (p. 83).
148. Roman Jakobson 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic
Disturbances' in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle Fundamentals of
Language (1956), second edition, (The Hague, 1971), pp. 67-96, (p. 74).
149. As Langer writes, 'the context, seen or stated, modifies the word
and determines just what it means.' Philosophy in a New Key, p. 139.
150. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 22, p. 63, (1458"). There are certain texts,
those for example of Heidegger and Derrida, which have very much the
appearance of riddles to me, simply because of the density of metaphors
and the reliance of the sense on them.
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151. Leech, starting from a similar conception, comes to the conclusion
that the 'linguistic basis of metaphor' is a 'juxtaposition of semantic
incompatibles'. G.N,Leech 'Linguistics and the Figure of Rhetoric' in Roger
Fowler (ed.) Essays on Style and Language : Lingujjtic and Critical S>
Approaches to Literary Style (London, 1966), PP. 135-156, (p. 150).
However, if the terms are simply semantically incompatible then the
expression is meaningless and what we have is nonsense, not metaphor.
152. Quine 'A Postscript on Metaphor', p. 160.
153. Turbayne Myth of Metaphor, p. 4.
154. See Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind (London, 1949), p. 8. Turbayne
does make the comparison.
155. Turbayne Myth of Metaphor, p. 6.
156. While an analogy can suggest a conclusion it cannot, of course,
establish one.
157. Turbayne Myth of Metaphor, p. 4.
158. Ibid., p. 26.
159. Ibid., p. 64.
160. Ibid., p. 64.
161. Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651), (London, 1983), Pt. 1, ch. VIII, pp.
33-34.
162. Ibid., ch. IV, p. 18.
163. Nietzsche 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', p. 81.
164. Ibid., P- 81.
165. Ibid., P- 82.
166. Ibid., PP . 83, 84.
167. Ibid., P- 84.
168. Ibid., PP . 84, 85.
169. Ibid., P- 81.
170. Ibid., P> 79.
- 362 -
No t. *?.•«» • M *.v* t. p |-»o r-
171. How we might characterize, and what terms we might use to
designate, a figure which only appears to be a metaphor is something I
shall take up again at the end of this chapter.
172. Nietzsche 'The Philosopher : Reflections on the Struggle Between Art
and Knowledge' (1872) in Philosophy and Truth, pp. 1-58, (§ 79).
173. Jonathan Culler On Deconstruction : Theory and Criticism after
Structuralism (London, 1985), p. 148.
174. Locke quoted in Paul de Nan 'The Epistemology of Metaphor' in Sacks
On Metaphor, pp. 11-28, (p. 15).
175. Ibid., p. 15. Does 'motion' require this sort of definition?
176. Ibid., p. 14.
177. Ibid., p. 12.
178. De Man's choice is an odd one for Locke demonstrates an unusual
interest in linguistic questions for a seventeenth-century philosopher. In
the chapter before the one which de Man quotes there is a remark very
reminiscent of J.L.Austin : 'The ordinary words of language, and our
common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our
ideas, if they had been but considered with attention.' John Locke An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Abridgement of the 1700 edition),
edited by Raymond Wilburn, (London, 1947), Bk. Ill, ch. VII, 1, p. 235.
Compare; 'It is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our
knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering, first,
the nature, use, and signification of language'. Bk. II, ch. XXXIII, 19, p.
200. See also Bk. IV, ch. XXI, 4.
179. De Man 'The Epistemology of Metaphor', p. 28.
180. Harries makes this point in her distinction between philosophical
and literary metaphors; 'The metaphors of philosophy should thus be
contingent and questionable. They invite paraphrase and interpretation
that has as its goal the recognition that a particular metaphor is
dispensible. Poetic metaphor, too, invites interpretation. But here
interpretation does not have as its goal the recognition of the
metaphor's contingency but rather its necessity. The Poet's incarnation of
meaning forbids translation and paraphrase.' Karsten Harries 'The Many
Uses of Metaphor' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 165-172, (p. 168), I do not
believe, however, that this is a satisfactiory account; understanding may
exclude translation and paraphrase but interpretation does not.
181. Jajoues Derrida 'The Supplement of Copula : Philosophy before c
linguistics' in Margins of Philosophy (1972), translated by Alan Bass,
(Brighton, 1982), p. 178.
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182. Ja^hues Derrida 'White Mythology : Metaphor in the Text of c
Philosophy' in Margins of Philosophy, p. 209.
183. Ibid., p. 212.
184. Anatole France The Garden of Epicurus quoted in Derrida 'White
Mythology', p. 213.
185. Derrida 'White Mythology', p. 213. One might compare Fenollosa; 'Our
ancestors built the accumulations of metaphor into structures of language
' and into systems of thought....Metaphor, [poetry's! chief device, is at
once the substance of nature and of language. Poetry only does
consciously what the primitive races did unconsciously... .Metaphor was
piled upon metaphor in quasi-geological strata....The known interprets the
obscure, -the universe is alive with myth.' Ernest Fenollosa The Chinese
Written Character as a Medium for Poetry (1918), Idiogramic Series I,
edited by Ezra Pound, (London, 1936), pp. 28, 27.
186. Derrida 'White Mythology', p. 253.
187. Ibid., pp. 219-220.
188. Ibid., p. 264.
189. We may presume that he does believe in some type of what Russell
calls an 'object-language', but not in any meaningful discussion of it. See
Bertrand Russell An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth (London, 1940), ch. 4.
190. There is, indeed, a great deal more in Derrida's essay and also a
suggestion that he does not conflate new sense with original sense (p,
270) but the main impetus of the essay is in the idea outlined.
191. Derrida does in fact refer to lietzsche's essay in 'White
Mythology'.
192. In this respect he appears to be arguing that the existence of
terms in a philosophical context in some way precedes their essence,
defining properties, for that context. Such 'existentialist' overtones may
not be accidental; 'deconstruction' can be seen as another expression of
le gout du neant which has been such a recurrent theme in French
intellectual life this century.
193. J.L.Austin Sense and Sensihilia (Oxford, 1962), p. 63.
194. 'The only fallacy [in the idea of all abstract words originating in
concrete metaphors! is the assumption that the attached metaphor must
necessarily be the one implied in the etymology of the word....it looks as
though abstract words and ideas were an loan, so to speak, from a latent
concrete formulation which is to be found, not in the history of the word
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used, but in the structure of the argument into which the word is fitted.'
Northrop Frye Anatomy of Criticism : Four Essays (Princeton, 1957), p.
336.
195. I have deliberately chosen 'intention', as a problematic concept, one
that resists comprehensive definition, for it is its ability to appear
within contexts to which, depite its ambiguity, it recognizably belongs,
that I want to highlight.
196. In the passage from Austin quoted above, he concludes that
'tampering with words in what we take to be one little corner of the
field is always liable to have unfo^feeen repercussions in the adjoining e
territory.' Austin Sense and Sensibilia, p. 63.
197. A hypothetical objection which Pap makes to the verifiabllity
principle is relevant here. '"How could you find out that the statement
was in principle unverifiable unless you understood, it? Unless you
understood it, you would not be able to conclude that the very
supposition of its being either confirmed or disconfirmed by observations
contradicts what it asserts.'" Arthur Pap An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, 1962), p. 8.
198. (If an etymology sometimes seems revelatory, as for example if we
consider 'employ the expression' in the light of 'twine in what is
squeezed out', or 'rehearse a question' as 'harrow again a searching', it
is because we have in mind two separate concepts whose interaction we
find suggestive.) 'In order to find the meaning of a sentence we have to
transform it by the introduction of successive definitions until it
contains only words that are not further defined, but whose meanings can
be given only by direct ostension.' Schlick quoted in Paul Marhenke 'The
Criterion of Significance' Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, XXIII (1950), pp. 1-21, (pp. 12-13). As
Marhenke paints out, this is not a sufficient definition of 'significance'
but that is not relevant to the distinction we wish to draw.
199. John Dryden 'The Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic
Licence' (1677) in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical Essays, edited by
George Watson, 2 vols., (London, 1962), I, pp. 195-207, (p. 203).
200. Aristotle Poetics, ch. 25, pp. 69-70, (1460*9, Ehetorica, lAOe*1,
201. Bacon The Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, IV, 1, pp. 89-90.
202. Sol Saporta 'The Application of Linguistics to the Study of Poetic
Language' in Sebeok Style in Language, pp. 82-93, (pp. 98-99).
203. Roman Jakobson 'Closing Statement : Linguistics and Poetics' in
Sebeok Style in Language, pp. 350-377, (p, 377).
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204. Jakabsan defines the 'poetic function of language' as the
presentation of the message 'for its own sake' and argues that while such
an orientation is not confined to poetry it is the defining function of it
and only accessary to other verbal activities. See Jakobson 'Linguistics
and Poetics', p. 356. This is an account which, as we shall see, has its
counterparts in many theoretical writings an literature and which is at
best misleading, at worst nonsensical.
205. Leech 'Linguistics and the Figures of Rhetoric', p. 140. 'Deviant' in
this context refers to any word or usage the instances of which are
statistically low, though metaphor, as we have seen, is the form of
linguistic deviance par excellence.
206. Jan Mukarovsky 'Standard Language and Poetic Language' <1932)
translated by Paul L.Garvin in P.L.Garvin (ed.) A Prague School Reader on
Esthetics, Literary Structure, and Style (Washington, D.C., 1964), pp. 17-
30, (p. 19). This notion of foregrounding or deautomatization comes from
Victor Shklovsky: See, for example, his discussion of 'defamiliarization'
in 'Art as Technique' (1917) in Lee T.Lemon and Marion J.Reis (eds.)
Russian Formalist Criticism : Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 5-24.
207. Garvin in the introduction to Prague School Reader on Esthetics, p.
viii. Like Jakobson, Garvin describes the poetic as what becomes 'the
focus of attention for its own sake' p. vii. See Jakobson 'Linguistics and
Poetics', p. 356. This is, I believe, an oversimplification.
208. Mukarovsky 'Standard Language and Poetic Language', p. 18.
209. Mukarovsky 'The Esthetics of Language' (1948) in Garvin Prague
School Reader on Esthetics, pp. 31-69, (p. 37). 'The relationship between
poetic language and the standard, their mutual approximation or
increasing distance, changes from period to period.' Mukarovsky 'Standard
Language and Poetic Language', p. 28,
210. Puns are created on a similar basis but, though metaphor may be
involved, it is accidents of sound, rather than analogies in sense which
characterize the form.
211. We might remember Aquinas' distinction between the 'literal sense',
when things are signalled, by words, and the 'spiritual sense', when things
are signalled by other things, in scripture,
212. Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks (Oxford, 1975), p. 317.
213. 'The function of metaphor in general is to extend language'. Henle
'Metaphor', p. 186.
214. Hegel Aesthetics, p. 406.
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215. Samuel Taylor Coleridge Biographia Literaria or Biographical
Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions <1817), edited by James Engell
and W.Jackson Bate, 2 vols., (Princeton, 1983), II, pp. 16-17.
216. Ibid., p. 11.
217. Hobbes leviathan, Pt. 1, Ch. VIII, p. 34. Locke, echoing Habbes'
division, contrasts 'Judgement' with 'Wit', and goes as far as to say that
the processes of judgement are 'quite contrary to metaphor and allusion'.
Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Ch. XI, 2, p. 60.
218. Alexander Gerard An Essay on Taste, Vith Three Dissertations on the
Seuse Subject by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr. D'Alembert, Mr. De Montesquieu
(London. 1759), Pt. Ill, Sec. II, p. 174.
219. Ibid., p. 174.
220. Shelley 'Defence of Poetry', p. 1. 'Reason respects the differences,
and imagination the similitudes of things.' p. 1. We might compare
Shelley's 'reason' with conceptual thinking, which demonstrates
abstraction and analysis, and his 'imagination' with complex thinking, the
function of which is to establish bonds and relationships. See Vygotsky
Thought and language, p. 76, and the discussion of chain complexes above,
221. Thomas S.Kane The Oxford Guide to Vriting : A Rhetoric and Handbook
for College Students (Oxford, 1983), pp. 392-93.
222. Brooks 'Language of Paradox', p. 45. Brooks concentrates on the
paradoxical elements in metaphor.
223. Longinus On the Sublime, translated by T.S.Dorsch in Dorsch
Classical Literary Criticism, Ch. 23, p. 141.
224. Ibid., Ch. 17, p. 127. Ch. 32, p. 141.
225. Ibid., Ch. 32, p. 142. This is implicit in his discussion of the
passage from Plato's Laws.
226. Aristotle Rhetorica, 1410t>.
227. Ibid., 1410*.
228. Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of language, p. 100.
229. Langer Philosophy in a Mew Key, p. 149.
230. Lewis 'Bluspels and Flalansferes', p. 137.
231. Alexander Pope An Essay on Criticism (1711), 11. 297-300.
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232. Johnson 'Cowley', p. 19.
233. Dryden 'Apology for Heroic Poetry', p. 207.
234. Ibid., p. 201.
235. Thomas Browne Religio Medici and Other Writings (1643), (London,
1969), p. 2.
236. See Rudolf Carnap Meaning and Nexxssity : A Study in Semantics and
Modal Logic (1947), second edition, (Chicago, 1956), pp. 220-21,
237. Dryden 'Apology for Heroic Poetry', p. 205. The images are from
Virgil's Aeneid, 'They storm the city, buried in sleep and wine,' II, 265,
and Dryden's State of Innocence, I, i.
238. Bacon Advancement of Learning, Second Book, IV, 3, p. 81.
239. Demetrius On Style, 82, p. 221.
240. Brooks 'Language of Paradox', p. 45, note.
241. Ibid., p. 45.
242. Ibid., p. 56. With regard to obvious paradox Donne is, of course, a
special case, but if we allow that all metaphor does contain some element
of rhetorical paradox then Brook's statement does have more general
application. Compare; 'metaphor turns its back on ordinary descriptive
meaning, and presents a structure which literally is ironic and
paradoxical..,.All poetic imagery seems to be founded on metaphor'. Frye
Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 123, 281.
243. I.A.Richards Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), second edition,
(London, 1926), p. 240,
244. Bacon Advancement of Learning, Second Book, IV, 2, p. 81.
245. Herbert Read Collected Essays in Literary Criticism (1938), second
edition, (London, 1951), p. 98. 'Metaphor, in fact, for such a poet becomes
the normal mode of expression, and I think we should always be prepared
to judge a poet, to the exclusion of all other qualities, by the force and
originality of his metaphors.' p. 98.
246. Ibid., pp. 98, 100.
247. Andrb Breton First Surrealist Manifesto (1924) translated by
Patrick Waldberg in P.Waldberg (ed.) Surrealism (London, 1978), pp. 66-75,
(pp. 66, 72). To go into the connection between metaphorical processes
and dream symbolism would mean never coming to an end of this essay;
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suffice it to say that I believe both metaphor and metonymy to govern
the relationship between dreams and the waking-life of the dreamer.
248. 'Exquisite corpse : Game of folded paper played by several people,
who compose a sentence or drawing without anyone seeing the preceding
collaborations. The now classic example, which gave the game its name,
was drawn from the first sentence obtained in this way : The-exquisite-
corpse-will-drink-the-new-wine.' Andre Breton The Exquisite Corpse (1948)
in Waldberg Surrealism, pp. 93-95, (pp. 93-94).
249. Ibid., p. 93.
250. Ibid., p. 95. Elsewhere Breton writes; 'I have never experienced
intellectual pleasure except on the analogical plane. For me the only
evidence in the world is commanded by the spontaneous, extralucid,
insolent rapport which establishes itself, under certain conditions,
between one thing and another, and which common sense hesitates to
confront...The word like is the most exalting at our command when it is
pronounced familiarly. Through it human imagination fulfils itself and the
highest destiny of the mind comes into play...The first duty of poets and
artists is to re-establish analogy in all its prerogatives', Andrd Breton
'Rising Sign' (1947) translated by Stephen Schwartz in What is
Surrealism? Selected Writings, edited by Franklin Rosemont, (London,
1978), pp. 280-283, (pp. 280, 282). In the same essay, however, he also
writes that 'Poetic analogy differs profoundly from mystical analogy in
that it never presuj)poses, beyond the bounds of the visible world, an
invisible universe tending to make itself manifest.' (p. 281).
251. Magritte was a master of the true visual metaphor.
252. Breton First Surrealist Manifesto, p. 66.
253. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 62, Friday, 11 May, 1711. Compare;
'metaphor may arise from the wit of subjective caprice which, to escape
from the commonplace, surrenders to a piquant impulse, not satisfied
until it has succeeded in finding related traits in the apparently most
heterogeneous material and therefore, to our astonishment, combining
things that are poles apart from one another.' Hegel Aesthetics, p. 407.
254. Addison Spectator No. 62.
255. J.Middleton Murray 'Metaphor' (1927) in Countries of the Mind :
Second Series (London, 1931), pp. 1-16, (p.9). Ricoeur Rule of Metaphor, p.
247.
256. D.G.James 'Metaphor and Symbol' in Knights and Cottle Metaphor and
Symlxil, pp. 95-103, (pp. 98-99). According to Murray 'All metaphor and
simile can be described as the analogy by which the human mind explores
the universe of quality and charts the non-measurable world....[The]
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predominant passion of the poet's mind is but the counterpart of a
predominant quality of the region of the universe which he contemplates.
His passion roused by the quality is reflected back upon the quality, and
gives it redoubled power; so that it begins to dominate all other
qualities and properties, to suffuse them with itself till it becomes as
it were the living and governing soul of that which the poet
contemplates. By means of his passion the actual realizes its own idea.
However much we struggle, we cannot avoid transcendentalism, for we are
seeking to approximate to a universe of quality with analogy for its most
essential language through a universe of quantity with a language of
identities. Sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, a
transcendentalism (which is only the name for a prodigious metaphor) is
inevitable.' Murray 'Metaphor', pp. 9, 14-15.
257. Mowottny/Language Poets Use, p. 86. Elsewhere she explicitly states TW.
that she does not consider metaphor to be a 'peephole on the nature of
transcendental reality', p. 87. However, any means of rising above an
idealism as rigorous as that of her description of consciousness can only
be transcendental.
258. Karsten Harries 'Metaphor and Transcendence' in Sacks On Metaphor,
pp. 71-88, (pp. 87-88).
259. Ibid., p. 88.
260. Booth 'Metaphor as Rhetoric', p. 68.
261. Quoted in Hick Philosophy of Religion, p, 72.
262. Ibid., p. 70.
263. F.C.Copleston Aquinas (Harmondsworth, 1955), p. 130.
264. Ibid., p. 133.
265. Ibid., p. 131. The theologian Rudolf Bultmann, outlining his program
for 'demythologizing' the Mew Testament, writes: 'The real purpose of myth
is not to present an abjective picture of the world as it is, but to
express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he
lives...Myth speaks of the power or the powers which man supposes he
experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his own activity
and suffering. He describes these powers in terms derived from the
visible world, with its tangible objects and forces, and from human life,
with its feelings, motives and potentialities, He may, for instance,
explain the origin of the world by speaking of a world egg or a world
tree. Similarly he may account for the present state and order of the
world by speaking of a primeval war between the gods. He speaks of the
other world in terms of this world, and of the gods in terms derived
from human life. Myth is an expression of man's conviction that the
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origin and purpose of the world in which he lives are to be sought not
within it but beyond it - that is, beyond the realm of known and tangible
reality...' Rudolf Bultmann 'New Testament and Mythology' (1943) in Hans
Werner Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth : A Theological Debate (1948),
translated by Reginald H.Fuller, (London, 1953), pp. 1-44, (p. 10). 'On
Bultmann's definition', comments Ernest Lohmeyer, 'it fallows that myth is
the language of all religion, the form in which it is expressed, and that
to demythologize a religious proclamation of whatever kind is to condemn
every religion to silence and therefore to destroy it.' 'The Right
Interpretation of the Mythological' (1944) in Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and
Myth (1948), pp. 124-137, (p. 126). Bultmann's reply is the traditional
one; religious belief is a matter of faith! (See 'Bultmann Replies to his
Critics' (n.d.) in Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth (1948), pp. 191-211, (pp.
209-211).
266. Henry Peacham The Garden of Eloquence (1593) quoted in Salomon
Hegnauer 'The Rhetorical Figure of Systrophe' in Brian Vickers (ed.)
Rhetoric Revalued : Papers from the International Society for the History
of Rhetoric, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, Vol. 19, (New
York, 1982), pp. 179-186, (pp. 179-180).
267. Hegnauer 'Systrophe', p. 180.
268. William Shakespeare Macbeth, II, ii, 11. 38-41.
269. William Shakespeare The Rape of Lucrece, 11. 764-770.
270. Sir Philip Sidney Astrophel and Stella, Sonnet LXVIII, 11. 1-4.
271. Hegnauer 'Systrophe', pp. 182-83.
272. George Herbert Prayer (1).
273. Hegnauer 'Systrophe', p. 183.
274. Ibid,, p. 183.
275. Ibid., p. 184.
276. Ibid., p. 183.
277. Read Essays in Literary Criticism, p. 100.
278. James 'Metaphor and Symbol', p. 97. Compare; 'The truth values,
however, as far as they are - to say with the logicians
"extralinguistic entities", obviously exceed the bounds of poetics and of
linguistics in general.' Jakobson 'Linguistics and Poetics', p. 351.
279. James 'Metaphor and Symbol', p. 100.
- 371 -
No -t- «• s& : M «.• -t.«»pPo r>
280. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
281. Mukarovsky 'Standard Language and Poetic Language1, p. 19.
282. Henle 'Metaphor', p. 181.
283. Aristotle Rhetorica, 141013.
284. Addison Spectator So. 421,
285. Aristotle Rhetorica, lAlO1*,
286. Demetrius On Style, § 80, p. 220.
287. Barfield 'Meaning of the Word "Literal"', p. 61. Yeats makes a
similar point about the inseparability of form and sense in 'The
Symbolism of Poetry' in Ideas of Good and Evil (London, 1903).
288. Donald Davidson 'What Metaphors Mean' in Sacks On Metaphor, pp. 24-
46, (pp. 30. 41).
289. Ibid., p. 30.
290. Aristotle Rbetorica, 1412*. Emphasis mine.
291. Harries 'Metaphor and Transcendence', p. 87.
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hence as that of fifty years ago seems now.
90. Bk. Ill, Ch. VI.
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91. The more specialized historian, or the person who was, or has been,
"there" demonstrates their expertise when they judge a fiction 'a true
picture' or a 'misrepresentation' - but in doing so they are judging the
work as information.
92. Arthur Schopenhauer The World as Will and Idea (1818, 1844),
translated by R.B.Haldane and J.Kemp, 3 vols., (London,1883), I, § 59,
93. George Saintsbury 'Introduction' to Shorter Elizabethan Novels
(London, 1957), p. vi, emphasis mine.
94. Hegel Aesthetics, pp. 8-9.
95. Ibid., p. 9. Ve might here remember Aristotle characterizing poetry
as more philosophical than history, for similar reasons.
96. Ibid., p. 9.
97. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, I, §§ 36, 34,
98. Ibid,, § 34. In recognition, according to Gadamer, 'what we know
emerges, as if through an illumination, from all the chance and variable
circumstances that condition it and is grasped in its essence.'. This
recognition is for him fundamental to the work of art. Thus he speaks of
the 'jay of knowledge' in connection with the aesthetic: 'Imitation and
representation are not merely a second version, a copy, but a recognition
of the essence. Because they are not merely repetition, but a 'bringing
forth', the spectator is also involved in them. They contain the essential
relation to everyone for whom the representation exists.'. There may be
much in this, but the 'joy of knowledge' can be merely the 'joy of
opinion', even the 'joy of satisfying falsehood'; recognizing oneself, in
Gadamer's sense, need not be identifiable with knowing oneself. Hans-Georg
Gadamer Truth and Method (.1960), translation of the second edition (1965)
by Garrett Barden and John Gumming, (London, 1975), pp. 102-103.
99. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, § 36.
100. Ibid., § 52.
101. Martin Heidegger 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (1960) in Poetry,
Language, Thought (1971), translated by Albert Hofstadter, (London, 1975),
pp. 15-87, (pp. 35-36). 'Art', writes Jaspers, 'originates as the
elucidation of Existenz by an ascertainment that will let us visualize
being in present existence. In philosophizing we treat being as thinkable,
in art as representable.' Karl Jaspers Philosophy (1932), translation of
the third edition (1956) by E.B.Ashton, 3 vols., (London, 1969), I, p. 327.
102. Heidegger 'The Origin of the Work of Art', pp. 37-38, 44, 46.
Compare Ransom; 'The critic should regard the poem as nothing short of a
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desperate ontological or metaphysical manouevre. The poet himself, in the
agony of composition, has something like this sense of his labours. The
poet perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life
is constantly crumbling beneath his touch. His poem celebrates the object
which is real, individual, and qualitatively infinite. He knows that his
practical interests will reduce this living object to a mere utility, and
that his sciences will disintegrate it for their convenience into their
respective abstracts. The poet wishes to defend his object's existence
against its enemeies, and the critic wishes to know what he is doing, and
how. The critic should find in the poem a total poetic or individual
object which tends to be universalized, but is not permitted to suffer
this fate.' John Crowe Ransom 'Criticism, Inc.' (1937) in The World's Body
(London, 1938), pp. 327-350, (pp. 347-48),
103. Heidegger 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 56. Chesterton writes,
'I believe, about the universal cosmos, as for that matter about every
weed and pebble in the cosmos, that men will never rightly realize that
it is beautiful, until they realize that it is strange,...Poetry is the
separation of the soul from some object, whereby we can regard it with
wonder.' G.K.Chesterton Christendom in Dublin (London, 1932), p. 25,
Shklovsky likewise writes that we usually apprehend things merely as
'silhouettes', through what he describes as 'prose perception'. This
'habitualization', then, 'devours' life. He believes that 'art exists that
one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things,
to make the stone stony. ...The technique of art is to make objects
"unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic
end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the
artfulness of an object; the object is not important.' Victor Shklovsky
'Art as Technique' (1917) in Lee T.Lemon and Marion J.Reis (eds.) Russian
Formalsit Criticism : Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp. 5-24, (pp. 11-12).
104. Gearg Lukacs 'Art and Objective Truth' in Writer and Critic and
Other Essays, edited and translated by Arthur Kahn, (London, 1970), pp.
25-60, (pp. 34-35).
105. Ibid., p. 40.
106. Ibid., p, 40. This concept of 'partisan objectivity' and conflicting
realities can be observed in the gradual erosion of the concept of
'socialist realism' in the following passages: 'Realism means giving a
picture not only of the decay of capitalism and the withering away of its
culture, but also of the birth of that class, of that force, which is
capable of creating a new society and a new culture. Realism does not
mean the embellishment or arbitrary selection of revolutionary phenomena;
it means reflecting reality as it is, in all its complexity, in all its
contrariety, and not only capitalist reality, but also that other, new
reality - the reality of socialism.' Karl Radek 'Contemporary World
Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art' in Ail-Union Congress of
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Soviet Writers Problems of Soviet Literature : Reports and Speeches at
the First Soviet Writer's Conference (1934), edited by H.G.Scott, (London,
n.d.), pp. 73-162, (pp. 156-157). 'Myth is invention. To invent means to
extract from the sum of a given reality its cardinal idea and embody it
in imagery - that is how we got realism. But if to the idea extracted
from the given reality we add - completing the idea, by the logic of
hypothesis - the desired, the passible, and thus supple^ment the image,
we obtain that romanticism which is at the base of myth and is highly
beneficial in that it tends to provoke a revolutionary attitude to
reality, an attitude that changes the world in a practical way.' Maxim
Gorky 'Soviet Literature' in Problems of Soviet Literature, pp. 57-69, (p.
44). 'Socialist realism', according to Bukharin, will portray 'sensory
reality and its motion, and not its fictitious sublimations...real feelings
and passions, real history, and not various versions of the "world
spirit"....The combination of images, the verbal scoring, will not serve to
conjure up the supernatural but to reproduce reality and the real motions
of the feelings with the greatest possible vividness. It does not,
however, follow from this that realism, from the point of view of form,
precludes the employment of metaphors, including personification.
Everything that enhances the sensory effect can and does find a place in
the poetic lexicon, because it is perceived as a metaphor....If socialist
realism is distinguished by its active, operative character; if it does
not give just a dry photograph of a process; if it projects the entire
world of passion and struggle into the future; if it raises the heroic
principle to the throne of history - then revolutionary romanticism is a
component part of it....On the other hand, socialist realism does not
merely register what exists, but, catching up the thread of development
in the present, it leads it into the future, and leads it actively. Hence
an antithesis between romanticism and socialist realism is devoid of all
meaning.' Nikolai Bukharin 'Poetry, Poetics, and the Problems of Poetry in
the U.S.S.R.' in Problems of Soviet Literature, pp. 185-260, (pp. 251-54).
107. Wilde 'The Critic as Artist', p. 110.
108. Pope An Essay on Criticism (1711), 11. 255-56. Elsewhere he
describes it as the 'first principle of criticism': 'Whoever reads the
Odyssey with an eye to the Iliad, expecting to find it of the same
character or of the same sort of spirit, will be grieviously deceived and
err against the first principle of criticism, which is, to consider the
nature of the piece, and the intent of its author.' Alexander Pope
'Postscript' to Homer's Odyssey (1725-1726) in Homer's Odyssey;
translated by Alexander Pope, to Which is Added The Battle of the Frogs
and Mice, translated by Archdeacon Parnel, and corrected by Mr. Pope
(Halifax, 1854), pp. 357-373, (p. 357).
109. Wordsworth 'Preface' to the 1850 edition of Lyrical Ballads, p. 149,
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110. T.E.Hulme 'Romanticism and Classicism' in Speculations : Essays on
Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Herbert Read <1924), second
edition, (London, 1936), pp. 111-140, (pp. 128-133),
111. Richards Principles, p. 29.
112. H.Coombes Literature and Criticism (London, 1953), pp. 77-80.
113. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'The Use of Theory' (1955, 1963) in For A New
Novel : Essays on Fiction (1963), translated by Richard Howard, (New
York, 1965), pp. 7-14, (p. 10). Similarly Pound writes that 'No good
poetry is ever written in a manner twenty years old', Ezra Pound 'A
Retrospect' (1918) in Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, edited by T.S.Eliot,
(London, 1954), pp, 3-14, (p. 11).
114. 'Montaigne was a kind of premature classic, of the family of Horace;
but for want of worthy surroundings, like a spoiled child, he gave
himself up to the unbridled fancies of his style and humour,' Charles-
Augustin Sainte-Beuve 'Vhat is a Classic?' (1850) from Causeries du Lundi,
III in Essays by Sainte-Beuve, pp. 1-12, (p. 8). 'Some judge the author's
names, not works, and then / Nor praise nor blame the writings, but the
men,' Pope Essay on Criticism, 11. 412-13.
115. Hough An Essay on Criticism, pp. 59-60.
116. R.G.Collingwoad The Principles of Art (London, 1938), p. 282.
117. Richard Hurd Letters on Chivalry and Romance (1762) in Hurd's
Letters on Chivalry and Romance with the Third Elizabethan Dialogue,
edited by Edith J.Morley, (London, 1911), pp. 76-176, (Letter VIII, pp.
118-119.
118. Hough An Essay on Criticism, pp. 61-2.
119. Pope expresses this approach, which claims that an author can only
be judged in the context of his times, thus; 'You then whose judgement the
right course would steer, / Know well each Ancient's proper character; /
His fable, subject, scope in every page; / Religion, country, genius of his
age; / Without all these at once before your eyes, / Cavil you may, but
never criticize.' Essay on Criticism, 11. 118-123.
120. Thus Knight writes that 'My suggestion as to the poet's
"consciousness" must...be considered as either pure hazard or useful
metaphor, illuminating the piay's nature and perhaps hitting the truth of
Shakespeare's mind in composition.' G.Wilson Knight The Wheel of Fire :
Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy With Three New Essays (1930),
(London, 1965), p. 6.
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121. John Harington 'A Preface, or rather a Briefe Apologie of Poetrie,
and of the Author and Translator' prefixed to Harington's translation of
Orlando Furioso (1591) in G.Gregory Smith (ed.) Elizabethan Critical
Essays, 2 vols., (London, 1904), II, 194-222, (p. 214).
122. Imagine a scene in a play which consisted of a striptease, with the
audience playing the role of an audience. Are they watching a striptease?
The author might say that it was intended as an indictment of male
fantasy, but its significance can only be judged by its effect - it is no
mare nor less a striptease for what its author says.
123. L.C.Knights 'How Many Children had Lady Macbeth? : An Essay in the
Theory and Practice of Shakespeare Criticism' (1933) in Explorations :
Essays in Criticism Mainly on the Mature of the Seventeenth Century
(London, 1946), pp. 1-39, (p. 5).
124. Ibid., p. 5.
125. Gadamer, I believe, misunderstands Schleiermacher in this respect,
for he quotes the following passage as indicative of a misplaced
historicism; "'Hence a work of art, too, is really rooted in its own soil.
It loses its meaning when it is wrenched from this environment and
enters into general commerce; it is like something that has been saved
from the fire but still bears the marks of the burning upon it."'
Schleiermacher quoted in Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 148. It is true
that we are not in a position to know if the work has 'marks of burning'
upon it or not. But Schleiermacher may be thinking here in terms of the
sort of distinction I shall make below between 'meaning' and
'significance': 'Historical interpretation is not to be limited to
gathering historical data. That task should be done even before
interpretation begins, since it is the means for re-creating the
relationship between speaker and the original audience, and the
interpretation cannot begin until that relationship has been established.'
F.D.E.Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819 (1819, 1828) in Hermeneutics : The
Handwritten Manuscripts by F.D.E.Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle,
(1958), translation of second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack
Forstman, (Missoula, 1977), V.2.
126. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie (1595), p. 37. Jonson Timber: or
Discoveries: Made upon Men and matter: as they have flow'd out of his
daily Readings; or had their refluxe to his peculiar Motion of the Times
(1641) in Discoveries and Conversations with William Drummond of
Hawthornden (1641, 1619), edited by G.B.Harrison, (Edinburgh, 1966), pp,
3-106, (p. 70). Sir Villiam D'Avenant 'Preface' to Gondibert : An Heroick
Poem (London, 1651), pp. 1-70, (p. 8). Sir Kenelm Digby 'Concerning
Spenser that I wrote at Mr.May's Desire' (1638) in Paul J.Alpers (ed.)
Edmund Spenser : A Critical Anthology, Penguin Critical Anthologies,
(Harmondsworth, 1969), pp. 57-60, (p. 58).
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127. D'Avenant 'Preface' to Gondibert, p. 8.
128. Thomas R.Preston 'From Typology to Literature : Hermeneutics and
Historical Narrative in Eighteenth-Century England' in The Eighteenth
Century, vol. 23, no. 3, 1982, pp. 181-196, (p. 189).
129. John Dryden 'Preface' to Secret Lave: or The Maiden Queen (1668) in
Of Dramatic Poesy, I, pp. 104-109, (p, 105),
130. Samuel Johnson 'Milton' (1779) in Lives of the English Poets, pp.
84-194, (p. 85).
131. Johann Wolfgang Goethe Goethe's Conversations with Eckermann
(1836-1848), translated by John Oxenford, with a preface by Eckermann
and introduction by Wallace Wood, (London, 1901), (December 16, 1828), p.
289.
132. Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819, X.18.3.
133. Wilhelm Dilthey 'The Construction of the Historical World in the
Human Studies' (1910) in Selected Writings, edited and translated by
H.P.Rickman, (1976), pp. 170-245, (p. 174). W.K.Wimsatt and Monroe
C.Beardsley 'The Intentional Fallacy' (1946) in The Verbal Icon : Studies
in the Meaning of Poetry (Kentucky, 1954), pp. 3-18, (p. 3). Wellek and
Warren Theory of Literature, p. 42.
134. Edgar Allen Poe 'The Poetic Principle' (1850) in Essays Miscellanies
in The Complete Works of Edgar Allen Poe, edited by James A.Harrison, 17
vols., (New York, 1902), XIV, pp. 266-292, (p. 132).
135. Ibid., P. 271.
136. T.S.Eliot 'Tradition and the Individual talent' (1919) in The Sacred
Wood : Essays on Poetry and Criticism (1920), second edition, (London,
1928), pp. 47-59, (pp. 53, 58).
137. Wimsatt and Beardsley 'The Intentional Fallacy', pp. 17, 4..
138. R.S.Crane 'The Houyhnhmns, the YcThoos, and the History of Ideas'
(1962) in The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays Critical and
Historical, 2 vols., (London, 1967), II, pp. 261-282, (p. 271).
139. My own thought is that this is such a work, that 'Swift' in making
the horses admirable by giving them human aspirations, and the human
beings detestable, by portraying them as less than human, cancels out the
very judgement that seems implied. If the work is misanthropic it is
because we are, while reading, under the spell not of direct assertion but
of metaphor; mankind are briefly Yahoos.
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140. There is a certain oddness in saying that the work, as opposed to
the author, does this or that, but at least it is a formula not so open to
abuse or misinterpretation. Cinthio, after all, sets a precedent when he
has the tragedy Orbecche address the reader. ('An Address to the Reader
by the Tragedy of Orbeccbe (1541). There is also the epigram to Ovid's
Amores.)
141. Helen Gardner The Business of Criticism (Oxford, 1959), p. 18,
142. If, for example, we were to weave into the criticism of a work by
Gide a criticism of his journal neither need be necessarily used as an
authority on the impart of the other. We can use it merely in a
comparative way, as one might use any other frame of reference to refine
one's criticism. Even the biography of a writer could be used thus, so
long as we did not treat it as a collection of facts. From an aesthetic
point of view it might, indeed, be just as enlightening to study a work
by A in the light of B's biography.
143. Johnson's Lives, which seems to promise some sort of biographical
criticism contains little that could be strictly called intentional - his
discussion of William Collins is a good example of this distinction, that
of Milton to some degree an exception.
144. Longinus On the Sublime, translated by T.S.Dorsch in Dorsch
Classical Literary Criticisim, pp. 97-158, (p. 113),
145. T.S.Eliot 'The Metaphysical Poets' (1921) in SelecZted Essays (1932),
third enlarged edition, (London, 1951), pp. 281-291, (p. 287).
146. D.H.Lawrence 'The Spirit of Place' (1924) in Selected Literary
Criticism, edited by Anthony Seal, (London, 1955), pp. 296-302, (p. 297).
147. Thomas Carlvle Heroes and Hero-worship (London, 1840), p. 68.
Compare Emerson; '[Criticism] is an art when it does not stop at the
words of the poet, but looks at the order of his thoughts and the
essential quality of his mind. Then the critic is poet. 'Tis a question
not of talents but of tone; and not particular merits, but the mood of
mind into which one and another can bring us.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'Art
and Criticism' (n.d.) in The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
edited by Edward Waldo Emerson, 12 vols., (Boston, 1903-1904), vol. XII
The Natural History of the Intellect and Other Papers (1904), pp. 281-305,
(p. 305).
148. Emilio Betti 'Hermeneutics as the general methodology of the
Geisteswissenschaften' (1962) translated by Joseph Bleicher in Joseph
Bleicher Contemporary hermeneutics : Hermeneutics as method, philosophy
and critique (London, 1980), pp. 51-94, (p. 57). Gadamer makes a similar
point; 'Interpretation is probably, in a certain sense, re-creation, but
this re-creation does not fallow the process of the creative act, but the
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lines of the created work which has to be brought to representation in
accord with the meaning the interpreter finds in it.' Gadamer Truth and
Method, p. 107.
149. Betti 'Hermeneutics', p. 57.
150. Ibid., p. 59. Croce approaches the problem in a better way; 'All that
which has not become the content of poetry and remains outside it, though
linked to the work materially or pertaining to the person of the poet, is
excluded from the process whose aim is to grasp and define the
generating motif of poetry which shapes and animates all parts of the
poem. But the object of this further investigation is human reality in its
wholeness', Benedetto Croce Poetry and Literature : An Introduction to Its
Criticism and History <1936), translation of the sixth edition (1963) by
Giovanni Gullace, (Southern Illinois University, 1981), p. 142.
151. Frederick von Schlegel 'On the Limits of the Beautiful' (1794) in
The Aesthetic and Miscellaneous Works of Frederick von Schlegel,
translated by E.J.Millington, (London, 1860), pp. 413-424, (p. 418).
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Chapter III : Form and Content
1. Aristotle On the Art of Poetry, translated by T.S.Dorscli in Classical
Literary Criticism, edited by T.S.Dorscli, (Harmondsworth, 1965), pp. 29-75,
Cch. 6, pp. 38-39). <1449b).
2. Ibid., p. 31. (1447-).
3. Giraldi Cinthio On the Composition of Romances (1549), translated by
Allen H.Gilbert in Allen H.Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to
Dryden (Hew York, 1940), pp. 262-273, (p, 270).
4. Lodovico Castelvetro The Poetics of Aristotle Translated and
Annotated (1571) translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary
Criticism, pp.305-357, (p. 317).
5. Matthew Arnold 'Preface to the First Edition of Poems' (1853) in The
Poems of Matthew Arnold, Longmans Annotated English Poets, edited by
Kenneth Allot, (London, 1965), pp. 590-607, (pp. 593-94).
6. Ibid., p. 601.
7. John Henry fewman 'Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics'
(1829) in Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols., (1871), I, pp. 1-26, (p.
16). T.E.Hulme 'Romanticism and Classicism' in Speculations : Essays on
Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Herbert Read (1924), second
edition, (London, 1936), pp. 111-140, (pp. 137). Jos<§ Ortega y Gasset
'Hates on the Hovel' in The Debumanization of Art and Motes on the Novel
(1925), translated by Helene Weyl, (Princeton, 1948), pp. 57-103, p. 75.
'The theme or content cannot...be practically or morally charged with
epithets of praise or blame. When critics of art remark that a theme is
badly selected, in cases where that observation has a just foundation, it
is a question of blaming, not the selection of the theme (which would be
absurd), but the manner in which the artist has treated it, the failure of
the expression due to the contradictions which it contains.' Benedetto
Croce Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1901),
translation of the fourth edition (1911) by Douglas Ainslee, revised
edition, (London, 1922), p. 51.
8. I am aware of those distinctions made between these last two terms
by Victor Shklovsky, in his 'Sterne's Tristram Shandy : Stylistic
Commentary' (1921) and Boris Tomachevsky in his 'Thematics' (1925) (the
'story' is 'the aggregate of mutually related events reported in the
work.', the 'plot' is 'the same eventsarranged and connected according to
the orderly sequence in which they are presented in the work.', pp. 66-
67), and also similar distinctions made by E.M.Forster, in Aspects of the
Novel (London, 1927), and those subsequently made, along similar lines, by
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several 'structuralist' writers; such distinctions, however, as will
emerge, are of no relevance to the subject in hand. For Shklovsky and
Toraashevsky see Lee T.Lemon and Marion Reis (eds.) Russian Formalist
Criticism : Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp, 5-24, 62-95.
9. Frederick Schlegel Lectures on the History of Literature (1815), 'Now
first completely translated', no translator given, (London, 1859), p. 276
(Lecture XII).
10. A similar mistake is made by Pound when he insists that 'rhythm
must be interpretative' - as if it could avoid being so. Ezra Pound 'A
Retrospect' (1918) in Literary Essays of Ezra Found, edited by T.S.Eliot,
(London, 1954), pp. 3-14, (p. 9).
11. Henry James 'The Art of Fiction' (1884) in Selected Literary
Criticism, edited by Morris Shapira, (1963), (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp.
78-97, (p. 88).
12. William Empson Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), third revised
edition, (London, 1953), p. 28.
13. The text can, of course, be analysed into such categories as those
described by Tomashevsky CThematics') - story and plot, dynamic and
static motifs, conventional and free devices, exposition (immediate,
delayed, or transposed), situation, conflict, intrigue, ending, exciting
force, peripety, climax, foreshadowing - but to write in this way, by
simply filling-in these common denominators, is not to write about the
text as work. See Appendix on formalism.
14. James Henry Leigh Hunt 'An Answer to the Question What is Poetry?'
in Imagination and Fancy; Or, Selections from the English Poets (London,
1844), pp. 1-61, (pp. 38-39).
15. Alexander Pope Essay on Criticism (1711), 11. 305-43.
16. Friedrich Nietzsche Human, All-Too-Human (1878), translated by
Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Wietzsche, edited by Walter Kaufmann,
(New York, 1954), pp. 51-64, (§ 189).
17. Thus, for example, J.Middleton Murray's description of the critic's
task: 'First, the critic should endeavour to convey the whole effect of
the work he is criticizing, its peculiar uniqueness. Second, to work back
and define the unique quality of the sensibility which necessitated this
expression. Third, to establish the determining causes of this
sensibility. (Here the relevant circumstances of the writer's life have
their proper place.) Fourth, to analyse the means by which this
sensibility was given expression; in other words, to conduct a technical
examination into style. Fifth, a still closer examination of a perfectly
characteristic passage, that is, a passage in which the author's
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sensibility is completely expressed.' 'A Critical Credo' (1921) in
Countries of tie Mind : First Series (1922), revised and enlarged,
(London, 1931), pp. 183-89, (p. 188). (This, despite New Criticism, might
still be the unspoken manifesto of all popular criticism.) Because he
sees the effect as divorced from the sensibility of the work, the third
term - the author - is introduced. Without this intentionalism steps two
and four might be identical. Thus by five we have a dissociation of part
from whole, the sensibility is detached from the work, and the work
itself becomes accidental.
18. Philip Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie (1595) in The Complete Works
of Sir Philip Sidney, edited by Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols., (Cambridge,
1922-1926), III (1923), pp. 1-46, (pp. 10-11) [spelling modernized]. John
Dryden 'The authors Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic Licence' (1677),
in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical Essays, edited by George Watson,
two volumes, (London, 1962), I, pp. 195-207, (p. 207).
19. Joseph Addison The Spectator, Friday, 11 May, 1711.
20. Matthew Arnold 'Preface to the First Edition of Poems', p. 601. Ezra
Pound 'A Retrospect', pp. 1-4. We can see how what is, in effect, the very
condition of communication, becomes a false standard for evaluation, in
the following passage from Adam Smith; '[The] perfection of style
consists in expressing] in the most concise, proper, and precise manner
the thought of the author, and that in the manner which best conveys the
sentiment, passion, or affection with which it affects - or he pretends it
does affect - him, and which he designs to communicate to his reader....In
like manner what is it that is agreeable in style? It is when all the
thoughts are .justly and properly expressed in such a manner as shews the
passion they affected the author with, and so that all seemed natural and
easy.' Adam Smith Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762-63),
edited by John M.Lothian, (London, 1963), p.51.
21. Mark Schorer 'Technique as Discovery' The Hudson Review, vol. 1, no.
1, Spring 1948, pp. 67-87, (p, 67).
22. Ibid., p. 69.
23. Ibid., pp. 76-78.
24. When I was being 'taught Plato' a great many terms were left in the
original Greek, simply because they have no English synonyms which are
not misleading; this is not the same as saying Plato is not amenable to
paraphrase, since it is possible to explain the meaning of each Greek
word even if not to replace it with a single English one.
25. E.D.Hirsch The Aims of Interpretation (London, 1976), pp. 50-73.
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26. Arthur Schopenhauer Essays and Aphorisms, selected and translated by
R.J.Hollingdale [from Farerga and Paralipomena <1851)1, (Harmondsworth,
1970), pp. 202-203.
27. George Puttenham The Arte of English Poesie (1589), edited by Gladys
Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker, (Cambridge 1936), p. 148 (spelling
modernized). 'Style is properly speaking a germinative phenomenon, the
transmutation of a humour....[Stylei is a Necessity which binds the
writer's humour to his form of expression.' Roland Barthes Writing Degree
Zero (1953) in Writing Degree Zero and Elements of Semiology, translated
by Annette havers and Colin Smith, first published seperately (1967), as
one volume, (London, 1984), pp. 1-76, (pp. 13-14).
28. Thomas De Qunicey 'Rhetoric' (1828) in The Collected Writings of
Thomas De Quincey, edited by David Masson, 14 vols., (London, 1896-1897),
X Literary Theory and Criticism (1897), pp. 81-133, (p. 115). A similar
sensitivity on De Quincey's part to the way in which form incarnates
meaning is to be found in his 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth'
(1823), His essay on 'Style' (1840-41) is disappointing in this respect.
29. Victor Hugo 'Preface' to Cromwell (1825) translated by George
Burnham Ives (1909) in Gay Wilson Allen and Harry Hayden Clark (eds.)
Literary Criticism : Pope to Croce (New York, 1941), pp. 320-339, (p.
334).
30. Matthew Arnold 'Letter to A.H.Clough' (c. March 1, 1849), in The
letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough (1845-1868), edited by
Howard Foster Lowry, (London, 1932), Letter 26, pp. 100-101, (p. 101). 'Nay
in Sophocles what is valuable is not so much his contributions to
psychology and the anatomy of sentiment, as the grand moral effects
produced by style.'. The 'matter', he continues, 'is the expression of the
richness of his mind : but on men character produces as great an effect
as mind.'. D.H.Lawrence 'The Novel' (1925) in A Selection From Phoenix,
edited by A.A.H.Inglis, (Harmondsworth, 1971), pp. 161-176, (p, 162).
Schleiermacher, even while arguing against the separation of 'style' and
'thought', allows intentionalism nevertheless to enter in, through a
normative description of style; 'The goal of technical interpretation
should be formulated as the complete understanding of style. We are
accustomed to restrict the term "style" to the way language is handled.
But thoughts and language are intertwined, and an author's distinctive
way of treating the subject is manifested by his organization of his
material and by his use of language...Since a person always has numerous
ideas, the development of any specific one involves accepting something
and excluding something else. - Yet when an idea does not develop from
the distinctive character of the author, but is acquired by study or
custom, or is cultivated for its effect, then there is mannerism, and
mannerism is always poor style.' F.D.E.Schleiermacher Compendium of 1819
(1819, 1828) in Ilermeneutics : The Handwritten Manuscripts by
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F.D.E.Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle, <1958), translation of
second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack Forstman, (Missoula, 1977).
31. Oscar Wilde 'Preface' to The Picture of Dorian Gray (London, 1891).
Whether it is unpardonable, as he also says, depends upon one's ethics.
Wayne C.Booth's Rhetoric of Fiction (London, 1961) is an excellent
description of several of these mannerisms and their import.
32. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'On Several Obsolete Motions' (1957) in For a New
Novel : Essays on Fiction (1963), translated by Richard Howard, (New
York, 1965), pp. 25-47, (p. 44). This is an important point with regard to
intention. Consider Croce; '[When] we talk of books well thought and ill-
written, we cannot mean anything but that in such books are parts, pages,
periods, or propositions well thought and well written, and other parts
(perhaps the least important) ill-thought and ill-written, not really
thought and so not really expressed....If we pass from th^consideration of
big books to a short sentence, the error or innacuracy of such a
contention will leap to the eyes. How could a single sentence be clearly
thought and confusedly written?...The poet or painter who lacks form,
lacks everything, because he lacks himself...In this sense, when we take
"content" as equal to "concept," it isjmost true not only that art does not
consist of content, but also that it has no content.' Croce Aesthetic, pp.
24-25. Here, then, the concept of the separability of work and intention
and the concept of the inseparability of form and content (from an
aesthetic viewpoint), become themselves inseparable, for, as Croce writes
elsewhere, 'The poet is...nothing but his poetry.' Poetry and Literature :
An Introduction to Its Criticism and History (1936), sixth edition (1963),
translated by Giovanni Gullace, (Southerb Illinois University, 1981), p.
162.
33. 'Whatever we want to convey, there is only one word to express it,
one verb to animate it, one adjective to qualify it. We must therefore go
on seeking that word, verb or adjective until we have discovered it, and
never be satisfied with approximations, never fall back on tricks, even
inspired ones, or tomfoolery of language to dodge the difficulty.' Guy de
Maupassant 'The Novel' (1887) preface to Pierre and Jean (1888),
translated by Leonard Tancock, (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 21-35, (p. 33).
Matthew Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series (London, 1888), p. 22.
Arnold describes the relation between seriousness in style and in 'matter
and substance' as directly proportional, their identification is only
implicit. Stendhal 'Letter to Honore de Balzac' (16 October 1840) in To
the Happy Few : Selected Ltters oof Stendhal, edited by Emmanuel Boudot-
Lamotte, translated by Norman Cameron, (London, 1952), pp. 364-374, (p.
366, first draft. Joseph Conrad 'Letter to Hugh Clifford' (9 October 1899)
in The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad, edited by Frederick R.Karl and
Laurence Davies, 2 vols., II, pp. 199-202, (p. 200).
34. Gustave Flaubert 'Letter to Mademoiselle Leroyer de Chantepie', 12
December 1857, in Allot Novelists on the Novel, p. 313. 'There is no such
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thing as mere form in poetry. All form is expression.' A.C.Bradley 'Poetry
for Poetry's Sake' (1901) in Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London, 1909), pp.
3-36, (p. 18). 'The impassibility of translation is the very reality of
poetry in its creation and re-creation.' Croce Poetry and Literature, p.
114.
35. Samuel Taylor Coleridge A Course of Lectures (.1818) in Coleridge's
Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare ans Some Other Old Poets and
Dramatists (Everyman, 1907), pp. 213-385, (Lecture XIV 'On Style', p. 326).
George Orwell 'Politics and the English Language' (1946) in Shooting an
Elephant and Other Essays (London, 1950), pp. 84-102, (p. 85).
36. This is not to say, however, that it can be easily analyzed.
37. Sidney Apologia for Poetrie, p. 42.
38. Walter Pater Appreciations : Vith an Essay on Style (London, 1889),
p. 28.
39. Ibid., p.16. This is not, of course, simply a modern dogma; 'Let
briefness be your most important study in all things; ponder it, master
it, practice it, use it.' Alberic of Monte Cassino Flowers of Rhetoric
(c.1087), translated by Joseph M.Miller in Joseph M.Miller, Michael
H.Prosser and Thomas W.Benson (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric
(London, 1973), pp. 131-161, (p. 156).
40. Orwell 'Politics and the English Language', p. 100.
40. It is easy to forget when reading Flaubert or Maupassant or Stendhal
on the effort they put into writing that this effort reflects no glory on,
and guarantees no value in, their respective works - there was no ideal
form of Madame Bovary, Pierre et Jean, or Le Rouge et le Noir except
perhaps in the novelist's head. They could equally well have searched all
day for banalities. The right word, for the reader, is right only after
the event.
- 397 -
NO t- tfi* IF. I™ ± ±.<r» r* <n< i.. lj r «m i~> c:l R h-»»» t-o i" .i. c:
Chapter IV : Literature and Rhetoric
1. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'New Navel, New Man' (1961) in For a New Novel :
Essays on Fiction (1963), translated by Richard Howard, (New York, 1965),
pp. 133-142, (pp. 141-42). 'On Several Obsolete Notions' (1957) in ibid.,
pp. 25-47, (p. 45). [There! are no noble or ignoble subjects; from the
standpoint of pure Art one might almsot establish the axiom that there is
no such thing as subject - style in itself being an absolute manner of
seeing things.' Gustave Flaubert 'Letter to Louise Colet' (January 16, 1852)
in The Letters of Gustave Flaubert 1830-1857, selected, edit^ed and
translated by Francis Steegmuller, (London, 1980), p. 154. 'Poetry is not
the thing said but a way of saying it.' A.E.Housman 'The Name and Nature of
Poetry' (1933) in Selected Prose, edited by John Carter, (Cambridge, 1961),
pp. 168-195, p. 187.
2 Group jj A General Rhetoric (1970), translated by Paul B.Burrell and
Edgar M.Slotkin, (London, 1981).
3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. Even with clothing, to have "no style" one must dress in a certain
manner.
5. Oscar Wilde 'Preface' to The Picture of Dorian Gray (London, 1891).
6. Antonio Minturno De poeta libri sex (Venice, 1564), Lib., ii, p. 102. See
his L'Arte Poetica (1564) translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Alllan H.Gilbert
(ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to Dryden (New York, 1940), pp. 275-303,
(p. 289). This joining of the Horatian emphasis on instruction and
pleasure, and Longinus' emphasis on the power of poetry to transport the
reader, first appeared in Minturno's Latin work.
7. Jacopo Mazzoni On the Defense of the Comedy (1587) translated by Allen
H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 359-403, (p. 383). A similar
position is advanced in John Dennis' The Usefulness of the Stage to the
Happiness of Mankind, to Government, and to Religion. Occasioned by a late
book, written by Jeremy Collier (London, 1698).
8. Ibid., p. 383.
9. Thomas Heywood An Apology for Actors (1612) in Gilbert Literary
Criticism, pp. 553-564, (p. 558),
10. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 'Discourse on the Arts and Sciences' (1750),
translated by Lowell Blair in The Essential Rousseau (London, 1974), pp.
203-230, (pp. 207-208).
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11. Georg Lukacs 'Preface' to Writer and Critic : And Other Essays, edited
and translated by Arthur Kahn, (London, 1970), pp. 7-23, (p. 20).
12. Bertolt Brecht 'On Experimental Theatre' (1939) in Brecht on Theatre :
The Development of an Aesthetic, translated by John Willet, (London, 1964),
pp. 130-135, (p. 135).
13. Quoted by Philip Sidney in An Apologie for Poetrie (1595) in The
Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney, edited by Albert Feuillerat, 4 vols.,
(Cambridge, 1922-1926), III (1923), pp. 1-46, (p. 31).
14. Matthew Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series (London, 1888), p,
5.
15. William Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets (1818) in The Collected
Works of William Hazlitt, edited by A.R.Waller and Arnold Glover, 12 vols.,
(London. 1902-1904), V (1902), pp. 1-168, (p. 10).
16. W.H.Auden 'Writing' in The Dyer's Hand and Other Essays (London,
1963), pp. 13-27, (p. 27).
17. I.A.Richards Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), second edition,
(London, 1926), pp, 32-33. Gadamer values art for similar reasons; 'The
aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but
represents the essence of experience itself. As the work of art as such is
a world for itself, what is experienced aesthetically is, as an experience,
removed from all connections with actuality. The work of art would seem
almost by definition to become an aesthetic experience: that means,
however, that it suddenly takes the person experiencZing it out of the
context of his life, by the power of the work of art, and yet relates him
back to the whole of his existence. In the experience of art there is
present a fullness of meaning which belongs not only to to this particular
content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life. An
aesthetic experience always contains the experience of an infinite whole.
Precisely because it does not combine with others to make one open
experiential flow, but immediately represents the whole, its significance
is infinite.' And elsewhere; 'Aesthetic experience., .is a mode of self-
understanding. But all self-understanding takes place in relation to
something else that is understood and includes the unity and sameness of
this other. Inasmuch as we encounter the work of art in the world and a
world in the individual work of art, this does not remain a strange
universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we to
learn to understand oursleves in it, and that means that we preserve the
discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence.
Therefore it is necessary to adopt an attitude to the beautiful and to art
that does not lay claim to immediacy, but corresponds to the historical
reality of man....This negative insight, expressed positively, means that
art is knowledge and the experience of the work of art is a sharing of
this knowledge.' Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation
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of the second edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London,
1975), pp, 63, 86-87, This step, then, is an existential one, in that it
reveals the existential nature of the whole; but as an existential step it
is within existence! Thus Jaspers; 'Because this art [which is addressed to
consciousness at large] is a pure medium, does not bind us to anything, is
neither religious nor philosophical, it cannot be for or against religion
and philosophy. It has no source of its own except the endless free play
of possibilities.,.,The deliverance we get from the work of art becomes a
noncommittal semblance, for in the work there is only the work's own law,
not the law of real life. The poetic forms I create seem to relieve me of
existential decisions, and the possibilities I conceive seem to obviate my
need to deal with reality. Instead of having to decide, I can guess at what
might be; instead of having to be, I can content myself with the vistas of
my imagination. I may expand without limits in contemplative delight, may
be moved by whatever is humanly possible. I am rapture, and I am in
despair; I am free to forget myself in a pure, present timelessness without
consequences....¥hile a possibility in philosophical thinking is nothing but
an appeal to translate it into real self-being, art allows us to live a
full life without committment. It is the intentional delusion of being
inwardly moved by a concretely experienced presence of the most profound
and distant possibilities of being.' Karl Jaspers Philosophy (1932),
translation of the third edition (1956) by E.B.Ashton, 3 vols., (London,
1969), I, pp. 332-33, And elsewhere; 'The satisfaction I feel in the
imaginative viewing of art lifts me out of mere existence as well as out
of the reality of Existenz....But imagination does not commit me. Instead
of causing me really to be myself, it creates a space in which I can be,
or a presence whose being changes my inner posture without my taking any
real existential step in it....[Without] that noncommmittal viewing I am not
free to be passible Existenz. Entirely immersed in the reality of
existence, or solely concerned with the reality of my Existenz, I would be
as though in chains....Without a moment of voiding reality in the language
of art I could not freely seize upon reality as Existenz.' Philosophy, III,
pp. 169-170.
18. Lodovico Castelvetro The Poetics of Aristotle Translated and
Annotated (1571) translated by Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary
Criticism, pp. 305-357, (p. 307).
19. Castelvetro retreats somewhat from this position in discussing the
cathartic effect of tragedy.
20. Richards Principles, p. 97.
21. Dante 'Letter to Can Grande Delia Scala' (1319) translated by Allen
H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 202-206, (p. 204).
22. Giangiorgio Trissino Poetica (1529), translated by Allen H.Gilbert in
Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 213-232, (p. 213).
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23. Thomas Elyot The Book named The Governor (1530), edited by
S.E.:ehmberg, (Everyman, 1962), pp. 47-48.
24. Philip Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, p. 23.
25. Ibid., p. 23.
26. Castelvetro The Poetics of Aristotle, p. 315,
27. Ibid., p. 349.
28. Giraldi Cinthio On the Composition of Romances (1549), translated by
Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 262-273, (p. 270), Such a
bald statement of this antithesis and the conclusion drawn from it sounds
today, from a popular point of view, like the most damnable of critical
heresies; I can think of only certain light American comedy series which
overtly demonstrate such a motivation.
29. Ibid., p. 271. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, p. 18.
30. Torquato Tasso Discourses on the Heroic Poem (1594) translated by
Allen H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 467-503, (p. 488).
31. Edmund Spenser 'Letter to Sir Walter Raleigh' (1589). See also Heywood
An Apology for Actors.
32. Samuel Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of Villiam Shakespeare (1765) in
The Yale Edoition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. VII, J ohnson on
Shakespeare, edited by Arthur Sherbo, (London, 1968), pp. 59-113, (pp. 67,
71), Even his statement that we read Paradise Lost for instruction but
'look elswhere for recreation' might adequately describe the
undergraduate's progress. 'Milton' (1779) in Lives of the English Poets,
edited by George Birkbeck Hill, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1905), I, pp. 84-194, (pp.
183-84).
33. Percy Bysshe Shelley 'Preface' to The Cenci (1819).
34. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Goethe's Conversations with Eckermann
(1836-1848), translated by John Oxenford, with a preface by Eckermann and
introduction by Wallace Wood, (London, 1901), (March 1832) pp. 392-93.
Luk&cs 'Preface' to Writer and Critic, p. 16.
35. John Ruskin Lectures on Art (London, 1870), pp. 65-67. He also, rather
surprisingly, says that 'the first morality of a painter...is to know his
business', p. 74. George Eliot 'Leaves from a lote-book' in The Impressions
of Theophrastus Such, Essays, and Leaves from a Note-book (1879), vol. XII
of The Warwick Edition of George Eliot's Works (London, 1901), pp. 585-607,
(p. 589),
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36. F.R.Leavis 'James as Critic' (1963), preface to Henry James : Selected
Literary Criticism (1963), edited by Morris Shapira, (Harmondsworth, 1968),
pp. 13-24, (p. 19). My emphasis.
37. T.S.Eliot 'Religion and Literature' (1935) in Essays Ancient and
Modern (London, 1936), pp, 93-112, (p. 99). Lawrence, too, while admitting
that the novel must have a metaphysic asserts that this metaphysic 'must
always subserve the artistic purpose beyond the artist's conscious aims.
Otherwise the novel becomes a treatise.' D.H.Lawrence 'From Study of Thomas
Hardy1 (1936) in Selected Literary Criticism, edited by Anthony Beal,
(London, 1955), pp. 166-228, (p.188).
38. Wayne C.Booth The Rhetoric of Fiction (London, 1961), pp. 389, 392.
39. James Russell Lowell 'The Function of the Poet' (1855) in Allen and
Clark Literary Criticism, p. 421.
40. Wilde 'Preface' to Dorian Gray.
41. See Walter Pater The Renaissance : Studies in Art and Poetry (1893
edition), edited by D.J.Hill, (London, 1980). The only truly amoral account
of aesthetic experience I know occurs, strangely enough, in Lamb's essay
'On the Artificial Comedy of the Last Century' (1822), where he insists
that, while in life 'the moral point is everything', drama is a world unto
itself, in the enjoyment of which moral concerns are an irrelevance. It is
to 'formalist' or 'linguistic' approaches to the 'text' that we would have
to turn to discover an approach that was not explicitly or implicitly
concerned with the ideology of the work.
42. Gustave Flaubert 'Letter to George Sand (6 February 1876)' quoted in
Miriam Allott Novelists on the Novel (London, 1959), p. 96.
43. Nathaniel Hawthorne 'Preface' to The House of Seven gables (1851) in
Novels, edited by Millicent Bell, (New York, 1983), pp. 351-353, (p. 352).
My emphasis.
44. D.H.Lawrence 'Morality and the Novel' (1925) Selected Literary
Criticism, edited by Anthony Beal, (London, 1955), pp. 108-113, (p. 110).
45. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, pp. 8-9.
* 46. Matthew Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, p. 142.
47. John Henry Newman 'Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics'
(1829) in Essays Critical and Historical, 2 vols., (London, 1871), I, pp. 1-
26, (p. 21). Coventry Patmore 'Bad Morality is Bad Art' in Principle in Art
(London, 1889), pp. 15-19, (p. 15).
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48. The first 'description' is the world as an object of direct individual
experience, I have called literature a redescription to emphasize the fact
that in reading we are exposed to a "pattern", an ascription of value not
primarily our own.
49. Samuel Taylor Coleridge A Course of Lectures (1818) in Coleridge's
Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare and Some Other Old Poets and
Dramatists (Everyman, 1907), pp. 213-385, (Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or Art',
p. 311). Compare Camus; 'Artistic creation is a demand for unity and a
rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of what it
lacks and in the name of what it sometimes is...."I believe more and more",
writes Van Go^gh, "that God must not be judged on this earth. The world is
a study of God which has turned out badly." Every artist tried to
reconstruct this study and to give it the style it lacks....[But] there was
also in art a tendency to acquiescence...Equally well, no form of art can
survive on total denial alone. Just as all thought, and primarily that of
non-signification, signifies something, so there is no art that has no
signification. Kan can allow himself to denounce the total injustice of the
world and then demand a total justice which he alone will create. But he
cannot affirm the total hideousness of the world. To create beauty, he must
simultaneously reject reality and exalt certain of its aspects. Art
disputes reality, but does not hide from it....The incontestable importance
of the novel, our insistence, in fact, on taking seriously the innumerable
myths with which we have been provided, for the last two centuries, by the
genius of writers, implies a rejection of reality. But this rejection is not
a mere escapist flight, and should be interpreted as the retreat of the
soul which, according to Hegel, creates for itself in its deception a
fictitious world in which ethics reign alone....The contradiction is this:
man rejects the world as it is, without accepting the necessity of
escaping it. In fact, men cling to the world and by far the greater
majority do not want to abandon it. Far from always wanting to forget it,
they suffer, on the contrary, from not being able to possess it completely
enough, strangers to the world they live in and exiled from their own
country. Except for vivid moments of fulfilment, all reality for them is
incomplete....At this point is born the fatal envy, which so many men feel,
of the lives of others. Seen from a distance, these existences seem to
possess a coherence and a unity which they cannot have, in reality, but
which seem evident to the spectator. He only sees the salient points of
these lives without taking into account the details of corrosion. Thus we
make these lives into works of art. In an elementary fashion we turn them
into novels. In this sense, everyone tries to make his life a work of
art....But the lives of others always escape us and we escape them too;
they are without firm contours. Life, from this point of view, is without
style. It is only an impulse which endlessly pursues its form without ever
finding it. Man, tortured by this, tries in vain to find the form which
will impose certain limits between which he can be king. If only one
single living thing had definite form, he would be reconciled....What, in
fact, is a novel but a universe in which action is endowed with form,
where final words are pronounced, where people possess one another
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completely and where life assumes the aspect of destiny? The world of the
novel is only a rectification of the world we live in, in pursuance of
man's deepest wishes. For the world is undoubtedly the same one we know.
The suffering, the illusion, the love are the same.' Albert Camus The Rebel
(1951), translated by Anthony Bower, (London, 1953), pp, 222-232.
50. Frederick Schlegel Lectures on the History of Literature (1815), 'Mow
first completely translated', no translator given, (London, 1859), p. 260
(Lecture XII).
51. Coleridge 'Letter to J.Briton' (28 February, 1819) in Essays and
Lectures, pp. 8-9, (p. 8). Coleridge Shakespeare, Vith introductory matter
on Poetry, the Drama, and the Stage (1811-1812) in Essays and Lectures,
PP. 9-212, (p. 10),
52. Lowell 'The Function of the Poet' in Allen jlAterary Criticism, p. 422. cwi<A CUrW
53. Ibid., p. 430.
54. Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets, p. 2. 'Fear is poetry, hope is
poetry, love is poetry, hatred is poetry; contempt, jealousy, remorse,
admiration, wonder pity, despair, or madness, are all poetry.' p. 2.
55. Matthew Arnold Essays in Criticism (London, 1865), p. 80.
56. Henri Bergson Laughter : an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (1900),
translated by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell, (London, 1911), pp.
151-57.
57. Joseph Conrad 'Henry James : An Appreciation' (1905) in Motes on Life
and Letters (London, 1921), pp. 13-23, (p. 16).
58. T.E.Hulme 'Romanticism and Classicism' in Speculations : Essays on
Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Herbert Read (1924), second
edition, (London, 1936), pp. 111-140, (p. 127).
59. Ibid., p. 127.
60. T.S.Eliot 'Poetry and Drama' (1951) in On Poetry and Poets (London,
1957), pp. 72-88, (p. 87).
61. Jean-Paul Sartre What is Literature? (1948), translated by Bernard
Frechtman, (London, 1950), pp. 26-27.
62. Coleridge A Course of Lectures, p. 319 (Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or
Art').
63. Thomas Carlyle Heroes and Hero-worship (London, 1840), p. 87,
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64. E.M.Forster Aspects of the Navel (London, 1927), p. 88.
65. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
66. Schlegel Lectures on the History of Literature, p. 260 (Lecture XII).
67. Ibid., p. 265.
68. Carlyle Heroes and Hero-worship, p. 67.
69. Ibid,, p. 69.
70. Martin Heidegger 'What Are Poets For?' (1950) in Poetry, Language,
Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter, (London, 1971), pp. 89-142, (pp.
92-93).
71. Ibid., pp. 130-33.
72. Ralph Waldo Emerson 'The Poet' in Essays : Second Series (1844), The
Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson : Volume III, edited by Alfred
R.Ferguson and Jean Ferguson Carr, (London, 1983), pp. 3-24, (pp. 18, 8).
73. Ibid., p. 8.
74. 'This preference of the genius to the parts is the secret of that
deification of art which is found in all superior minds.' Ralph Waldo
Emerson 'Nominalist and Realist' in Essays : Second Series, pp. 133-145,
(p. 137).
75. Auguste Comte A General View of Positivism (1848), translated by
J.H.Bridges (1865), second edition, (London, 1880), Ch. VI.
76. Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, pp. 1-2.
77. Giovanni Boccaccio The Life of Dante (1363-64) translated by Allen
H.Gilbert in Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp. 208-211, (p, 211), Martin Opitz
considered that at first 'poetry was nothing but disguised theology', The
Book Concerning German Poetry (1624) translated by Olga Marx Perlzweig in
Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp, 565-67, (p. 565). Arnold Essays in
Criticism : Second Series, pp. 2-3. 'Beautiful art, like the religion
peculiar to it, has its future in true religion. The restricted value of
the idea passes utterly and naturally into the universality identical with
the infinite form; the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon
the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge, into an existence which
is itself knowledge - into revelation.' G.W.F.Hegel Hegel's Philosophy of
Mind, translated from Part III of The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences (1830) by William Wallace, (Oxford, 1894), p. 174 (Section III, §
563).
- 405 -
Not©® L„ .1 +..ef v <>u t.. 1.4 r is* jiii r> c.l Rf"i t-oric
78. Coleridge A Course of Lectures, p. 300 (Lecture XI).
79. Percy Bysshe Shelley 'A Defence of Poetry' (1821) in The Prose Varks
of Percy Bysshe Shelley, edited by Richard Heme Shepherd, 2 volumes,
(London, 1906), I, pp. 1-38, (p. 12). 'Preface' to The Cencii.
80. Arthur Schopenhauer The World as ¥111 and Idea (1818, 1844),
translated by R.B.Haldane and J.Kemp, (London, 1883), I, Bk. Ill, § 36. In
the same passage he writes how such a dreamer may write 'and then we
shall have the ordinary novel of every description, which entertains those
who are like him and the public at large, for the readers imagine
themselves in the place of the hero, and then find the story very
agreeable.'. The same idea is echoed in Sigmund Freud's 'Creative Writers
and Day-Dreaming' (1908).
81. Jean Duvignaud The Sociology of Art (1967), translated by Timothy
Wilson, (London, 1972), p. 20.
82. David Hume Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning
the Principles of Morals (1777), edited by L.A.Selby-Bigge, third edition
revized by P.H.Nidditch, (Oxford, 1975), p. 47.
83. Samuel Taylor Coleridge Biograpbia Literaria or Biographical Sketches
of My Literary Life and Opinions (1817), edited by James Engell and
W.Jackson Bate, 2 vols., (Princeton, 1983), I, p. 304.
84. The difficulty of distinguishing between the concepts of 'belief and
'imagination' is that it is belief itself which provides the distinction.
The conceptions of belief, as they belong to perception and memory, are
'more intense and steady', as Hume writes, than those of imagination. Hume
Enquiries, p. 50. False belief, or delusion, is still belief. One can,
therefore, say that while imagination can be subject to the will, belief
cannot. And yet as soon as one has said so, instances occur to the mind in
which belief is based on no more than willing a thing should be so.
85. Casey defines imagination as 'an autonomous mental act; independent
in status and free in its action,' Edward S.Casey Imagining : A
Fhenomenological Study (London, 1976), p. ix. If this were the case then
any relationship between it and the imaginer's life would have to be put
down to coincidence. Imagination is comparatively free, but what is not,
aside from direct sensory perception? To be able to talk meaningfully
about imagination it must be seen as part of the overall mental
functioning, conscious and unconscious, of the individual.
86. Hazlitt lectures on the English Poets, p, 1.
87. Friedrich Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man : In a Series of
Letters (1795), translated by Reginald Snell, (London, 1954), pp. 119-20
(Twenty-fifth Letter). According to Dufrenne, the aesthetic object 'takes us
- 406 -
No *t- 60> s» j Li tarat-ure aur*cf Rhetoric
back to an innocence by repressing emotions and imagination' and 'spares
us the expense of an exuberant imagination'; this is, however, to claim two
things that experience will not bear out - that the aesthetic object does
not exercise the imagination, and that the unaided imagination is
unlimited. Mikel Dufrenne The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (1953),
(Evanston, 1973), pp. 340, 366,
88. Schopenhauer The World as Will and Idea, I, Bk. Ill, § 38.
89. Joseph Addison The Spectator No. 421, Thursday, 3 July 1712.
90. William Hazlitt Lectures on the English Comic Writers (1819) in The
Collected Works of William Hazlitt, VIII (1903), pp. 1-168, (p. 5),
91. Longinus On the Sublime translated by T.S.Dorsch in T.S.Dorsch (ed.)
Classical Literary Criticism (Harmondsworth, 1965), pp. 99-158, (p. 107).
92. Edward Young Conjectures on Original Composition in a Letter to the
Author of Sir Charles Grandison (London, 1759), pp. 85-86.
93. Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets, p. 10,
94. Edgar Allen Poe 'The Poetic Principle' (1848) in Essays Miscellanies,
vol. XIV of The Complete Works of Edgar Allen Poe, edited by James
A.Harrison, 17 vols., (lew York, 1902), pp. 266-292, (p. 266). Tolstoy
writes that 'The stronger the infection the better is the art, as art.',
Count Leo Tolstoy What is Art? (1898) in Tolstoy on Art, edited and
translated by Aylmer Maude, (Oxford, 1925), pp. 121-357, (p. 275). An
opinion also shared by Flaubert; 'It doesn't require much brain to be a
critic: you can judge the excellence of a book by the strength of the
punches it has given you and the time it takes you to recover from them.'
Gustave Flaubert 'Letter to Louise Colet' (July 15, 1853) in Letters, pp.
193-194, (p. 193).
95. D.H.Lawrence 'Why the Movel Matters' (1936) in Selected Literary
Criticism, pp. 102-107, (p. 105). He includes the Bible, Homer, and
Shakespeare in the category 'novel'!
96. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren Theory of Literature (1949), third
edition, (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 102.
97. Young Conjectures, pp, 85-86.
98. W.K.Wimatt and Monroe C.Beardsley 'The Affective fallacy' (1949) in
The Verbal Icon : Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Kentucky, 1954), pp.
20-39, (p. 20).
99. Ibid., p. 21.
- 407 -
Notes; ; Literature mrtci Rhetoric
100. Ibid., p. 38.
101. Ibid., p. 21.
102. Count Leo Tolstoy What is Art?, p. 173.
103. Wimsatt and Beardsley 'The Affective Fallacy', pp. 25-26.
104. Marcus Tullius Cicero De Orataire, translated by E.W.Sutton, Loeb
Classical Library, 2 vols., (London, 1942), I, Bk. I, 30-34, II, Bk. Ill, 17-
24. Quintilian Institutes of Oratory: Or, Education of an Orator, translated
by John Selby Watson, 2 vols., (London, 1856), II, Bk. XII, Ch. 1. The
rhetorician Isoc~rates, a near contemporary of Plato, had also written that
good speaking is an index of sound understanding (See his Antidosis,
translated by George loulin in Isocrates, translated by George Moulin and
Larue van Hook, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols., (London, 1928-1945), II
(1929), pp, 181-365, (274-78). At the end of Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates
praises him and hints that he will probably one day become a philosopher.
105. In fact when he writes that the 'foundation of eloquence...is wisdom',
what he is actually talking about is wisdom in selecting what is
appropriate to the occasion, that is, decorum. For 'the same thing is often
approved or rejected according as it is expressed in one way or another,'
Cicero Orator, translated by H.M.Hubbell in Brutus and Orator, Loeb
Classical Library, (London, 1939), pp. 306-509, (70, 72). Isocrates too
talks of thoughts 'clothed' in language, in Against the Sophists, translated
by George Moulin in Isacrates, II, pp. 163-177, (17).
106. The 'naturalistic fallacy'. See G.E,Moore Principia Etbica (Cambridge
1903), pp. 18-20. Quintilian derives enthymemes from syllogisms simply by
suppressing a premiss in the presentation, but his syllogisms, containing
as they do, evaluative terms, can also be classed as enthymemes! See
Institutes of Oratory, I, Bk. V, Ch. XIV, 24-26. 'Mow the enthymeme, which
is considered by the Latins to be a mental concept, the grammarians are
wont to call it an imperfect syllogism, For the form of this type of
argumentation has only two parts; and furthermore, it uses material
outside the domain of syllogism, for the purpose of winning
belief... .wherefore the enthymeme is thought better fitted for the use of
the rhetorician than of the dialectician,,..The parts of the enthymeme are
five: 1) the convincible; 2) the plausible; 3) the sentential; 4) the
paradigmatic; 5) the compendious.' Isidore of Seville "Concerning Rhetoric"
from The Etymologies (early 7th Century), II. 1-15, translated by Dorothy
V.Cerino in Joseph M.Miller, Michael H.Prosser and Thomas W.Benson (eds.)
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric (London, 1973), pp. 79-95, (p. 89).
107. Plato Gorgias, translated by J.Wright (1848) in Five Dialogues of
Plato Bearing on Poetic Inspiration (Everyman, n.d.), pp. 205-277, (p. 250).
Antonius, in Cicero's De Oratore, holds that it is essential for the orator
to win the favour of the audience, for 'men decide far more problems by
- 408 -
Nolteffi ; Li taratuv© wind Rh^t-or i c
hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or
illusion, or some other inward emotion, that by reality', De Oratore, I, Bk.
II, 178. See also the discussion of ethos at 184.
108, Francis Bacon The Two Books of Francis Bacon. Of the Proficience and
Advancement of learning, Divine and Human (1605) in The Advancement of
Learning and New Atlantis (1605, 1627), edited by Arthur Johnson, (Oxford,
1974), pp". 1-212, (p. 141).
109. Ibid,, pp. 116-17.
110. Ibid., p. 139.
111. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
112. Ibid., p. 116.
113. Ibid., p. 142.
114. Thomas Be Quincey 'Rhetoric' (1828) in The Collected Writings of
Thomas De Quincey, edited by David Massan, 14 vols., (London, 1896-1897),
Volume X, Literary Theory and Criticism (1897), pp. 81-133, (p. 91).
115. Bacon Advancement of Learning, p, 141.
116. Ibid., p. 141.
117. Ibid., p. 141.
118. Ibid., p. 81.
119. Ibid., pp. 80-81. 'Not every sentence, however, is a proposition; only
those sentences are propositions to which truth or falsehood belongs, and
these do not belong to every sentence... But let us leave the other kinds
of sentence out of consideration, since an examination of them belongs
more properly to rhetoric or to poetry. Propositions are what concern our
present enquiry.' Aristotle On Interpretation, translated by A.E.Wardman and
J.L.Creed in The Philosophy of Aristotle, edited by Renford Bambrough, (New
York, 1963), pp. 149-159, (p. 149, (4)).
120, George Puttenham The Arte of Englishe Poesie (1589), edited by
Gladys D.Willcock and Alice Walker, (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 8, 196. Bacon
makes a similar historical claim in his Advancement of Learning, p. 81.
Compare Vica; 'Throughout this book it will be shown that as much as the
poets had first sensed in the way of vulgar wisdom, the philosophers later
understood in the way of esoteric wisdom; so that the former may be said
to have been the sense and the latter the intellect of the human
race...Wisdom among the gentiles began with the muse' Giambattista Vico The
New Science of Giamhattista Vico (third edition, 1744), translated by
- 409 -
Note® : l.J. teralure ffitrnd Rhetoric
Thomas Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, (Ithaca, Mew York, 1968), Bk. II, §§.
363, 365,
121. George Campbell 'Introduction' to The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776)
in Scott Elledge (ed.) Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, 2 volumes, (New
York, 1961), II, pp. 932-42, (p. 938).
122. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, p. 43. Cicero had described poets as
'next of kin to orators', De Oratore, II, Bk. Ill, 27. Even the ends of
poetry we have seen Minturno propose are echoes from writers on rhetoric.
Thus Cicero describes the orator having three styles; the 'plain' (for
proof), the 'middle' (for pleasure), and the 'vigorous' (for persuasion),
Orator, 69. Quintilian likewise defines the end of rhetoric as 'to inform,
to move, to please', Institutes of Oratory, I, Bk. Ill, Ch. V, 2.
123. Longinus On the Sublime, pp. 127-28. Later in the work he writes
that 'to apply great and stately terms to trifling matters would be like
putting a big tragic mask on a tiny child.', continuing, 'However, in poetry
and....'. Unfortunat&ly four pages of the manuscript are missing here,
though it is interesting to speculate on the nature of the qualification.
'In the figures mentioned above there is a certain effect of color and a
certain gravity which arises from the fact that the statement does not
show itself in public with a bare face or avail itself of its own voice,
but rather uses a strange voice. And thus it covers itself, as it were,
with a cloud (still clear, however, under its cloud) ....The thought that has
arrived at elegant "color" by such means does not come so as to be clearly
detected, but instead reveals itself through signs. It sheds its light from
off to one side; it does not care to proceed directly into the light.'
Geoffrey of Vinsauf The New Poetics (c.1210), translated by Jane Baltzell
Kopp, in James J.Murphy (ed.) Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts (London,
1971), pp. 27-108, (pp. 71, 89).
124. Tasso Discourses on the Heroic Poem, pp. 490-91.
125. Mazzoni On the Defense of the Comedy, p. 396.
126. William Wordsworth 'Essay Supplementary to the Preface' (1815) in
The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, edited by W.J.B.Owen and Jane
Worthington Smyser, 3 vols., (Oxford, 1974), III, pp. 62-84, (p. 63). The
thought was not, of course, a new one; Joseph Trapp, a century before, had
asserted that 'it is the great art of poetry to work upon the passions'.
Joseph Trapp 'Of Beauty of Thought in Poetry or of Elegance and Sublimity'
from Lectures on Poetry (1711, 1715, 1719), translated from Latin by
William Clarke and William Bowyer (1742) in Elledge Eighteenth-Century
Critical Essays, I, pp. 229-50, (p. 242),
127. Wordsworth 'Essay Supplementary to the Preface', p. 63. He does not
use the word 'rhetoric' but the distinction he draws relies upon the
concept of a rhetorical power in poetry.
- 410 -
Is!o t\. is» j L i it» vv is* t..u r «*• <21 v> ci Rhi t-or J. c
128. James Henry Leigh Hunt 'An Answer to the Question What is Poetry?1
in Imagination and Fancy; Or, Selecetions from the English Poets (London,
1844), pp. 1-61, (pp. 3-4),
129. Ibid., p. 4. 'Painting gives the object itself; poetry what it implies.'
Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets, p. 10.
130. Coventry Patmore 'Poetical Integrity' in Principle in Art, pp. 35-39,
(p. 37).
131. Walter Pater Appreciations : With an Essay on Style (London, 1889),
pp. 6-7. 'As the painter in his picture, so the artist in his book, aims at
the production by honourable artifice of a peculiar atmosphere.' p. 15.
132. Richards Principles, p. 240.
133. Henry James 'Preface' (1907-1917) to The Spoils of Poynton (1897) in
The Art of the Novel : Critical Prefaces (Hew York, 1934), pp. 119-39, (p.
120).
134. Victor Hugo 'Preface' to Cromwell (1825), translated by George
Burnham Ives (1909) in Gay Wilson Allen and Harry Hayden Clark (eds,)
Literary Criticism : Pope to Croce, pp. 320-339, (p. 335),
135. 'The virtue of' art', writes Emerson, 'lies in detachment, in
sequesting one object from the embarrassing variety....The power to detach,
and to magnify by detaching, is the essence of rhetoric in the hands of
the orator and the poet, This rhetoric, or power to fix the momentary
eminency of an object, - so remarkable in Burke, in Byron, in Carlyle, -
the painter and the sculptor exhibit in colour and stone. The power
depends on the depth of the artist's insight of that object he
contemplates. For every object has its roots in central nature, and may of
course be so exhibited to us as to represent the world. Therefore each
work of genius is the tyrant of the hour, and concentrates attention on
itself.' Ralph Waldo Emerson 'Art' in Essays : First Series (1841), The
Collected Works of ralph waldo Emerson : Volume II, pp. 207-218, (p. 211).
De Quincey, we might remember, defines the result of rhetoric as the mind's
being left 'practically under the possession of a one-sided estimate.'.
136. Aristotle On the Art. of Poetry in Dorsch Classical Literary
Criticism, pp. 29-75, (p. 33, (144831)). [Hereafter referred to as Poetics.]
137. Pierre Hicole Of Comedy (1671) translated by Clara W.Crane in
Gilbert Literary Criticism, pp, 597-99, (p. 598).
138. Samuel Johnson The Rambler No. 4, Saturday, March 31, 1750.
139. Joseph Addison The Spectator No. 418, Monday, 30 June, 1712.
Duvignaud expresses a similar idea, when he writes that 'every significant
- 411 -
Notffitr. ; L. A mracl Rhetoric
imagined action is a communication from a distance which is never
reconciled to this distance.' Duvignaud Sociology of Art, p. 52,
140. Camus The Rebel, p. 237.
141. Ibid., p. 237.
142. Lawrence 'From Study of Thomas Hardy^ p. 188.
143. Arnold Essays in Criticism, pp. 249-250.
144. Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, p. 187.
145. Ibid., pp. 143-44.
146. Milton Paradise Lost, XI, 11. 553-54.
147. Keats 'Ode on a Grecian Urn', 1. 20.
148. Shakespeare The Tempest, IV, i, 11. 156-58.
149. Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, pp. 1-2.
150. Anton Tchekhov 'Letter to A.S.Souvorin' (27 October 1888) in The Life
and Letters of Anton Tchekhov, translated by S.S.Koteliansky and Philip
Tomlinson, (London, 1925), pp. 126-129, (p. 127).
151. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'The Use of Theory' (1955, 1963) in For a New
Novel, pp, 7-14, (p. 14).
152. Robbe-Grillet 'A Future for the Movel' (1956) in For a New Novel, pp.
15-24, (p. 24). Roland Barthes considers the essence of Balzac's writing as .
exclusively a matter of cultural codes, that is, as made up of an 'army of
stereotypes' and outmoded maxims about 'life, death, suffering, love, women,
ages of man, etc.'; 'Although entirely derived from books, these codes, by a
swivel characteristic of bourgeois ideology, which turns culture into
nature, appears to establish reality, "life". "Life" then, in the classic
text, becomes a nauseating mixture of common opinions, a smothering layer
of received ideas'. Roland Barthes S/Z (1970), translated, by Richard
Miller, (London, 1975), p. 206.
153. Robbe-Grillet 'Mature, Humanism, Tragedy' (1958) in For a New Novel,
pp. 49-76, (p. 54). Compare John Ruskin's 'Of the Pathetic Fallacy' in
Modern Painters, 5 vols., (London, 1843-1860), III (1856), Pt, 4.
154. Robbe-Grillet 'Mature Humanism, Tragedy', pp. 53-54,
155. De Quincey 'Rhetoric', p. 92. Cicero, too, has some trouble, after
proposing and then rejecting rhythm and verse, in differentiating between
U"i runj C A*
- 412 -
Klot-tf&ss j Li i«»raiure an rncd Rhetoric
the poet from the orator. His tentative solution is that poets 'have a
greater freedom in the formation and arrangement of words,..and also that,
with the approval of some critics, they pay more attention to sound than
to sense.' Cicero Orator, 68.
156. Hazlitt Lectures on the English Poets, p. 15, fn. 1.
157. Jfewman 'Poetry', p. 24.
158. John Stuart Mill 'What is Poetry?' <1833) in Kill's Essays on
Literature and Society, edited by J.B.Schneewind, (London, 1965), pp, 102-
117, <p. 109).
159. Henry James 'The Art of Fiction' (1884) in Selected Literary
Criticism, pp. 78-97, (p. 91). Compare; 'Art is limitation; the essence of
every picture is the frame.' G.K.Chesterton Orthodoxy (London, 1908), p. 69.
160. James 'The Art of Fiction', p. 86.
161. Heidegger '...Poetically Man Dwells...' (1954) in Poetry, language,
Thought, pp. 211-29.
162. Eobbe-Grillet 'A Future For the Hovel', p. 19. Here one might
remember the 'filtering' effect of the subsidiary subject in metaphor.
163. Ibid., p. 23.
164. Ibid., p. 21.
165. If Robbe-Grillet truly believed the first part of his argument he
would scarcely be an author. Barthes also avoids this implication when he
writes of Literature 'having tended for a hundred years now to transmute
its surface into a form with no antecedents, could no longer find purity
anywhere but in the absence of all signs', and describes the work of
Camus, Blanchot, Cayrol, and Queneau, as exemplifying 'the degree zero of
writing'. Roland Barthes Writing Degree Zero (1953), translated by Annette
lavers and Colin Smith in Writing Degree Zero and Elements of Semiology,
published separately 1967, as one volume (London, 1984), pp. 1-76, (p. 6).
166. Mazzoni On the Defense of the Comedy, pp. 367-70.
167. Ibid,, p. 369. 'Since therefore the faculty of eloquence is the key
which makes possible the winning of many either to virtue or to vice, why
not tie it in with the study of the virtues, so that it can battle for
truth just as the wicked now make it serve iniquity and errror by
supporting ends that are perverse and evil?' Rabanus Maurus On the
Training of the Clergy, III. 19 (early ninth century) in Miller et al,
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, pp. 125-27, (p. 126).
- 413 -
Mot.©® ! Li ieratur® «hv>el Fv'hetor i i::
168. Ibid., p. 393.
169. John Stuart Mill 'Bentham' (1838) in Essays on Literature and
Society, pp. 240-289, (p. 285).
170. Ibid., p. 286.
171. Ibid., p. 286.
172. The metaphors of science or philosophy need not be rhetorical, but
only at the expense of being amenable to paraphrase, of being proposed
expressly for the purpose of being replaced by better ones.
173. Aristotle Poetics, pp. 43-44, (1451^).
174. Elyot The Governor, pp. 46-47.
175. Sidney An Apologie for Poetrie, pp. 4, 16. He writes that, of all
philosophers, it is Plato he has 'ever esteemed most worthy of reverence,
and with good reason, since of all philosophers he is the most poetical.'
p. 33. 'But because metaphysics is the sublime science which distributes
their determinate subject mattex-s to all the so-called subaltern sciences;
and becuase the wisdom of the ancients was that of the theological poets,
who without doubt were the first sages of the gentile world; and because
the origins of all things must by nature have been crude: for all these
reasons we must trace the beginnings of poetic wisdom to a crude
metaphysics.' Vico The New Science, Bk. II, § 367.
/
176. Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, p. 128,
177. Lukacs makes this point well, though I differ from him in believing
that 'truth' has nothing to do with the relationship; 'true to life' is a
property of a convincing ai-gument not a true one. 'The effect of art, the
immersion of the receptant in the action of the work of art, his complete
penetration into the special "world" of the work of art, results from the
fact that the work by its very nature offers a truer, more complete, more
vivid and mox~e dynamic reflection of reality than the receptant otherwise
possesses, that it conducts him on the basis of his own experiences and
on the basis of the organization and generalization of his previous
reproduction or reality beyond the bounds of his experiences toward a more
concrete insight into reality. It is therefore, only an illusion - as
though the work itself were not a reflection, of reality, as though the
reader did not conceive of the special "world" as a reflection of reality
and did not compare it with his own experiences. He acts consistently in
accordance with this pretence, and the effect of the work of art ceases
once the reader becomes aware of a contradiction, once he senses that the
work of art is not an accurate reflection of reality. But this illusion is
in any case necessary. For the reader does not consciously compare an
individual experience with an isolated event of the work of art but
- 414 -
Noieis ; L. i terature anrtcd Rh»t.or ic
surrenders himself to the general effect of the work of art on the basis
of his own assembled general experience.' Georg Luk&cs 'Art and Objective
Truth' in Writer and Critic, pp. 25-60, (pp. 36-37).
178. A.J.Ayer Language, Truth and Ingle (1936), second edition, (london,
1946), pp. 44-45.
179. An analytical proposition is one which can be proved from
definitions by means of logical laws, for example 'Black cats are black',
'Bachelors are unmarried', 'All matter occupies space', the negation of
which would be self-contradictory. Empirical propositions are ones which
can be verified by recourse to observation.
180. Bertrand Russell History of Western Philosophy and its Connection
with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the
Present Day (1946), second edition, (London, 1961), pp. 290-91,
181. Consider, for example, the tales of the young woman putting off her
decision, or the waiter playing at being a waiter, or the narrator's
fascination with the honey sliding off the spoon, in Jean-Paul Sartre
Being and Nothingness : An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (1943),
translated by Hazel E.Barnes, (London, 1958), Pt. 1, Ch. II, sec. 2, Pt. 4,
Ch. II, sec. 3.
182. Blaise Pascal Pensees (1670), translated by William Finlayson
Trotter, (Everyman, 1904), § 347.
183. Likewise Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript is the
story of a series of mental revolutions, a story which the reader must to
some extent imitate to be able to follow at all.
184. I do not allude merely to scriptures that take the form of
historical accounts, or to eschatological descriptions; doctrines of sin,
forgiveness, and salvation are themselves narratives. Thus Bultmann, after
outlining his program for 'demythologizing' the lew Testament writes that
'the redemption of which we have spoken is not a miraculous supernatural
event, but an historical event wrought out in time and space.' Rudolf
Bultmann 'New Testament and Mythology' (1943) in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.)
Kerygma and Myth : A Theological Debate (1948), translated by Reginald
H.Fuller, (London, 1953), pp. 1-44, (p. 43).
185. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, I, §§ 57-8.
186. George Campbell 'Introduction' to The Philosophy of Fhetoric, p. 939.
187. This is what Merleau-Ponty, for example, appears to believe; 'The
work of a great novelist always rests on two or three philosophical ideas.
For Stendhal, these are the notions of the Ego and Liberty; for Balzac, the
mystery of history as the appearance of a meaning in chance events; for
- 415 -
Not.«f.u?€5. ; Li "t.®r»*.uir<t& <•»r>d Rf~»*«• t.©Vs :i. c
Proust, the way the past is involved in the present and the presence of
times gone by. The function of the novelist is not to state these ideas
theraatically but to make them exist for us in the way that things exist.
Stendhal's role is not to hold forth an subjectivity; it is enough that he
makes it present.' Maurice Merleau-Ponty 'Metaphysics and the Novel'
(1945), in Sense and Non-Sense (1948), translated by Hubert L. and
Patricia A.Dreyfus, (Evanston, 111, 1964), pp. 26-40, (p. 26). Compare
Taine's assertion that 'art is a kind of philosophy made sensible, religion
a poem taken for true, philosophy an art and religion dried up, and
reduced to simple ideas.' Hippolyte Taine 'Introduction' to History of
English Literature (1864), translated by H. van laun, 2 vols., (Edinburgh,
1871), I, pp. 1-21, (p. 15).
188. Arnold Essays in Criticism : Second Series, pp. 148-49.
189. Shakespeare The Tempest, IV. i, 11. 156-58.
190. Wordsworth 'Lines Composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey' (1798),
1. 91.
191. Proust Le Temps Retrouve, Vol. II, Ch. 3.
192. Morris Weitz 'Truth in Literature' (1955) in John Hospers (ed.)
Introductory Readings in Aesthetics (London, 1969), pp. 213-224, (p. 222).
193. Ibid., p. 220.
194. The term 'rhetoric' is often used to characterize the relationship
between author and reader, that is, the author's manipulation of the
reader's response. Satire, for example, is a rich field for such study.
However, such an approach presupposes that rhetoric is detachable from
some element of the work. So it is, insofar as there are levels of
rhetoric. But by cutting out the hypothetical author, or rather by
realizing the hypothetical nature of this author, we are left with an
overall rhetoric, the rhetoric of the work.
195. F.R.Leavis 'Literary Criticism and Philosophy' (1937) in The Common
Pursuit (London, 1952), pp. 211-222, (p. 216).
196. Ibid., p. 219.
197. Ibid., p. 221.
198. T.S.Eliot 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca' (1927) in Selected
Essays (1932), third enlarged edition, (London, 1951), pp. 126-140, (p.
135).
199. Ibid., pp. 136-37. 'The tragic emotion is not a response to the
tragic course of events as such or to the justice of the fate that
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overtakes the hero, but to the metaphysical order of being that is true
for all. To see that "this is how it is" is a kind of self-knowledge for
the spectator, who emerges with new insight from the illusions in which he
lives. The tragic affirmation is an insight which the spectator has by
virtue of the continuity of significance in which he places himself.' Hans-
Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (196-0), translation of the second edition
(1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), p. 117.
200. Ibid., pp, 137-38. Eliot probably comes closer to the truth when he
writes that what poets like Dante present us with is not a philosophy but
'the emotional and sense equivalent for a definite philosophical system'.
Eliot 'Introduction' (1930) to G.Wilson Knight The Wheel of Fire
Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy, With Three ilTew Essays (1930),
(London, 1965), pp. xiii-xx, (p. xiii).
201. Dante Faradiso, III, 1. 85. See Graham Hough An Essay On Criticism
(London, 1966), p. 78, for a contrary conclusion.
202. Charles Sanders Peirce 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear' (1878) in
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume V, Pragmatism and
Pragmaticism, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, (Cambridge,
Mass., 1934), pp. 248-271, (pp. 259-62).
203. Ibid., p. 257.
204. Ibid., p. 270.
205. William James Pragmatism (1907), edited by Fredson Bowers and Ignes
Skrupskelis, (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), in The Works of William James,
edited by F.H.Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers and Ignes Skrupskelis, 11 vols.,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1975-1983), p. 30.
206. Ibid., p. 34.
207. Ibid., pp. 36-37, 42.
*
208. Ibid., p. 43.
209. Ibid., p. 34.
210. James Pragmatism, p. 39.
211. Rudolf Carnap Philosophy and Logical Syntax, Psyche Miniatures,
General Series Ho. 70, (London, 1935), p, 14.
212. Schopenhauer World as Will and Idea, I, § 1.
213. (Consider also the relationship between Schopenhauer's 'man's
existence is a constant dying' and Webster's 'We...cease to die by dying.'
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The White Devil, V, vi, 1. 251.) I have described 'meaningless' as
rhetorical in this context because, far from suggesting an assertion the
pragmatic consequences of which are confined to the emotional set of the
person to whom they are significant, it suggests something that cannot be
made significant, that is, pure gibberish.
214. Poe 'The Poetic Principle', p. 272.
215. It is just because, to continue the musical analogy, the shift from
'A' to 'A sharp' is so obvious in metaphor that we are not usually misled
into taking the terms it uses at their denotational value. In the
metaphysic of the novel this is not so obvious, since often the work can
seem a mere transcription of the real rather than a metaphor of it.
216. William Wordsworth 'Preface' to the 1850 edition of Lyrical Ballads
in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, I, pp, 119-159, (p. 136).
'[Whatever] it is we know in this poem, we know only in the poem. It is
not a knowledge we can extract fromjthe poem...and carry off.' Archibald
Macleish Poetry and Experience (London, 1960), p. 11, Macleish too talks of
a meaning that 'goes straight to what we call the heart", p. 13. ('The
problem is that this proof of the spirit and of power no longer has any
spirit or power, but has sunk to the level of human testimonies of spirit
and power....I deny that they can and should bind me to the very least
faith in the other teachings of Christ. What then does bind me? Nothing
but these teachings themselves.' G.E.Lessing 'On the Proof of the Spirit and
of Power' (1777) in Theological Writings, edited and translated by Henry
Chadwick, (London, 1956), pp. 51-56, (pp. 52, 55).)
217. There may be an argument here for assimilating certain metaphysical
philosophers, at least as they are represented in those works where the
interest is not primarily philosophical, into the literary canon.
218. Carnap Philosophy and Logical Syntax, pp. 28-29.
219. Ibid., p. 29.
220. Ibid., p. 31. We might remember here Sidney's assertion that the poet
'never affirms and therefore never lieth.'. See Chapter 2, fn. 12.
221. Mill 'Bentham', p. 286.
222. G.K.Chesterton 'The Optimism of Byron' in Twelve Types (London,
1910), pp. 31-44, (pp, 37-8), 'One of the best tests in the world of what a
poet really means is his metre. He may be a hypocrite in his metaphysics,
but he cannot be a hypocrite in his prosody. And all the time that Byron's
language is of horror and emptiness, his metre is bounding "pas de
quatre.'" pp. 42-3. What I mean by 'metaphysic' would include what the
prosody suggests as well,
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223. So 'opinion : fact' as 'dreaming : consciousness', or 'what we call
dreaming : what we call consciousness' as 'what we call consciousness :
consciousness'. (The same proposition considered literally, as Descartes
considers it in the first of his Meditations, quickly reveals itself to be
'meaningless' in precisely the same way as the idealist thesis is
'meaningless'.) The most austerely anti-rhetorical statement can also
become memorable, become rhetorical, simply through its austerity. Consider
the opening of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Fbilnsophicus; 'The world is
all that is the case.'. It is the antithesis of Schopenhauer's 'The world is
my idea', but, like that phrase, it is given pride of place in the work,
isolated, claiming for itself fundamental significance. The fact, then, that
it is simply a tautology, paradoxically gives it a rhetorical impact.
224. Suggestibility changes with time, but at an impressionable age I
believe that a hero is chosen as a model less for the qualities he/she
possesses, which may be the most abject and self-destructive, than for the
fact that he/she is the centre of attention.
225. We may also discover the connection between this and its
prescriptions to be either logical or illogical. All these positive
qualities might be subsumed under the heading of 'beauty', the other merit
which Russell claims a metaphysic can possess, and tentatively define this
problematic concept as that property which a thing or idea possess when
it embodies for us the end of a desire.
226. Bertrand Russell Human Knowledge : Its Scope and Limits (London,
1948), p. 415.
227. Peirce 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear'.
228. Peirce 'The Fixation of Belief (1877) in Collected Papers, V, pp.
223-231, (p. 227, n. 1).
229. Kazzoni draws a parallel between the rhetorician who personifies
vice and virtue and the tale which presents the two as figures in the
action; 'It seems to me, then, it can be reasonably said that poetry
deserves to be classified under the ancient sophistic, since poetry too
deals with all things according to the credible, and speaks of them with
great pride, as professing to know all things through the aid of Appollo
and the Muses.' Mazzoni On the Defense of the Comedy, p. 368. Is this not
precisely the sort of dualism which Lawrence constructs out of Jude the
Obscure in his Study of Thomas Hardy?
230. Peirce 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', p. 255.
231. Thomas De Quincey 'The Poetry of Pope' (1848) in The Collected
Writings of Thomas De Quincey, XI (1897), pp. 51-97, (pp. 56-57).
232. Sartre What is Literature?, pp. 27, 38.
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233. Ibid., p. 42.
234. Chesterton Twelve Types, pp. 36-7.
235. One may read poetry as if sampling different viewpoints but
narrative requires immersion.
236. Lawrence 'Morality and the Novel', p. 110.
237. Newman 'Poetry', p. 16,
238. Gestures, of the grand sort, are the quintessence of this desire to
make life 'literary', Lukacs essay on Kierkegaard, 'The Foundering of Form
Against Life' (1909), is interesting in this regard but falls into the
inevitable paradox of giving Kierkegaard's life a "form" through the very
terms he uses to deny that Kierkegaard's life had one. Georg Luk&cs Soul
and Form (1971), translated by Anna Bostock, (London, 1974), pp. 28-41.
239. Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in Intentions, pp. 1-54, (p. 53).
Like Hazlitt, Shklovsky too describes everyday perception as 'prose
perception' in his 'Art as Technique' (1917) in Lee T.Lemon and Marion
J.Reis (eds.) Russian Formalist Criticism : Four Essays (Lincoln, 1965), pp.
5-24, (p. 11). Take, for example, aphorisms and maxims - though their
history is predominantly oral they fall within the category of the written
word, for they are 'written into' the language, in that their form is fixed,
so that uttering one is like pointing to a text.
240. '[Each! of us simply creates for himself an illusion of the world
which may be poetic, sentimental, joyful or melancholy, sordid or
lugubrious according to his nature. And the writer has no other mission
than to reproduce this illusion faithfully with all the artistic techniques
he has learned and can bring to bear....The great artists are those who
impose their personal illusion upon humanity.' Guy de Maupassant 'The
Novel' (1887) preface to Pierre and Jean (1888), translated by Leonard
Tancock, (Harmondsworth, 1979), 21-35, (pp. 27-28).
241. Oscar Wilde De Profundis : Being the first complete and accurate
version of 'Epistola: in Carcere et Vinculis' the last prose work in
English of Oscar Vilde (London, 1949), pp, 45, 78.
/
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Chapter V : Evaluation
1. Friedrich Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols : Or How One Philosophizes
With A Hammer (1888), translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable
Nietzsche, edited by Walter Kaufmann, (New York, 1954), pp. 463-563, (pp.
525-26).
2. 'A species cannot do otherwise but thus affirm itself alone. Its lowest
instinct, that of self-preservation and self-expansion, still radiates in
such sublimities... At bottom, man mirrors himself in things; the judgement
"beautiful" is the vanity of the species. For a little suspicion may
whisper this question into the sceptic's ear : Is the world really
beautified by the fact that man thinks it is beautiful.' Nietzsche Twilight
of the Idols, pp. 525-26. The answer is, of course, yes.
3. Benedict Spinoza 'Letter to Hugo Boxel' (September 1674) in The
Correspondence of Spinoza, translated and edited by A.Wolf, (London, 1928),
(Letter LIV) pp. 276-281, (p. 279).
4. Benedict Spinoza Ethics Proved in Geometrical Order in Ethics and Do
Intellectus Emendatione (1677), translated by A.Boyle, (London, 1910), pp,
1-226, (p. 35 (Appendix to Part I)), and 'Letter to Henry Oldenburg'
(November, 1665) in Correspondence, (Letter XXXII) pp. 209-214, (p. 210)
'[Beauty], like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the
Perception of some Mind' Francis Hutcheson An Enquiry into the Original of
our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), third edition, (London, 1729), I,
xvii,
5. David Hume 'The Sceptic' (1742) in Essays Moral, Political, and
Literary (1777), edited by Eugene F.Miller, (Indianapolis, 1985), pp. 159-
180, (p. 51). Montesquieu 'An Essay on Taste : Considered with respect to
the productions both of Nature and Art' in Alexander Gerard An Essay on
Taste, With Three Dissertations on the Same Subject by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr.
D'Alembert, Mr. De Montesquieu (1759), pp. 251-314, (pp. 258-59).
6. Friedrich Schiller On The Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), translated
by Reginald Snell, (London, 1954), p. 122 (Twenty-fifth Letter).
7. Alexander Pope An Essay in Criticism (1711), 11. 8-9.
8. Herbert Read Collected Essays in Literary Criticism (1938), second
edition, (London, 1951), p. 14.
9. Nelson Goodman 'Merit as Means' in Sidney in Hook (ed.) Art and
Philosophy : A Symposium (New York, 1966), pp. 56-57,
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10. This definition of art is actually put forward in George Dickie's 'The
Institutional Concept of Art' where he writes that 'Something is art
because of the place it has in a certain social system....A work of art in
the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) upon which some person or
persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the Artworld)
have confered the status of candidate for appreciation.' in Benjamin
R.Tilgham (ed.) Language and Aesthetics : Contributions to the Philosophy
of Art (Laurence, Kansas, 1973), pp. 21-30, (pp. 30, 25).
11. Northrop Frye Anatomy of Criticism : Four Essays (Princeton, 1957), p.
18.
12. Ibid., p. 25.
13. The very concept of value implies comparison. Howell's writes that
'The time is coming, I hope, when each new author, each new artist, will be
considered, not in his proportion to any other author or artist, but in his
relation to the human nature, known to us all, which it is his privilege,
his high duty, to interpret.' ¥.D.Howells Criticism and Fiction (New York,
1891), p. 8. But this is ingenuous, for, as Johnson writes, 'As among the
works of nature no man can properly call a river deep or a mountain high
without the knowledge of many mountains and many rivers; so in the
productions of genius, nothing can be styled excellent till it be compared
with other works of the same kind.' Samuel Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays
of Villiam Shakespeare (1765) in The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel
Johnson, vol. VII, Johnson on Shakespeare, edited by Arthur Sherbo, (London,
1968), pp. 59-113, (p. 60). Thus Eliot writes that a writer cannot be
evaluated in a vacuum but 'you must set him, for contrast and comparison,
among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not historical
criticism.' T.S.Eliot 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' (1919) The
Sacred Wood : Essays on Poetry and Criticism (1920), second edition,
(London, 1928), pp. 47-59, (p. 49). Eliot's concept of the necessity of
periodically setting 'the poets and poems in a new order.' has been
declared, by some critics, to be the whole of the project of criticism
('Matthew Arnold' (1933) in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism :
Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England (London, 1933),
pp. 103-119, (p. 108)). Thus Sainte-Beuve writes 'Is the work good or is it
bad? This is the whole extent of the critical province.' Sainte-Beuve
quoted in George Saintsbury (ed.) Loci Critic1 : Passages Illustrative of
Critical Theory and Practice from Aristotle Onwards (London, 1903), p. 418.
And Santayana that; 'To substitute judgements of fact for judgements of
value, is a sign of a pedantic and borrowed criticism. If we approach a
work of art or nature scientifically, for the sake of its historical
connexions or proper classification, we do not approach it aesthetically.'
George Santayana The Sense of Beauty : Being the Outline of Aesthetic
Theory (London, 1896), p. 20. As evidence of this last I quote Maupassant
who, beginning from premisses much like Frye's is led into intentionalism;
'A critic really worthy of the name should be simply an analyst, without
bias, with preferences, without passions and, like an expert in pictures,
- 422 -
1sto +.• «.• sb • v St :i l.j i»h 1 c:t j~i
should only appraise the artistic value of the work of art submitted to
him. His understanding, open to everything, should so override his own
personality that he can reveal and praise even books that as a man he
dislikes and that as a judge he is obliged to comprehend....The critic
should judge the result only in relation to the nature of the effort; he
has no right to concern himself with trends.' Guy de Maupassant 'The Novel'
(1887) Preface to Pierre and Jean (1888), translated by Leonard Tancock,
(Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 21-35, (pp. 22-23).
14. Northrop Frye 'On Value-Judgements' (1968) in The Stubborn Structure :
Essays on Criticism and Society (London, 1970), pp. 66-73, (p. 68).
15. Ibid., pp. 68-9.
16. 'To works, however, of which the excellence is not absolute and
definite, but gradual and comparative; to works not raised upon principles
demonstrative and scientific, but appealing wholly to observation and
experience, no other test can be applied than length of duration and
continuance of esteem.... [What] has been longest known has been most
considered, and what is most considered is best understood.' Samuel
Johnson 'Preface' to Plays of William Shakespeare, pp. 59-60.
17. According to D'Alembert the true critic will neither attribute 'the
pleasures that arise from poetry..,entirely to nature on the one hand, nor
wholly to opinion on the other.' but 'by examining attentively this
difference...will be able at length to determine how far the pleasures we
receive...are influenced by habit; what real additions they derive from
thence, and what imaginary ones they receive from opinion.' Jean le Rond
d'Alembert Reflexions on the Use and Abuse of Philosophy In Matters that
are properly relative to Taste (1757) in Gerard Essay on Taste (1759), pp.
209-250, (p. 232). Sainte-Beuve, also, defines a 'true classic' as 'an author
who has enriched the human mind, increased its treasure, and caused it to
advance a step; who has discovered some moral and not equivocal truth, or
revealed some eternal passion in that heart where all seemed known and
discovered ; who has expressd his thought, observation, or invention, in no
matter what form, only provided it be broad and great, refined and
sensible, sane and beautiful in itself ; who has spoken to all in his own
peculiar style, a style which is found to be also that of the whole world,
a style new without neologism, new and old, easily contemporary with all
time.' Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve 'What is a Classic?'(1850) in Essays
by Sainte-Beuve, translated by Elizabeth Lee, (London, 1892), pp. 1-12,
(pp.3-4). Frye himself, in his conclusion to Anatomy, writes that 'The goal
of ethical criticism is transvaluation, the ability to look at contemporary
social values with the detachment of one who is able to compare them in
some degree with the infinite vision of possibilities presented by culture.
One who possesses such a standard of transvaluation is in a state of
intellectual freedom. One who does not possess it is a creature of
whatever social values get to him first: he has only the compulsions of
habit, indoctrination, and prejudice.' Frye Anatomy, p. 348.
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18. Friearich Schiller On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 77 (Fifteenth
Letter).
19. Immanuel Kant The Critique of Judgement (1790), translated by James
Creed Meredith, (Oxford, 1952), § 1, pp. 41-42.
20. Ibid., §§ 11, 6. 'The consciousness of the causality of imagining the
state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that
state, may be said here to denote in a general vray what is called
pleasure; whereas displeasure is that imagining which contains the ground
for converting the state of the images into their opposites for hindering
or removing them' Ibid., § 10.
21. Ibid., §§ 1-6. 'This superior Power of Perception is justly called a
Sense, because of its Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the
Pleasure does not arise from any Knowledge of principles, Proportions,
causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with
the Idea of Beauty' Hutcheson Enquiry, I, xiii.
22. Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', p. 258. Samuel Taylor Coleridge A Course
of Lectures (1818) in Coleridge's Essays and Lectures On Shakespeare and
Some Other Old Poets and Dramatists (Everyman, 1907), pp. 213-385, (p.
314, 'Lecture XIII 'On Poesy or Art'). 'In my judgement, no writer can be
called a novelist unless he possess the gift of forgetting, and thereby
making us forget, the reality beyond the walls of his novel. Let him be
realistic as can be; that is to say, let the microcosm of his novel consist
of unquestionably true-to-life elements - he will have lost out if he
cannot keep us from remembering that there exists an extramural world.
Hence every novel is still-born that is laden with transcendental
intentions, be they political, ideological, symbolical, or satirical. For
those themes are of such a nature that they cannot be dealt with
fictitiously, they have meaning only in relation to the actual horizon of
each individual. As soon as they are broached we feel expelled from the
imaginary sphere of the novel and compelled to establish contact with the
absolute realm on which our real existence depends.' Jose Ortega y Gasset
'Motes on the Movel' in The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel
(1925), translated by Helene Weyl, (Princeton, 1948), pp. 57-103, (pp. 92-
93). Apropos the definition of metaphysics in the last chapter vie might
say that this is because beauty is subliminal desire - once we become
aware of the explicitness of the solution it becomes involved in the
relationship with reality which reveals its contingency too plainly. 'It
is...exactly because Hecuba is nothing to us that her sorrows are so
suitable a motive for tragedy.' Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in
Intentions (London, 1891), pp. 1-54, (p. 53).
23. Arthur Schopenhauer Essays and Aphorisms, selected and translated by
P.J.Hollingdale [from Parerga and Paralipomena (1851)], (Harmondsworth,
1970), p. 155.
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24. Kant Critique of Judgement, § 15, p. 69.
25. Edgar Allen Roe 'The Poetic Principle' (1850) in The Complete Works of
Edgar Allen Poe, edited by James A.Harrison, 17 vols., (few York, 1902),
XIV, pp. 266-292, (p. 275).
26. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated
and edited by LeRoy E.Loemker, 2 vols., (Chicago, 1956), II, p. 1031, From
'Remarks on the Three Volumes Entitled Characteristics etc...'.
27. Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', p. 265. His definition of 'excellence' is,
therefore, not surprisingly, a formal one; that it is 'in proportion to the
number of feelings which [the work] produce at the same instant in the
mind.' pp. 239-90.
28. Santayana The Sense of Beauty, p. 19.
29. Coleridge A Course of lectures, p. 314. Frye 'On Value-Judgements', p.
66.
30. Leibniz Philosophical Papers, II, p. 1031.
31. Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire 'An Essay on Taste* in Gerard An
Essay on Taste (1759), pp. 213-222, (pp. 215-16).
32. Alexander Gerard An Essay on Taste : To which is now added Part
Fourth, Of the Standard of Taste, with Observations Concerning the
Imitative Nature of Poetry, third edition, (Edinburgh, 1780), pp. 90-91.
33. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
34. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 70, Monday, 12 May 1711.
35. Voltaire 'Essay on Taste', pp. 213-214.
36. Ibid., pp. 214, 218-19. Montesquieu likewise claims that there are
three different sources of pleasure for the mind - 'one in its internal
faculties and essence, another in its union with the body, and a third in
those impressions and prejudices, that are the result of certain
institutions, customs and habits.' - and that those pleasures which are
'peculiar to its spiritual nature' arise 'from curiosity, from the ideas of
its own existence, grandeur and perfections, from the faculty of taking a
general and comprehensive view of things, of contemplating a great variety
of objects, and of comparing, combining and separating its own ideas,'
Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', pp. 257, 260,
37. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 409, Thursday, 19 June 1712.
38. Addison Spectator No 411, Saturday, 21 June 1712.
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39. Archibald Alison Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1790),
in Scott Elledge (ed.) Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, 2 vols, (New
York, 1961)11, pp. 1011-1046, (p. 1042).
40. Gerard Essay on Taste (1780), p. 188.
41. Hume 'The Sceptic', pp. 163-65.
42. D'Alembert Reflexions, p. 246.
43. Ibid., p. 234.
44. A.J.Ayer language, Truth and Logic (1936), second edition, (London,
1946), p. 113. Compare Wittgenstein; 'The sense of the world must lie
outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything
happens as it does happen; in it no value exists - and if it did exist, it
would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must
lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. Far all that
happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot
lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It
must lie outside the world. So too it is impossible for there to be
propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher. It
is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)' Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), translated by D.F.Pears and
B.F.McGuinness, (London, 1961), §§. 6.41-6.421.
45. Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, p. 108.
46. Ibid., pp. 113-14. Compare Isenberg; 'I may be stretching usage by the
senses I am about to assign to certain words, but it seems that the
critic's meaning is "filled in," "rounded out," or "completed" by the act of
perception, which is performed not to judge the truth of his description
but in a certain sense to understand it. And if communication is a process
by which a mental content is transmitted by symbols from one person to
another, then we can say that it is a function of criticism to bring about
communication at the level of the senses; that is, to induce a sameness of
vision, of experienced content. If this is accomplished, it may or may not
be followed by agreement, or what is called "communion" - a community of
feeling which expresses itself in identical value judgements.' Arnold
Isenberg 'Critical Communication' (1948) in Aesthetics and the Theory of
Criticism : Selected Essays of Arnold Isenberg, edited and William
Callaghan et al., (London, 1973), pp. 156-171, (p. 163).
47. Ayer language, Truth and Logic, p. 21,
48. 'When we judge something to be good we always judge it to be good in
respect of some property, and it is a question of empirical fact whether
it has this property or not....It is an essential feature of judgements that
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they are made by reference to standards or criteria; but it is necessary
to be extremely careful in discussing the way in which the criteria are
related to the verdict or appraisal,' P.H.Nowell-Smith Ethics
(Harmondsworth, 1954), p, 164.
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Rothstein, (Moscow, 1962), pp. 44-49, <p. 45). 'What must be the criteria on
which the evaluation of a work of literature should be based? Let us first
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88. Likewise Althusser, in attempting to give art a political seriousness,
finds himself trying and failing (as the innumerable italics, quotation
marks, and persuasive definitions testify) to say that literature both is
and is not the conveying of knowledge. 'J do not rank real art among the
ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific
relationship with ideology,,..Art (I mean authentic art, not works of an
average or mediocre level) does not give us a knowledge in the strict
sense, it therefore does not replace knowledge (in the modern sense:
scientific knowledge), but what it gives us does nevertheless maintain a
certain specific relationship with knowledge. This relationship is not one
of identity but one of difference....I believe that the peculiarity of art is
to "make us see" (nous donner a voir), "makes us perceive", "makes us feel"
something which alludes to reality....What art makes us see, and therefore
gives to us in the form of "seeingf, "perceiving" and "feeling" (which is
not the form of knowing), is the ideology from which it is born, in which
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alludes....Heither Balzac nor Solzhenitsyn gives us any knowledge of the
world they describe, they only make us "see", "perceive" or "feel" the
reality of the ideology of that world....Ideology is also an abject of
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female characters in a work and both are unsympathetic then the work is
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129. T.S.Eliot 'Introduction' to The Use of Poetry and the Use of
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to be drawn into any discussion of the definitions of "personality" and
"character".'
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which, we see clearly, .may modify all the rest of life.', pp. 237-38.
131. Ibid., p. 59.
132. Ibid., p. 62.
133. Helen Gardner The Business of Criticism (Oxford, 1959), pp. 6-7.
134. Aldous Huxley Texts and Pretexts : An Anthology with Commentaries
(London, 1932), p. 1.
135. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), p. 216.
*
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136. Ibid., p. 219.
137. Eliot 'Religion and Literature', p. 399.
138. Saint-Evremond Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672) translated bu
Qlga Marx Perlzweig in Gilbert Literay Criticism, pp. 659-663, (pp. 660,
662).
139. D'Alembert Reflexions, pp. 247-48.
140. Samuel Johnson The Rambler Mo 93, Tuesday, 5 February, 1751..
141. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), p. 112. John Dennis The Taste in
Poetry (1702), p. 128.
142. Marcus Tullius Cicero Brutus, translated by G.L.Hendrickson in Brutus
and Orator, translated by G.L.Hendrickson and H.M.Hubbell, Loeb Classical
Library, (London, 1939), pp. 18-293, (190-191).
143. Addison Spectator No. 409.
144. Richards Principles, p. 60.
145. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), p. 132. 'Taste consists chiefly in
the improvement of those principles which are commonly called the powers
of imagination', p. 1. T.S.Eliot 'The Function of Criticism' (1923) in
Selected Essays (1932), third enlarged edition, (London, 1951), pp. 23-34,
(p. 24).
146. Gardner The Business of Criticism, p. 7.
147. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), pp. 82-83.
148. Addison Spectator No. 409.
149. Voltaire 'An Essay on Taste', p. 214. D'Alembert Reflexions, p. 236.
Dryden, too, had written that 'It requires philosophy as well as poetry to
sound the depth of all the passions; what they are in themselves, and how
they are to be provoked.' John Dryden 'The Author's Apology for Heroic
Poetry and Poetic Licence' (1677) in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Critical
Essays, edited by George Watson, 2 vols., (London, 1962), I, pp. 195-207,
(p. 200).
150. 'The common defect with which they are charged is, that their
observations are too general. This is undoubtedly the case, as criticism
has been generally managed : and the reason is, that it has been seldom
cultivated by a regular and just induction....Indeed, in whatever regards
sentiment, there is a peculiar temptation to pursue this course. For the
very feelings excited by qualities that belong to different genera, being
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sensibly distinct, direct men, in some measure, to distinguish them, though
not with sufficient precision. But requires attention and acuteness to mark
the smaller varieties of sentiment, which correspond to the species of
each. The matter of fact objected only shows, therefore, that criticism has
been cultivated by a wrong method of induction. The consequence has been,
that even those general distinctions which appear to be ascertained, are
loose, uncertain, and ill defined; a defect that can never be remedied, till
the other sort of induction be applied, and critics be contented to rise
from particular principles, gradually, to such as are more general.' Gerard
An Essay on Taste (1780), pp, 173-74.
151. D'Alembert Reflexions, p. 227.
152. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), pp. 170-7
153. Fr.Benito Jeronimo Feijoo The "I Know Not What" (1676, 1764),
translated by Willard F.King in Milton C.Nahm (ed.) Readings in Philosophy
of Art and Aesthetics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), pp. 336-344, (Section
I, pp. 336-37).
154. Montesquieu 'Essay on Taste', p. 258.
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Chapter ¥1 : Interpretation
t
1. G.V.F.Hegel The logic of Hegel, translated from Part III of The
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) by William Wallace,
revized second edition, (Oxford, 1892), pp. 353-54.
2. Georges Poulet 'Criticism and the Experience of Inferiority' in
R.A.Macksey and E.Donato (eds.) The Structuralist Controversy : The
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Han (London, 1970), pp. 56-72,
(p. 72). This unease is a perennial feature of modern criticism. Thus
Cleanth Brooks; 'If we are to get all these qualifications into our
formulation of what the poem says - and they are relevant - then, our
formulation of the "statement" made by Herrick's poem will turn out to be
quite as difficult as that of Pope's mock-epic. The truth of the matter is
that all such formulations lead away from the centre of the poem - not
towards it; that the "prose-sense" of the poem is not a rack on which the
stuff of the poem is hung; that it does not represent the "inner"
structure or the "essential" structure or the "real" structure of the poem.
We may use - and in many connections must use - such formulations as
more or less convenient ways of referring to parts of the poem. But such
formulations are scaffoldings which we may properly for certain purposes
throw about the building: we must not mistake them for the internal and
essential structure of the building itself.' Cleanth Brooks The Veil
Wrought Urn : Studies in the Structure of Poetry (1947), (London, 1968),
p. 162.
3. James Russell Lowell 'The Imagination' (1894) in The Function of the
Poet and Other Essays, collected and edited by Albert Mordell, (Boston,
1920), pp. 68-88, (p. 82).
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), translated
by C.K.Ogden, (London, 1922), §. 7,
5. Quoted in A.J.Ayer Metaphysics and Common Sense, (London, 1973), p.
205,
6. Hegel The logic of Hegel, p. 80, and Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy
of Eeligion, Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God
(1832), translated by E.B.Speirs and J.B.Sanderson, 3 vols., (London, 1895),
III, p. 367.
7. Consider one of the philospher's favourite examples of an a priori
truth - 'All bachelors are unmarried'. Yet one could use the metaphor
(paradox?) 'Harried bachelor' to point to either of two real states-of-
affairs (a married man who behaved as though he was not, or an unmarried
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man who behaved as though he was). But one can only do so because there
is no ambiguity in the literal uses of 'bachelor' and 'married'.
8. Imagine a dialogue; "I have mystical experiences." "What are they
like?" "There is no way of describing them." "How do you know they are
mystical." "I have read descriptions of what others have called 'mystical
experiences'." "That is a contradiction." "Ho, for they are described as
experiences which defy description, and so are mine." "How do you know
that they were the same sort of experience as yours, and how do I know
that if I had such an experience I would not be able to describe it?" "You
must take my word for it."
9. Last sentence of Ernest Gellner's Wands and Things (London, 1959).
10. 'Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait point.' Blaise Pascal
Fensees, IV, 277.
11. Jacques Derrida 'Speech and Phenomena : Introduction to the Problem
of Signs in Husserl's Phenomenology' (1967) in Speech and Phenomena And
Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, translated by David B.Allison,
(Evanston, 1973), pp. 1-104, (p. 7).
12. Ibid., p. 12.
13. Ibid., p. 15.
14. Ibid., p. 50.
15. Ibid., p. 50.
16. Ibid., pp. 64, 65.
17. Ibid., p. 65.
18. Ibid,, p. 68.
19. Ibid., p. 68.
20. Ibid., p. 75.
21. Ibid., p. 75.
22. Ibid., p. 78.
23. Ibid., p. 78.
24. Ibid., p. 80.
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25. Ibid., p. 82. Edmund Husserl Ideas : General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology <1913), translated by V.R.Boyce Gibson, (London, 1931), §
59.
26. Derrida 'Speech and Phenomena', pp. 82, 84-85.
27. Ibid., p. 87.
28. Ibid., p. 88. 'The verb "to differ" Cdiffererl seems to differ from
itself. On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction,
inequality, or discernibility; on the other, it expresses the interposition
of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until
"later" what is presently denied, the passible that is presently
impossible.' Jacques Derrida 'Differance' (1968) in Speech and Phenomena,
pp. 129-160, (p, 129).
29. Derrida 'Speech and Phenomena', pp. 88-89.
30. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
31. Ibid., p. 93.
32. Ibid., p. 93.
33. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
34. Ibid., p. 97. 'Writing supplements perception before perception even
appears to itself lis conscious of itself]. "Memory" or writing is the
opening of that process of appearance itself. The "perceived" may be read
only in the past, beneath perception and after it.' Jacques Derrida 'Freud
and the Scene of Writing' (1966) in Writing and Difference (1967),
translated by Alan Bass, (London, 1978), pp. 196-231, (p. 224). Gadamer
takes the more traditional view, and, in doing so, reveals why Derrida
may be right in this respect; 'All writing is...a kind of alienated speech,
and its signs need to be transformed back into speech and meaning,
Because the meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation through being
written down, this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task.'
Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method (1960), translation of the second
edition (1965) by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, (London, 1975), pp.
354-355.
35. Derrida 'Speech and Phenomena', p. 99.
36. Jacques Derrida 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1968) in Dissemination (1972),
translated by Barbara Johnson, (London, 1981), pp. 61-171, (p. 63), and
'Speech and Phenomena', pp. 56-57. The interpretations of 'deconstruction'
which such phrases have given rise to, have prompted Derrida to disown
many of his commentators and disciples; 'It is totally false to suggest
that deconstruction is a suspension of reference....! never cease to be
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surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is
nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned in language; it is, in
fact, saying the exact opposite....Every week I receive critical
commentaries and studies on deconstruction which operate on the
assumption that what they call "post-structuralism" amounts to saying
that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged in words -
and other stupidities of that sort.' Jacques Derrida 'Deconstruction and
the Other' <1981), dialogue with Richard Kearney in Richard Kearney <ed.)
Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers : The phenomenological
heritage (Manchester, 1984), pp. 107-126, (p, 123).
37. Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology (1967), translated by Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, (London, 1976), p. 158.
38. Derrida 'Plato's Pharmacy', p. 95.
39. That it does manifest an unusual degree of scepticism about the
meaning of texts from the point of view of philosophy seems to be born
out by Searle's response to Derrida's treatment of J.L.Austin. See Derrida
'Signature Event Context' (1971) in Glyph, 1 (1977), pp. 172-197, John
R.Searle 'Reiterating the Differences : A Reply to Derrida' in the same
volume (pp. 198-208), and Derrida's 'Limites Inc abc...' in Glyph, 2 (1977),
pp. 162-254.
40. Giogio de Chirico 'On Metaphysical Art' (1919) in Massimo Carra (ed.)
Metaphysical Art (1968), translated by Caroline Tisdall, (London, 1971),
pp, 87-91, (p. 89). The effects of the Deconstructive picture of language
in its dotage, remembering only the distant past but blank as to
yesterday are anticipated by Chirico: 'I enter a room and see a man on a
chair, hanging from the ceiling I see a cage with a canary in it, on a
wall I notice pictures, and on the shelves, books. All this strikes me,
but does not amaze me, since the chain of memories that links one thing
to another explains the logic of what I see. But let us suppose that for
a moment and for reasons that are inexplicable and independent of my
will, the thread of this chain is broken, who knows how I would see the
seated man, the cage, the pictures, the bookshelves; who knows what terror
and perhaps what sweetness and consolation I would feel when
contemplating that scene.', p. 89.
41. Samuel Johnson The Rambler Mo. 156, Saturday, September 14, 1751.
42. Ben Jonson 'To the Readers' of Sejanus (1605), edited by Jonas
A.Barish, (London, 1965), pp. 26-28, (p. 27). Alexander Pope An Essay on
Criticism (1711), 1. 28.
43. Laurence Sterne The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1759-67),
Vol. Ill, Ch. 12.
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44. Samuel Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare (1765)
in The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. VII, Johnson on
Shakespeare, edited by Arthur Sherbo, (London, 1968), pp. 59-113, (p. 102).
Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire Essay on Epic Poetry (1733) translated
by Helena Brawley Watt in Gay Wilson Allen and Harry Hayden Clark (eds.)
Literary Criticism : Pope to Croce (New York, 1941), pp. 38-46, (p. 38).
'[Critics] have always been people less susceptible than other men to the
contagion of art. For the most part they are able writers, educated and
clever, but with their capacity for being infected by art perverted or
atrophied...Art criticism did not exist - could not exist - in societies
where art is undivided, and where, consequently, it is appraised by the
religious conception of life common to the whole people...Universal art
has a definite and indubitable internal criterion - religious perception;
upper-class art lacks this, and therefore the appreciators of that art
are obliged to cling to some external criterion. And they find it in "the
judgements of the finest nurtured," as an English esthetician has phrased
it, that is, in the authority of the people who are considered educated;
nor in this alone, but also in a tradition of such authorities.' Leo
Tolstoy What is Art? (1898) in Tolstoy on Art, translated by Aylmer
Maude, (Oxford, 1924), pp. 121-357, (p. 243).
45. Pope Essay on Criticism, 11. 102-103.
46. August Wilhelm von Schlegel A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and
Literature (1808), translated by John Black, revised according to the
latest German edition by A.J.Morrison, (London, 1846), p. 18. Anatoly
V.Lunacharsky 'Theses on the Problem of Marxist Criticism' (1928) in On
Literature and Art, translated by Avril Pyman and Fainna Glagoleva
(1965), second revised edition, (Moscow, 1965), pp. 9-21, (pp. 18-19, X).
47. Matthew Arnold Essays in Criticism (London, 1865), p. 6.
48. Coventry Patmore 'Principle in Art' in Principle in Art (London,
1889), pp. 1-4, (pp. 1-2). He continues, rather naively, that in certain
cases of what he considers corrupt schools, 'A few infallible and, when
once uttered, self-evident principles would at once put a stop to this
sort of representation among artists; and the public would soon learn to
be repelled by what now most attracts them.' p. 3,
49. Henry James 'Criticism' (1891) in Selected Literary Criticism, edited
by Morris Shapira, (1963), (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 167-171, (p. 170).
50. Henry James 'The Art of Fiction' (1884) in Selected Literary
Criticism, pp. 78-97, (p. 78).
51. Helen Gardner The Business of Criticism (Oxford, 1959), p. 17.
52. Ibid., p. 14.
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53. Alexander Gerard Ad Essay on Taste : To which is now added Part
Fourth, Of the Standard of Taste, with Observations Concerning the
Imitative Nature of Poetry (1759), third edition, (Edinburgh, 1780), p.
132.
54. Henry James 'The Hew Hovel' (1914) in Selected Literary Criticism,
pp. 358-391, (p. 358).
55. lorthrope Frye Anatomy of Criticism : Four Essays (Princeton, 1957),
p. 4.
56. L.C.Knights 'How Many Children had Lady Macbeth? : An Essay in the
Theory and Practice of Shakespeare Criticism' (1933) in Explorations :
Essays in Criticism Mainly on the Literature of the Seventeenth century
(London, 1946), pp. 1-39, (pp. 16-17).
57. Benedetto Croce Poetry and Literature : An Introduction to Its
Criticism and History (1936), sixth edition (1963) translated by Giovanni
Gullace, (Southern Illinois University, 1981), p. 139. It is interesting to
note that much of Knights' critical work consists of either redundant
description or paraphrase, a method he only discards when dealing with a
genre he does not like - Restoration Comedy.
58. Knights Explorations, p. ix.
59. Croce Poetry and Literature, p. 141. 'In completing his judgement, the
critic offers neither intuitive re-creations nor logical equivalents of
poetry; but he gives a characterization [much as the author does in
giving the work a title], which is something different.' p, 140, 'The
characterization refers properly to the content of poetry, to the feeling
expressed by poetry and by the same expressive act, amplified and
transferred within its own sphere.' p. 142. But there is always, according
to Croce, an 'abyss' between the characterization and the work.
60. Percy Lubbock The Craft of Fiction (London, 1921), pp. 272-74.
61. Ibid., p. 274.
62. William Empson Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930), third revized
edition, (London, 1953), pp. 19-22.
63. L.C.Knights 'How Many Children had Lady Macbeth?', p. 28.
64. There is a type of thematic criticism, however, which I wish to
pursue at greater length, both because it made a great impression on me
in school, and because one of its key terms ('metaphysical') is also a key
term in this thesis. This is the critical practice of G.Wilson Knight.
Knight rejects as 'false' that criticism which concentrates on those
elements, such as 'character', which 'lend themselves most readily to
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analysis on the analogy of actual life', and proposes instead that the
critic should be concerned with the 'poetic realities' of the work;
G.'Wilson Knight The Wheel of Fire : Interpretations of Shakespearian
Tragedy, With Three Few Essays <1930), (London, 1965), p. 12. 'To do this
we should regard each [work] as a visionary whole, close-knit in
personification, atmospheric suggestion, and direct poetic symbolism :
three modes of transmission equal in their importance....Each incident,
each turn of thought, each suggestive symbol throughout Macbeth or King
Lear radiates inwards from the play's circumference to the burning
central core without knowledge of which we shall miss their relevance and
necessity : they relate primarily, not directly to each other, nor to the
normal appearances of human life, but to this central reality alone....CA]
true philosophic and imaginative interpretation will aim at cutting below
the surface to reveal that burning core of mental or spiritual reality
from which each play derives its nature and meaning.', ibid., pp. 11, 14.
('To remain in the realm of literature,' writes Goldmann, 'the significance
of a work does not lie in this or that story - the events related in the
Orestes at Aeschylus, the Electra of Giraudoux and Les Mouches of Sartre
are the same, yet these three works quite obviously have no essential
element in common - nor does it lie in the psychology of this or that
character, nor even in any stylistic peculiarity which recurs more or
less frequently. The significance of the work, insofar as it is a literary
work, is always of the same character, namely, a coherent universe within
which the events occur and the psychology of the characters is situated
and within the coherent expression of which the stylistic automatisms of
the author are incorporated.' Lucien Goldmann 'The Sociology of Literature'
(1967) in Hilton C.Albrecht, James H.Barnett, and Mason Griff (eds.) The
Sociology of Art and Literature : A Reader (London, 1982), pp. 582-609,
(p. 597).) I would agree with all of Knight's propositions, with the
reservation that, this 'core', or mens Macbeth, mens King I^ear, and so on,
is made to sound accidental in Knight's account, for the unity is simply
the natural outcome of the work being one thing. Knight describes the
work as 'an expanded metaphor, by means of which the original vision has
been projected into forms roughly corrrespondent with actuality', The
Wheel of Fire, p. 15. However this type of abstraction can become equally
autonomous from its object; Knight's method very easily turns into a
drama of symbols, a morality play of metaphysical or super-psychological
concepts; 'In so far as we see the action of each play as a perfect and
complete statement within its own limits, we are forced to know it as a
universal statement. Therefore it is by no fantasy of exaggeration that
in interpretation the free-hearted hero ultimately becomes mankind; the
villain, creature of cynicism, becomes the Devil, Goethe's prince of
negation; and the loved one becomes the divine principle, Dante's
Beatrice,', p. 256. Precisely how this is so would be difficult to say,
for what is essential in Knight's approach is a vocabulary which defies
easy paraphrase; consider these passages from his essay on 'Macbeth and
the Metaphysic of Evil'; 'We are faced by man's aspiring nature,
unsatiated of its desire among the frailties and inconsistencies of its
world. They point us to good, not evil, and their very gloom of denial is
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the shadow of a great assertion....Yet we are left with an overpowering
knowledge of suffocating, conquering evil, and fixed by the basilisk eye
of a nameless terror...[This] world is unknowable, hideous, disorderly, and
irrational. The very style of the play has a mesmeric, nightmare quality,
for in that dream-consciousness, hateful though it be, there is a nervous
tension, a vivid sense of profound significance, an exceptionally rich
apprehension of reality electrifying the mind.... Macbeth shows us an evil
not to be accounted for in terms of "will" and "causality"...it expresses
its vision, not to a critical intellect, but to the responsive imagination;
and working in terms not of "character" or any ethical code, but of the
abysmal deeps of a spirit-world untuned to human reality, withdraws the
veil from the black streams which mill that consciousness of fear
symbolized in actions of blood.', pp. 140, 147, 158. One of the reasons
why Knight rejects the term 'character', and the idea of likelihood in
characterization or action as the touchstone of criticism, is because 'it
is so constantly entwined with a false and unduly ethical criticism.', p.
9. This 'false' criticim he associates with statements such as '"in Timon
of Athens it was Shakespeare's intention to show how a generous but weak
character may come to ruin through an unwise use of his wealth'" or
'"Shakespeare wished in Macbeth to show how crime inevitably brings
retribution"' or "'in Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare has given us a
lesson concerning the dangers of an uncontrolled passion"', p. 9. Yet it
is enough to use ethical categories, even without taking sides, to write
ethical criticism. Later in the same work he writes that; 'In Othello the
poet expresses dramatically the destructive force of cynicism and un-
faith directed against that Love to which man aspires, and in whose
reality he attempts to build his happiness. Ultimately, in so far as
Othello expresses a universal truth, it must be considered to suggest the
inability of love's faith to weather the conditions of this world.1, p.
249. Knight himself can talk of a plot as a 'philosophic argument', tell
us that Apemantus 'represents a philosophic principle, an especial
attitude to life.', that King Lear 'illustrates' a problem, that Timon of
Athens 'explains the meaning of Othelld, that the play 'asserts the
inability of any finite symbol to hold an infinite love', and that this
'statement is projected into a human plot', pp. 250-52.
65, The 'purpose of a writer', asserts Johnson, 'is to be read, and the
criticism which would destroy the power of pleasing must be blown aside.'
Samuel Johnson 'Pope' (1781) in Lives of the English Poets, edited by
George Birkbeck Hill, 3 vols., (Oxford, 1905), III, pp. 82-272, (p. 240).
66, Frye Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 4-5.
67, 'Interpret' in the sense of perform could be said to belong to either
the second or third of these definitions.
68, Villiam Hazlitt Table-Talk: or, Original Essays (1821-1822) in The
Collected Works of William Hazlitt, edited by A.R.¥aller and Arnold Glover,
12 vols., (London, 1902-1904), VI, pp. 1-350, (p. 225).
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69. Obviously one of the works I have in mind here is Harding's
'Regulated Hatred'. He writes there that 'This attempt to suggest a
slightly different emphasis in the reading of Jane Austen is not offered
as a balanced appraisal of her work. It is deliberately lopsided,
neglecting the many points at which the established view seems adequate.'
D.V.Harding 'Regulated Hatred : An Aspect of the Vork of Jane Austen'
(1939) in Scrutiny : A Quarterly Review, vol. VIII, No. 4, (March, 1940),
pp. 346-363, (p. 362). This, then, is criticism for critics - but the
pretence to empiricism has made this approach the norm.
70. T.S.Eliot 'Hamlet and His Problem' (1919) in The Sacred Wood : Essays
on Poetry and Criticism (1920), second edition, (London, 1928), pp. 95-
103, (p. 96).
71. T.S.Eliot 'The Function of Criticism' (1923)in Selected essays (1932),
third enlarged edition. (London, 1951), pp. 23-34, (pp. 32-33).
72. Voltaire Essay on Epic Poetry, pp. 44-45.
73. Rene Vellek and Austin Warren Theory of Literature (1949), third
edition, (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 44,
74. L.C.Knights 'The University Teaching of English and History : A Plea
for Correlation' (1939) in Explorations, pp. 186-199, (pp. 193, 196),
75. Ibid., p. 197.
76. Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare, p. 81.
77. G.W.F,Hegel Aesthetics ; Lectures on Fine Art (1835), translated by
T.M.Knox, 2 vols., (Oxford, 1975), I, p. 14.
78. Frederick Schlegel Lectures on the History of Literature (1815) 'Mow
first completely translated', no translator given, (London, 1859), p. 159
(Lecture VII). He also believes, as we have already seen in Chapter IV,
that the proper business of poetry is the 'eternal, the ever-important,
and the universally beautiful', p. 260 (Lecture XII).
79. Adolph Siegfried Tomars Introduction to the Sociology of Art (Mexico
City, 1940) quoted in Wellek and Varren Theory of Literature, p. 94, Jean
Duvignaud The Sociology of Art (1967), translated by Timothy Vilson,
(London, 1972), pp. 29, 31. One might also compare Roland Barthes' S/Z
(1970), translated by Richard Miller, (London, 1975).
80. Sainte-Beuve quoted in George Saintsbury Loci Critici : Passages
Illustrative of Critical Theory and Practice from Aristotle Downwards
(London, 1903), p. 413.
81. August Schlegel Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, p. 18.
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82. It is also worth remembering Wordsworth's observation that; 'If there
be one conclusion more forcibly pressed upon us than another by the
review which has been given of the fortunes and fate of poetical works,
it is this, - that every author, so far as he is great and at the same
time original, has had the task of creating the taste by which he is to
be enjoyed' William Wordsworth 'Essay Supplementary to the Preface'
(1815) in The Prose Works of Villiam Wordswoith, edited by W,J.B.Owen and
jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols,, (Oxford, 1974), III, pp. 62-84, (p. 80).
'My book is poetry; and if it is not, then it will be. The conception of
poetry in our country, in Morway, shall be made to conform to the book.',
Henrik Ibsen 'Letter to Bjornstjerne Bjornson' December 9, 1867 Letters of
Henrik Ibsen, translated by J.N.Laurvik and Mary Morison, (Mew York,
1905). Forster is an the same lines when he writes that 'imaginative
literature' may alter human nature by enabling individuals to 'look at
themselves in a new way' E.M.Forster Aspects of the Novel (London, 1927),
p. 220.
83. Charles-Pierre Baudelaire 'The painter of Modern Life' (1863) in
Selected Writings on Art and Artists, translated by P.E.Charvet,
(Harraondsworth, 1972), pp. 390-435, (p. 392).
84. Saint-Avremond Of Tragedy, Ancient and Modern (1672) translated by
Olga Marx Perlzweig in Allan H.Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to
Dryden (Mew York, 1940), pp. 659-663, (p. 663). 'Poetry, largely
consider'd, is an evolution, sending out improved and ever-expanded types
- in one sense, the past, even the best of it, necessarily giving place,
and dying out. For our existing world, the bases ora which all the grand
old poems were built have become vacuums - and even those of many
comparatively modern ones are broken and half-gone. For us today, not
their intrinsic value, vast as that is, backs and maintains those poems -
but a mountain-high growth of associations, the layers of successive
ages.' Walt Whitman 'A Thought on Shakespeare' (1888) in Complete Poetry
and Collected Prose, edited by Justin Kaplan, (Mew York, 1982), pp. 1150-
1152, (p. 1151). The action of Oedipus Fex, writes Artaud under the title
'Mo More Masterpieces', 'is clothed in a language which has lost any
contact with today's crude, epileptic rhythm. Sophocles may speak nobly,
but in a manner that no longer suits the times. His speeches are too
refined for today, as if he were speaking beside the paint.,..If the masses
do not frequent literary masterpieces, this is because the masterpieces
are literary, that is to say set in forms no longer answering the needs
of the times.' Antonin Artaud The Theatre and its Double (1938) in
Collected Works of Antonin Artaud : Volume Four, translated by Victor
Corti, (London, 1974), pp. 1-110, pp. 56-57. What Artaud is asking for is
a 'rudeness and epilepsy' that we can be at home in! We do not frequent
masterpieces for the very reason that they are not literary. It is the
contemporary which is self-consciously literary because it always links
itself with a contemporary idea of literariness, it is not given as
Establishment Art but as Art per se - it is always connected with
contemporary 'literary thought'. That is, an Elizabethan Play always has a
- 449 -
No t- e* is. ; I ri t.. ** r p:« r «n& t.. a% ±. i or\
greater potential for a crudeness and epilepsy that we cannot be at home
in than what is presented to us simply as a Play.
85. Alain Robbe-Grillet 'The Use of Theory* (1955 and 1963) in For A New
Novel : Essays on Fiction (1963), translated by Richard Howard, (New
York, 1965), pp. 7-14, (p. 9).
86. Ibid,, p. 10.
87. Another danger of looking at the work through the eyes of its own
time is that we may find that some aspect, or perhaps the whole of it,
was shocking, revolutionary, mare profound, on a certain subject than
anything of its time, and by that 'silent reference of human work to
human abilities' incorporate this response of the time into our own. But
today it may be none of these things and they are relevant only to
history. The precise tenor of the past is difficult to recover; but this
should not lead us to believe that this recovery is a critical virtue. I
have read somewhere that the many breasts of the Diana of Ephesus are
actually representations of the bulls' scrota sacrificed each year to the
magna mater Kybele; the image then is not so much ultra-maternal as
ultra-emasculating. But how could I now argue that the significance of
the image to generations was other than it was, or that the statue cannot
embody a maternal ideal?
88. Johnson 'Preface' to The Plays of William Shakespeare, p. 62.
89. Samuel Johnson The Rambler No. 36, Saturday, July 21, 1750.
90. Forster Aspects of the Novel, pp. 24-25.
91. Betti is one who in emphasizing the non-historical half of the
equation falls into this trap. Thus according to his 'canon of the
actuality of understanding' the task of the interpreter is 'to retrace the
creative process, to reconstruct it within himself, to retranslate the
extraneous thought of an Other, a part of the past, a remembered event,
into the actuality of one's own life; that is, to adapt and integrate it
into one's intellectual horizon within the framework of one's own
experiences by means of a transformation on the basis of the same kind
of synthesis which enabled the recognition and reconstruction of that
thought. It follows that the attempt of some historians to rid themselves
of their subjectivity is nonsensical.' Emilia Betti 'Hermeneutics as the
general methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften' (1962), translated by
Joseph Bleicher in Joseph Bleicher Contemporary hermeneutics
Hermeneutics as method, philosophy and critique (London, 1980), pp, 51-94,
(p. 62).
92. T.S.Eliot 'Introduction' (1930) to Knight The Wheel of Fire, pp. xiii-
xx, (p. xv).
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93. Gardner The Business of Criticism, p. 34.
94. Walker Gibson is writing about the rhetorical property of literature
when he says; 'The fact is that everytime we open the pages of another
piece of writing we are embarked on a new adventure in which we become a
new person - a person as controlled and definable and as remote from the
chaotic self of daily life as the lover in the sonnet. Subject to the
degree of our literary sensibility, we are recreated by the language. We
assume, for the sake of the experience, that set of attitudes and
qualities which the language asks us to assume, and, if we cannot assume
them, we throw the book away...A bad book, then, is a book in whose mock
reader we discover a person we refuse to become, a mask we refuse to put
on, a role we will not play.', Walker Gibson 'Authors, Speakers, Readers,
and Mock Readers' (L950) in Jane P.Tompkins (ed.) Reader-Response
Criticism : From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (London, 1980), pp. 1-6,
(pp. 1, 5).
95. Such an emphasis should not, however, lead the reader to conflate
this approach with what M.H.Abrams calls 'pragmatic' critical theories, in
his The Mirror• and the I^mp : Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition
(Few York, 1953), pp. 14-21.
96. Roland Barthes 'Criticism as Language1 The Times Literary Supplement,
27 September 1963, pp. 739-740, (p. 740). 'Being bound by a situation does
not mean that the claim to correctness that every interpretation must
make is dissolved into the subjective or the occasional....We saw that to
understand a text always means to apply it to ourselves and to know that,
even if it must always be understood in different ways, it is still the
same text presenting itself to us in these different ways. That the claim
to truth of every interpretation is not in the least relativised is seen
from the fact that all interpretation is essentially linguistic. The
linguistic explicitiness that the process of understanding gains through
through interpretation does not create a second sense apart from that
which is understood and interpreted....Rather, it is their nature to
disappear behind what they bring, in interpretation, into speech.
Paradoxically, an interpretation is right when it is capable of
disappearing in this way. And yet it is true at the same time that it
must be expressed as something that is intended to disappear.', Gadamer
Truth and Method, p. 359.
97. Barthes 'Criticism as Language', pp. 739-740.
98. Apropos this notion of reflexity in citicism Eliot writes that, given
that 'criticism is as inevitable as breathing' we shall be 'none the worse
for articulating what passes in our minds when we read a book and feel
an emotion about it, for criticizing our own minds in their work of
criticism.', and Barthes that 'All criticism must include (although it may
do so in the most indirect and discreet way) an implicit comment on
itself; all criticism is criticism both of the work under consideration
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and of the critic; to quote Claydel's pun, it is knowledge (connaissance)
of the other and co-birth (co-naissance) of oneself to the world.'
T.S.Eliot 'Tradition and the Individual talent' (1919) in The Sacred Wood,
pp. 47-59, (p. 48). Barthes 'Criticism as Language', p. 739.
99. 'The hermeneutical experience', writes Gadamer, 'must take as a
genuine experience everything that becomes present to it. It does not
have a prior freedom to select and discard. But nor can it maintain an
absolute freedom by leaving undecided that which seems specific to the
understanding of that which is understood. It cannot unmake the event
that is itself.' Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 420. (But, as we have seen
throughout this work, this is precisely what it does,) 'Here', continues
Gadamer, 'the obvious fact, that every interpretation seeks to be correct,
serves only to confirm that the non-differentiation of the interpretation
from the work itself is the actual experience of the work.', p. 107. But
why then does interpretation have to 'seek'? He further asserts that it is
naive to demand that one 'leave one's own concepts aside and think only
in the concepts of the epoch one is trying to understand.', because 'To
think historically always involves establishing a connection between
those ideas and one's own thinking. To try to eliminate one's own
concepts in interpretation is not only impossible, but manifestly
absurd.', p. 358. ('Even that which is closed to our understanding is
experienced by ourselves as something limiting and thus belongs to the
continiuity of self-understanding in which human existence moves.' p. 86.)
'[There] is no possible consciousness, however infinite, in which the u
"object" that is handed down would appear in the light of eternity. Every
assimilation of tradition is historically different: which does not mean
that every one represents only an imperfect understanding of it. Rather,
every one represents the experience of a "view" of the object itself. The
paradox that is true of all transmitted material, namely of being one and
the same and yet of being different, proves all interpretation to be, in
fact, speculative, hence hermeneutics has to see through the dogmatism of
a "meaning-in-itself" in just the same way as critical philosophy has
seen through the dogmatism of experience. This certainly does not mean
that every interpreter sees himself as speculative in his own mind, ie
that he is conscious of the dogmatism contained in his own interpretative
intention. What is meant, rather, is that all interpretation is speculative
as it is actually practised, quite apart from its methodological self-
consciousness.', p. 430. But, this being the case, the word 'speculative',
as the concept of the contemporary being historically determined which
underlies it, has no meaning here - for neither can the interpretation
appear 'in the light of eternity'.
100. Vilhelm Dilthey 'The Construction of the Historical World in the
Human Studies' (1906-1910) in Selected Vritings, edited and translated by
H.P.Rickman, (London, 1976), pp. 170-245, (pp. 227-28).
101. Lubbock The Craft of Fiction, p. 17.
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102. Oscar Wilde 'Preface' tc The Picture of Dorian Gray (London, 1891).
103. Empson Seven Types of Ambiguity, pp. 24-25.
104. Tzvetan Todorov Introduction to Poetics (1968, 1973), translated by
Richard Howard, (Sussex, 1981), p. xxii.
105. Gadamer Truth and Method, p. 106. According to Gadamer the
interpreter's 'own thoughts' also go into 'the re-awakening of the meaning
of the text. In this the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as
a personal standpoint that one holds on to or enforces, but more as a
meaning and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and
that helps one truly to make one's own what is said in the text. I have
described this above as a "fusion of horizons". Ve can now see that this
is the full realisation of conversation, in which something is expressed
that is not only mine or my author's, but common.', p. 350.
106. Martin Buber 'Dialogue' (1929) in Between Man and Man, translated
by Ronald Gregor Smith, (London, 1947), pp. 1-39, (p. 36).
107. John Crowe Ransom 'Criticism, Inc.' (1937) in The World's Body
(London, 1938), pp. 327-350, (pp. 329, 343).
108. Frye Anatomy of Criticism, p. 18. Such a procedure is, of course,
the antithesis of a scientific method for it assumes in advance what one
is looking for!
109. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
110. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
111. Ibid., p. 7.
112. Ibid., p. 17.
113. Ibid., p. 18.
114 Paradoxically, Wordsworth's line is often used as a charm against
the impulse to abstract a lesson from a literary work! That every
critical method implies a poetics, I can verify from my own experience.
At school my education in poetry began, naturally enough, with the
twentieth-century and then progressed to the nineteenth-century. In the
'Romantics' I found a greater intensity of 'poetry' than in twentieth-
century poetry. The only Renaissance poetry I came across was
Shakespeare, but here the question of 'poetry' was side-stepped by a
concern with character and action, and the symbolism of these things. The
Metaphysical poets introduced me to a slightly expanded poetics but on
coming to Jonson I could find only a couple of phrases of 'poetry' in an
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entire poem. When I turned to Roman poetry I could not see why it was
called 'poetry' at all - I could find nothing to say about it.
115. Hazlitt Table-Talk, p. 294.
116. Sainte-Beuve quoted in Saintsbury Loci Critic!, p. 412. D.H.Lawrence
'John Galsworthy' (1928) in Selected Literary Criticism, edited by Anthony
Beal, (London, 1955),, pp. 118-130, (p. 118).
117. Maud Bodkin Archetypal Patterns in Poetry : Psychological Studies
of Imagination (London, 1934), p. 39.
118. Henry James 'Criticism' (1891) in Selected Literary Criticism, pp,
161-171, (pp. 170-71).
119. I.A.Richards Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), second edition,
(London, 1926), p. 223.
120. W.K.Vimsatt and Monroe C.Beardsley 'The Intentional Fallacy' (1946)
in The Verbal Icon : Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Kentucky, 1954),
pp. 20-39, (p. 5). Michael Riffaterre 'Describing Poetic Structures : Two
Approaches to Baudelaire's Les Chats' in Jaques Ehrmann (ed.)
Structuralism (1966), pp. 188-230, (pp. 203-204).
121. Michael Riffaterre 'Describing Poetic Structures', p. 204.
122. Ibid., p. 191.
123. Charles-Pierre Baudelaire 'Further Motes on Edgar Poe' (1857) in
Selected Writings on Art and Artists, pp, 188-208, (p. 206).
124-. Richards Principles, pp. 81-82.
125. Ibid., p. 124.
126. Herbert Read Collected Essays in Literary Criticism (1938), second
edition, (London, 1951), p. 124-25.
127. Giovanni Boccaccio The Life of Dante (1363-1364) translated by
Allan H.Gilbert in Allan H.Gilbert (ed.) Literary Criticism : Plato to
Dryden (Mew York, 1940), pp. 208-211, (pp. 208-210).
128. Frye Anatomy of Criticism, p. 437.
129. Ibid., p. 437.
130. For an example of how reductive this type of criticism can be see
Maud Bodkin's discussion of The Ancient Mariner in Archetypal Patterns in
Poetry, pp. 37-53.
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131. Henry Fielding The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews
(London, 1741), Bk. Ill, Ch. I.
132. I should note here that even if we wish to believe in an afterlife,
those conventional representations of it which the scriptures of various
religions contain are not taken by contemporary theologians as literally
true.
133. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 40, Monday, 16 April 1711.
134. One might go as far as to say that the more relative the criticism
the more interesting it is likely to be to the reader, for the reader
probably already knows what they thought of the work,
135. 'Every Man, besides those general Observations which are to be made
upon an Author, forms several Reflections that are peculiar to his own
manner of Thinking; so that Conversation will naturally furnish us with
Hints which we did not attend to, and make us enjoy other Men's Parts and
Reflections as well as our own.' Joseph Addison Spectator No. 409,
Thursday, 19 June 1712,
136. T.S.Eliot 'The Modern Mind' (1933) in The Use of Poetry and the Use
of Criticism : Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England
(London, 1933), pp. 121-142, (p. 141).
137. Lubbock The Craft of Fiction, p. 1.
138. John Dryden 'The Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic
Licence' (1677) in Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Criticial Essays, edited
by George watson, 2 vols., (London, 1962)pp. 195-207, (p. 203). It is
fitting, then, that this statement should be made in the essay which also
contains the first recorded use of the word 'criticism' as a literary
term. p. 196.
139. Gerard An Essay on Taste (1780), p. 143.
140. Ibid., p. 243.
141. Joseph Addison Spectator No. 291, Saturday, 2 February 1712. Sainte-
Beuve quoted in Saintsbury Loci Critici, pp. 418-18. F.R.Leavis The Common
Pursuit (London, 1952), p. 224.
142. Thus Johnson, in eighteenth century and contemporary vein: 'It
is...the task of criticism to establish principles, to improve opinion into
knowledge, and to distinguish those means of pleasing which depend upon
known causes and rational deduction from the namelesss and inexplicable
elegancies which appeal wholly to the fancy, from which we feel delight
but know not how they produce it, and which may well be termed the
enchantresses of the soul. Criticism reduces those regions of literature
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under the dominion of science which have hitherto known only the anarchy
of ignorance, the caprices of fancy, and the tyranny of prescription.'
Samuel Johnson The Rambler No. 92, Saturday, 2 February, 1751.
143. Gerard An .Essay on Taste (1780), p. 247. Johnson himself seems to
have realized this; 'It is impossible to impress upon our minds an
adequate and just representation of an object so great that we can never
take it into our view or so mutable that it is always changing under our
eye and has already lost its form while we are labouring to conceive it.
Definitions have not been less difficult or uncertain in criticism than in
law. Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty, unsusceptible of
limitations and impatient of restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle
the logician, to perplex the confines of distinction, and burst the
enclosures of regularity. There is therefore scarcely any species of
writing of which we can tell what is its essence and what are its
constituents; every new genius produces some innovation which, when
invented and approved, subverts the rules which the practice of foregoing
authors has established.' Johnson The Rambler No. 125, Tuesday, 28 May,
1751.
144. Thomas De Quincey 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth' (1823)
in The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey, edited by David Masson,
14 vols., (London, 1896-1897), XI (1897), pp. 389-394, (p. 389).
145. Ibid., p. 390. 'To press to the sense of the thing itself with which
one is dealing, not to go off on some collateral issue about the thing, is
the hardest matter in the world. The "thing itself" with which one is
here dealing, - the critical perception of poetic truth, - is of all
things the most volatile, elusive, and evanescent; by pressing too
impetuously after it, one runs the risk of losing it. The critic of poetry
should have the finest tact, the nicest moderation, the most free,
flexible, and elastic spirit imaginable; he should indeed be the "ondoyant
and divers", the undulating and diverse being of Montaigne, The less he
can deal with the object simply and freely, the more things he has to
take into account in dealing with it, - the more, in short, he has to
encumber himself, - so much the greater the force of spirit he needs to
retain his elasticity.' Matthew Arnold On Translating Homer (London,
1862), pp. 116-118.
146. De Quincey 'On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth', pp. 392-93.
14-7. See Alfred North Whitehead Nature and Life (Cambridge, 1934).
148. Wilhelm Dilthey 'The Development of Hermeneutics' (1900) in Selected
Writings, pp. 247-263, (p. 259).
149, Leo Spitzer Linguistics and Literary History (Princeton, 1948), pp.
26-27, 37, n. 10.
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150. Ibid., pp. 26-28.
151. Ibid., p. 13. 'The unity of the work is to be found in the way the
sphere of language has been grammatically constructed. The chief features
of composition are to be found in the way the connections between the
thoughts have been constructed. Technical interpretation attempts to
identify what has moved the author to communicate....[An! author organizes
his thought in his own peculiar way, and this peculiar way is reflected
in the arrangement he chooses. Likewise, an author always has secondary
ideas which are determined by his special character. Thus the
distinctiveness of an author may be recognized by the secondary ideas
that distinguish him from others. To recognize an author in this way is
to recognize him as he has worked with language.1 F.D.E.Schleiermacher
Compendium of 1819 (1819, 1828) in Hermeneutics : The Handwritten
Manuscripts by F.D.E.Schleiermacher, edited by Heinz Kimmerle, (1958),
translation of second edition (1974) by James Duke and Jack Forstman,
(Missoula, 1977).
152. Spitzer Linguistics and Literary History, p. 14.
153. By the same lights we would have to say that our understanding of
every utterance involved 'intuition'. If we do not do so, however, it is
because there are limiting conditions in almost every instance of
communication, and 'limiting conditions' or presuppositions are precisely
what I would not wish to emphasize in the experience of literature - for
this emphasis would be quite as misleading as that which it sought to
combat.
154. Croce Poetry and Literature, p. 142.
155. Thus when Riffaterre describes the work as consisting of
transforms, he appears to be falling either into intentionalism or
literalism, though his notion of 'variations on' is, indeed, only a
corollary of my definition of literature as style. See Michael Riffaterre
'Generating Lautreamont's Text' in Josue V.Harari (ed.) Textual Strategies
: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism (London, 1980), pp. 404-
420.
156. 'A rather dishonest person one day, in a note contained in an
anthology, made a list of some of the images presented to us in the work
of one of our greatest living poets, It read:
"The next day of the caterpillar dressed for the ball "...meaning
"butterfly".
"Breast of crystal...meaning carafe."
Etc.
Mo, indeed, sir, It means nothing of the kind. Put your butterfly back in
your carafe. You may be sure Saint-Pol-Roux said exactly what he meant..'
Andre Breton Introduction to the Discourse on the Paucity of Reality
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(1927), translated by Bravig Imbs In What is Surrealism? Selected
Writings, edited by Franklin Rosemont, (London, 1978), pp, 17-28, (p. 25).
157. Thomas De Quincey 'The Poetry of Pope' (1848) in The Collected
Writings of Thomas De Quincey, XI (1897), pp. 51-97, (pp. 54-56).
158. Ibid., p. 56.
159. Ibid., pp. 56, 88-89.
160. Wordsworth 'The Tables Turned' (1798). For Wordsworth, of course, it
is both Science and Art which are 'barren'.
161. Oscar Wilde 'The Truth of Masks' in Intentions (London, 1891), pp.
221-263, (p. 263).
162. Gadamer Truth and Method, pp. xii-xiii. Roger Scrutan, too, writes
of 'forms of understanding...being derived from man's self-conception'
which possess 'another kind of objectivity, a convergence upon a common
fund of superficial truth, which entitles them to their own claims to
knowledge.'. He calls upon philosophy, in the form of aesthetics, to
protect this 'knowledge', this 'sense of the world' against science;
'Philosophy must repair the rents made by science in the veil of Maya,
through which the winds of nihilism now blow coldly over us,' Roger
Scruton 'Aesthetics' The Times Literary Supplement Friday 5 June 1987, pp.
604, 606-607, (pp. 606-607).
163. C.Chirius Fortunatianus Artis rhetoricae libri tres, I (c. 450 A.D.)
in Joseph M.Milller et al (eds.) Readings in Medieval Rhetoric (London,
1973), pp. 25-32.
164. Croce Poetry and Literature, p. 21.
165. Ibid., p. 62.
166. Gottlieb Baumgarten Reflections on Poetry (1735), translated, with
the original text, by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B.Holther, (Berkeley,
1954), § 115.
167. Ibid., § 116.
168. Ibid., §§ 3, 4, 9, 14, 29.
169. Ibid., § 3.
170. Thought itself is a kind of dialogue; 'It is not himself that the
thinker addresses in the stages of the thought's growth, in their
answerings, but as it were the basic relation in face of which he has to
answer for his insight, or the order in face of which he has to answer
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for the newly arrived conceptual form....Signs happen to us without
respite, living means being addressed, we would need only to present
ourselves and to perceive.' Martin Buber 'Dialogue', pp. 1-39, pp. 26, 10,
171. Edgar Allen Poe 'The Poetic Principle' (1850) in The Complete Works
of Edgar Allen Poe, edited by James A.Harrison, 17 vols., (New York, 1902),
XIV, pp, 266-292, (pp. 281-82). Poe, as we shall see, defined poetic
excellence by example.
172. Matthew Arnold .Essays in Criticism : Second Series (London, 1888),
pp. 20-21.
173. Poe 'The Poetic Principle', p. 290.
174. T.S.Eliot 'Introduction' (1932) to The Use of Poetry and the Use of
Criticism, pp. 13-36, (p. 18).
175. John Middleton Murray 'Metaphor' (1927) in Countries of the Kind :
Second Series (London, 1931), pp, 1-16, (pp. 13-14), 'A great work of
literature does not so much satisfy the reason as bring it to birth
within ourselves....We have been granted a moment of the pure life of
Reason; it is our duty not to degrade it into a function of our ordinary
consciousness, but to seek a way to lift our ordinary consciousness to
the condition we have been privileged to share. It is, after all, not an
alien condition, but our own, because we have been proved capable of it.'
'Reason and Criticism' (1926) in Countries of the Kind : Second Series,
pp. 31-44, (pp. 4-3-44).
176. 'At twilight nature becomes a wonderfully suggestive effect, and it
is not without loveliness, though perhaps its chief use is to illustrate
quotations from the poets.' Oscar Wilde 'The Decay of Lying' in Intentions,
pp. 1-54, (p. 54),
- 459 -
Noi»«s : Ro v in«iH 3. .1 «iit«
Appendix : Formalism
1. Tzvetan Todorov 'Structuralism and Literature' in Seymour Chatman
(ed.) Approaches to Poetics, Selected Papers from the English Institute,
(London, 1973), pp. 153-168, (p. 154).
2. Roland Barthes 'The Structuralist Activity' (1963) in Critical Essays
(1964), translated by Richard Howard, (Evanston, 1972), pp. 213-220, (pp.
214-15). 'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives' (1966) in
Image-Kusic-Text, essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath,
(London, 1977), pp. 79-124, (p. 83),
3. Barthes 'Structural Analysis of Narratives', p. 80.
4. Roman Jakobson and Jurij Tynjanov 'Problems in the Study of language
and Literature' (1928), translated by H.Eagle in Roman Jakobson Selected
Writings III : Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry, edited by Stephen
Rudy, (The Hague, 1981, pp. 3-6, (p. 3).
5. Roman Jakobson 'Two Poems by Pushkin' (1961), translated by Stephen
Rudy in Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time, edited by Krystyna Pomorska
and Stephen Rudy, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 47-58, (p. 51).
6. Roman Jakobson and Stephen Rudy 'Yeats' "Sorrow of Love" through the
years' (1977) in Selected Writings III, pp. 600-638.
7. Jakobson 'Two Poems by Pushkin', p. 57.
8. As Ducasse pointed out, at a time when logical positivism was still
in its infancy; 'To say that something always happens, is not to give any
reason why it ever does...when I say that a certain design is ugly because
against the "law of symmetry", I am not giving a reason why it had to
give me aesthetic displeasure, but only mentioning the fact that it
resembles in a stated respect certain others which as a bare matter of
fact also displease me.'. Curt J.Durcasse The Philosophy of Art (New York,
1929), Ch. 15, § 13. Scientists do not, of course, write papers about their
preferences, though whether such a strict distinction can be merited with
regard to literature is another matter.
9. Roman Jakobson and Claude Levi-Strauss 'Charles Baudelaire's Les
Chats' (1962), translated by Katie Furness-Lane in Michael Lane (ed.)
Structuralism : A Reader (London, 1970), pp. 202-221. This is not
Jakobson's total vision of literature; see, for example, 'On a Generation
that Squandered Its Poets' (1973) in Jakabson Verbal Art, Verbal Sign,
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